6. Conclusions
Most observers assume the most likely scenario is that the dispute between Qatar and its Gulf neighbours will settle into a holding pattern for several years, with most outside parties trying to maintain relations with both sides. Neither side seems willing to compromise; neither is hurting enough to break the stalemate; each appears convinced it is right; and there is limited international pressure to negotiate a solution. Paradoxically, the two countries in the region that appear to have the greatest chance of political stability – Qatar and the UAE – will be actively undermining each other, to the considerable detriment of the GCC’s long-standing reputation for business-focused political stability. That said, the dynamics could still change quickly, since the politics that are driving the current stand-off are so highly personalized among a handful of senior leaders whose calculations could change in the face of any shocks or surprises affecting regional politics.
Risks of escalation
While it is usually assumed that the situation is a stalemate, there are risks of escalation. In January 2018, for instance, the UAE and Qatar made rival assertions that, by Qatar’s account, UAE fighter jets had infringed on Qatar’s airspace, and, by the UAE’s, that Qatar had harassed civilian aircraft;78 and there have been similar claims and counterclaims over fishing boats. The risks of such incidents are particularly high in the small area that the GCC countries share, and tensions are high in the context of (unconfirmed) reports that the UAE and Saudi Arabia had considered a military invasion of Qatar.79
Another way the situation could escalate is if Qatar were to become more involved in supporting opposition movements in its Gulf neighbours. Already, the Qatari-funded media now offers more of a platform for criticism of other Gulf countries than it has ever done previously. Qatar does not have much organized opposition for the UAE or Saudi Arabia to back, but the Arab Quartet countries have given a platform to dissident members of its royal family. This began with Sheikh Abdullah bin Ali Al Thani,80 but in an odd episode in January 2018 he was filmed in Abu Dhabi saying that he was detained there, and then left the country.81 More recently, the son of a former crown prince has been featured in the media in Quartet countries, alleging that his father was poisoned by the former Qatari emir, Sheikh Hamad.82
So far, Western government assessments suggest that Qatar’s main response to the embargo appears to have been to lobby against the Quartet and deploy its media against them. But there could be further escalation if it started to give substantive support to non-state armed groups that Quartet countries are fighting. The UAE’s military has become more extended in the region in recent years, and there are some concerns that if it is overstretched this may create vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, 2019 has seen a revival of public protests in several Arab countries, particularly in Algeria and Sudan, where protesters have called for long-standing rulers to step down, in a manner reminiscent of the 2011 Arab uprisings. If there are further contested political transitions in the region, Qatar and the Quartet may sometimes find themselves on different sides. It is also quite possible that individuals or groups who are seeking power will court either Qatar or the Quartet for financial support, promising to be staunch allies in the future.
Prospects for resolution
Several factors could drive the parties to begin unwinding the tensions:
A US-driven ‘cold peace’
As the pre-eminent security ally for all the countries concerned, the US could make a difference. US ambitions to build a Middle East Strategic Alliance of Arab states – largely as a signal to Iran – could at least bring Qatar and the countries of the Arab Quartet around the same table in pursuit of a larger cause – even if it is uncertain how active or significant the alliance may be in reality. As part of this effort to convene an anti-Iranian bloc, the US may push for the embargo to be wound down and for Qatar, in return, to curb its recently strengthened ties with Iran.
As part of this effort to convene an anti-Iranian bloc, the US may push for the embargo to be wound down and for Qatar, in return, to curb its recently strengthened ties with Iran.
But even if the embargo does come to an end, the recent events will mean an enduring legacy of mistrust among leaders in Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia who may be in charge of their countries for decades to come. The longer the divisions last, the greater the risk that they will also be entrenched within societies, circumscribing leaders’ future options.
Economic necessity
With all the GCC countries needing to focus on diversifying their economies, economic factors could bring about at least the restoration of trade and transport links between the two sides. The rift took investors by surprise, and disrupted business activity; it has thereby added to investors’ perceptions of political risks for the Gulf as a whole.83
The countries of the Arab Quartet could come to take the view that their embargo, in making no distinction between leaders and ordinary citizens, has backfired by encouraging Qataris to rally round their government. If they were to focus more on public diplomacy, they could ease the embargo as a sign of goodwill to the Qatari public (which would also have benefits for their own economy) without necessarily reaching a resolution on all of the political issues.
A more comprehensive solution could involve a resumption of trade and transport ties, mutual investments (such as Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund investing in some of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 projects), joint energy projects (the UAE relies on Qatari gas, while Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are both in need of new gas supplies).
There could also be joint tourism initiatives linked to Qatar’s hosting of the football World Cup in 2022. The World Cup could potentially be an occasion for overcoming differences, especially because citizens from the Quartet will naturally want to attend. The chairman of the UAE’s General Authority for Sports, Mohammed Khalfan al-Romaithi, a former Abu Dhabi police chief who is standing for the presidency of the Asian Football Federation, has suggested football could bring the countries back together and said in January 2018 that the UAE would be open to co-hosting the World Cup if the rift was resolved.84
The GCC’s external partners could, meanwhile, offer incentives, including the ability to resume trade negotiations as a bloc, and further defence cooperation with the GCC as a whole.
External shocks
External shocks could force the GCC countries to work together again. In 2014 the tensions between Qatar and some of its neighbours were reduced partly because they saw a common threat in the rise of ISIS. Subsequently, in 2015, they saw a common interest in working together to intervene in Yemen.
If other issues destabilize the wider region, their calculations could again change. In the event of a conflict between the US and Iran, for instance, it might become untenable for Qatar to maintain its relations with the latter; or a collapse in oil prices might yet force economic cooperation among the GCC states higher up the political agenda. (There was some speculation following the assassination of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi, in Istanbul in October 2018, that the damage done to Saudi Arabia’s international reputation might prompt it to mend fences with Qatar, perhaps as part of a political deal with Turkey, which had access to intelligence about the Saudi role in the killing. However, this did not materialize.)
Taking account of all these factors, elements of a solution could include the following:
- The GCC leaders would recognize that they need to demonstrate their capacity to mediate, negotiate and arrive at solutions if they are to be credible as leaders in a region beset by multiple conflicts. The propaganda war has damaged all of them, and is a poor use of resources.
- Each would also publicly recognize that other Arab states are entitled to hold different positions on the role of Islam in their politics, constitutions and legislation. These differences should be respected as part of the right of independent, sovereign states to self-determination.
- At the same time, the GCC states should each undertake not to undermine each other’s security. Since concepts of security differ from country to country, this commitment would need to be defined in far greater detail than was set out in the brief and sketchy 2013–14 Riyadh agreements. A formulation would need to be found to accommodate security concerns and show goodwill, without insisting that all GCC countries deny a voice to every critical journalist or scholar.
- Media professionalism and standards in the region have been badly damaged and are in urgent need of repair. The countries of the Arab Quartet object to Al Jazeera because they are unused to such criticism from their own media, and also because they see the channel as politicized and partisan. As a result of the dispute, the politicization of the media has intensified on both sides. This, in turn, has held back the development of credible media that can explain the region to international audiences. The GCC states should bring in – and uphold – new media standards based on international best practice, with advice and training on impartiality and governance from established broadcasters, such as the BBC and France 24, that have strong institutional structures to safeguard their own independence.
- The GCC states would also press ahead with a ballistic-missile-defence system in coordination with the US to shore up their defences against potential future threats from Iran. At the same time, they would accept that not all members will cut their ties with Iran, and that the maintenance of dialogue by some could be a useful channel in the future. They would also agree a shared set of messages about what the GCC regards as acceptable behaviour by Iran in the region, thereby strengthening their negotiating position as a collective.
78 See e.g. Lampert, A. and Cornwell, A. (2018), ‘U.N. aviation agency eyes talks, meeting to defuse Gulf airspace standoff’, Reuters, 29 March 2018, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-gulf-qatar-un/u-n-aviation-agency-eyes-talks-meeting-to-defuse-gulf-airspace-standoff-idUKKBN1H52W5 (accessed 15 Mar. 2019).
79 For examples, see footnote 41.
80 Sheikh Abdullah was for a time lionized in Saudi and UAE media as a potential contender for the throne. He praised Saudi Arabia and was held up as the figure responsible for negotiating for Qataris to obtain visas for the hajj despite the crisis.
81 Telegraph (2018), ‘Qatari royal says he is being held against his will in UAE’, 14 January 2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/01/14/qatari-royal-says-held-against-will-uae/ (accessed 5 Mar. 2019).
82 See for example Al Dakhil, T. (2018), ‘Sheikh Sultan bin Suhaim: Hamad bin Khalifa poisoned my father’, Al Arabiya, 7 March 2018, https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2018/03/07/Sheikh-Sultan-bin-Suhaim-Hamad-bin-Khalifa-poisoned-my-father.html (accessed 5 Mar. 2019). (The author of this article, Turki Al Dakhil, was appointed as Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the UAE in February 2019.)
83 The IMF noted in October 2017 that medium-term growth in all the GCC economies could weaken if the rift is protracted: ‘The diplomatic rift between Qatar and several other countries is expected to have a limited impact on growth in the region at this stage … although a protracted rift could weaken medium-term growth.’ IMF (2017), Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, October 2017, p. 20, https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/REO/MCD-CCA/2017/October/MENAP/mcd-printer-without.ashx?la=en (accessed 19 Mar. 2019).
84 Cornwell, A. and Mulvenney, N. (2019), ‘Soccer: UAE open to co-hosting World Cup if Qatar rift resolved – sports chief’, Reuters, 22 January 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-fifa-worldcup-emirates/soccer-uae-open-to-co-hosting-world-cup-if-qatar-rift-resolved-sports-chief-idUSKCN1PG165 (accessed 5 Mar. 2019).