4. Security Cooperation: Training, Advice and Weapons Sales
The Pentagon defines security cooperation as, ‘interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations.’80 Until recently, it was unknown how many of these programmes existed. A 2013 RAND Corporation study estimated that the US government was engaged in 165 security cooperation programmes directed by 184 separate legislative authorities.81 A separate 2017 Government Accountability Office investigation determined that there are 194 security cooperation programmes.82
US security cooperation programmes provide support for military operations conducted by allies and partners in the region. These routine activities range from educating and training regional military officers on basic tactics, techniques and procedures, to serving as a co-combatant in Middle East wars by providing the essential support to allow regional militaries to conduct and sustain high-intensity combat operations.83 These security cooperation programmes demonstrate the breadth of capacity-building and partnership-enhancing activities that are undertaken all the time. In the absence of such programmes and the clear benefit that they provide to regional governments, US military access to these territories would be severely constrained.
For 2017 over 75,000 students from 154 countries participated in some training activities… including training in tactical combat skills, English-language instruction, civil–military relations, maritime security, and the law of armed conflict and human right.
Over several decades, these programmes include extensive US military training programmes with Middle East countries. The State Department publishes a congressionally-mandated report every two years detailing the ongoing and planned training for foreign militaries. This includes training in tactical combat skills, English-language instruction, civil–military relations, maritime security, and the law of armed conflict and human rights. For 2017, the last year for which there are comprehensive data, over 75,000 students from 154 countries participated in some training activities.84 For the Middle East countries covered in this paper, the 9,007 officers shown in Figure 3 received US military training.
Figure 3: Numbers of officers receiving US training, 2017
— Source: US State Department and US Department of Defense (2018), Foreign Military Training Report: Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017, Joint Report to Congress, Volume 1, 2018.
Figure 3: Numbers of officers receiving US training, 2017
In addition to these military-to-military training and education programmes, the US provides a range of further security cooperation support for Middle East militaries that conduct their own combat operations. For example, successive administrations have provided extensive operational support to Israel during several of its recent military campaigns. Such as when, five days into its 34-day war against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006, the Israeli Air Force ran out of precision-guided munitions, the Bush administration approved an expedited resupply of those bombs, as well as 5,000-pound bunker buster bombs, anti-armour missiles and jet fuel.85 In a further example, since 2007, the US and Turkey have cooperated in the city of Ankara, which processes US-supplied overhead surveillance and intelligence analysis that is used for Turkish airstrikes against forces associated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – a State Department-designated foreign terrorist organization – located in northern Iraq. Similarly, at Al Dhafra Air Base, US and Emirati military personnel staff a joint planning cell where the US shares targeting and intelligence information that the UAE uses in bombing operations against ISIS.86
The decisions by the Obama and Trump administrations, since March 2015, to back Saudi-led bombing campaigns against suspected Houthi fighters in Yemen have been far more consequential. This support has included in-air refuelling, combat search and rescue for downed pilots, and intelligence analysis (including at one time up to 45 analysts) to assist in the development and refinement of targets. Moreover, US defence contractors provide much of the training, advice and logistical assistance that allows the Royal Saudi air, naval and land forces to operate. One representative example is S&K Aerospace, which, in September 2017, was awarded a six-year contract worth $560 million to provide logistical support for the Saudi Air Force fleet of F-15Es, the workhorse of the kingdom’s strikes in Yemen.87 The bombing campaign in Yemen has been unusual for contemporary conflicts employing advanced weaponry for its relatively indiscriminate nature and high numbers of civilian casualties.88
Finally, the most expensive, lethal and politically consequential component of US security cooperation with the Middle East is exports of weapons and munitions. US arms export policy has remained consistent over the past three decades and can essentially be defined as: support the defence of allies and partners; enhance regional security; assure the interoperability between the US military and partners; and provide high-paying jobs for American workers – US aerospace and defence exports support more than 1.4 million jobs.89 In April 2018, the Trump administration announced a series of executive orders and initiatives to streamline the interagency review process, push weapons sales and actively promote the sale of armed drones (overturning an Obama administration policy).90 President Trump also reversed Obama’s suspension of attack aircraft sales to Bahrain and sales of precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia. Subsequently, the first year of Trump’s presidency saw an 8 per cent year-on-year increase in the total value of US weapons sold worldwide in 2017 – rising from $76 billion to $82 billion – with the Middle East once again the top regional recipient.91
There are several reliable data sources for tracking weapons sales, including from non-profits, such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), in addition to government sources such as the State Department and the Congressional Research Service.92 Though their estimates differ slightly, by every measure imaginable, for the past two decades the US has been the largest weapons exporter to the Middle East and the wider world. Indeed, for the period between 2013 and 2017, 49 per cent of all global US weapons exports by value were shipped to Middle East countries.93 In 2017, the US sold $52 billion worth of weapons to the region, far ahead of suppliers in Western Europe, Russia or China.94 The majority of those sales went to Saudi Arabia, a country that has ramped up its defence spending over the past decade – even surpassing Russia to be the third highest global defence spender in 2016. From 2000–09, the US agreed to $17.3 billion in weapons sales to Saudi Arabia. Since the start of 2010, sales to Saudi Arabia have reached $136 billion.95
Table 1: Military sales over time – US weapons exports to Middle East (in millions)
|
Country |
2008 |
2009 |
2010 |
2011 |
2012 |
2013 |
2014 |
2015 |
2016 |
2017 |
|
Bahrain |
2 |
– |
68 |
– |
– |
60 |
– |
15 |
– |
4 |
|
Iraq |
281 |
311 |
343 |
397 |
340 |
255 |
285 |
791 |
898 |
506 |
|
Israel |
663 |
134 |
41 |
59 |
107 |
65 |
121 |
252 |
529 |
515 |
|
Jordan |
32 |
15 |
6 |
24 |
38 |
39 |
53 |
58 |
81 |
127 |
|
Kuwait |
– |
1 |
37 |
36 |
22 |
52 |
681 |
311 |
165 |
55 |
|
Lebanon |
– |
16 |
10 |
– |
31 |
21 |
5 |
36 |
27 |
56 |
|
Oman |
71 |
2 |
2 |
– |
38 |
35 |
468 |
– |
127 |
87 |
|
Qatar |
– |
280 |
– |
150 |
280 |
– |
– |
385 |
595 |
496 |
|
Saudi Arabia |
248 |
244 |
358 |
397 |
394 |
607 |
1,411 |
1,759 |
1,796 |
3,425 |
|
Syria rebels* |
– |
– |
– |
– |
– |
– |
– |
– |
– |
1 |
|
Turkey |
49 |
21 |
11 |
333 |
1,009 |
363 |
1,109 |
320 |
201 |
94 |
|
UAE |
677 |
394 |
153 |
863 |
923 |
1,063 |
542 |
814 |
779 |
499 |
|
Yemen |
5 |
– |
– |
12 |
– |
4 |
– |
11 |
– |
– |
|
Iran |
– |
– |
– |
– |
– |
– |
– |
– |
– |
– |
|
Total |
2,028 |
1,418 |
1,029 |
2,271 |
3,182 |
2,564 |
4,675 |
4,752 |
5,198 |
5,865 |
* No data for Syria.
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2017), SIPRI Yearbook 2017: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2017 (accessed 23 Aug. 2018); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2017), SIPRI Importer/Exporter TIV Tables, https://sipri.org/databases/armstransfers (accessed 11 Sep. 2018).
US weapons exports to the region are not simply the various physical weapons platforms or bombs. The exports include sustained military-to-military relationships over the entire life cycle of those weapons, such as training and simulations at test ranges in the US or in the region, upgrades of avionics and sensors, logistical support, joint exercises with US pilots, and intelligence and targeting support when those weapons are used in combat. Regional militaries buy US weapons not simply to integrate them into their own armed forces, but also for the much closer political and military relationship that comes with them. In turn, the US sells these weapons to earn money and support high-paying jobs, but also to promote interoperability between US and regional armed forces, and to sustain close relations with Middle East governments that support US military access.
Informal US–Middle East security cooperation programmes
The revolving door between military service and the defence industry has become well-established in recent years.96 In 2004–08, 80 per cent of retired three and four-star generals took jobs with defence contractors or consultancies.97 Over the next three years, some 70 per cent of retired general officers took such jobs.98 Many of these positions are with military contracting firms that provide training and advice for Middle East military and security services, or directly for those services. Most of these retired generals were deployed to the region during their active-duty careers, developed relations through shared professional military education (PME) courses or military-to-military engagements, and commanded US forces in the region. The applicable federal laws and Pentagon directives are remarkably permissive in the freedom allowed to retired officers to serve regional militaries as advisers or even as officers.
In an interview with the author, a chief executive officer of a northern Virginia-based contracting firm that places retired officers into advisory and formal officer roles with Persian Gulf militaries noted, ‘[Gulf military] officers pass through the PME schools in the United States, and they’ve all worked alongside our guys at some point in the past 15 years. There is already a shared doctrine, vernacular, and relationships, so naturally they’re looking for trusted and familiar faces. We broker that connection, making certain we obey all applicable American and Gulf state laws.’ This executive also freely admitted that if the retired officers did not agree with the status quo policy or advance the Gulf government’s interests with their active-duty peers, they would not be hired in the first place.99
One prominent exemplar of this phenomenon is former Marine General James Mattis, who retired as the commander of CENTCOM in 2013. Six months after stepping down, he joined the board of directors of General Dynamics (a prominent manufacturer of command and control and intelligence networks, land-attack missiles and land warfare support systems), where he served until January 2017. While at General Dynamics, from 4 June 2015 until 6 August 2016, he was also an unpaid military adviser to the UAE.100 According to one UAE official, Mattis visited the country from time to time to provide advice, adding, ‘He was and still is a trusted friend and he would come over to maintain the relationship.’101 At present, James Mattis is the US secretary of defense and his relations in the region are considered an asset for performing this role.
Other notable cases of retired general officers serving in such roles include retired General James Jones, former commandant of the Marine Corps and later Obama’s national security adviser. In 2015, he was paid to speak on behalf of Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK), which is an anti-Iranian regime dissident group that the US previously designated as a foreign terrorist organization. At the same time, he also worked at Ironhand Security LLC with the Saudi Ministry of Defence.102 Former CENTCOM General commander Anthony Zinni has similarly been paid to speak on behalf of the MEK, while also serving in executive positions with DynCorp and BAE Systems.103 In addition, retired Major General Thomas Moore, Jr was the chief of staff and deputy commander of CENTCOM in 2008, and later a senior consultant for Stark Aerospace Business Development based in Israel.104
Beyond prominent former generals and admirals, an unknown number of retired officers work directly for regional militaries and security agencies. Moreover, many military education and research institutions developed by Gulf and Middle East countries are led, staffed and/or run by retired US military officers. Stephen Toumajan, who retired from the US Army as a lieutenant colonel in 2007, is a relevant example of this phenomenon. Soon after leaving the Army, Toumajan began advising the UAE, and was appointed to the rank of a two-star general within the UAE military itself.105 As an Emirati government website proclaims, ‘H. E. Major General Staff Pilot Stephen Toumajan is the Commander and Senior Aviation Advisor for the Joint Aviation Command (JAC)’, which is ‘responsible for the combat readiness and execution of all aviation missions and training for UAE forces and numerous Foreign Military Sales.’106 Highlighting the continued close relations with the US that these retired officers engender, an October 2017 DOD video shows Toumajan commanding UAE forces that have been deployed to the Fort Irwin National Training Center in California, which is the US Army’s premier training facility.107 Similarly, the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center detailed above was led for over two years, from 2012 to 2014, by Frank Toney, a retired US Army brigadier general.
It is difficult to definitively assess the impact that these retired officers have on the development and implementation of US military policy in the Middle East and on regional security services. According to the CEO cited above, retired American officers serve as a backchannel to their active-duty peers through whom they relay the concerns of regional political leaders and defence ministries.108 The retired officers also help to sustain the relationships forged between the US military and regional militaries by being candid and honest with their regional partners in a way that active-duty officers cannot be. But, perhaps most importantly, these retired officers, now with economic incentives, further intensify the widely-accepted norm within the Pentagon – as well as on Capitol Hill – that US military personnel must remain deployed in large numbers in the Middle East.109 Furthermore, US military presence in the Middle East can only continue with predictable access to the region, which is enhanced by maintaining personal and professional relationships with host-nation governments and government officials. This revolving door is both an enabler and manifestation of US military policy in the region.
80 Department of Defense (2016), ‘DoD Directive 5132.03: DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation’, 29 December 2016, https://open.defense.gov/portals/23/Documents/foreignasst/DoDD_513203_on_Security_Cooperation.pdf (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
81 Moroney, J. D. P., Thaler, D. E. and Hagler J. (2013), ‘Security Cooperation Database’, Appendix A, in Review of Security Cooperation Mechanisms Combatant Commands Utilize to Build Partner Capacity, Washington, D.C.: Rand Corporation, 2013.
82 US Government Accountability Office (2017), ‘Building Partner Capacity: Inventory of Department of Defense Security Cooperation and Department of State Security Assistance Efforts’, 24 March 2017, https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683682.pdf (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
83 Undoubtedly, additional security cooperation initiatives are never reported, but have a material impact on shaping options and outcomes in the region. For example, in March 2003, 18 months before the Iraq War began, every time CENTCOM conducted a military exercise in the region, it would send in more troops than were required, and then leave them behind to support the regime change effort. See, DeLong, M. (2007), A General Speaks Out: The Truth About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, St. Paul, MN: MBI Publishing, p. 71.
84 US State Department and US Department of Defense (2018), Foreign Military Training Report: Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017, Joint Report to Congress, Volume 1, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/275295.pdf (accessed 24 Sep. 2018).
85 Cloud, D. S. and Cooper, H. (2006), ‘U.S. Speeds up Bomb Delivery for the Israelis’, New York Times, 22 July 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/22/world/middleeast/22military.html (accessed 23 Aug. 2018); Cloud, D. S. (2006), ‘Israel Asks U.S. to Ship Rockets with a Wide Blast’, New York Times, 11 August 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/11/world/middleeast/11military.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fdavid-s.-cloud&action=click&contentCollection=undefined®ion=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=202&pgtype=collection (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
86 Chandrasekaran (2014), ‘In the UAE, the United States has a Quiet, Potent Ally Nicknamed “Little Sparta”’.
87 US Department of Defense (2017), ‘Contracts for Sept. 22, 2017’, 22 September 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/1321878/ (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
88 According to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, more than 60 per cent of all documented civilian fatalities between March 2015 and August 2017 were the result of airstrikes. See, UN (2017), ‘Yemen: UN Report urges Probe into Rights Violations amid “Entirely Man-Made Catastrophe”’, 5 September 2017, https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/09/564302-yemen-un-report-urges-probe-rights-violations-amid-entirely-man-made (accessed 23 Aug. 2018). Since March 2015, Pentagon officials have claimed that US military assistance plays a critical role in reducing collateral damage and civilian casualties.
89 Lineberger, R. S. et al. (2017), 2017 U.S. Aerospace and Defense Sector Export and Labor Market Study, Deloitte Consulting, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/manufacturing/us-2017-us-A&D-exports-and-labor-market-study.pdf (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
90 White House (2018), ‘National Security Presidential Memorandum Regarding U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy’, 19 April 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/national-security-presidential-memorandum-regarding-u-s-conventional-arms-transfer-policy/ (accessed 23 Aug. 2018); US Department of State (2018), ‘United States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy’, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 19 April 2018, https://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2018/280621.htm (accessed 23 Aug. 2018); US Department of State (2018), ‘U.S. Policy on the Export of Unmanned Aerial Systems’, Office of the Spokesperson, 19 April 2018, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/04/280619.htm (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
91 Hartung, W. (2018), Trends in Major U.S. Arms Sales in 2017: A Comparison of the Obama and Trump Administrations, Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy, March 2018.
92 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2017), SIPRI Yearbook 2017: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2017 (accessed 23 Aug. 2018); International Institute for Strategic Studies (2018), The Military Balance 2018, https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2018 (accessed 23 Aug. 2018); US State Department (2018), World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2017, https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/2017/index.htm (accessed 23 Aug. 2018); Thomas, T. (2017), Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, 11 October 2017, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44984.pdf (accessed 23 Aug. 2018); Theohary, C. A. (2016), Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2008–2015, Congressional Research Service, 19 December 2016, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R44716.pdf (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
93 Wezeman, P. D. et al. (2018), ‘Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2017’, SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2018, p. 2, https://www.sipri.org/publications/2018/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2017 (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
94 Thomas C. (2017), ‘Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy’, Congressional Research Service, 11 October 2017, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44984.pdf (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
95 Blanchard, C. M. (2017), ‘Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations’, Congressional Research Service, 22 November 2017, pp. 21–22, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
96 Adams, G. (1982), The Politics of Defense Contracting: The Iron Triangle, Piscataway, New Jersey: Transaction Books.
97 Bender, B. (2010), ‘From the Pentagon to the Private Sector’, Boston Globe, 26 December 2010, http://archive.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/12/26/defense_firms_lure_retired_generals/ (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
98 Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (2012), ‘The Revolving Door from the Pentagon to the Private Sector’, November 2012, http://goodtimesweb.org/documentation/2012/CREW_Strategic_Maneuvers_Pentagon_Generals_Revolving_Door_11_15_12.pdf (accessed 23 Aug. 2018). This revolving door also features civilians: more than half of Obama’s top Pentagon nominees came straight from the defence industry, and after his second term more than half of them returned to the defence industry. President Trump’s initial top civilian Pentagon appointees were even more immersed in the defence industry: 82 per cent of them came directly from defence contractor positions. See, Skolnik, S. (2018), ‘Revolving Door Between Trump Pentagon, Contractors Spins Faster’, Bloomberg Exclusives, 1 February 2018, https://about.bgov.com/blog/revolving-door-trump-pentagon-contractors-spins-faster/ (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
99 Author interview with CEO of military advisory contracting firm, 22 May 2018.
100 Smithberger, M. (2017), ‘Seven Top U.S. Marines Took Jobs with Foreign Governments and Firms’, War is Boring, 3 August 2017, https://warisboring.com/seven-top-u-s-marines-took-jobs-with-foreign-governments-and-firms/ (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
101 Herb, J. (2017), ‘Mattis Advised UAE Military Before Joining Trump Administration’, CNN.com, 2 August 2017, https://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/02/politics/mattis-advised-uae-military/index.html (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
102 Smithberger, M. (2017), ‘Seven Top U.S. Marines Took Jobs with Foreign Governments and Firms’.
103 Wilkie, C. (2011), ‘Mujahideen-e Khalq: Former U.S. Officials Make Millions Advocating For Terrorist Organization’, Huffington Post, 8 August 2011, https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/mek-lobbying_n_913233 (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
104 Smithberger, M. (2017), ‘Seven Top U.S. Marines Took Jobs with Foreign Governments and Firms’.
105 Roston, A. (2018), ‘This American is a General for a Foreign Army Accused of War Crimes in Yemen’, Buzzfeed News, 7 May 2018, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/aramroston/stephen-toumajan-general-us-uae-yemen-contractor (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
106 United Arab Emirates: The Supreme Council for National Security, National Search and Rescue Center (undated), ‘Director General’s Message’, https://www.nsrc.gov.ae/en/about-us/director-generals-message.aspx (accessed 3 Jun. 2018).
107 US Department of Defense (2017), ‘UAE at NTC’, Defense Visual Information Distribution System, 2 October 2017, https://www.dvidshub.net/video/558974/uae-ntc (accessed 23 Aug. 2018).
108 Author interview with CEO of military advisory contracting firm, 22 May 2018.
109 After 20 years of close professional relationships with countless active-duty and retired military officers, the author cannot recall speaking with any that recommended, much less even considered, reducing the US military footprint in the Middle East.