2. Reasons for the Dispute
The dispute between the Arab Quartet and Qatar is a serious one. It is also highly personalized, as the foreign policy of each country is decided by a handful of key individuals and does not always necessarily enjoy widespread support across their societies.6 Many Gulf families span several countries, and until the crisis broke out in 2017 citizens were being actively encouraged to work, invest and even marry across GCC borders. Thus, the dispute is sometimes viewed internationally as a squabble among princes who are playing foreign policy games on a grand regional canvas. But for the leaders concerned – especially those in Qatar and the UAE – the dispute touches on deep internal insecurities.
The members of the Arab Quartet have made a host of accusations against Qatar based on objections to its foreign policy, focusing on its supposed support of ‘extremism’, its relations with Iran, and its sponsorship of the satellite broadcaster Al Jazeera.
It may be surprising to think of the UAE and Qatar as vulnerable to domestic insecurity. In a region where many states have come under pressure because of failures to meet youth expectations or renew their social contracts, these two countries have barely seen opposition mobilization. This is partly because the UAE and Qatar enjoy world-record ratios of sovereign wealth to population. But their respective governments have different internal security concerns, resulting in very different policy responses. The UAE, led by Abu Dhabi, is focused on the perceived threat from the Muslim Brotherhood element in its society, and has cracked down on alleged sympathizers. Qatari leaders, by contrast, have traditionally been concerned with potential opposition from within the large ruling family, and do not regard the Muslim Brotherhood as having a significant foothold in Qatar’s largely politically quiescent and salafist society. Each sees the other as conspiring against it. The UAE has accused Qatar of supporting Emirati Islamist activists. Qatar has accused Saudi Arabia of (unsuccessfully) planning coups in 1996 and in 20057 – a concern that has been further stoked by the Arab Quartet’s championing of dissident Qatari princes during the current crisis.
The members of the Arab Quartet have made a host of accusations against Qatar based on objections to its foreign policy, focusing on its supposed support of ‘extremism’, its relations with Iran, and its sponsorship of the satellite broadcaster Al Jazeera. In July 2017 they issued a list of 13 demands to Qatar in order to end their embargo on the country. These included: cutting ties with ‘terrorist organizations’ – named as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Hezbollah and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), even though Qatar is part of the anti-ISIS coalition and has bombed ISIS positions in Syria; closing Al Jazeera and several other media outlets believed to be funded by Qatar; ending all contacts with opposition movements in the Quartet countries; closing all diplomatic representation in Iran; throwing out a recently established Turkish military base in Qatar; aligning itself fully with other Gulf countries’ foreign policies; and paying unspecified ‘reparations’ for the unspecified damage caused by its policies. The sweeping nature of these demands, notably the last two, meant that they were generally regarded by international observers as unachievable, and no serious progress has been made either in negotiating over or clarifying them.
At the core of the issue, however, is the Muslim Brotherhood and the perception on the part of the Quartet countries that Qatar has actively supported its movements across the region, including in its GCC neighbours. Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have all accused Qatar of supporting Brotherhood dissidents on their territory. Kuwait, for its part, has criticized Qatar as supporting Kuwaiti oppositionists, but has called for the dispute to be resolved diplomatically.
Table 1: Drivers and motivations of the Arab Quartet
|
Saudi Arabia |
UAE |
Bahrain |
Egypt |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Leaders/personalities |
Rise of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, and a strong, strategic alliance with Abu Dhabi leadership, has encouraged development of a shared view of the Muslim Brotherhood. |
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan has been preoccupied with Qatar/Muslim Brotherhood threat for years. There is a view in the UAE that Qatar’s ‘Father Emir’, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, is still pulling the strings in Doha. |
Long-running border disputes between Bahrain and Qatar had been resolved under King Hamad bin Issa Al Khalifa, and there had even been plans for a ‘Friendship Causeway’ to link the main island of Bahrain to Qatar (reducing Bahrain’s dependence on Saudi Arabia for imports). |
President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi has accused Qatar of consistently trying to undermine the Egyptian regime. |
|
Family/party |
Saudi Arabia opposed Emir Hamad’s bloodless 1995 coup against his father and allegedly supported a failed counter-coup in 1996. The Qatari leadership is regarded as having been closer to former Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef Al Saud than to his successor, Mohammed bin Salman. |
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed is publicly unchallenged when it comes to foreign policy, although there are suggestions that Dubai is less supportive of the trade embargo because of its role as a hub for Gulf (and wider) trade. |
Historical conflicts between the two dynasties had been largely relegated to the past, but some parts of the Al Khalifa family still resent Qatar. |
The Egyptian military accused Qatar, among others, of orchestrating the 2011 uprising that brought the Muslim Brotherhood to power. Former president Mohammed Morsi (elected in 2012 but swiftly deposed in the 2013 coup) was convicted of spying for Qatar in 2016. |
|
Regime security |
Saudi Arabia has accused Qatar of supporting Saudi dissidents, specifically those associated with the sahwa movement, who have some ideological commonalities with the Muslim Brotherhood. By contrast, the previous crown prince had worked with some of them against Al-Qaeda. |
The UAE has accused Qatar of directly supporting, funding and training Muslim Brotherhood dissidents in the country. In 2013 the UAE convicted 69 people on charges of plotting a coup on behalf of the Brotherhood. |
Bahrain’s local Muslim Brotherhood party enjoys a good relationship with the government. The government has latterly found it more politically expedient to accuse Qatar of funding and backing the largely Shia Islamist opposition – an accusation it has more usually levelled at Iran. |
Egypt has blamed Qatar for supporting the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the government of Mohammed Morsi, who was overthrown in a coup in 2013. |
|
Foreign policy competition |
There is a history of differences, between Bahrain and Qatar, Saudi Arabia over the Arab spring, as well as competition in Syria. Qatar sent small numbers of forces into Bahrain in 2011 and into Yemen in 2015 to show solidarity with other GCC countries. |
The UAE and Qatar backed different sides in Egypt, Libya, Gaza and Tunisia. The UAE sees Qatar supporting the Muslim Brotherhood/Islamists, at odds with the Emirati preference for secular, socially liberal authoritarians. |
Bahrain’s foreign policy is essentially to follow the Saudi line. |
Egypt works closely with the UAE in Libya. |
|
Societal perspectives |
The GCC dispute is not one of the top priorities for Saudis, who are preoccupied by a host of domestic issues. The embargo does not necessarily enjoy strong support in Saudi Arabia, but neither is it a focus of particular criticism (which is in any case strongly discouraged). |
The UAE has banned anyone in UAE territory from expressing sympathy with Qatar on social media (this extended to the arrest of a British national who wore a Qatar football shirt to a Qatar–Iraq football match that took place in Abu Dhabi as part of the 2019 Asian Cup). |
Bahrain has said that it is illegal for citizens and residents to express sympathy with Qatar on social media. Since 2011 many Bahraini Sunnis, fearful of an Iranian threat, have rallied around their government. It is harder to mobilize Bahraini society against Qatar. |
A significant minority still supports the Muslim Brotherhood, which is now banned as a terrorist organization. |
Qatar’s foreign policy
Qatar – in common with the other smaller GCC states – has long been nervous about the extent to which its much larger neighbour, Saudi Arabia, would respect its sovereignty and independence. But the current tensions largely date back to 1995, when Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani overthrew his father in a bloodless coup.8 The deposed emir fled to Saudi Arabia, and Qataris have long claimed that Saudi Arabia tried to restore him to power in at least one counter-coup in 1996 (and possibly again in 2005). This used to be whispered as a rationale for Qatar’s agreeing to host the main US airbase in the Middle East in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq: in 2003, the US moved its Middle East air operations centre from Saudi Arabia (where the presence of US troops has become a rallying cry for jihadists) to Al Udeid in Qatar, even as Qatar took in members of Saddam Hussein’s regime and family, and although many Qataris were opposed to the US-led war in Iraq. More recently, as the current crisis has developed, Al Jazeera has broadcast detailed allegations of the alleged Saudi counter-coup in 1996.9
Historically, Qatar’s foreign policy was limited to largely local relations, reflecting its tiny population, economy and military. The Al Thani family, which emerged as the rulers of Doha in the 19th century, signed a treaty with the UK in 1868 that they regard as the first recognition of Qatar as an entity independent of Bahrain (the latter’s Al Khalifa dynasty having formerly ruled the Qatari peninsula). Qatar became part of the Ottoman empire until 1915; and then, as the Ottomans retreated from the Gulf, signed another treaty with the UK whereby the Al Thanis in effect outsourced foreign policy in return for British recognition and protection.10
From the mid-1990s, Emir Hamad and his powerful foreign minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani radically changed Qatar’s foreign policy, making the country a far more active player in regional diplomacy. The new approach was based on their personal political inclinations and ambitions, as well as a desire to make Qatar important to a large number of countries internationally so as to reduce its vulnerability to potential threats from larger neighbours.11 This more assertive role was enabled by Qatar’s belated exploitation of its vast natural gas reserves; prior to the 1990s, other Gulf countries saw it as a relatively poor cousin.
Under Emir Hamad, Qatar began to challenge Saudi Arabia’s dominance of Gulf politics, using its financial and energy resources to establish itself as a foreign policy player, and building up a major new source of soft power in the form of broadcaster Al Jazeera. Qatar also adopted a role as a mediator in conflicts from the Israeli–Palestinian arena to Darfur and Lebanon, and as a major provider of foreign aid, as well as a large-scale sovereign investor abroad. It sought to be a friend to a wide range of competing political actors, hosting the US airbase at Al Udeid and inviting Israeli officials to debate on Al Jazeera, while also hosting members of the Taliban and Hamas. Western countries sometimes criticized its contacts particularly with the latter, but also found the existence of channels facilitated by Qatar useful from time to time. Doha also became home to Arab political activists of many stripes, working in think-tanks, universities and the media.
Qatar has been criticized extensively in the US and other Western countries for a permissive attitude to financing extremist organizations. A particular focus of attention in this respect has been Sheikh Abdullah bin Khalid Al Thani, a senior member of the ruling family who was minister of Islamic affairs in the 1990s. Sheikh Abdullah was widely seen as being sympathetic to jihadis, including members of Al-Qaeda, and hosted its leading figure Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in Doha in the 1990s, as well as returned mujahedin from the Afghanistan war.
Sheikh Abdullah then held the post of interior minister (although he is not thought to have held much real power) until 2013, when Sheikh Tamim came to the throne and removed him. Under Tamim, Qatar has tightened its laws, but it has never prosecuted anyone for financing terrorism. In 2014 it adopted laws on charity fundraising and on cybercrimes that included provisions on terrorist financing. In 2015 and 2016, for the first time, Qatar prosecuted five of its nationals for financing terrorism; none was convicted, however. These included the particularly prominent Abd Al-Rahman al-Nuaimi, formerly Qatar University professor and head of the Qatar Football Association, who has been designated by the US as an Al-Qaeda funder; in 2017 Qatar said he was still on trial.
It is important to recognize, however, that Qatar has historically not been unique among the GCC states in dealing with Islamist extremist groups. Most notably, before 9/11 all the GCC countries underestimated the risk that Al-Qaeda would pose both to the US and to their own internal security, but after the attacks on the mainland US Qatar’s neighbours were quicker to distance themselves from the group. In particular, attitudes in Saudi Arabia changed after Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) started to carry out attacks in the country, from 2003 onwards; and the Saudi interior ministry has since built up extensive counterterrorist capacities. In 2009 Saudi Arabia’s then interior minister, Mohammed bin Nayef, was the target of an assassination attempt by an Al-Qaeda returnee. Conversely, Al-Qaeda has never targeted Qatar.
A tipping point in Doha’s foreign policy came with the Arab uprisings of 2011, when Qatar became increasingly aligned with popular Islamist movements in the region.12 It was generally seen as sympathetic to the uprisings – in part because of the extensive coverage by Al Jazeera, which often gave a voice to protesters – but, like all the other countries in the region, it was selective about which uprisings and movements it supported. Along with other Gulf states, Qatar became directly involved in supporting the Syrian opposition in its efforts to overthrow the government of Bashar al-Assad; and, along with the UAE, it participated in enforcing the no-fly zone during the NATO-led intervention in Libya. But it went further than other Gulf states13 in offering economic support to the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated governments in Egypt and Tunisia, just as it had long offered economic support to Hamas.14 Like Turkey, Qatar shifted away from a posture of being ‘a friend to all’, and was more and more seen as taking sides. Al Jazeera also came under increasing criticism, not only in terms of ‘kneejerk’ reaction on the part of the region’s authoritarian governments to any challenging coverage, but also from liberals and religious minorities who saw the broadcaster’s output as all too often dominated by Sunni Islamist viewpoints.
Above all, international concerns started rising about exactly in whose hands Qatar’s money was ending up, particularly in Syria. Objectively, of the support for the Syrian opposition that came from Gulf actors and Turkey, Qatar was probably at the most extreme end of the range. Former prime minister Hamad bin Jasim was quoted in 2017 as saying that the Qatar had ‘maybe’ supported the Al Nusra Front in Syria, but that it had moved away from the group when its unacceptability became clearer.15 Qatar also reportedly encouraged the Al Nusra Front to break officially with Al-Qaeda in 2016,16 which it projected as an attempt to moderate the group. Its critics, however, pointed to this as Qatar trying to normalize Al-Qaeda through a cosmetic rebranding.17
Qatar’s record of enforcing laws against financing terrorism has also come under critical scrutiny. For instance, David Cohen, a counterterrorism specialist at the US Treasury, said in 2014 that Qatar and Kuwait were the more permissive jurisdictions;18 and the then US assistant secretary for terrorism financing, Daniel Glaser, said in 2016 that Qatar had made less progress in combating financing for terrorist actors than Saudi Arabia had.19 Furthermore, Qatar’s neighbours were also angered by reports that the emirate had made ransom payments of between £250 million and £1 billion to a variety of militants in 2017 to secure the release of several members of its royal family who were being held hostage in Iraq.20
Friction between Qatar and its Gulf neighbours
The other Gulf monarchies were far more wary of the Arab uprisings and of political Islam, perhaps because they had greater concern about opposition at home. Their media outlets took a very different tone towards the 2011 wave of protests. Nonetheless, in some cases they did support changes of regime or government. This was particularly the case in Syria, where there was extensive support for groups fighting the Assad government; in Libya, where the UAE joined Qatar in supporting the no-fly zone against the Gaddafi regime; and in Yemen, where the GCC helped broker the transition deal whereby Ali Abdullah Saleh ceded the presidency in 2012. More recently in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been working with non-state actors, including a variety of armed Islamist groups,21 as well as the internationally recognized but exiled government of Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, in an attempt to reverse the 2014 coup. And in Libya, they have supported the forces of General Khalifa Haftar, who launched an assault on the capital in 2019. The distinction between Qatar and the other Gulf monarchies when it comes to supporting non-state actors is thus not quite as binary as the UAE and Saudi Arabia claim. However, they have generally been less comfortable working with Islamist groups, particularly in Syria.
Qatar’s foreign policy adventurism has, in part, reflected the government’s almost total lack of anxiety about domestic opposition. Given a history of internal coups, the main domestic concern of successive Al Thani rulers has been rivals within the ruling family itself. But in a society of some 300,000 citizens, the government has largely been able to legitimize its rule by dispensing its vast gas wealth, which has made Qataris the richest people in the world (measured by GDP per capita at purchasing-power parity). It has repeatedly postponed promised parliamentary elections, with little pushback – and a general sense of disinterest – from the public when these have not materialized.22 This is perhaps partly because traditional parliament-based means of consultation are relatively effective in such a small and closely connected society.
Qatar’s foreign policy adventurism has, in part, reflected the government’s almost total lack of anxiety about domestic opposition.
It was mainly over Egypt that the divisions between Qatar and its neighbours deepened. Saudi Arabia and the UAE portray Qatar’s aid to the Muslim Brotherhood government of President Mohammed Morsi, elected in 2012, as a deliberate attempt to destabilize a country that they call the pillar of Arab stability – even as Western countries also engaged with Morsi’s government and encouraged all the GCC states to give it economic support. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait actively supported the military’s seizure of power in 2013; and the UAE in particular has since then engaged intensively in economic, political and security support for the government of President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi. The UAE’s gross aid to Egypt in 2015 was $2.5 billion, amounting to around 0.7 per cent of the Emirates’ GDP.23
That the members of the Quartet have been so riled by Al Jazeera has added credence to Doha’s line that Qatar is being punished for supporting democracy and freedom of speech. However, while Al Jazeera Arabic has massively increased the diversity of voices on air in the Arab world, it is at times partisan and politicized. For instance, it began to air criticism of the Saudi-led war in Yemen only after its row with Saudi Arabia began in 2017.
Qatar and Bahrain
Qatar’s apparent support for the Arab uprisings did not extend to the most potentially destabilizing uprising that took place within the GCC itself – i.e. in Bahrain, beginning in February 2011. Al Jazeera Arabic barely covered the protests there, nor did it give much airtime to the smaller scale ones in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province or in Oman.24 Speaking at Chatham House in early 2012, the station’s former director-general (from 2003–11), Wadah Khanfar, acknowledged that the broadcaster had devoted less coverage to the uprising in Bahrain than to those in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria or Yemen, stating that this was because attitudes to the protests in Bahrain’s society were politically divided on sectarian lines.25 Bahrain’s opposition is primarily made up of Shia Muslims, who constitute the majority of the population, while the (Sunni) Muslim Brotherhood is generally aligned with the government.
During the protests in Bahrain, its crown prince consulted with Qatar and other GCC countries. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait agreed to provide the government with $5 billion in economic aid through the institution of the GCC. The report of the official inquiry into the protests26 cited opposition sources as saying that Qatar’s emir had in March 2011 attempted to mediate between the government of Bahrain and the opposition, but that the government had rejected this.27 The US also tried to mediate at this time, without success, and an earlier mediation effort by Kuwait was also rebuffed by Manama. As events on the street escalated, Qatar sent a small number of police to Bahrain to join UAE and Saudi forces in supporting the Bahrain government as it cracked down on the protests. By contrast, Kuwait and Oman did not participate, as they had reservations about intervening in Bahrain’s domestic politics and about the potential effects this could have on their own internal political and sectarian balance.
Thus, Qatar gave security and financial support to the government of Bahrain when it faced a serious internal challenge. After the GCC crisis broke out in 2017, however, Bahrain’s state media released partial recordings of several phone calls between Qatari officials and Bahraini opposition leaders purportedly showing that Qatar was covertly supporting the protesters. The extracts released at this time included parts of calls between Qatar’s prime minister and Bahraini opposition leader Sheikh Ali Salman, of the Shia Islamist political movement Al Wefaq, and sections of four calls between one of the emir’s advisers and another Wefaq politician, Hassan Sultan.28 The Bahraini opposition and Qatari officials both said the calls took place as part of Qatar’s mediation attempts. The clips indicate that Qatar and Al Wefaq were communicating, and that Qatari officials expressed some sympathy with protesters, saying they wished the situation had not escalated to a military deployment and that the priority was to remain peaceful; beyond this, however, the publicly available extracts do not indicate a Qatari contribution to the protests.
In November 2017 the authorities charged Ali Salman, who was already serving a prison sentence on charges of inciting violence, with conspiring with Qatar, which is potentially punishable by death. He was acquitted in June 2018, but in November this acquittal was overturned and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. This came the day after a meeting between the kings of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, amid reports that the US was pressing the Arab Quartet countries to end their boycott of Qatar.29
It is noteworthy that the allegations of Qatar’s collusion with the Bahraini opposition in 2011 emerged only when the Qatar crisis began in 2017; before that, Manama had blamed Iran and Iraq for supporting the opposition. Bahrain’s Muslim Brotherhood has a generally good relationship with the government and the ruling family, and it appears to have been politically convenient for the latter to link Qatar with the Shia opposition rather than the Brotherhood.
The Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf
The governments of the UAE, Saudi Arabia and (less vocally) Kuwait have all accused Qatar of supporting Muslim Brotherhood opposition groups (or, in the case of Saudi Arabia, opposition clerics) inside their countries. Certainly, Al Jazeera has frequently given airtime to dissidents from other Gulf countries, and Qatar has hosted some dissidents at conferences. Many of the Quartet’s complaints focus on Al Jazeera supposedly undermining Arab states in general by providing such a platform. Beyond this, there is little basis in the public domain for assessing the Quartet’s claims that Qatar supported opponents in more direct ways. While the Gulf ruling families have had their own differences and disputes, they have historically eschewed supporting opposition movements in each other’s countries – not least because most of these draw inspiration from broader transnational movements and an internal popular challenge to any one Gulf monarchy could potentially have a knock-on effect on the others. However, it is also possible that Qatar is an exception because of its rulers’ lack of anxiety about domestic opposition movements.
The concern is greatest on the part of the UAE, where Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed has been a staunch opponent of political Islam in all its forms. The Muslim Brotherhood is the only movement that the Abu Dhabi leadership believes to have posed a serious domestic political threat to the UAE government for many years; the UAE has no openly active opposition parties or protests, and it has experienced very few terrorist incidents. In July 2013, however, 69 people were convicted of plotting a coup on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood’s local affiliate Islah.30 Since then, UAE media have repeatedly claimed that Qatar provided specific training and support for the Muslim Brotherhood in the Emirates. From the point of view of the Abu Dhabi leadership, therefore, this is not just about differences over foreign policy: its position is that Qatar was complicit in a serious and possibly existential threat to its rule.
This is contentious, and is typically seen by Western governments as exaggerated. The situation is complicated by the fact that, prior to the rise of Mohammed bin Zayed as the de facto leader of the UAE, Islah was largely accepted there as a social movement with some narrow influence. It was not traditionally seen as a ‘terrorist’ group. As in Qatar (and several other countries), Islah focused on society, charitable activities and education rather than engaging overtly in politics – although gaining ideological influence in society and in the education system can be a precursor to more formal political activism. According to some former Western diplomats, Mohammed bin Zayed has indicated that he almost fell under the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood as a youth, and that he has a particular animosity towards it as a result.
The extent to which Islah posed a genuine threat to the UAE authorities in 2013 is unclear to external observers, but it is not at all thought to have been on the brink of a coup, or to have had the coercive capacity required to seize power. The UAE’s record of regarding relatively mild forms of dissent as a security threat can make it difficult for outsiders to distinguish between more and less serious accusations; for instance, several people were jailed in 2011 for petitioning the ruler for an elected parliament (one of whom, the human rights activist Ahmed Mansoor, is now serving a 10-year jail term for social media postings deemed to have damaged the country’s reputation), and one of those arrested in 2013, Mohammed Al Roken, was a human rights lawyer.
The sense of threat in the UAE also stemmed from broader regional dynamics. The convictions in July 2013 came at a time of pushback against the Muslim Brotherhood in the wider region; for example, the coup against President Morsi in Egypt took place the day after the convictions in the UAE. These events also took place just after Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa had unexpectedly abdicated the Qatari throne in favour of his son Tamim (although the abdication is largely thought to have been for health reasons), and the former prime minister and foreign minister Hamad bin Jasim was removed from all his positions.
Emir Tamim: attempts to reset relations
Saudi Arabia and the UAE saw the accession of Sheikh Tamim as an opportunity to reset relations with Qatar. In his inaugural address, Tamin spoke of the need for Qatar to reach ‘the highest levels of integration’ with other GCC countries and to respect the sovereignty of all other Arab countries, although he also said that Qatar’s founder had promised that the country should be ‘a refuge for the oppressed’ and that he would remain faithful to that.31 A meeting between the new emir and Egypt’s interim president, Adly Mansour, was also welcomed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. At the same time, Qatar became a refuge for some Muslim Brotherhood members fleeing Egypt. Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, an influential Egyptian cleric based in Qatar, publicly criticized GCC countries that had supported the military coup.32
In 2013 and again in 2014, the other GCC states reached agreements with Qatar to resolve the sources of friction (see Box 1).33 Copies of these agreements, leaked to the broadcaster CNN in 2017, give some insight into the threat perceptions of the GCC states, and highlight the extent to which the governments of the GCC countries regard critical media and opposition activism as security threats.34 This presents a dilemma for Western governments. They may not agree with Qatar’s support for Islamists, but quite a few of the Qatari behaviours criticized by other GCC countries – such as giving refuge to opposition activists and hosting critical media – are normal activities for Western democracies.
By the time of the second agreement in 2014, the GCC states had other matters to preoccupy them. ISIS had proved to be a more serious threat than they had foreseen, and most of them signed up to join the US-led anti-ISIS airstrikes in Syria. The accession of King Salman in Saudi Arabia in early 2015 also changed the dynamics – initially in Qatar’s favour, as he appeared less preoccupied with the idea of the Muslim Brotherhood as a critical threat. When Saudi Arabia called on other GCC countries to go to war in Yemen to overturn the 2014 coup, Qatar joined the coalition. The two countries shared a common interest not only in countering the coup, but in supporting Yemen’s Islah party, generally seen as sympathetic to Muslim Brotherhood thinking although not a formal part of the international movement.
Two years later, however, Abu Dhabi remained adamant that Qatar was supporting movements that threatened the UAE’s security. Increasingly, it appeared to have persuaded Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman that Qatar was supporting Saudi Islamists who were detrimental to his social and economic reform projects. Beyond the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi Arabia has focused on Qatar’s relations with Iran. This cannot, however, be the main driver of the rift, since other GCC countries also have some degree of relations with Iran. (Oman’s in particular are closer, warmer and far better established that Qatar’s.) An additional factor appears to have been the 2017 hostage deal whereby some of the money paid by the Qatari royal family went to the Shia militia Kata’eb Hezbollah as well as to Sunni jihadi groups.
In an indication of the personalization of politics in the GCC countries, just as King Salman’s accession Saudi Arabia had initially eased tensions with Qatar, Mohammed bin Salman’s appointment as crown prince in April 2017 paved the way for a new standoff with Qatar – and an entirely new approach to regional relations. This approach was also enabled and encouraged by US President Donald Trump, who has championed Mohammed bin Zayed and Mohammed bin Salman as key forces for positive change in the region, and the strong relations that the two crown princes had developed with Trump’s son-in-law and Middle East envoy, Jared Kushner.35
Box 1: The 2013 and 2014 Riyadh agreements
A short agreement was reported in 2013 to have been concluded in Riyadh between the rulers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar. The agreement included three commitments: that they would not interfere in each other’s internal affairs, support each other’s dissidents or ‘antagonistic media’, or give asylum to oppositionists from other Gulf countries; that they would not support the Muslim Brotherhood or other organizations that threatened security and stability; and that they would not support any faction in Yemen that could threaten the country’s neighbours. In March 2014, however, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE withdrew their ambassadors from Doha, asserting that Qatar was failing to implement GCC agreements. They called on it not to support any party threatening their stability, and stated that it had refused to sign a common security pact. By Qatar’s account, their differences were over issues outside the GCC itself. The situation in Egypt continued to be a particular source of tension, as was evident in November 2014 when Qatar asked Egypt to return $2.5 billion that it had provided to support the Egyptian currency during Morsi’s presidency.
A second Riyadh agreement was reached in December 2014, this time by all the GCC leaders except for Sultan Qaboos of Oman (but including Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum of Dubai). Its main principles essentially repeated those of the 2013 agreement, but instead of referring to Yemen (which was not now mentioned), it included a clause saying that all GCC countries would support Egypt and cease any media activity against the country – in effect conflating media criticism of the Egyptian government with media opposition to the country, as Gulf countries often deliberately obfuscate such distinctions. Specific commitments included deporting any non-citizen members of the Muslim Brotherhood; shutting down centres that ‘train GCC citizens to work against their own governments’; and not offering support or refuge to anyone who acts in opposition to the GCC states, even if they are current or former officials – perhaps a veiled reference to the former emir and prime minister of Qatar.
As part of this effort at rapprochement, Al Jazeera suspended its Egyptian channel, Al Jazeera Mubasher Misr. This move, welcomed by Egypt, is illustrative of the recurring importance of media as a perceived security issue in the region, and is just one instance of state-owned media being instrumentalized for diplomatic purposes.
Box 2: Claims of Qatari support for the UAE and Saudi oppositions
In July 2017 several UAE newspapers reported comments made by an alleged repentant member of the UAE Muslim Brotherhood, Abdul Rahman bin Subaih Khalifa Al Suwaidi, in a television interview for a documentary called ‘Qatar’s Files for Supporting Terrorism’. He was quoted as saying that Qatar sought to spread chaos in the UAE by supporting the Muslim Brotherhood.
Al Suwaidi alleged that a Qatari, Mohammed Al Jaida, who had been arrested in the UAE in 2013 (and jailed for two years before being returned to Qatar), had carried funds from Qatar to ‘the secret organization in the UAE’ and to fugitive Emirati members of the organization in an attempt to ‘regroup’ the organization after its members were arrested. Al Suwaidi added that this was done with the knowledge of the Qatari government, which was assisting the Muslim Brotherhood in spreading chaos ‘by guiding and harbouring its elements and securing travel documents for them’, and that ‘a training programme was conducted in the UAE on how to spread chaos and stir troubles in the UAE through social media platforms’. Overall, he said, ‘Qatar has not left the Muslim Brotherhood elements, it opened the doors for them to vent their hatred of the UAE.’ Al Jaida has rejected all such allegations,36 and said he was falsely imprisoned as a political pawn in the intra-GCC political dispute.
Again, the UAE’s wide definition of terrorism and security threats, which makes little distinction between social-media activism and cyberterrorism, makes it difficult to assess the seriousness of the allegations. Online criticism is often conflated with attempts to spread chaos and undermine national unity.
In Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, several critics and activists, including clerics, were arrested in September 2017. There were suggestions in the local media that some may have received funding from Qatar. Moreover, one of them, Sheikh Salman Al Auda, was arrested after tweeting his support for reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. However, his views on Qatar were most likely only a pretext, or at most a trigger, for his arrest. His imprisonment is part of a broader push by the Saudi leadership to weaken any constituencies that have been sources of political opposition, including clerics. Ironically, in a bid to reassure Saudi Arabia of its goodwill, Qatar had deported one activist, Mohammed Al Otaibi, back to Saudi Arabia just a week before the GCC crisis erupted.37
6 Data are limited as there are systematic efforts to prevent citizens in the relevant countries from expressing views contrary to government positions on the dispute. In the UAE and Bahrain, the governments have explicitly said that it is illegal to express sympathy with Qatar; in one case, security forces even arrested a British tourist for wearing a Qatar football shirt to a Qatar–Iraq football match in Abu Dhabi when the emirate hosted the Asian Cup in 2019.
7 Ulrichsen, K. (2017), ‘Qatar: The Gulf’s Problem Child’, The Atlantic, 5 June 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/qatar-gcc-saudi-arabia-yemen-bahrain/529227/ (accessed 5 March 2019).
8 Saudi tensions with Hamad bin Khalifa himself have a longer history, including a ‘friendly fire’ incident during the 1991 invasion of Kuwait.
9 Al Jazeera (2018), ‘New details revealed on 1996 coup attempt against Qatar’, 4 March 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/al-jazeera-reveals-details-1996-coup-attempt-qatar-180304200532130.html (accessed Aug. 30 2018).
10 British records indicate some concern that Qatar’s education ministry was sympathetic to Arab nationalism and anti-imperialism, and that visits by Qatari education officials to the then Trucial States (which became the UAE) might damage British influence there. This was never a major issue between the countries, but is interesting to compare with the current Quartet objections to the ideas promoted by Qatar. See Smith, S. (2004), Britain’s Revival and Fall in the Gulf: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial States, 1950-71, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, p. 54.
11 Roberts, D. B. (2012), ‘Understanding Qatar’s Foreign Policy Objectives’, Mediterranean Politics, 17(2), 233–39, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2012.695123 (accessed 30 Aug. 2018).
12 Coates Ulrichsen, K. (2014), Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy Drivers and Regional Implications, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 24 September 2014, https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/24/qatar-and-arab-spring-policy-drivers-and-regional-implications-pub-56723 (accessed Jun. 2018).
13 Saudi Arabia and the UAE also promised aid to Egypt after the uprising, but their delivery of aid slowed or halted after President Mohammed Morsi was elected in 2012. Morsi visited Saudi Arabia to seek aid, but aid flows resumed only after he was ousted the following year. See Farouk, Y. (2014), More Than Money: Post-Mubarak Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, Gulf Research Center, April 2014, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/179860/Egypt_Money_new_29-4-14_2576.pdf (accessed 30 Aug. 2018).
14 At home, however, the emir moved to emphasize Qatar’s tradition of salafi Islam. In 2011 he opened a new central mosque in Doha, named after Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdul Wahhab – the Saudi theologian after whom ‘Wahhabism’ is named. In May 2017, just before the embargo, the latter’s descendants in Saudi Arabia wrote to the emir demanding that he drop the name from the mosque and reportedly said the mosque did not represent the Wahhabi tradition. Gulf News (2017), ‘Saudi family wants Qatar mosque name changed’, 28 May 2017, https://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/saudi-arabia/saudi-family-wants-qatar-mosque-name-changed-1.2034425 (accessed 7 Nov. 2018).
15 ‘Qatar ‘maybe’ supported al-Qaeda in Syria, says former PM’, Middle East Eye and agencies, 30 October 2017. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/qatar-maybe-supported-al-qaeda-syria-says-former-pm-1280907406 (accessed 7 Nov. 2018).
16 Roberts, D. (2015), ‘Is Qatar Bringing The Nusra Front In From The Cold?’, BBC News, 6 March 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31764114; Karouny, M. (2015), ‘Insight – Syria’s Nusra Front may leave Qaeda to form new entity’, Reuters, 4 March 2015, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-nusra-insight-idUKKBN0… (accessed 7 Nov. 2018).
17 See for example Schanzer, J. (2017), ‘Assessing the US-Qatar Relationship’, Congressional Testimony, Foundation for the Defence of Democracy, 26 July 2017, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20170726/106329/HHRG-115-FA13-Wstate-SchanzerJ-20170726.pdf (accessed 8 Jul. 2018).
18 US Department of the Treasury, ‘Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen before the Center for a New American Security on “Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing”’, 4 March 2014, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx (accessed 5 Mar. 2019).
19 Slavin, B. (2016), ‘U.S. Treasury Official Praises Saudi Cooperation Against Terror Funding.’ Al Monitor, 14 October 2016, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/10/us-treasury-official-saudi-combat-terror-funding.html (accessed 7 Nov. 2018).
20 Wood, P, (2018), ‘‘Billion dollar ransom’: Did Qatar pay record sum?’, BBC News, 17 July 2018, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-44660369 (accessed 5 Mar. 2019).
21 Specifically, these are a mix of Yemen’s Islah party (broadly aligned to the Muslim Brotherhood way of thinking but with some local differences) and various salafist groups.
22 Gengler, J. (2011), ‘Qatar’s Ambivalent Democratization’, Foreign Policy, 1 November 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/11/01/qatars-ambivalent-democratization/ (accessed 7 Nov. 2018).
23 OECD Development Assistance Committee data put the UAE’s gross overseas development assistance (ODA) to Egypt at $2.5 billion in 2015. GDP was $358 billion in the same year, according to the World Bank. The UAE’s net ODA disbursements in 2015, at $4.4 billion, were equivalent to 1.2 per cent of gross national income, and 84 per cent of this went to five Arab countries: Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Iraq and Morocco. See OECD (2019), ‘United Arab Emirates’ Development Co-operation’, http://www.oecd.org/countries/unitedarabemirates/uae-official-development-assistance.htm (accessed 28 Mar. 2019).
24 Al Jazeera International, the English-language news channel, took a different approach, including broadcasting two documentaries about the protests.
25 Royal Institute of International Affairs (2012), Transcript: Q&A, Al Jazeera and the Arab Spring, Chatham House members’ event, 19 January 2012, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Meetings/Meeting%20Transcripts/190112khanfarQ%26A.pdf (accessed 7 Nov. 2018).
26 The Independent Commission of Inquiry, established by official order of King Hamad in July 2011, presented its report in November of that year.
27 Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (2011), Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, p. 143, para 527, http://www.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf (accessed 8 Jul. 2018).
28 The publicly available transcripts of the latter show that Hassan Sultan had accused the small number of Qatari police of being part of Gulf occupation forces helping to give a Gulf blessing to the crackdown in Bahrain; in response, the emir’s adviser, Hamad Khalifa Al Attiyah, said that Qatar had some reservations and would potentially be willing to change its policy if it had solid information about the problems. He also said he would potentially be willing to meet in person in Bahrain, and offered to connect another Al Wefaq politician with Al Jazeera for an interview. See Gulf News, ‘Bahrain TV plays tapes showing Qatar’s role in 2011 crisis’, 17 June 2017, https://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/bahrain-tv-plays-tapes-showing-qatar-s-role-in-2011-crisis-1.2045153 (accessed 7 Nov. 2018).
29 Paul, K. and El Gamal, R. (2018), ‘Saudi Arabia defies U.S. pressure to end Qatar row after Khashoggi killing’, Reuters, 16 November 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-usa-gulf/saudi-arabia-defies-u-s-pressure-to-end-qatar-row-after-khashoggi-killing-idUSKCN1NL1XM (accessed 5 Mar. 2019).
30 Peel, M. and Hall, C. (2016), ‘Scores of Emiratis jailed after coup plot trial in Abu Dhabi’, Financial Times, 2 July 2013, https://www.ft.com/content/379fc630-e2ed-11e2-9bb2-00144feabdc0 (accessed 30 Aug. 2018).
31 Government of Qatar (2013), ‘The Inaugural Speech of His Highness Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani, The Amir of Qatar, on Becoming the Amir’, 26 June 2013, https://www.gco.gov.qa/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/The-Inaugural-Speech-of-HH-Sheikh-Tamim-bin-Hamad-Al-Thani-on-Becoming-the-Emir-of-Qatar.pdf (accessed 5 Mar. 2019).
32 Hellyer, H. A. (2014), ‘Withdrawal of Qatari Ambassadors Points To Deep Frustration’, The National, 6 March 2014, https://www.thenational.ae/withdrawal-of-qatari-ambassadors-points-to-deep-frustration-1.282622 (accessed 30 Aug. 2018).
33 In August 2014 Bahrain also called on Qatar to stop naturalizing Bahrainis, stating that Qatar was luring a certain segment of Bahraini society to become Qatari citizens. This was a sensitive issue for Bahrain, as it is itself believed to be naturalizing Sunni Arabs from elsewhere in order to tilt its demographic balance and reduce the Shia majority (which is seen as the backbone of support for the political opposition). Meanwhile, Qatar was thought to be offering citizenship to Bahrainis from Sunni tribal backgrounds (traditionally a bedrock of support for the Bahraini ruling family). In response, Qatar said it would stop naturalizing citizens from other GCC states.
34 Sciutto, J. and Herb, J. (2017), ‘Exclusive: The secret documents that help explain the Qatar crisis, CNN, 11 July 2017, https://edition.cnn.com/2017/07/10/politics/secret-documents-qatar-crisis-gulf-saudi/index.html (accessed 30 Aug. 2018); the documents leaked to CNN are at https://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2017/images/07/10/translation.of.agreementsupdated.pdf.
35 Cynics pointed to the fact that the Qatari government had declined to make a major investment in a New York property owned by Kushner’s father just before the crisis broke out.
36 MacDonald, A. (2017), ‘A Qatari citizen’s two years of abuse and false imprisonment by the UAE’, Middle East Eye, 28 August 2017, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-qatari-citizen-describes-two-years-abuse-and-false-imprisonment-uae-1532406963 (accessed 30 Aug. 2018).
37 Khaleej Times (2017), ‘Saudi fugitive ‘deported’ from Qatar’, 30 May 2017, https://www.khaleejtimes.com/region/qatar/saudi-fugitive-deported-from-qatar (accessed 30 Aug. 2018).