1. Introduction
Since Azerbaijan became an independent country in 1991, its foreign policy has entailed a balancing of its relations with Russia and the West. Azerbaijan has endeavoured to pursue its national interests – especially in the conflict with Armenia over Nagorny Karabakh, and in maintaining independence of action – while limiting foreign influence from both sides. This has involved, among other things, eschewing military alliances with either Russia or NATO, and resisting both Russian and Western economic integration models.
In recent years, however, this balancing act has become harder to perform. The 2008 war between Georgia and Russia made the South Caucasus more insecure by increasing Russian influence there, a problem since exacerbated by the West’s declining interest in the region. Most notably, US foreign policy towards the South Caucasus changed during the second term of the Barack Obama administration – and even more clearly under the administration of Donald Trump. Previously, the US had provided a strong counterbalance to Moscow’s influence in the region. By strengthening Russia’s position, the impoverishment of US engagement and influence has enabled Moscow to move from seeing the South Caucasus as merely its ‘backyard’ to considering the region to be specifically within its ‘sphere of influence’.
Up to 2013, Azerbaijan’s balancing of relations with Russia and the West had remained reasonably successful. The strategy had relied in part on dangling the prospect of a major foreign policy shift towards Russia, including participation in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), even though Azerbaijan in fact had no intention at that time of joining the EAEU. Thereafter, especially in light of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine from 2014, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy became less evenly balanced as the country sought to deepen relations with Russia despite the dilemma this presented. Azerbaijan saw (and continues to see) Russia as a threat, yet increasingly cooperated with it at the expense of Western integration, at the same time adopting anti-Western rhetoric in reaction to Western pressure for democratic reforms.
Such developments have been widely interpreted by foreign observers as evidence of a desire on the part of Azerbaijan’s ruling elite for a fundamental realignment towards Russia. Azerbaijan’s growing dependency on Russia in several areas has strengthened this line of thinking. However, it is not yet possible to distinguish whether the leadership is genuinely considering such a shift; or whether the recent rapprochement is merely a tactic to pacify Russia, limited to the rhetoric of the ruling elite. Certain elements who support closer alignment with Russia are becoming stronger within that elite. However, a genuine change in foreign policy will ultimately depend as much on external geopolitical trends and Western policies as on domestic developments.
Azerbaijan’s foreign policy has been influenced in particular by the ruling elite’s understanding of Russia’s role in the region. There has been a perception in Baku that closer bilateral relations would prompt the Kremlin to help find solutions to some of Azerbaijan’s challenges. In particular, the elite has mistakenly believed that only Russia can resolve critical issues such as the Nagorny Karabakh conflict – a perception that Moscow continues to reinforce through its soft-power tools. This could lead to a situation in which concessions to Russia are seen as essential in Azerbaijan. At the same time, Russia’s wide range of tools for creating more favourable perceptions of itself in the country could weaken Western influence. The recent deepening of ties between Baku and Moscow, though arguably a deliberate risk-mitigation strategy on the part of the Azerbaijani authorities, has had the unwelcome effect of strengthening Russia’s role in Azerbaijan’s media and education sectors.
This paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the evolution of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy with regard to Russia and the West since independence. Chapter 3 then looks at the diplomatic imperatives surrounding the Nagorny Karabakh conflict in more detail, reviewing the Azerbaijani leadership’s motivations and underlying geopolitical calculations in respect of Russia’s role. The chapter also examines Azerbaijani attitudes towards Russia’s regional economic and security integration projects. Chapter 4 considers the impact and influence of the diaspora in Russia in terms of bilateral relations and elite power struggles in Azerbaijan. Chapter 5 considers how the actions of Azerbaijan’s elite in recent years have enabled Russian soft power to flourish in the country. A concluding chapter sets out four areas of risk for Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia. The author also provides recommendations as to how to mitigate these risks and build healthy relations with Russia.