5. Conclusion
Armenia’s delicate foreign policy balancing has been frustrated by regional geopolitics, an assertive Russia, a democracy deficit at home, the miscalculation of geopolitical shifts, and a lack of engagement from the West. The country’s security deficit has grown as it has sought a closer security partnership with Russia. The latter has found that it can exploit Armenia’s predicament, whether to obstruct a closer partnership with the EU or to increase Azerbaijan’s convergence with Moscow. Through its actions, Russia risks losing a political ally, as well as further thinning what public sympathy remains towards it in Armenia. But the burden of reversing the asymmetry in the bilateral relationship ultimately falls on Yerevan. Armenia will need to increase the cost to Russia of not upholding its side of the alliance. Unless Moscow is presented with the risk of diminished regional clout, it will continue to take its ally for granted.
Although the 2018 Velvet Revolution has not fundamentally altered the geopolitical landscape, it is likely to result in a more Armenia-centric foreign policy in the longer run. The country is now raising uncomfortable questions for Russia and other partners in the CSTO and EAEU about the lack of broader convergence across these alliances. How Armenia handles its over-reliance on Russia will largely influence its regional and international standing, and will determine the extent to which it can expand relations with other partners. It still needs to prove that it is not unduly supporting Russia’s interests. The new government is putting the emphasis on deepening ties with Georgia and Iran, two countries that offer unfulfilled potential as political and economic partners. China may also be an emerging actor in Yerevan’s delicate balancing act. By prioritizing ties with these countries, Armenia will further aim to minimize any fallout from the confrontation between Russia and the West.
For Armenia’s Western partners, there is an inherent contradiction in the fact that they have been displeased by its over-reliance on Russia, but have also de facto conceded that it falls within Russia’s ‘zone of influence’. Armenia’s vulnerability to Russia has scarcely been recognized, at least until recently. Similarly, the resignation of the EU and the US to seeing Armenia as a democracy laggard had in the past been paralleled by policies that, inadvertently or not, empowered incumbents lacking domestic legitimacy. The West’s ability to inspire a more conducive environment in the region for overcoming entrenched paradigms of enmity and insecurity has been limited. All of the above may explain why scepticism towards Russia within Armenian society – a mood that has grown gradually over the past couple of years due to Moscow’s policies – has not been converted into increased sympathy towards the West. Armenians are sceptical of the West as much as they are doubtful of Russia. If the West wants to increase its attractiveness, it needs to develop a more nuanced policy towards Armenia, put more emphasis on democracy, and support a better security environment in the region. The West may now be facing higher expectations from the new Armenian government. The unspoken challenge is that Armenia’s revolution has brought about the ambition of democratic governance without the geostrategic shift towards the West and away from Russia that revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine have observed.
The crisis between the West and Russia is likely to persist, as are regional geopolitical divides; both factors will continue to limit Armenia’s policy options. Addressing these challenges will require non-conventional solutions. Armenia should not underestimate the power of diplomacy to overcome geopolitical constraints. Its image has been damaged by its timid policymaking and the mismanagement of its diplomatic cadre. The country bears part of the blame for the failure of Western policymaking to develop a more nuanced understanding of Armenia. The 2018 Velvet Revolution has created new opportunities for the country’s foreign policy. The new government is more empowered internationally, by virtue of enjoying unprecedented public support at home. Because the revolution was unexpected for its partners and they are now adjusting to the new reality, Armenia has a chance to initiate and guide a new level of relationships with them. It could gain more support if it were to pursue bolder policies. It will need to build convergence of interests with different actors where this is absent, and increase it where it already exists.
To overcome its predicament, Armenia should not only focus on seeking hard security and defence solutions, but also view security as part of a broader set of foreign and economic policies. It should focus on cultivating a wide range of alliances and policies that will render war in the region costly, and motivate a more cooperative attitude across the regional divides.