4. The Azerbaijani Diaspora in Russia
The number of Azerbaijanis in Russia grew from the early 1990s onwards, reaching more than 1 million in the late 2000s.34 Half of them have Russian citizenship or permanent residence, while the other half are legal and illegal labour migrants, and seasonal workers. Although this diaspora has a largely apolitical presence in the country, this has not protected its members from occasional Russian threats of deportation, made to give Moscow political leverage over Azerbaijan.
Remittances from the diaspora are a significant source of income for millions of people in Azerbaijan. This was especially the case in the 1990s, when the country had limited financial resources and had yet to benefit from the huge oil revenues that accrued after 2005. Many experts say that the actual flow of remittances is higher than indicated by official statistics, because an estimated 60 per cent of all such transfers are made in cash through informal channels.35 (That said, Azerbaijan is actually much less dependent on remittances than other post-Soviet countries, and the volume of inflows has declined sharply since 2014 as a result of economic and financial problems in Russia.)36 In 2015, Russia imposed new immigration requirements, increasing work permit fees and introducing language and history tests for migrant workers from countries which are not members of the EAEU, including Azerbaijan.37
Table 1: Remittances from Russia to Azerbaijan
Year |
Total, US$ |
---|---|
2010 |
794 million |
2011 |
1,049 million |
2012 |
1,132 million |
2013 |
1,232 million |
2014 |
1,221 million |
2015 |
627 million |
2016 |
482 million |
2017 |
531 million |
Source: Central Bank of the Russian Federation (undated), ‘Cross-Border Transfers of Individuals (Residents and Nonresidents)’, http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/Default.aspx?Prtid=tg (accessed 20 Sep. 2018).
For Russia, the principal importance of the diaspora is in helping the spread of its soft power, especially in increasing interest in the Russian language in Azerbaijan. Migrants and temporary workers, with their extended personal and family connections and networks, offer a good propaganda channel for reaching Azerbaijanis, who get their information mainly from Russian sources.38 Many Azerbaijanis see Russia as the primary job market, and push the new generation to participate in Russian-language courses and attend Russian-streamed schools.
At the same time, influential figures in Azerbaijan’s presidential administration have long drawn political legitimacy and power from their management of the diaspora in Russia. This is a channel that can be used in two ways. The first is to demonstrate support to the Kremlin by asking the diaspora to provide financial contributions to the election campaigns of President Putin. The second is to gain support from the diaspora for Azerbaijan’s own government, and especially President Aliyev, during domestic election campaigns. Preserving this channel has enabled those managing it – notably, key figures among the political old guard – to maintain influence over aspects of the relationship with Russia.
Domestic concerns about the diaspora
After independence, the diaspora rapidly became an issue for Azerbaijan’s authorities, due to its vulnerability to Russian manipulation. Ayaz Mutalibov took refuge in Russia after his ouster from the presidency in 1992, and other political figures did so too. They engaged in diaspora activities, with Mutalibov especially remaining politically active in exile and enjoying popularity among Azerbaijani labour migrants in Russia. President Heydar Aliyev was alarmed that Russia might use Mutalibov and others against him, a possibility occasionally hinted at by the Kremlin in the 1990s. The Azerbaijani government was concerned about the rise of a counter-elite among the diaspora at a time when, due to the economic situation, there were many more wealthy Azerbaijanis in Russia than at home. In 2002, Mutalibov was elected as head of the Community of Azerbaijanis in Russia, with the backing39 of a strong segment of the diaspora in Russia. He declared his aim of running in the 2003 presidential election, which concerned the authorities in Baku.
Former officials were seen as potential candidates who could unite this powerful network against the government and its associates.40 Another diaspora organization, Azeri Federal National Cultural Autonomy in Russia (AzerRos), was created in 1999 by Soyun Sadigov, an ethnic Azerbaijani construction mogul from Georgia. AzerRos was opposed to any control of the diaspora by Baku, and its leadership sometimes issued statements hostile to the government. These developments led the Azerbaijani authorities to try to unite the diaspora in one organization. In 2001, the authorities supported the creation of the All-Russia Azerbaijanis Congress (ARAC). The majority of diaspora groups were united under this new body, which was larger than AzerRos. The presidential administration controlled ARAC and tried to unite influential figures around it. ARAC was financed directly by the government, with its leadership also appointed by the government and reporting to it.
Neither of the above-mentioned organizations was under Russian control or influence. Russia did not seek to manipulate them in pursuit of its interests in Azerbaijan, nor did it create alternative bodies. Russia preferred to exploit ethnic tensions. In the 1990s it provided financial and logistical support to ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan seeking to rise up against Aliyev and his inner circle. Occasionally it supported such efforts by organizing conferences in Russia about violations of the rights of the Lezgin, Avar and Talysh minorities, and featuring anti-Azerbaijan speeches. Such conferences led to the re-establishment within Russia of separatist organizations, such as the Lezgin National Movement (Sadval) in Dagestan,41 which had been banned in Azerbaijan; and to the creation of the Lezgin and Talysh Youth Organizations. In each case, Russia’s support was active and visible.
Russian influence was again seen during the unsuccessful negotiations in 2012 over the extension of the lease to Russia of a radar installation in Azerbaijan.42 Russia began to galvanize support from diaspora organizations opposed to Azerbaijan’s government and from ethnic separatist groups. During the course of the talks, the Union of Azerbaijani Organizations in Russia (UAOR) was created by Abbas Abbasov, a former deputy prime minister who had gone to Moscow to pursue a career in business. He was assisted by AzerRos’s chairman, Sadigov (who was not trusted in Baku due to his previous career with the Russian KGB and as a representative of President Putin). The UAOR included former government officials and wealthy ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia, most of whom had long-standing and close ties with the political power centre in Azerbaijan.43
Initially, the UAOR enjoyed a dialogue with the government and even gained high-level endorsement, including from President Aliyev.44 Azerbaijan’s leadership supported not only the UAOR’s establishment but also its function as an umbrella organization, and tasked Abbasov with uniting smaller diaspora groups.45 As a result, Abbasov was elected chairman of a new body formed under AzerRos: the Council of Elders. The government requested that Sadigov be removed from any leadership position in the UAOR. Sadigov was also ejected from his position as chairman of AzerRos in January 2013, though he was allowed to stay on as honorary chairman in order to calm anxieties about his possible disruptive influence.
The 2013 presidential election and the ‘Billionaires’ Union’
As the 2013 presidential election neared, there were rumours that Russia might seek to effect regime change through the diaspora and the newly created UAOR. It was further speculated that members of the Azerbaijani political old guard would lose their positions during a third Aliyev term. ARAC opposed the work of the UAOR, fearing that the new organization would erode its influence. The possibility of unification of the diaspora in Russia under the leadership of Abbasov alarmed Azerbaijani officials such as the head of the presidential administration, Ramiz Mehdiyev, whose portfolio encompassed security, law enforcement, the media and diaspora issues. Using media propaganda, political insiders thus sought to disparage the UAOR by branding it as a ‘Billionaires’ Union’ that included the tycoons Telman Ismayilov, Vahid Alakbarov and Araz Aghalarov. These figures had always been loyal to the Azerbaijani leadership, though, and were even part of ARAC. (In 2011 Aghalarov, Alakbarov and Abbasov had been elected to the presidium of the Central Council of ARAC before initiating the UAOR, which they saw as a way of supporting President Aliyev.) Abbasov was determined to preserve his position as a key figure in Russian–Azerbaijani relations by unifying the diaspora, but, despite early support from the leadership, met with opposition from the presidential administration and other members of the political establishment. Leading figures within this establishment accused him of being self-serving and claimed that his ultimate goal was to achieve a top-ranking position in Azerbaijan.46
The perception that Russia was behind the UAOR was reinforced by regional and domestic developments. The success of the party of Bidzina Ivanishvili – a billionaire who had made his fortune in Russia – in Georgia’s 2012 parliamentary elections led to fears that a similar prominent figure could use the UAOR to unseat Azerbaijan’s political establishment. Putin’s visit to Baku in 2013, ahead of the Azerbaijani presidential election, further strengthened rumours that Russia was trying to engineer a change of government by supporting those members of the elite loyal to Abbasov and the UAOR. On the domestic front, Rustam Ibragimbekov, a dual citizen, was chosen as a presidential candidate by a new grouping of opposition parties in Azerbaijan.47 As he had also been one of the founding members of the UAOR, this led to more accusations that the opposition was acting on Russia’s orders.
Furthermore, the UAOR included Ramazan Abdulatipov, a Putin confidant who is not Azerbaijani and whose involvement was perceived in Azerbaijan as evidence of Russian support for the new diaspora organization. His appointment as head of the regional government in Dagestan in 2013 amplified anxiety among members of the Azerbaijani ruling elite, because the neighbouring Russian republic plays an important role in relations between Baku and Moscow. It conducts a significant volume of trade with Azerbaijan and is home to a large number of Azerbaijanis. In addition, there is a risk of ethnic separatist groups operating on both sides of Dagestan’s border with Azerbaijan.
Another reason for the fear of Russian involvement in the UAOR was rooted in similarities to past events. In 2005, Rasul Guliyev, an oligarch and former speaker of parliament, had tried but failed to organize and finance an opposition faction in parliamentary elections. For the government, the difference between Guliyev and Abbasov was that the former lacked connections with external power brokers in Russia or the West. The latter, however, has good relations with high-level personalities in the Kremlin and among the Russian political elite.
The unification of the diaspora under the UAOR threatened to weaken ARAC and diminish the ability of those in Azerbaijan managing this channel to influence the relationship with Russia. Before the 2013 presidential election, members of the old guard who expressed negative views of the so-called Billionaires’ Union found themselves in trouble. Videos were released that purported to expose a corruption scandal implicating Mehdiyev and ministers.48 The allegations were later dismissed as unfounded by government authorities, but the episode certainly affected the image of Mehdiyev, who had previously been considered politically ‘untouchable’. These developments led to rumours that there could be a change in key positions, and increased suspicions that Abbasov harboured political ambitions. Privately, and in meetings with the leaders of diaspora organizations across Russia, Abbasov expressed the view that Aliyev should reshuffle the cabinet.49 As a result, though, the old guard was successfully able to argue that the UAOR was seeking to unseat the president. This led to the rapid disintegration of the organization, and its activities in Azerbaijan were suspended before the election.
In the end, the UAOR had no real impact on the 2013 presidential election. In fact, there are strong indications that it was a sort of ‘phantom’ entity: it was unregistered, its members met only twice, and they did not produce any agenda for Azerbaijan’s domestic affairs; nor, despite the rumours, was there any visible support for it from Russian authorities. Although there was a belief among entrenched political figures that Abbasov threatened their ability to control diaspora issues, in reality the members of the so-called Billionaires’ Union were wealthy Azerbaijanis loyal to Aliyev and included people with family ties to him. Several even made statements declaring their loyalty to the president.
In short, it seems that the UAOR, rather than being a tool used by Russia to influence Azerbaijan’s domestic politics, was in fact the manifestation of an internal elite power struggle. This contest between incumbent and former members of the old guard had mixed outcomes. The old guard not only survived the presidential election but became more powerful by consolidating control over the diaspora issue. It used the allegations that Russia was backing the Billionaires’ Union to gain support from the West and reduce Western criticism over the election. At the same time, although rumours that the UAOR’s goal had been to oust Aliyev were largely unfounded, the speculation provided Russia’s leadership with an opportunity to create the appearance of a threat that significantly influenced Azerbaijan’s domestic affairs.
Russia’s lessons
As the above details have elaborated, the claim that Russia was seeking regime change in Azerbaijan through the diaspora is flawed. High-level bilateral ties are strong, despite occasional differences. The weak and fragmented opposition is more critical of Russia than of the Aliyev administration. Furthermore, the public is inclined towards anti-Russian sentiment due to historical factors. Thus, any attempt at undue external influence would damage Russia’s already poor image in Azerbaijan.50 Russia learned this lesson from the Billionaires’ Union episode. Yet it also gained a better understanding of how members of the diaspora could be deployed against Azerbaijan’s government. While the government succeeded in reuniting diaspora organizations under ARAC (and weakened the alternative grouping, AzerRos), the Russian authorities eventually shut down ARAC in 2017. This led to various lines of speculation: for example, that Russia intended to create a new diaspora organization; and that until then there would be no possibility of a new diaspora organization, and thus no management of diaspora issues by the Azerbaijani government. This development has fragmented the diaspora and reduced the Azerbaijani authorities’ control of it. It also opens up a potential future channel for Russia to engage with groups other than the current ruling elite in Azerbaijan. Despite its weakness and small size, AzerRos is now the biggest officially registered diaspora organization of Azerbaijanis in Russia.
The diaspora remains an important tool for Russian interests in two respects. First, there is the threat of deportation, which could create severe socio-economic problems for Azerbaijan by cutting off remittances. (Such inflows are the main source of income for many people on the periphery of society.) The return of thousands of people harbouring grievances over their treatment could foment instability and generate anti-government sentiment. Second, the diaspora could be used to push Azerbaijan towards joining the EAEU, since the latter is supposed to allow the free flow of labour between member states. However, the current state of affairs means that, while the diaspora remains a potential political lever, Russia’s primary mechanism for bringing Azerbaijan into its sphere of influence remains, as with other post-Soviet countries, its agenda to strengthen ties through the use of soft-power tools such as the media and education.