4. External Actors: Russian–Iranian Competition in Syria
In addition to the domestic factors that have eroded its authority, the Syrian state has become hostage to the regime’s external patrons, Iran and Russia. While the state publicly asserts its authority and sovereignty, the need to keep Iran and Russia politically and economically satisfied has depleted Syria’s agency in its external relations with both countries. Iran is working to establish long-term influence in Syria at the grassroots level, while Russia is seeking to reshape Syrian state institutions to guarantee long-lasting loyalty to Moscow. Russia, in particular, has the upper hand in its relationship with Syria: without its intervention since 2015, Assad would not have been able to regain the military ascendancy, even with Iran’s help.
Both Iran and Russia have increasingly visible military and security presences in Syria. In addition to backing several local militias, Iran is using its own IRGC forces and foreign Shia militias to retake rebel-controlled districts. Russian military intervention in support of the Syrian regime was initially limited to air campaigns, directing operations from military bases and engaging on the ground in an advisory capacity. But its role has since expanded to include combat. Russia has deployed (mainly Chechen) soldiers and military police to hold strategic areas, first in Aleppo in 2017 and later in the Eastern Ghouta suburb of Damascus in 2018, and to reshape some Syrian public institutions.66
Russia and Iran have historically extensive ties with Syria, but in both cases the relationship has now evolved into one of patron and client. Russia’s ties stretch back to before the days of Hafez al-Assad. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union helped with the training of the Syrian army. Bilateral relations subsequently deepened during the rule of Hafez al-Assad, with a wide variety of cooperation taking place in the military, educational and economic spheres. Many of Syria’s current army personnel, as well as other public officials, ministers and bureaucrats, were educated and trained in Russia.
Russia’s active military involvement in the current conflict was prompted by the decline in international support for the Assad regime at a time when calls in the West for his departure were mounting. Moscow’s support for Assad evolved from political and non-combat measures – such as vetoing 11 UN Security Council resolutions that would have damaged the regime, and supplying the Syrian army with weapons, warplanes and tanks – to the crucial commencement in 2015 of a large-scale military operation.67 This has bound Syria closely to Moscow’s agenda: while the Assad regime may not always obey Russian orders, it is in no position to roll back Russia’s increasing military influence over the Syrian state.
Hafez al-Assad also strengthened ties with Iran after that country’s Islamic revolution. At the time, bilateral cooperation did not entail Syria sacrificing its control over Iran’s presence, interests and influence in Syria. Decision-making on Syrian affairs remained squarely in Assad’s hands. This was not to be the case after 2011. Bashar al-Assad’s dependence on Iranian support in the conflict meant that Iran grew in influence in Syria. Iran used the promotion of Shiism as a tool to buy loyalty among Syrians from poor areas. This had become visible in the 1980s and 1990s, but intensified in post-2011 Syria. Public expressions of Shia practices, which were limited during the time of Hafez al-Assad, are now prevalent, including in the Sunni Omawi Mosque in Damascus.68
Iran is now focused on building alliances and implanting loyalists in areas that it sees as strategic for its long-term presence in Syria.69 This embedding of Iranian forces and loyal local and regional allies, such as Hezbollah and the Iraqi PMU, extends from the military and economic spheres to religious ones. Iran is now occupying almost every shrine that it claims has a Shia link, and implanting loyalist Shia to reside around each one.70 This is evident in the Old City of Damascus, which, despite the presence of the Sayyida Ruqqayya Shia shrine, is predominantly Sunni. Iran’s increasing influence in the Old City is inflaming sectarian resentment among the Damascus Sunni community.71 Iran is also responsible for the design and implementation of the siege tactics used by pro-regime forces against opposition-held cities and towns in an effort to impose terms of surrender. In a few cases, Sunni populations in such areas have reportedly been forcibly evacuated as part of surrender agreements – effectively enabling a process of demographic change aimed at replacing Sunnis with loyalist Shia.72 As with Russia, the Syrian state is unable to stem Iran’s growing influence.
Although Iran- and Russia-backed forces are helping the Syrian army in its military campaigns, the relationship between the three sides is uneven, with the Syrian army subservient to both its foreign counterparts. This unevenness is reflected, for instance, in the fact that Russia is shaping the Syrian military to suit its own interests. Shortly after its intervention began in 2015, Russia established the Syrian army’s Fourth Corps. The new entity encompassed most of the country’s pro-regime militias, including most NDF units and other Syrian militias like Kataeb al-Baath. Fourth Corps members were paid monthly salaries but retained the right to return to their civil jobs. In time, Russia’s relationship with the army’s Fourth Corps was strained by the latter’s unruly behaviour, which included refusing to abide by international agreements to allow humanitarian aid to enter the then-besieged city of Daraya.
With the Fourth Corps proving to be an unreliable partner,73 Russia’s response was to set up the Fifth Corps. This was an attempt to restructure the Syrian army around personnel who were both reliable and loyal to Russia – and also to roll back some of the influence of militias favoured by Iran. The Fifth Corps included the NDF and other pro-regime militias, as well as former opposition fighters who had been reconciled with the regime.
The Tiger Forces, led by Suheil Hassan, are now the only state-affiliated militia not yet fully integrated into the state military structure. Although Hassan originally came from the security apparatus and joined the army, he has been allowed to recruit fighters from outside the security apparatus and army, and works autonomously but in coordination with the Syrian army. He was involved, in the presence of Bashar al-Assad, in a direct discussion with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin during the latter’s surprise visit to the Hmeimim military base in Tartous in late 2017.
Iran’s military support to Syria operates through a hierarchy that subordinates the Syrian army and its affiliates. NDF members have complained that non-Syrian militias such as Hezbollah are getting favourable treatment.74 The salaries of some NDF fighters were delayed for several months pending presidential approval for the release of funds, while members of non-Syrian militias were getting higher salaries directly from Iran. This has driven even some non-Shia Syrians to seek to join predominantly Shia militias (such as the Syrian branch of Hezbollah). In addition, many prisoner-exchange deals have prioritized the release of non-Syrian militiamen held by the opposition.75
The dynamics outlined above show that while Iran and Russia differ in their methods of influence in Syria, the end result in both cases is the hollowing out of the Syrian state. Iran’s long-term strategy for influence in Syria is built on creating bottom-up support and institutions parallel to those of the state, as well as on infiltrating the state. In this way, the weakening of state institutions can be used to justify the need for Iranian-supported ones. Conversely, Russia’s strategy in Syria is built on keeping state institutions strong but loyal to it, even if this means reshaping those institutions.
Russia and Iran have an alliance of convenience in Syria that is driven both by their interests and by developments on the ground, at the expense of Syria’s sovereignty. Both Russia and Iran see in Syria a platform for a strategic long-term presence in the Levant. But despite being pragmatic allies, these two patrons are also rivals for resources and power inside Syria. This is manifest in, among other things, their contestation of geographical control. In 2017, Iran attempted to persuade the Syrian government to grant it land around Damascus Airport, extending to the Shia shrine of Sayyida Zeinab in Damascus, using agricultural development as a pretext. Having a permanent presence in that region would give Iran a strategic advantage as well as safeguard its interests by facilitating the transport of weapons and fighters from Hezbollah and other Iran-backed militias across the Syria–Lebanon border. However, Russia objected to this request. It pushed the Syrian government instead to grant Iran land near Raqqa, in the north-east of the country, in the hope of preventing Iranian consolidation of power in strategic areas.76
Russia’s growing military influence in Syria is creating competition with Iran on the ground. Syrian army movements are tactically exploited by Russia to demonstrate to Iran that Russia has the upper hand. In the south-west of the country, along the Israeli border, Russia is seeking – in agreement with Israel – to contain the Iranian presence by using its own troops in the area. These troops, along with Syrian army soldiers, retake territory from rebel groups. But the Russian presence ensures that Iran-backed armed groups, which have aided in the fight against the rebels, are denied a long-term role in recaptured towns and districts.77
In other examples, Iran had its sights on taking control of Daraya after its militias drove the town’s residents out. It planned to expand the Sayyida Sukayna shrine there to create a religious hub, and also to build a highway extending through Deraa to the Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Damascus. But Russia, concerned that Iran might take advantage of the inhabitant vacuum in Daraya, derailed the plan and is now pressuring the Damascus governorate to work for the return of the town’s original residents. Earlier, during the battle to retake eastern Aleppo in 2016, Russia conducted air raids on the towns of Foua and Kefraya, both strategic locations for Iran, in order to force Iran-sponsored militias to lift their blockade of the evacuation of Aleppo. Later, in 2017, according to witnesses, Hezbollah fighters prevented Russian soldiers from entering Wadi Barada during the siege of that town.78
The sidelining of the Syrian state is also seen in the competition between Iran and Russia to cultivate support in Syrian communities. Iran’s religious influence in Syria has become more evident than before. It is imposing conservative religious practices and rules even in areas where neither the Sunni community nor Alawites loyal to the regime would welcome such customs.79 Russia is taking advantage of the tensions this creates, presenting itself as more considerate of local circumstances and preferences. In particular, Moscow is pandering to Sunni resentment in an attempt to limit Iranian control. For example, it has installed (Sunni) Chechen military police to provide security in areas recently brought back under government control. Iran is trying to counter such efforts by appealing directly to Sunni regime loyalists, rather than by trying to reach them through Syrian state institutions.
A further complication for the Syrian regime is that it lacks the capacity to fully deliver on economic promises to its external patrons. Although both Russia and Iran have signed economic contracts with the Syrian government, Russia is putting pressure on the Syrian government to secure preferential treatment. In October 2017, a Russian business publication, RVB, quoted a Syrian government official as saying that a contract for phosphate mining ‘was really going to be given to Iran, but in the end the choice was in favour of Russia’.80 Two months later, following reports of Iranian interest in signing energy deals with the Syrian government, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said after a meeting with President Assad in Damascus that Russia had ‘a moral right to expect financial returns from its efforts to liberate Syria from terrorists’, adding that ‘the Syrian authorities want to work with Russia, and Russia alone, to re-establish all of the country’s energy capacities’.81
It is Russia – not the Syrian state – that is exhibiting the ability to wield power over profiteers associated with the regime.
Two factors aid Russia’s increasing influence over the Syrian state. First, Russia has come to be regarded as something of a lesser evil by the opposition, thanks to its (limited) efforts to win local hearts and minds. In Eastern Ghouta, although Russian forces were partially responsible for the heavy bombardment of the area and the displacement of its residents, they also provided safe passage to those who surrendered; in some areas, Russian troops prevented Syrian pro-regime forces from looting. Russian military police were deployed to Douma to maintain order, presenting themselves as professionals who could protect residents and prevent violence and other transgressions by the Syrian army and Iran-backed pro-regime militias. Russian military police were publicly seen punishing Syrian soldiers and militiamen who had engaged in looting in a southern suburb of Damascus, following its capture by pro-regime forces.
Russia is stretching its power beyond the military sphere. It is now working to enforce order in Syria, turning its back on powerful warlords whom it once supported on the battlefield. Ayman Jaber was one of the first names to be targeted, with Russian forces confiscating his property and dismantling his private militia.82 As such, it is Russia – not the Syrian state – that is exhibiting the ability to wield power over profiteers associated with the regime. In the security sphere, Russia regards the General Intelligence Directorate as its most trusted branch of the security apparatus in Syria, and also works closely with the Military Intelligence Directorate and Military Police.
Second, Russia is the more important actor internationally. While both Iran and Russia are pursuing their own interests in Syria, often employing brutal military tactics, Russia is also presenting itself as the future broker of Syria’s peace at the international level. Here, it should be noted that the Russian definition of ‘peace’ differs from the internationally recognized one. For example, the regime’s provision of basic services to the population favours loyalist areas and often punishes areas recaptured from the opposition. This approach has Russia’s blessing. Above all, what is notable in Syria today is how the much the agency of the Syrian state in general – even given the effects of its discriminatory tactics – has been reduced in discussions about reaching peace.
66 Hauer, N. (2017), ‘A War Within a War: Chechnya’s Expanding Role in Syria’, News Deeply, 30 November 2017, https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/articles/2017/11/30/a-war-within-a-war-chechnyas-expanding-role-in-syria (accessed 30 Jul. 2018).
67 Sinjab, L. (2015), ‘Syria conflict: The close ties behind Russia’s intervention’, BBC News, 5 October 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34422209 (accessed 30 Jul. 2018).
68 Field trip to Damascus, spring 2017.
69 Al-Khalidi, S. (2017), ‘Syrian, Iranian-backed forces advance in border area near Israel’, Reuters, 25 December 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-israel/syrian-iranian-backed-forces-advance-in-border-area-near-israel-idUSKBN1EJ024 (accessed 6 Sep. 2018).
70 See, for example, Al-Quds Al-Arabi (2013), مقام الصحابي عمار بن ياسر في الرقة: في صراع الطوائف والطائفية [The shrine of Ammar bin Yasser in Raqqa: In the battle of sects and sectarianism], 12 August 2013, http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=72519 (accessed 6 Sep. 2018).
71 Interviews with residents in Damascus, April 2017. See also The Syria Report (2018), ‘Iran, Russia Also Pushing for Influence in Syrian Education Sector’, 23 January 2018, http://www.syria-report.com/news/education/iran-russia-also-pushing-influence-syrian-education-sector (accessed 31 Jul. 2018).
72 Chulov, M. (2017), ‘Iran repopulates Syria with Shia Muslims to help tighten regime’s control’, Guardian, 14 January 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/13/irans-syria-project-pushing-population-shifts-to-increase-influence (accessed 30 Jul. 2018).
73 Telephone interview with military expert in Damascus, September 2018.
74 Interviews with NDF members, Damascus, May 2018.
75 Interviews with NDF members, Damascus, May 2018.
76 Interviews with military personnel in Damascus, June 2018.
77 Bassam, L. and Perry, T. (2018), ‘Exclusive: In Syria, a Russian move causes friction with Iran-backed forces – officials’, Reuters, 5 June 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-deploymen/exclusive-in-syria-a-russian-move-causes-friction-with-iran-backed-forces-officials-idUSKCN1J125S (accessed 30 Jul. 2018).
78 Sinjab, L. (2018), ‘Russia and Iran are increasingly competitive in Syria’, Chatham House, February 2018, https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/russia-and-iran-are-increasingly-competitive-in-syria (accessed 30 Jul. 2018).
79 Ibid.
80 The Syria Report (2017), ‘Phosphate Exports Restart but Low Prices, Russian Stake, Will Limit Revenues’, 24 October 2017, http://www.syria-report.com/news/oil-gas-mining/phosphate-exports-restart-low-prices-russian-stake-will-limit-revenues (accessed 30 Jul. 2018).
81 The Syria Report (2017), ‘Russia Lays Claims Over Syria’s Energy Resources’, 19 December 2017, http://www.syria-report.com/news/economy/russia-lays-claims-over-syria%E2%80%99s-energy-resources (accessed 30 Jul. 2018).
82 Interviews with businessman in Damascus, July 2018.