5. The Future Trajectory of the Transactional State
Although the Syrian state and its institutions have been depleted both economically and in terms of human resources over the past seven years, they have not collapsed. The state has malfunctioned, but it has managed to maintain ties with public institutions even in places such as Raqqa and Deir Ezzor while these were under the control of ISIS, as well as in Kurdish-controlled areas. The regime has maintained a pragmatic relationship with the Kurds in the north-east, tolerating their efforts to establish a self-governed region without indicating that this tolerance would extend to recognition by the Syrian state.83
This resilience stands in sharp contrast to assessments of Syria as a fragile state. Steven Heydemann argues that Syria is instead a ‘fierce state’, where governance ‘is managed as an expression of a zero-sum existential struggle in which conflict reinforces the determination of a ruling elite to defend existing institutional arrangements by force’.84
This paper has shown that Syria’s case is even more complicated. State institutional arrangements may have survived, and transactionalism may have been a feature of the Syrian state throughout both Assad eras, but the way in which the state wields power has changed. This has implications for the state’s power to ensure stability, even if the regime wins the war militarily. In particular, while the army and the security apparatus are delivering limited essential services, the restoration of such services has not occurred on the national scale the regime claims. Transactionalism and a lack of agency have undermined the shadow state.
The organized chaos created by the regime has spread. It is not certain that the state will be able to control the country under any future post-settlement scenario while the current regime remains in place, given that its agency has been compromised and that it has come to rely on transactional relationships to exert power.
Several factors will impede state agency in the long run. The first is the presence of thousands of foreign militiamen, brought into the country by Iran. It is unlikely that these fighters will readily leave. Many are now entrenched in Syria, having taken over property and settled their families there.85 Just as Hezbollah managed to maintain its special status in Lebanon after the withdrawal of Israel in 2000, Iraqi, Iranian and Lebanese militiamen in particular are likely to remain in Syria once the war is over for as long as the current regime is in power.
If the post-2003 Iraq experience is viewed as a comparative model, guerrilla warfare tactics – though often publicly blamed on Sunni jihadists – are often used by Iran if it feels pressured. With such pressure mounting in Washington as well as in Tel Aviv, efforts to contain Iran may push it to use its proxies in Syria to foment instability.
Moreover, the recent agreement between Israel and Russia over securing Israel’s border with Syria and clearing it of any Iranian militias – as well as the Israeli–Russian coordination over airstrikes in Syria – does not mean that Moscow is in a position to limit Iran’s power and influence on the ground. The Assad regime is also incapable of restraining Iran. Iran considers Assad a client and will not tolerate regime attempts to contain it.86
The second factor impeding Syrian state power is Iran’s agenda of cultivating grassroots support. Iran has been working to boost such influence since the 1980s, and has used social networks and institutions as well as its main cultural centre in Damascus to implement projects aimed at buying the loyalty of the populace. Iran’s involvement in creating Syrian militias, as well as its establishment of civil initiatives, shows that its model of influence in Syria relies not only on installing institutions parallel to the state but also on infiltrating the state.
In this regard, Iran’s militias and many of its non-military institutions in Syria have state legitimacy akin to that granted to Hezbollah in Lebanon and to the PMU in Iraq. This paves the way for their long-term presence. With NDF fighters the recipients of higher salaries and more privileges than their counterparts in the Syrian army, it is difficult to envisage the former agreeing to integrate into the regular forces once the conflict ends. The regime is also facing a degree of local resentment from loyalists uncomfortable with Iran’s grassroots efforts to promote a religious and cultural agenda that many Syrians – Alawites included – see as alien to Syrian society.87
The future Syrian state will likely become more dependent on Iran-, China- and Russia-supplied specialist workers in fields such as architecture, medicine and service delivery.
A third factor affecting Syrian state power is the extent of Iranian and Russian economic influence in the country. Iran transferred US$3.6 billion to the Syrian government in connection with the war in 2013, and US$1 billion in 2015.88 It has set up business institutions and companies acting on its behalf, to allow it to maintain a long-lasting presence in Syria. Russia, meanwhile, is looking to benefit from Syria’s reconstruction. The Russian government is inviting Russian businessmen and companies to strike deals with the Syrian government. The war has also meant that Syria suffers from a significant shortage of skilled labour,89 posing a challenge for post-war redevelopment.90 The future Syrian state will therefore likely become more dependent on Iran-, China- and Russia-supplied specialist workers in fields such as architecture, medicine and service delivery.
A fourth factor is Iran’s work to secure its long-term influence geographically and demographically. While the majority of the Syrian population is Sunni, Hafez al-Assad managed to construct a system in which minority Alawites controlled the country. In the 1980s, he brought Alawites from the mountains and installed them in slums in the Mount Qassioun area surrounding Damascus, including in Eish Al-Warwar, Jabal Al-Riz and Mezzeh 86. Many of the inhabitants of these areas are now members of the security apparatus and the NDF, and they were pivotal in the crackdown on the mostly Sunni opposition.
Iran is now applying a similar model by implanting Shia newcomers from elsewhere in the region (namely from Lebanon and Iraq) in sensitive areas in Damascus. Many such arrivals have been granted Syrian citizenship.91 Their numbers are small, but their strategic location would facilitate efforts to control the capital were political and economic conditions to turn against them – this is similar to the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon, where the group’s strategic buying of property all over the country aided its rapid takeover of Beirut in May 2008.
Although Iran does not enjoy the same large Shia constituency in Syria that it has in Lebanon or Iraq, it does not need many fighters or loyalists to maintain its influence. In Iraq and Lebanon, it created political alliances with Sunnis and Christians. The pro-Iran political coalitions in Iraq and Lebanon, which can block any national deal they disapprove of, are a strong reminder of how Iran is capable of destabilizing Syria’s future regardless of Bashar al-Assad’s agenda.
Iran’s influence in Syria can be minimized, but it is difficult to foresee its eradication. As demonstrated in Lebanon and Iraq, Iran plays the long game. Its strategies are conceived in terms of generation-long timelines. This means that Syrian sovereignty is likely to continue to be compromised for the foreseeable future.
The post-war Syrian state will also need to accommodate the growing ambitions of profiteers. Pro-regime militias are unlikely to limit their role to military and security matters in the future. In Iraq, the PMU evolved from militias to political actors that openly contest parliamentary elections (indeed, they came second in the last national election, in 2018). Before that, Lebanese Hezbollah had also transformed itself from a militia into the strongest political party in Lebanon today. The difference in both Iraq and Lebanon was that the rise of pro-Iran paramilitary groups did not happen in the context of an existing authoritarian regime, as has been the case in Syria. However, the weakening of the regime’s hold over the country may allow the rise of new political actors that will make increasing demands of the state. Regime profiteers from the business community also have the potential to evolve into political actors, further blurring the line between political and economic elites and exacerbating the wealth gap.
The lucrative nature of the conflict ensures that some warlords – from both militia and non-militia backgrounds – have a stake in maintaining instability. In this, their interests coincide with those of the country’s much-depleted rebel groups, the remnants of which will not cease fighting even assuming the regime wins the war militarily. Their reasons for revolt and revenge have intensified after more than seven years of conflict. As a result, even if a settlement to the conflict is achieved, Syria is likely to suffer waves of insurgency attacks similar to those in Iraq after 2003. Meanwhile, the brutality of the regime will continue, creating a new cycle of grievances that are not exactly optimal for long-term peace and stability.
Russia is anticipating these challenges. It continues to seek to install new institutions and/or reshape existing ones by appointing personnel whom it sees as capable and reliable (as it did with the creation of the Fifth Corps). This indicates that it envisages having a long-term influence in Syria, whether in terms of a military presence or through diplomatic and economic means. Russia is trying to assert its dominance in order to present itself as the agenda-setter in the country, and to show the world that it is able to get the Syrian state back on its feet (though any ‘rehabilitation’ would naturally be on Moscow’s terms). The irony is that Russia, though partly responsible for the war and destruction in Syria, is positioning itself as the party best able to impose stability and restore order. However, Iran may block the realization of this agenda.
In short, a combination of factors – including the Syrian state’s lack of agency; the suboptimal situation on the ground; Iran’s potential to act as a spoiler vis-à-vis Russia’s stabilization plans; rising international pressure on Iran; and popular resentment of Iran among Syria’s Sunnis and Alawites – means that Syria is likely to enter a lengthy period of precarious post-conflict equilibrium in which all pro-regime stakeholders coexist uncomfortably.
83 The Economist (2018), ‘Can Syria’s Kurds keep control of their territory?’, 25 January 2018, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/01/25/can-syrias-kurds-keep-control-of-their-territory (accessed 6 Sep. 2018).
84 Heydemann (2018), Beyond Fragility: Syria and the Challenge of Reconstruction in Fierce States, p. 2.
85 Examples are the Fatimiyoun and Zeinabiyoun.
86 During the third Mediterranean conference in Rome, Iran’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif, said ‘we are going nowhere’ when asked if Iranian troops were going to leave Syria. ‘The aim of the US administration is to get Iran out of Syria,’ Zarif said. ‘The US and Russia cannot decide for Iran. We are there at the request of the Syrian government. It’s our region; it’s the Persian Gulf not the Gulf of Mexico. We are going nowhere. We are in the region. We will never leave. We cannot leave our home.’
87 The Syria Report (2018), ‘Iran, Russia Also Pushing for Influence in Syrian Education Sector’, 23 January 2018, http://www.syria-report.com/news/education/iran-russia-also-pushing-influence-syrian-education-sector (accessed 31 Jul. 2018).
88 Westall, S. and Al-Khalidi, S. (2015), ‘Syria ratifies fresh $1 billion credit line from Iran’, Reuters, 8 July 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-iran-idUSKCN0PI1RD20150708 (accessed 6 Sep. 2018).
89 Synaps (2018), ‘Picking Up the Pieces: How Syrian Society Has Changed’, http://www.synaps.network/picking-up-the-pieces (accessed 6 Sep. 2018).
90 Figures from 2017 estimate that there has been a 30 per cent permanent loss of human capital stock since 2010. See World Bank Group (2017), The Toll of War: The Economic and Social Consequences of the Conflict in Syria, 10 July 2017, p. 53, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/syria/publication/the-toll-of-war-the-economic-and-social-consequences-of-the-conflict-in-syria (accessed 6 Sep. 2018).
91 Martin Chulov reported in January 2017 that ‘in Darayya, south-west of Damascus, more than 300 Iraqi Shia families moved into neighbourhoods abandoned by rebels last August [2016] as part of a surrender deal’. See Chulov, M. (2017), ‘Iran repopulates Syria with Shia Muslims to help tighten regime’s control’, Guardian, 14 January 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/13/irans-syria-project-pushing-population-shifts-to-increase-influence (accessed 6 Sep. 2018).