In 2013, Chatham House and The Nippon Foundation launched an ambitious five-year project to examine bilateral relations between the UK and Japan. The resulting UK–Japan Global Seminar series aimed to explore ways in which the two countries can deepen and expand their cooperation to address a number of pressing regional and global challenges.
The focus of this partnership has been a series of high-profile annual conferences, alternating between London and Tokyo, at which leading academics, politicians, journalists and representatives from business and the non-profit sector have exchanged views on the roles of the two countries and considered the specific opportunities and challenges faced by the UK and Japanese governments. In addition to the annual conferences, the project convened numerous smaller workshops and discussion seminars (funded in part by The Great Britain Sasakawa Foundation), and produced a series of podcasts and audio and video interviews, as well as conference reports and research publications (see https://www.chathamhouse.org/about/structure/asia-pacific-programme/uk-japan-global-seminar-series).
This report represents the culmination of the project. It brings together a select number of conference participants from both countries to take stock of the current bilateral relationship, and to offer their personal views on how best to enhance and expand mutual cooperation in the immediate future.
The need for such a perspective is especially important today, given the serious challenges that both countries are facing. At a global level, the critical challenges to the rules-based international order are a source of acute concern to policymakers in both Tokyo and London – in the form of a more explicitly unilateral and transactional US under President Donald Trump, the increased assertiveness of Russia and China, or the spread of authoritarian and populist political movements that threaten to undermine support for democratic values.
Regionally, too, there are a host of equally pressing challenges. In Europe, the UK’s decision to leave the European Union as a result of the referendum in June 2016 has had a profound impact, raising important questions about the character and resilience of the EU and the nature and durability of the UK’s broader international engagement. The uncertainty surrounding outgoing Conservative Prime Minister Theresa May’s negotiation of a withdrawal agreement with the other 27 EU members has created profound concern in Japan over how best to manage its substantial trade and investment commitments in the UK. Following May’s resignation announcement on 24 May, this uncertainty has increased given the ensuing leadership contest within the Conservative Party, and what impact this will have on the prospects of the UK government realizing its commitment to deliver Brexit. Moreover, Brexit has raised important questions about the integrity of the UK, given the practical difficulties of avoiding a return to a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland should the UK choose not to remain in a customs union in any future deal with the EU, or in the event that it leaves the EU without a deal.
The integrity and stability of nation states have also come under threat elsewhere in Europe for reasons independent of the Brexit decision. For example, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the continuing presence of Russian-backed separatists in Donbas, eastern Ukraine, have amplified fears of the fragmentation of once stable and politically secure countries. Moreover, Moscow’s apparent willingness to use cyberattacks, misinformation and propaganda to influence national election campaigns in a number of European countries, including the UK’s referendum and France’s 2017 presidential and National Assembly elections, has highlighted the threat to liberal democratic governments from any outside power intent on fostering disunity and division abroad.
In East Asia, North Korea’s long-term pursuit of a nuclear weapons programme, including a sixth nuclear test in 2017 and rapid advances in high-profile long-range missile capabilities, has increased the existential threat to neighbouring countries such as Japan and South Korea, as well as to the US and, theoretically, Europe, including the UK. The risk of political, diplomatic and potentially military tension in the East and South China seas has also increased as China has expanded its maritime capabilities and become more assertive in advancing its own contentious territorial claims, against Japan and many other states in Southeast Asia.
Alongside these recent developments, there are long-term and systemic threats, including the challenge of climate change; adapting to the long-term economic impact of the 2008 financial crisis; maintaining the stability of world financial markets and the international production supply chains that rely on a resilient global free-trade regime; adapting to demographic changes and the ageing of advanced societies; confronting the rise of populist reactions against mainstream politics; promoting sustainable development among less developed countries; combating global pandemics; and offsetting the threat of fundamentalist Islamist terrorist organizations in the Middle East and their affiliates across the world.
The report’s authors, in considering how the UK and Japan can best work together, debate many of these critical global and regional issues, while also reflecting on the specific internal, political, economic and social challenges faced by the two countries.
Introducing the report, Chatham House Director Dr Robin Niblett surveys the history of bilateral ties between the UK and Japan since the 19th century, and compares and contrasts their differing approaches to foreign policy in the post-1945 period, as well as their respective long-standing relationships with their primary ally, the US. Niblett strikes an optimistic note, emphasizing how, rhetorically at least, in the UK commitment to being a ‘Global Britain’ and Japan’s ‘proactive pursuit of peace’, both countries have demonstrated their willingness to remain fully engaged in international affairs, at a time when the US appears to be withdrawing from its traditional role as a guarantor of international stability. The extent to which either country’s prime minister will be able to realize the ambitious plans associated with these slogans is dependent on the ability of their respective countries to confront their domestic economic challenges and the willingness of their publics to support an outward-looking vision. The UK and Japan should, in Niblett’s view, avoid reacting defensively to the new dynamics of international politics, and work together by focusing on three areas of cooperation:
- Sustaining the rules-based international order by bolstering the UN, the G7 and G20 process, and by working cooperatively in bodies such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Thematically, there are a number of priority areas where Tokyo and London can join forces, most notably in combating climate change and global pandemics, and in enhancing cybersecurity, fostering human security and, where feasible, promoting democratic governance.
- Enhancing security in the Asia-Pacific region, especially by addressing the nuclear threat from North Korea, minimizing security risks in the East and South China seas, and fostering greater joint defence cooperation. The latter is an area where notable progress has been made since 2017, especially in the framework of the regular ‘two plus two’ meetings between the defence and foreign ministers of both countries.
- Bolstering economic, cultural, educational and other forms of social cooperation, with the UK using its extensive experience of service-sector reform to establish a post-Brexit bilateral trade agreement with Japan that might complement and advance the structural changes envisaged in Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s three prolonged ‘Abenomics’ agenda. This could, in theory, go beyond the terms of the new EU–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), which entered into effect in February 2019. Closer educational collaboration at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels may also be a promising area for further cooperation. Japan has also been especially receptive to recent suggestions that the UK might ultimately become part of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).
In Chapter 2, Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones, former head of the UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), and Dr Harukata Takenaka of Japan’s Graduate Research Institute for Peace and Security (GRIPS) focus on the practicalities of implementing security policy in Japan and the UK by analysing the role of the National Security Council (NSC) decision-making process in their respective countries. Neville-Jones considers the external context for the establishment of the UK’s NSC in 2010, particularly the threat of terrorism and the impact of the second Gulf war, and also analyses the domestic shortcomings of cabinet government under Tony Blair. She notes the critical importance of ensuring a balance across different ministries in Whitehall and the decisive chairing role played by UK prime ministers in managing the NSC process. Over time, the UK approach towards security has become more holistic and integrated, with a particular focus on resilience as a defining concept for thinking about national security needs. Neville-Jones’s assessment of the NSC is broadly positive, noting that the new structures are likely to persist despite the absence of a formal statutory definition of the NSC. At the same time, it remains an open question whether the NSC has facilitated genuine strategic decision-making given the relatively small size of its secretariat, the resource constraints faced by the UK government, and the need to balance the role of the national security adviser against the position of more well-established and powerful bureaucratic and political actors such as the foreign secretary.
Takenaka carefully traces the evolution of Japan’s national security policymaking from the 1950s onwards, noting the important changes introduced by various prime ministers – Yasuhiro Nakasone in the 1980s, Jun’ichiro Koizumi in the 2000s, and, most notably, Shinzo Abe after 2012, especially the establishment of the NSC in 2016. Procedurally, national security decision-making in Japan is coordinated by the prime minister, the foreign and defence ministers and the chief cabinet secretary. This concentration of government decision-making is part of a steady strengthening of executive authority in Japan, encouraged indirectly through changes in the country’s voting system that have undermined the power of party factions and bolstered the authority of the prime minister. Takenaka analyses a number of areas for closer bilateral security cooperation, highlighting the importance of the August 2017 UK–Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation and the progress that has been achieved in terms of defence-equipment collaboration and recent agreements to bolster joint exercises between different branches of the armed forces of both countries.
In Chapter 3, Dr John Nilsson-Wright of Cambridge University and Chatham House explores the broader internal political dynamics of the UK and Japan. In particular, he considers the impact of the rise of populist politics and its role in shaping the Brexit vote in the UK. Populism, he notes, is an essentially contested concept and a political pathology that has undermined faith in leadership and institutions in a number of countries, raising important questions about the capacity of governments to respond to contemporary policy challenges. He argues that part of the populist phenomenon in the UK can be explained by the impact of relative economic decline and misgivings over increasing immigration, which in turn have encouraged a rise in political nostalgia and identity politics. In Japan, by contrast, the impact of economic uncertainty and the challenge of immigration have been less immediate, even though some politicians, especially at the local level, have embraced populist themes. Notwithstanding the apparent durability of mainstream politics in Japan, Nilsson-Wright warns against complacency in assuming that a more radicalized, extremist populist form of politics is unlikely in Japan. He notes the increasingly ideological polarization that is emerging, particularly on the far right. He also emphasizes the importance of not overlooking subtle efforts to qualify media freedom and diversity in Japan, as well as a tendency towards self-censorship that may restrict open political discourse in a way that could undercut effective and responsive government decision-making.
In Chapter 4, Professor Yukiko Fukugawa of Waseda University explores the economic dimension of potential bilateral cooperation. She notes that Japan remains broadly committed to fostering an open economy, and has not retreated into narrow economic nationalism in the face of regional and global challenges. She stresses the success of the Abe administration in encouraging the Japanese public to accept the country’s need for greater economic integration, both regionally and globally – a trend reflected in Japan’s support for CPTPP and other bilateral and multilateral regional free-trade agreements. Fukugawa documents a number of important economic reforms, including Abe’s 2018 New Economic Policy Package and the Society 5.0 initiative, intended to attract more foreign talent to Japan to bolster innovation at home. While acknowledging the considerable anxieties in Japan about the impact of Brexit, she also emphasizes the longer-term opportunities for cooperation in the form of an economic partnership agreement between the UK and Japan. This would enable the UK to capitalize on existing regional trade agreements such as CPTPP and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Japan, for its part, can learn from the UK’s considerable experience in fostering corporate governance reform and could gain from embracing public–private partnerships (PPPs) and private finance initiatives (PFIs) similar to those undertaken in the UK. Other areas for greater collaboration include social innovation to deal with ageing populations, the adoption of fintech, smart cities technology, and new healthcare and value-added tourism initiatives.
In Chapter 5, Hans Kundnani of Chatham House and Professor Ken Endo of Tokyo University focus on the distinctive relationships that the UK and Japan have had with their respective continental neighbours, and their contrasting attitudes towards regionalism in Europe and Asia. Despite a long history of isolationism, the UK’s attitude towards Europe became more accommodating and proactive after 1973, following its entry into the European Economic Community, but has experienced a reversal since the Brexit vote.
Japan, by contrast, has in the post-war period lacked any obvious regional project to identify with in Asia. Its relations with the region have been largely shaped by the primacy of its relationship with the US, and the latter’s bilateral hub-and-spoke approach towards security in East Asia. At times, US intervention has limited Japan’s ability to support regionwide initiatives, such as Tokyo’s abortive effort to establish an Asian Monetary Fund in the 1990s. Asia’s identity has been multifaceted and sometimes riven by internal disagreements over ideological loyalties and the priority assigned to state sovereignty over intraregional cooperation. Japanese officials have tended to conceive of Asia as a ‘milieu’, a fluid and shifting environment, rather than a distinct and coherent region. This is despite past and present attempts to articulate a regional agenda, such as Abe’s call for a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’.
Despite these differences in attitudes towards regionalism, the UK and Japan remain important partners for each other in their respective regions and have been making significant progress in developing new bilateral partnerships, whether through defence-equipment cooperation, the signing of an important Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in 2017, continued progress in combating the threat from North Korea, cybersecurity challenges or vocal support for the rules-based international system. There remain two critical, broadly defined security areas where Tokyo and London could do more together. First, on the promotion and support of democracy for open societies and the defence of press freedom, the approach in both countries has been more rhetorical than substantive. Second, when it comes to each acknowledging the primary long-term security threats in their respective regions – Russia in the case of Europe, China in the case of East Asia – there arguably needs to be more genuine cooperation. The UK’s desire to foster wider economic opportunities with China, and Japan’s wish to reach a post-war settlement with Russia over the contested ‘Northern Territories’ have sometimes stood in the way of officials in Tokyo and London fully and actively embracing efforts to confront each other’s key regional security rival.
In Chapter 6, Professor Yuichi Hosoya of Keio University provides a detailed analysis of the concept of the rules-based international order, and notes the contrast between the approach of the Trump administration and past US efforts to support this order during and after the Cold War. He examines the UK’s formal articulation of its national security policy via the publication of the 2015 National Security Strategy and its Strategic Defence and Security Review. Hosoya highlights the important steps taken by the UK to use aid to promote global stability since 2016 via the creation of its RBIS (rules-based international system) Fund to strengthen the UN and the Commonwealth, and to provide support for the International Criminal Court. He notes the UK’s considerable efforts to enhance the role of women in peacekeeping, in combating sexual violence, and wider measures to combat corruption and promote employment, as well as efforts to develop new alliance partnerships. For its part, Japan has shown a similar enthusiasm for strengthening international institutions by developing a more strategically focused use of official development assistance (ODA), and through its involvement in international initiatives, most notably at the Ise-Shima G7 summit in 2016. Japan’s support for efforts to combat piracy and its rhetorical commitment to conflict avoidance, most strikingly in Abe’s 2015 statement on the 70th anniversary of the Second World War, are a further reminder of its commitment to diplomacy as a means of minimizing the risk of conflict regionally and globally. In terms of future bilateral initiatives, Hosoya advocates the expansion of freedom of navigation operations between UK and Japanese navies in the South and East China seas, and points to the recently concluded Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) between Japan and the EU as a model for wider cooperation between London and Tokyo.
In Chapter 7, Professor Tomohiko Taniguchi of Keio University (and an adviser to Abe) discusses the concept of ‘soft power’ and explores some of the areas for closer bilateral collaboration, which he argues is likely to increase notwithstanding the impact of Brexit. He considers initiatives in the field of education and foreign aid, noting important existing collaboration between Japan’s International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the UK’s Crown Agents. He emphasizes the value of deeper UK–Japan cultural engagement via the creation of Japan House in the UK in 2018, arguing that this can foster greater awareness of Japan’s global role by capitalizing on the UK’s prominence within the English-speaking world. Taniguchi also notes the role of the Japanese government in fostering new scholarship schemes to improve foreign students’ access to Japan, especially those from Africa and from South and Southeast Asia, despite historically low levels of immigration to Japan. He argues that new dual-degree programmes for African students to study in both Japan and the UK could be one way of building on both countries’ comparative advantage in education and training. Finally, looking ahead to the Rugby World Cup of 2019 and the Tokyo Olympics and Paralympics of 2020, Taniguchi considers the relatively under-explored question of sports diplomacy as a basis for strengthened UK–Japan collaboration.
In Chapter 8, Akiko Yamanaka, formerly parliamentary vice-minister for foreign affairs and Japan’s special ambassador for peacebuilding, offers a personal reflection on the discussions over the five years of the UK–Japan Global Seminar series. She sets out some of her suggestions on a range of policy areas where the UK and Japan might collaborate.
In conclusion, in Chapter 9, John Nilsson-Wright offers an assessment of the current political factors in both Japan and the UK that might affect the capacity and willingness of the two governments to enhance their bilateral relationship, at least in the short term. Notwithstanding these factors, he argues that there is scope for the two countries to expand their joint efforts as international partners, if not formal allies, with a focus on common values and the importance of maintaining open, resilient societies and the safeguarding of liberal democratic norms.
Our findings in this report are partial rather than exhaustive, and the views of the individual authors represent just one subset of a wider and more diverse range of opinions that have been canvassed and documented over the course of the past five years. In essence, these individual views represent a baseline for thinking about a much more extensive set of opportunities for closer UK–Japanese engagement. Potential obstacles to a deeper bilateral partnership remain, particularly capacity constraints, and uncertainty regarding the receptivity of public opinion in both Japan and the UK with regard to further joint initiatives to combat a host of global challenges.
Nevertheless, the UK–Japan Global Seminar series has highlighted not only the urgency of the problems facing government leaders in Tokyo and London; it has also revealed the multiple arenas in which the expertise of Japanese and UK individuals, drawn from many branches of public and private life, can be creatively combined to advance each country’s national interests as well as wider global concerns. It may be premature to characterize this as the start of a new UK–Japanese alliance, but there is little doubt that the opportunity for a strengthened and genuinely global and proactive bilateral partnership is real, and demands serious and sustained attention from the governments and the people of both countries.