6. Conclusion and Recommendations
The state security apparatus still rules Syria with an iron fist, but the regime no longer exercises control of the country as it once did. It lacks both the resources and the legitimacy to provide peace and stability. The conflict has created new informal economic and security networks, which are eroding Syria’s security. Rampant corruption among these networks is also transforming Syria from a ‘shadow’ state into a ‘transactional’ state. This makes it unrealistic to expect the regime to be an economic and security partner for the international community.
The regime’s external patrons, Iran and Russia, seek long-term influence in the country. Although they cooperate in some respects, their increasing competition over power is further eroding Syria’s sovereignty. None of this bodes well for the prospect of refugees returning to Syria. Nor does it suggest that the country is likely to return to the pre-2011 status quo of rule by a shadow state. Syria today is neither a sovereign state nor a civil state, but a mafia-like dictatorship ruled under a Russian mandate and influenced by Iran.
The crisis is not contained within Syria’s borders. Just as the Syrian war has affected Europe in particular, and the West in general, the instability and insecurity created by the cocktail of problems highlighted in this paper will create further challenges for the international community.
What the West can do now: recommendations
As things stand in Syria, the implementation of any stabilization plan will be on Russian terms. Russia is increasing the scope of its influence despite Iranian pushback. The US’s de facto inaction on Syria has paved the way for Russia to effectively ‘own’ the Syrian conflict – in the sense of determining its intensity and trajectory. Only the US can change this formula and prevent Russia from controlling outcomes in post-conflict Syria. Under the current circumstances, there are no incentives for Russia to change its Syria strategy. Washington needs to engage Moscow diplomatically as a partner; otherwise, the US will be handing control of Syria and the Levant wholesale to Russia, and permitting the implementation of Russia’s problematic version of ‘peace’. The US must counterbalance Russia and not let a unilateral power set the agenda in Syria.
The administration of President Donald Trump is determined to combat Iran’s influence in the Middle East. However, Iran’s involvement in Syria cannot be fought through military might. Economic sanctions and diplomacy, in liaison with Russia, could offer more traction. Such efforts could push some of the non-Syrian, Iran-supported militias out of Syria, although this will still not end Iran’s presence in the country. At the same time, the increasing resentment among local communities – whether loyalist or opposition – towards Iran’s grassroots attempts to change Syria’s identity could be an important factor in combating Iranian influence.
It is worth noting that even among loyalists, many people merely tolerate the regime rather than support it wholeheartedly. Recognizing the difference between the regime and the state is crucial in this regard. The regime has actively worked to blur the line between the state and itself. The US and its allies need to devise strategies to counter this tactic.
One component of such a strategy must be the issue of refugee return. Russia is pressing for the return of refugees, but proactively suppressing matters of accountability. For example, Moscow ordered the regime to release files on detainees who have died during imprisonment, so that the matter can be closed and not come up in future negotiations over peace. However, there is no guarantee that there will not be new detainees from those already inside Syria or from returnees. The West needs to acknowledge that refugees cannot return to Syria under the current circumstances when they have no rights or security, would be at risk of revenge attacks by local communities, and would face dire living conditions. Western countries need to insist that international human rights law applies in any negotiation with Russia over refugees, and that such law applies not just to returnees but also to those who have stayed inside Syria.
Another component is reconstruction and stabilization, also promoted by Russia because it stands to benefit from these processes. Amid further military gains by the Syrian regime – and despite public declarations by the EU, Western countries and international entities that there cannot be reconstruction in Syria without a political process taking place first – debate is ongoing about the possibility of stabilization as a short-term step. Yet any debate on stabilization or ‘resilience’ must take into consideration the pitfalls of engagement in the absence of plans for brokering and implementing a political deal. Such a deal is an essential component for any process of elite bargaining via which the West may wish to engage in the Syrian context.
Any engagement with Russia about reconstruction or stabilization should be conditional on a political deal and a transparent process – with international monitoring to prevent the empowerment of militias and warlords, and to ensure that goods and services reach communities in need. Even supporting infrastructure in Syria – currently the focus of work by the UN and others – has a political price. There must be transparency about procurement and the choice of local implementing bodies for any reconstruction projects, including those relating to the delivery of services such as electricity and water. There must be conditionality in all projects meant to help the Syrian community, with an insistence that projects are implemented in former opposition areas as well as loyalist ones. Otherwise, stabilization projects will end up empowering the regime (and those connected to it) at the expense of the community at large. Western engagement with communities in former rebel-held areas is important because the regime is exhibiting signs of wanting to punish these areas by keeping displaced residents out and limiting the provision of essential services. This engagement should not be done in a way that gives the regime control over the distribution of provisions. Any projects on community resilience, including in areas retaken from rebels, must be alert to the risk of the regime closing the space for independent NGOs to operate and discriminating in favour of loyalist NGOs.
All this emphasizes the necessity of reviving the Geneva process, with the US taking the lead on reactivating it. UN Resolution 2254 must be the first step towards stabilization in Syria, not the final or interim step. Once a political settlement is reached, Syria can then work on tackling endemic corruption in its security institutions; on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) for armed groups outside the regular army; on paths to settle the status of current members of pro-regime militias; on measures to counter the phenomenon of warlordism; and on transitional justice in respect of war crimes. All these are issues that, if not addressed transparently as part of the peace process, will continue to weaken the Syrian state’s ability to exercise power.