A man examines his ballot in front of information posters of the candidates for Ukraine’s parliamentary elections on voting day in a polling station in Kiev. Photo: Getty Images
1. Introduction
In societies struggling to democratize, revolutions and social uprisings are an opportunity for new political elites to come to the fore. Social upheavals in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine demonstrated this by propelling new political actors into positions of power that were previously closed to reformists. However, a closer look at the current political leadership in these three states reveals no fundamental changes in their modes of governance. Despite these countries embracing political transformations, genuine reformers still face major systemic challenges that prevent them from having a positive impact on democracy consolidation.
After more than 25 years of independence and protracted, ongoing democratic transitions, post-communist societies continue to struggle with poor-quality governance. Political elites seem unwilling and unable to bring about sustainable democratic reforms regardless of societal demands and the often-generous inflows of external assistance. Charismatic personalities still dominate electoral competition, which results in ideologies, policies and manifestos as an afterthought. Despite the political ruptures that the uprisings in these post-communist states have created, the leadership in these countries suffers from a lack of coherent political will, poor implementation and vague visions for the future. From the public perspective, the reform process is mainly driven by external pressure from donors and Western partners. This has a direct negative impact on the trust of citizens in state institutions and, as a result, in the rate of democratic change in society.
In the last 15 years, the societies of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have repeatedly demonstrated their pro-European aspirations and rebelled with limited success against Soviet-type political leadership and practices. As a result, Georgia’s Rose Revolution, Ukraine’s Euromaidan and Moldova’s break with communist rule in 2009, brought new pro-European political parties to power. This generation of political elites raised expectations among citizens and Western partners that the countries could democratize and adopt European values and standards of living.
However, recent public opinion polls show that distrust in political leadership and parties in these countries remains high.1 Current elites employ strategies and techniques similar to those of the ancien regime when engaging with civil society or participating in the governance process, which has given rise to further distrust among populations.
This paper examines the factors that shaped the current context for political elite renewal in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Firstly, it analyses the reasons for the lack of new political leadership capable of pushing through sustainable democratic reforms in these countries and identifies sources of elite renewal. Secondly, it examines how political parties in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine recruit and promote new and diverse political elites in the governance process. Thirdly, it explains the factors that prevent parties from promoting individuals capable of genuine political leadership into their higher ranks. Fourthly, the paper looks at the extent to which current post-revolutionary elites differ from their predecessors and outlines the systemic changes necessary to drive sustainable elite renewal. Finally, the paper proposes policy recommendations to support the development of new elites willing and capable of implementing effective democratic reforms, who are not guided primarily by rent-seeking opportunities or private interests that only favour narrow elite circles.2 In this context, elite renewal refers to the process of replacing those that use public office to serve their own interests with new elites intent on serving the interests of the public.
Where possible, examples from all three countries are given to illustrate arguments. Due to space limitations, the paper occasionally presents a single example from the most relevant country. This focus on commonalities is not to say that all three states experience identical trajectories of elite renewal. But they share a Soviet past that has had a significant impact on their political cultures; and each had a difficult early transition in the 1990s marked by non-transparent privatization and the revival of informal institutions. Oligarchs, to differing extents, are a common feature of their politics. In the 2000s, they experienced colour revolutions, and have since elected pro-Western elites to deliver the ‘European dream’. All have signed Association Agreements with the European Union (EU) while being part of the group of countries in the Eastern Partnership with a closer relationship with the EU. After undergoing social upheavals, they each took different reform trajectories. Georgia launched a radical economic and political reform agenda that modernized and opened up the country – for a while at least. Ukraine had to pass through a second uprising before embarking on a painful reform programme with as yet unclear implementation prospects. In Moldova, the so-called ‘pro-European’ coalitions, which were marred by corruption scandals, disillusioned the country’s civil society and Western partners despite a promising start.
Poor governance practices still dominate domestic politics in these three societies. After the latest social upheavals and increasing support for democratic transformation, the international community has renewed interest in understanding the current nature of political behaviour and the prospects for sustainable reform in these countries. In February 2019, Moldova’s parliamentary elections saw Old Guard elites hold on to the new legislature. These political survivors are likely to further consolidate the capture of state institutions, leaving little room for alternative pro-reformist elites to take centre stage and steer the governance process. In spring 2019, Ukraine held presidential elections, which resulted in the victory of Volodymyr Zelenskyi, and in the autumn the country is expected to hold parliamentary elections. The results of which are expected to either reiterate support for further painful reforms or to consolidate the country’s strong vested interests. Meanwhile, the incumbent Georgian government is expected, at best, not to erode the institutions established as a result of reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution.
1 Center for Insights in Survey Research (2018), Public opinion survey: residents of Georgia. April 10–22, 2018, International Republican Institute, http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2018-5-29_georgia_poll_presentation.pdf (accessed 11 Mar. 2019); Razumkov Centre (2019), Рівень довіри до суспільних інститутів та електоральні орієнтації громадян України [Level of trust towards public institutions and electoral orientations of Ukrainian citizens], 20 February 2019, http://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichnidoslidzhennia/riven-doviry-do-suspilnykh-instytutiv-ta-elektoralni-oriientatsii-gromadian-ukrainy (accessed 11 Mar. 2019); Institutul de Politici Publice (2018), ‘Brometrul opiniei publice’ [‘Barometre of public opinion’], 4 December 2018, http://ipp.md/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Barometrul-opiniei-publice-prezentare.pdf (accessed 11 Mar. 2019).
2 The findings of this paper are based on desk research and six weeks of fieldwork in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in March–July 2017. Field research included 15–20 in-depth anonymous interviews with member of the elite and experts per country including policymakers, ambassadors, senior public officials, former ministers, civil society activists, and young opinion leaders.