Twin pillar tensions
Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia have come to define and drive the wider policies of the GCC states. Tehran has not traditionally considered Riyadh to be a regional threat. Since the revolution, Iran has anticipated its main geostrategic challenges coming from larger powers like the US and Israel. However, this perception might be changing in the current context of regional politics and increased Saudi pressure. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, views Iran and its policies of interference and support for non-state actors as their principal regional challenge. This mismatch of threat perceptions and a structural disparity between the states lies at the heart of tensions between the two.
While Iran and Saudi Arabia have ties that pre-date the latter’s creation in 1932, they did not develop robust bilateral relations. Until 1979, the two countries cooperated as fellow monarchies and under the umbrella of US strategy in the region, however, Iran’s increasing regional assertiveness and differences over oil prices caused the two to diverge.7 After the revolution, tensions grew as Iran began to criticize Saudi Arabia’s pro-Western ties and question its religious legitimacy as the guardian of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. This led to demonstrations by Iranian protesters during the annual Hajj pilgrimage, which, when met with Saudi riot police, resulted in the deaths of worshippers. In 1987, following growing annual clashes at the pilgrimage, the Saudi embassy in Tehran was ransacked, causing Riyadh to break off diplomatic relations in 1988. During any periods of Shia unrest in the eastern province in Saudi Arabia, as occurred in 2011–12, the government has blamed Iran as the cause rather than addressing local economic and political grievances.8 Iran has similarly accused Saudi Arabia of stoking sectarian tensions among its Sunni population and of spreading Salafi ideology. It also believes Saudi Arabia has played a role in the withdrawal of the US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear activities. Moreover, Iranian policymakers see Riyadh’s pursuit of anti-Iranian policies as having been exacted without response or retaliation from Tehran. Time will tell if Iran will alter its threat perception and develop a more robust strategy to counteract Saudi Arabia. Iranian support for the Houthis in Yemen could be the first indication of such a shift.
Saudi Arabia has regularly pressured its smaller GCC neighbours to align with its Iran policy. This has created regional disputes and provided opportunities for Iran to exploit feelings of Saudi bullying among Gulf states.
Saudi Arabia has regularly pressured its smaller GCC neighbours to align with its Iran policy. This has created regional disputes and provided opportunities for Iran to exploit feelings of Saudi bullying among Gulf states. With the exception of Bahrain, whose own position is more aligned with that of Riyadh, GCC states have experienced varying degrees of tension with Saudi Arabia, stemming from rows over oil resources, tribal and political rivalries, border conflicts and Saudi religious soft power. Despite coming together under the umbrella of GCC collective security, the smaller states have been unwilling to subordinate their sovereignty to the Saudi-led effort at greater economic integration. These dynamics have ultimately tempered the strength and effectiveness of the GCC. Due to the unique identity and internal dynamics of each GCC state, Iran has cultivated relationships with them individually rather than with the bloc as a whole.9 This has served Iran well and offered it limited economic and strategic opportunities.