Conclusion
The Russian intervention has been decisive in preventing the military defeat of Bashar al-Assad. Moreover, by manipulating the security imperatives of regional and international actors, either in confronting Islamist radicals or containing Kurdish separatist aspirations, Moscow has seemingly convinced these actors to cooperate or at least tolerate its role in Syria. Indeed, Putin is attempting to redefine his role as a mediator in Syria. This posture has convinced Tehran’s enemies of Moscow’s potential to counter Iran’s growing influence in Syria. Nonetheless, such an objective cannot be attained without considerable Russian investment in dismantling the complex net of Iranian interests in the country.
Thus far, Moscow has shown little aptitude to increase its engagement beyond its mid-to-long term objectives of consolidating Damascus’s central authority over the numerous loyalist militias and certain sectors of the economy. To bolster and accelerate such plans, Russia demands unconditional support from the international community for the rehabilitation of Assad as well as considerable investments in the reconstruction of the devastated Syrian infrastructure and economy. But the EU and the US have made it clear that they will not participate if there is no conclusive political agreement to end the conflict. Thus, Moscow for the time being will maintain the modest objective of blocking any foreign attempt to control the Syrian economy while leveraging its dominance over Damascus to allow the Russian private sector to invest in specific lucrative business ventures.
The lack of Russian interest in directly confronting Iran is theoretically allowing the latter to preserve its gains in Syria for the time being. However, US sanctions and its withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal have placed an enormous burden on Tehran’s capacity to expand and even maintain its current assets in Syria. More important, this context has also considerably impeded Iran’s ability to compete with Russian investments in Syria especially in the energy, agriculture, tourism and infrastructure sectors. Yet, it would be extremely imprudent to ignore Iranian influence in the Syrian economy. Tehran is a very important trading partner with Damascus, and has been providing the latter with vital commodities in large quantities and at a low price.
Meanwhile, Syrian businessmen with close links to the regime have taken advantage of this status quo and strengthened their grip on the Syrian economy. Both Iran and Russia are looking at consolidating their relationships with this new class of businessmen, who are loyal to Assad and are not immune to his manipulation. However, they remain vulnerable in terms of benefiting from working with foreign funds and interests. The monopolies established by Rami Makhlouf83 and Samer al-Foz84 among others, over real estate, transportation, trade and communication present opportunities for Russian and Iranian businesses to infiltrate the Syrian economy through partnerships and influence. The same opportunity is available for international businesses if Assad is able to rehabilitate himself regionally and internationally. For the time being, Assad and the close clique around him are the main benefactors and patrons of these monopolies.
Assad believes he successfully overcame the opposition and he is shifting his focus to achieve two new objectives. First, to regain undisputed control over state functions and sovereignty; second, to rehabilitate his rule in the region and internationally. From Assad’s perspective, the proliferation of armed militias that arose to combat opposition forces was a necessity at the time, but it is difficult to imagine that Assad would tolerate any continued divided authority in a post-war scenario. This has been demonstrated by his successful Russian-aided attempts at dismantling and reintegrating various loyalist armed groups, including many from the National Defence Forces and most famously the Desert Eagles brigade established by the once very powerful Ayman al-Jaber. The regime clearly does not want to see security or governance decentralized. However, this approach requires considerable political and financial support from overseas. In addition to believing that the stability of his rule is mostly dependent on regional and international recognition, Assad needs substantial funds to finance his domestic reconsolidation campaign and to reinforce his agency independently from Iran and Russia. Accustomed to political bargaining, Assad believes that his regional rehabilitation at least will begin with economic recovery. The regime’s determination to normalize relationships with its wealthy neighbours is clear through its objectives of reopening the Nassib and al-Bukamal border crossings with Jordan and Iraq, respectively; the reopening of the Emirati and Bahraini embassies in Damascus; and efforts to reintegrate the Syrian government in the Arab League.
Yet Assad still faces many challenges in stabilizing the country. The level of destruction endured by the population cannot be simply fixed through economic growth. In this context, it is important to remember that the Syrian uprising was only partially motivated by the economy. Democracy, greater individual liberties, rule of law, accountability and transparency were and still are legitimate aspirations in the eyes of the people.
To date, economic sanctions intended to induce changes in regime behaviour or persuade Russia and Iran to reduce their support of Assad have been insufficient. Such economic tools can only be effective as part of a comprehensive framework to assist Syria in a meaningful and credible political transition. In this context, sanctions should be used to hinder the regime’s capacity to coerce the population into submission; target monopolies and attempts of regime associates to control the Syrian economy; and persuade foreign entities and governments to invest in Syria’s political and financial rehabilitation.
The efficiency of US and EU sanctions on the Syrian economy is debatable, in light of the negative impact on civilians. However, it is necessary to impose and maintain sanctions on key individuals involved in financing the regime’s activities. Each time a new name is added to the growing list of sanctioned individuals, the regime is forced to find alternatives. If sanctions were to include foreign entities and individuals associated with the regime and its associates – as is expected once the US ratifies the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act – Russia and Iran’s protection of Assad may waver. US sanctions against Iran have hindered the latter’s activities in Syria. Potential sanctions on Russia have yet to be tested. The prospect of sanctions for those engaged in economic investments in Syria has already put off Chinese and Indian companies.
The regime and Russia are betting on their ability to exploit regional security concerns to induce reconciliation and push for the acceptance of Assad as the Syrian leader. Furthermore, they also wish to create a perception of a promising Syrian economy that attracts foreign funds to invest in the reconstruction phase. While the US and some European countries have ruled themselves out as participants in any future reconstruction of the country before there is a meaningful political transition, more needs to be done to persuade regional allies to follow suit. It is particularly important that Washington accommodates its partners’ security concerns, especially if it requires their participation in countering Iran’s expansion in the Levant.
Nonetheless, exercising economic and financial pressures on Assad will have severe consequences for the Syrian people. The UN in this context can play a positive role in alleviating the suffering of the most unfortunate. More efficient procurement procedures should be put in place to ensure higher levels of transparency and accountability when working with Syrian actors. On several occasions UN agencies have fallen victim to regime tactics and ended up financing those with close links to Assad or even Iranian and Russian local partners. To overcome this, donor countries should be able to monitor UN activities in Syria. This would allow them to prevent reinforcing blacklisted warlords and also to take cautionary actions if the UN fails to. In addition, UN agencies should be encouraged to increase their personnel through hiring vetted individuals, conducting continuous evaluation of their employees and limiting their dependencies on local organizations that are often affiliated with the regime indirectly. Finally, the return of refugees should be voluntary and donor countries and the UN should intensify their efforts to relieve the burden of host communities that accommodate refugees, especially as Russia is actively pressuring them to recognize Assad’s authority in exchange for the refugees’ return.
83 Oweis, K. Y. (2011), ‘Syria’s Makhlouf owes fortune and infamy to Assad’, Reuters, 17 June 2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-tycoon/syrias-makhlouf-owes-fortune-and-infamy-to-assad-idUSTRE75F7Z420110616 (accessed 21 Feb. 2019).
84 Makki, D. (2018), Syria’s war economy exacerbates divide between rich and poor, Middle East Institute, 6 November 2018, https://www.mei.edu/publications/syrias-war-economy-exacerbates-divide-between-rich-and-poor (accessed 21 Feb. 2019).