Conclusions
Russia has evolved a coherent concept and organization for the conduct of new-generation war. Many aspects of these have been and are being tested in Ukraine and in Syria, with useful lessons learned.37 Russia probably perceives itself as being superior to most, or all, NATO members at least in the many-faceted non-military aspects of its conduct. This may give Moscow the confidence to risk war with the potentially – or even actually – militarily stronger coalition. Axiomatically, an alliance such as NATO is militarily less than the sum of its parts. Inevitably, allies have more or less divergent aims and different levels of devotion to the cause. They endeavour to shift the heaviest burdens on to the shoulders of others. They have differing perceptions of justifiable risk, and differing levels of preparedness for pain. Strategy becomes a series of compromises between competing and/or conflicting interests that threatens indecision. Thus, too much can be made of the fact that that Russia’s conventional potential strength is limited, given a GDP in 2016 estimated by the World Bank at about half that of the UK and slightly less than that of the state of New York.38 In any contest, the weaker party is not the one with most to lose, but the one most afraid of losses. Self-assurance may well contribute to the assertion of a foreign policy that may seem not merely threatening, but foolhardy to some external observers. The risk of war resulting from miscalculation and/or hubris in assessing the opposition is now much greater than it was in the Cold War era.
What Russia’s political leadership and military high command intend, and believe, is one matter. What its capabilities actually are is another. The command-and-control system is probably inadequate to meet the demands of future war. Most of the army’s equipment is still, essentially, legacy kit from the Soviet era which is being modernized but not yet replaced by a new generation: to address this will take some time and investment that may be unaffordable without damage to the economy and, possibly, to popular support for the government.39 A number of questions remain, moreover. Is, for example, the latest materiel qualitatively comparable with that of the US – or even, in some critical areas, of other Western powers? Russia currently lags behind in many high-tech areas where qualitative superiority can potentially be decisive, such as digital command-and-control systems to enable network-centric operations.40 There are immediate manpower difficulties, too, with the expansion of the force structure not having been fully matched by increases in personnel numbers. Many non-elite units and formations are currently undermanned, casting doubt on their high readiness. Indeed, one estimate, using Russian figures, suggests that the ground forces as a whole are 19 per cent short of their theoretical composition.41 This should not be a longer-term problem, however, as the rising birth rate year-on-year from 1999–2015 can be expected to ensure the supply of manpower from a larger recruitment pool into the 2030s.42 But there must be doubts as to whether Russian military personnel, now and into the future, will be up to meeting the demands of doctrine. The almost half who are one-year conscripts will certainly not be, and there are grounds for questioning whether much of the professional contingent is of the calibre, training standards and flexibility required against a first-class enemy.
In its time of trial in 1941, the Red Army’s practice fell disastrously short of theory – and the theory itself proved to contain significant errors and weaknesses. Will its successor fare better?
On the other hand, how capable will NATO militaries, which to varying degrees have neglected high-end warfare for decades, and which in most cases have been hollowed out to save money, prove to be when put to an unexpected test? Even more critically, will its members now stand together in crisis, let alone find the will – and the money – to rebuild an effective deterrent in peacetime? At present, there are plenty of reasons for doubt. Let us hope we do not need to find out the answers.
37 For many examples, see Adamsky (2018), Moscow’s Syria Campaign.
38 World Bank Development Indicators, retrieved 1 July 2017; and for the comparison with the UK, using the US Bureau of Economic Analysis estimate, retrieved 8 December 2017.
39 See Connolly, R. and Boulègue, M. (2018), Russia’s New State Armament Programme.
40 In Russia’s New Ground Forces (2017), pp. 85–88, Sutyagin and Bronk cite numerous Russian articles from the military-industrial sector that illustrate the degree of dependence of defence industries on imports of modern Western technologies.
41 Ibid, pp. 135–137.
42 Kofman (2018), ‘The Durability of Russian Military Power’.