3. The EAEU and CSTO: Armenia’s Inconvenient Alliances?
Armenia’s 2013 withdrawal from signing the EU association agreement not only alienated its Western partners, but also diminished its relative regional political clout and its weight vis-à-vis Russia and other Eurasian partners. Russia’s reported blackmail on the issue heralded the beginning of a crisis in relations between the two countries. In the events that followed, Armenia found its interests ignored both by Russia and within Eurasia’s multilateral structures – namely the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
On the EAEU front, Armenia has entered an alliance of already divided interests, in which Kazakhstan and Belarus are frustrated with Russia’s hegemonic policies towards them. Locked in endless negotiation with Russia, these two countries saw in the obstruction of Armenia’s accession to the EAEU an opportunity to increase their bargaining power with Russia.56 Armenia’s relations with Belarus and Kazakhstan – notwithstanding their formal alliances within the CSTO and EAEU – have also been marred by divergent interests with regard to Azerbaijan.
From a purely economic point of view, the advantages that Armenia expected from EAEU accession proved unrealistic. The first reason is that Armenia does not border the other members.57 Second, trade has declined among members as a result of Western sanctions against Russia and the rouble’s devaluation. Furthermore, Armenia barely trades with any EAEU member state except Russia. For a long time, Armenia’s major trade partner was the EU; only since EAEU accession has this dynamic started to shift towards a more prominent role for Russia as a trading partner.58 Overall, the Eurasian project has failed to morph into a full-fledged economic union, primarily because its raison d’être is geopolitical.59 But this geopolitical project has economic costs for Armenia in the form of missed trade opportunities elsewhere. The country has not made economic gains from joining the EAEU, and now its hands are tied in terms of striking trade deals with third parties.
The security rationale behind EAEU accession is equally questionable. Neither Turkey nor Azerbaijan posed any more threat to Armenia at the time of the 2013 U-turn than they had before. The conclusion is that the ‘security threat’ that actually motivated Yerevan’s decision emanated from Russia.60 One way for Russia to threaten Armenia could be by disturbing the relative balance of power around the Nagorny Karabakh conflict – which, until recently, precluded a slide back into war – either by boosting its support for Azerbaijan or by withdrawing its support for Armenia.
The theory that entry into the EAEU would improve the security situation for Armenia started to crumble almost immediately. In practice, the opposite proved to be the case: throughout 2014–15, Armenia’s security situation deteriorated as military escalation not only occurred along the Line of Contact but also routinely extended to the de jure border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia continued arms deliveries to Azerbaijan, based on agreements from 2010–11. Armenia secured a $200 million Russian loan in 2015 to acquire modern weaponry, but deliveries were delayed for unconfirmed reasons; the Russian media published leaked classified details on the acquisitions.61 The belief in Armenia following the 2016 war was that the military balance had been disturbed. While various factors have affected the dynamics around the escalation of the conflict,62 the war was also indicative of the decline in Armenia’s international standing and of its perceived vulnerability following its 2013 U-turn. The decline in cohesion in the relationship between Armenia and Russia, as well as within the CSTO and the EAEU, was the trigger for Azerbaijan to seek ways of reversing the status quo militarily. Armenia’s alliance frameworks within the CSTO and with Russia failed to prevent a deterioration of the security situation in the region, partly enabling the four-day war in April 2016.63
While the military escalation was soon halted, the conflict further highlighted divergences in the alliances. A military flare-up along the Line of Contact would not trigger any mutual defence commitments in Armenia’s agreements with Russia and the CSTO, but the spirit of these alliances nonetheless implied a degree of moral support at best or neutrality at worst. But when Armenia’s Eurasian allies offered moral support, it was not to Armenia. For example, Kazakhstan initiated a change in venue, from Yerevan to Moscow, for an EAEU intergovernmental summit. This was probably driven by Kazakhstan’s reluctance to appear to be taking Armenia’s side, but the result was that it appeared to be taking Azerbaijan’s instead.64 Visiting Baku shortly afterwards, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin announced that Russia would continue providing arms to both countries.65 Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov received a cold welcome in Yerevan, where he was questioned on the reasons for the flare-up. Suspicions abounded as to whether a partial change in the status quo would pave the way for the deployment of Russian peacekeepers, without necessarily solving the conflict.66
Shifts in the military and geopolitical balance of power in the region were not enough to change the status quo militarily, but the 2016 war further deepened the crisis of confidence between Armenia and Russia, as well as highlighting the former’s disillusionment with its Eurasian allies. Moscow often comes across as exploiting Armenia’s geographic situation and perceived inability to escape Russia’s orbit. Russia has not been compelled to use soft-power tools to improve its image in the country, and its cynicism has helped anti-Russian sentiment grow without help from abroad (even though Moscow often likes to suggest the contrary).
One example was the mishandling of the case in 2015 when a soldier from the Russian military base in Gyumri deserted and killed a family of seven. For around six months, Russia refused to hand over the captured suspect to the Armenian authorities, sparking protests in Yerevan and Gyumri.67 To add insult to injury, Foreign Minister Lavrov suggested that the public outrage was orchestrated by third parties so as to trigger anti-Russian sentiment in Armenia, thereby exacerbating the popular backlash.68
When in 2015 people took to the streets in Yerevan to protest against an electricity price hike – the result of mismanagement by Electric Networks of Armenia (a then-Russian-run enterprise) – the Kremlin again saw a third-party plot agitating for a Maidan-style revolution.69 This further added fuel to the public’s resentment over Russia’s insensitivity. In other instances, Russian officials have drawn the Armenian public’s ire by trying to push for official status for the Russian language in largely mono-ethnic Armenia.70
However, in a move that surprised many observers, Russia stood aside when a growing popular movement forced Serzh Sargsyan’s resignation as prime minister in April 2018. Russian officials announced that the protests were a domestic matter for Armenia. Russia’s position was the result of several factors. First, the protests had no foreign policy dimension, and their leader, Nikol Pashinyan, made it clear that the movement did not seek any changes in Armenia’s geopolitical alignment. Second, Russia’s calculus was clearly based on its unwillingness to support an unpopular government and further damage its image in the eyes of Armenian society. Had it interfered, this could have turned the massive display of ‘people power’ against Moscow.71
In what appears to be recognition that the EAEU and the CSTO fall short of being functioning alliances, the new Armenian government has stated the importance of making both groupings more efficient. Achieving this may be a long shot, but Armenia can still work towards improving its own standing in these alliances.
56 See, for example, Grigoryan, M. (2014), ‘Armenia: Karabakh Question Clouds Eurasian Union Accession’, Eurasianet, 10 October 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/70416.
57 This is what Armenian officials were arguing before joining the union. See, for example, Kommersant (2012), «„Таможенный союз не имеет для нас смысла’’. Премьер Армении о взаимоотношениях с РФ» [‘The Customs Union does not make sense for us’. Armenia’s PM on the relationship with Russia], 4 April 2012, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1908052.
58 The EU’s share of Armenian trade has declined, while Russia’s has grown since Armenia’s EAEU accession. For example, in 2012 the EU’s share of Armenia’s external trade was 27 per cent and Russia’s was 21 per cent; in 2017 their shares were 24.3 per cent and 26.7 per cent respectively. The EU’s share of Armenia’s exports is still slightly bigger than Russia’s, but imports from the EU lag behind those from Russia. Sources: Armstat and European Commission.
59 Dragneva, R. and Wolczuk, K. (2017), The Eurasian Economic Union: Deals, Rules and the Exercise of Power, Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/eurasian-economic-union-deals-rules-and-exercise-power.
60 See 168.am (2014), «Ժիրայր Լիպարիտյան. «Մեզ սպառնալիքի տակ է դրել այն երկիրը, որը մեզ պաշտպան էր հանդիսանալու»» [Gerard Libaridian: the country that was supposed to protect us has put us under threat], 3 April 2014, https://168.am/2014/04/03/348816.html.
61 Daly, J. C. K. (2016), ‘Russia Proclaims ‘Parity’ in Arms Sales to Armenia and Azerbaijan’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 13, Issue 71, 12 April 2016, https://jamestown.org/program/russia-proclaims-parity-in-arms-sales-to-armenia-and-azerbaijan/; Grigoryan, A. (2016), ‘After a Delay, Russia Delivers New Types of Weapons to Armenia’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 13, Issue 154, 26 September 2016, https://jamestown.org/program/after-a-delay-russia-delivers-new-types-of-weapons-to-armenia/; and Grigoryan, A. (2016), ‘Russian Media Leaks Sensitive Details of Armenia’s Defense Posture’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 13, Issue 54, 18 March 2016, https://jamestown.org/program/russian-media-leaks-sensitive-details-of-armenias-defense-posture/.
62 These included domestic dynamics in Azerbaijan: economic decline connected with oil prices, growing public discontent and the need to deflect public attention from economic problems.
63 Shirinyan, A. (2017), ‘For Armenia, an Alliance That May Be More Trouble Than It’s Worth’, Chatham House Expert Comment, 24 January 2017, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/armenia-alliance-may-be-more-trouble-it-s-worth.
64 Musayelyan, S. (2016), ‘Speaking Diplomatically: Armenia rebukes Kazakhstan over EEU meeting postponement’, ArmeniaNow.com, 19 April 2016, https://www.armenianow.com/en/news/2016/04/19/armenia-kazakhstan-karabakh-azerbaijan-eeu-summit-nalbandian/1215/.
65 TASS (2016), ‘Russia set to continue arms supplies to Azerbaijan and Armenia — official’, 8 April 2016, http://tass.ru/en/defense/868312.
66 Shahnazaryan, D. (2017), ‘A Conflict of Interests in Nagorno-Karabakh’, Stratfor, 28 July 2017, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/conflict-interests-nagorno-karabakh.
67 Movsisian, H., Kaghzvantsian, S., Mkrtchian, A. and Gabrielian, S. (2015), ‘Protesters, Police Clash Outside Russian Consulate In Armenia’, Azatutyun.am, 15 January 2015, http://www.azatutyun.am/a/26795774.html. The soldier was eventually tried by an Armenian court in the premises of the base and later extradited to Russia to serve his sentence there.
68 See, for example, Martirosyan, S. (2015), «О роли посольства РФ в Армении в разжигании и раскачивании: письмо Лаврову» [On the role of the Embassy of RF in Armenia in fuelling and escalating: a letter to Lavrov], Kavkazskiy Uzel, 21 January 2015, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/blogs/485/posts/20332.
69 Whitmore, B. (2015), ‘Electric Yerevan Exposes Kremlin’s Mind-Set’, RFE/RL, 26 June 2015, http://www.rferl.org/content/electric-yerevan-exposes-kremlins-mindset/27095362.html.
70 Harutyunyan, A. (2014), ‘‘Russian Lesson’ Provokes Fury in Armenia’, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 30 June 2014, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/russian-lesson-provokes-fury-armenia; and Kucera, J. (2017), ‘Moscow Suggests Armenia Adopt Russian As Official Language’, Eurasianet, 17 July 2017, https://eurasianet.org/s/moscow-suggests-armenia-adopt-russian-as-official-language.
71 For some other possible reasons why Russia did not intervene, see Baev, P. K. (2018), ‘What explains Russia’s uncharacteristic indifference to the revolution in Armenia?’, Brookings, 7 May 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/05/07/what-explains-russias-uncharacteristic-indifference-to-the-revolution-in-armenia/.