As Japan and the UK face serious challenges at home and in their respective regions, this report makes the case that a stronger relationship could advance each country’s ability to address shared global concerns.
A Japanese translation of the report is also available as a PDF via this link.
In an increasingly unstable international environment where states face multiple threats to their national security, strategic thinking is paramount. While there is no formally accepted definition of ‘strategy’, Lawrence Freedman notes that ‘having a strategy suggests an ability to look up from the short term and the trivial to view the long term and the essential, to address causes rather than symptoms, to see woods rather than trees.’30 According to Freedman:
[Strategy is about] maintaining a balance between ends, ways, and means; about identifying objectives; and about the resources and methods available for meeting such objectives … By and large, strategy comes into play when there is actual or potential conflict, when interests collide and forms of resolution are required.31
For some countries, such as the US, these features of strategy are long-standing challenges that demand institutional responses. The need to reconcile conflicting institutional interests in the face of threats to US security at home and abroad forced the government to focus on how best to balance means, ways and ends in countering the Soviet Union in the Cold War. The clearest expression of this response was through the establishment of the US National Security Council in 1947. For other countries, less accustomed in modern times to playing a leading role in global affairs, the apparatus and practice of thinking strategically about national security is less developed. This is true for both the UK and Japan. However, over the past decade this has begun to change as civil servants and politicians have sought to improve their strategic capabilities.
There is little doubt that policymakers in both Japan and the UK are increasingly concerned with improving their ability (individually and jointly) to respond to critical global challenges
In considering the opportunities for Japan and the UK to cooperate more closely, it is important to contemplate the potential policy outcomes and objectives, as well as the process both countries adopt to develop policy. In this chapter, two experienced analysts provide their perspectives on this issue. Pauline Neville-Jones offers a uniquely detailed and personally informed assessment of the birth and evolution of the UK’s National Security Council (NSC) since 2010 and its capacity to enhance the UK’s ability to think strategically about the country’s core security concerns. Harukata Takenaka, a specialist in Japan’s institutional politics, provides an equally detailed account of the evolution of Japan’s National Security Council, which was established in 2013. While it may be too early to provide a definitive assessment of how well these two sets of institutional innovations are working, there is little doubt that policymakers in both countries are increasingly concerned with improving their ability (individually and jointly) to respond to critical global challenges, not only as they affect national security, but in terms of national prosperity and economic resilience.
The framework for decision-making in foreign and defence policy in the UK barely altered in the decades after the Second World War. The formation of an NSC in 2010 marked a significant new departure. It sprang out of the need to respond more effectively to the changing international context, which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of terrorism as a direct threat to Western democracies. The development was long overdue. This section looks at the factors that led to bureaucratic change; it discusses the effect of the NSC on the way policy is made in the UK; and comments on the extent to which it has led to more strategic and better policymaking.
During the Second World War, the Cabinet Office emerged as the department responsible for coordinating Whitehall. Under a committee structure, it brought areas of the government together to consider cross-departmental issues and, at the ministerial level, make decisions within the boundaries of policy agreed by the cabinet. Representatives of departments of state were expected to attend Cabinet Office meetings and to take account of the views of other departments on issues that had been the object of collective discussion.
It was a solid system, but was ill-equipped to respond swiftly to changes in the conduct of intergovernmental relations or to the post-Soviet world. Presidential rather than parliamentary systems had become dominant, with the head of government being primarily responsible for foreign and defence policy. This meant that the UK prime minister played a growing role in foreign affairs, often at the expense of the foreign secretary. After the European Council was established in the 1980s, this tendency also became increasingly common in the European Union (EU). The period of Western military interventionism beginning in the 1990s reinforced the status of the prime minister in international affairs, but also exposed the weakness of the exiguous dedicated personal support available – consisting of one private secretary for foreign affairs.
The system was further tested at the turn of the millennium, when the relatively slow pace of the Cold War was replaced by a much faster-moving and volatile global context, which bred unfamiliar, mainly terrorist-related threats. As a result, the UK found itself engaging in military interventions abroad while simultaneously defending itself against terrorist attacks. Countering these related events effectively meant bringing external and internal affairs analysis and policymaking together.
However, the cabinet committee structure did not provide for this. When the Security Service warned Prime Minister Tony Blair that military intervention in Iraq would lead to an increased risk of terrorism in the UK, there was no preventive action as a result. The lack of a readily available forum, while not in itself a valid reason for the omission, helps to explain why no action took place. Al-Qaeda carried out a major terrorist attack in London on 7 July 2005; on that occasion 52 people died and more than 700 were injured in four coordinated bombings.
Blair was prone to make decisions with small numbers of officials, avoiding normal ministerial procedures. This unaccountable ‘sofa government’ – the product of outdated governmental structures and Blair’s personal style – was arguably unconstitutional and certainly brought government policy into disrepute. The result was an ill-prepared military campaign in Iraq conducted while the government was weakened by resignations, lacking in accountability and facing controversy in parliament and the country at large. Blair’s successor as prime minister, Gordon Brown, brought more order to policymaking through the National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID) subcommittee, which he set up in 2008. However, its potential was thwarted by the overwhelming scope of its remit and Brown’s lack of commitment to his own creation, which seldom met.
There was no well-functioning structure at the centre of government to give strategic direction to manage increasingly complex security settings. This was the context in which David Cameron, the leader of the Conservative Party and new prime minister, chaired the inaugural meeting of the newly minted NSC, on the coalition government’s first day in office in May 2010. The NSC exists as the result of a simple executive decision and has no statutory basis.
Relatively minor alterations to government were required to create the NSC, which crowns part of a pre-existing cabinet committee system. The decision to introduce the term ‘national security’ stemmed, in part, from the perception that defence, foreign affairs and domestic security had to be brought together in a dedicated forum where ministers had time for adequate discussion; the customary 10 to 15 minutes spent on foreign and defence affairs at the end of the weekly cabinet meeting were insufficient.
Furthermore, it was recognized that governments needed to assure the resilience of the interconnected systems that modern societies depend on. This meant that discussions of security needed to include a broader set of issues, for example energy policy. Appropriate sectoral policies, such as for cybersecurity, needed to be developed in the cabinet committee structure under the NSC. National security was no longer regarded as the purview of a few departments providing security to the rest of government and society but as an undertaking for the whole government, which needed the participation of the private and voluntary sectors.
Lastly, security and prosperity are strategically linked: without the first, the second is unattainable over the long term; but, equally, a security guarantee could be a benefit of prosperity. As such, a strategy is vital.
The coalition’s first National Security Strategy (NSS), accompanied by a Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) on capabilities, was published in the autumn of 2010. It was based on risk assessments, with each threat tiered according to likelihood and impact – a fairly crude measuring rod but one that, for the first time, gave a public rationale for the allocation of scarce resources. The second NSS, which incorporated the SDSR and a second iteration of the cybersecurity strategy, was published in 2015.32
The prime minister chairs the NSC. It meets at his or her bidding (under Cameron it was usually once a week for an hour when parliament was sitting and as necessary otherwise) and the prime minister can vary its membership. Typically, this will include the senior office-holders of government such as the chancellor of the exchequer, the foreign, home and defence secretaries, and other relevant cabinet members. At present, attendees include those responsible for the Cabinet Office, business, energy and industrial strategy, international development, and the government’s chief law officer, the attorney general. At fewer than 10 members, it is substantially smaller than the full cabinet of 22.
The NSC is supported by ministerial cabinet committees, the remit and membership of which is also decided by the prime minister. Currently there are two major standing subcommittees with overlapping membership: one dealing with nuclear deterrence and security, chaired by the prime minister; and another, larger subcommittee, handling threats, hazards, resilience and contingencies, under the chairmanship of the Cabinet Office minister. They ensure implementation of NSC decisions and make recommendations to it.
Official attendance at the NSC is headed by the national security adviser (NSA), a senior official who is also secretary to the NSC and appointed by the prime minister. In an advisory capacity, the council includes the chief of the defence staff, the heads of the three main intelligence agencies and the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee. Other ministers and officials, including the head of the Metropolitan Police, will be present when an agenda item, such as counterterrorism, requires it.
Officials prepare the weekly agenda. The NSC (Official), a committee comprising the heads of relevant Whitehall departments, meets to identify items requiring ministerial discussion, agree on recommendations and, if possible, resolve any disagreements. The NSA is responsible for issuing instructions to departments and/or committees to implement ministerial decisions. The National Security Secretariat, which has incorporated various pre-existing units in the Cabinet Office, is about 200-strong, with two deputy NSAs responsible respectively for intelligence, security and resilience, and for conflict, stability and defence. Since its inception, the secretariat has remained small, in line with a broader policy of successive Conservative-led governments of reducing the size of central government. The effect this has had on its role is discussed later.
Decision-making on all but major national security matters has been effectively relocated from the cabinet to the NSC. However, some fundamentals of the UK system of government remain unchanged. The constitutional position is that when it meets, the NSC is exercising authority delegated from the full cabinet. The prime minister still does not dispose of executive power independently from cabinet colleagues. In practice, members of the cabinet have not disputed positions agreed in the NSC. When major matters such as the deployment of UK armed forces abroad are in contemplation, the cabinet makes the final decision, thus specifically engaging collective responsibility. Issues of the scope, scale and political sensitivity of, for example, the referendum on Scottish independence or Brexit have also been decided directly within the cabinet.
Since the inception of the NSC, the crisis management mechanisms under its aegis have expanded and received considerable publicity. In the case of terrorist incidents, the announcement of ministerial meetings in ‘COBRA’ – the secure and specially equipped Cabinet Office room where these take place and which now operates on a 24/7 basis – has been seen as a way of reassuring the public that the situation is under control. COBRA is also used to monitor military operations such as the UK–French-led intervention in Libya in 2011. Orders to commanders on operational matters remain with military command, but in COBRA ministers can give guidance on overall political objectives, address international challenges, ensure interdepartmental coordination and monitor the provision of resources. In the case of civil emergencies such as widespread flooding (a serious hazard in the UK), COBRA would set in motion and monitor the management and rescue efforts led by the police and frequently aided by the army. Following the 2011 tsunami and Fukushima nuclear accident, travel and evacuation advice for UK citizens in Japan was decided in COBRA. In all cases, the NSC supervises crisis management in COBRA.
Regular meetings of the NSC, with agendas and minutes announced publicly and with procedures for follow-up, have corrected the disarray and much of the mistrust engendered by the previous ‘sofa’ style of government. The presence of the NSA at the centre of government injects discipline into national security decision-making and implementation. It reduces the opportunity for intentional avoidance of collective ministerial discussions on controversial issues of the kind that occurred in the lead-up to the second Gulf war, which were heavily criticized by Sir John Chilcot in his Iraq Inquiry report.33 There is less opportunity to pursue divergent policies at the departmental level, and it is harder for departments to bury policies they do not favour.
Accountability has been strengthened by three important changes in parliamentary procedure initiated by the government when the NSC was established. First, the House of Commons is now able to vote on membership of its committees, making them more independent-minded; secondly, the joint committee of both houses of senior parliamentarians that oversees the intelligence agencies has been given more powers, most crucially for inquiring into operations; and, lastly, a separate joint committee of both houses has been set up to examine the NSS, providing parliament with an opportunity to examine its validity in detail.
One of the objectives in creating the NSC was to change the culture at the centre of government so that it drives, rather than merely coordinates, policy. Setting the direction of policy in this way, it was argued, could and would make it more strategic in character and more coherent across Whitehall departments, and would promote greater interdepartmental collaboration. The result would be better government.
The second and third objectives – coherence and collaboration – have been realized to some extent. The domestic and overseas aspects of security receive focused attention and, as the top national priority, have mostly received the resources needed. Many departments now have a better understanding of the security aspects of their portfolios, and there have been experiments in joint policy operation and funding.
Whether the NSC has made policymaking more strategic is less clear. The NSC controls the drafting of the NSS, which sets an overall framework for policy and determines priorities. This is a considerable power. The 2010 NSS and subsequent NSC decisions have had a major effect on defence priorities, enhancing the role of the armed forces in national security and significantly diminishing the emphasis on expeditionary warfare. The Lancaster House bilateral defence and security cooperation treaty with France, one of the early decisions of the NSC in November 2010, can fairly be classed as strategic.
However, the NSC adviser is too busy and the secretariat too thinly spread to do much long-range independent thinking themselves; this is still largely left to departments. Some of the horizon-scanning at the centre of government is thus wasted. The same limitations apply when it comes to policy implementation. The secretariat lacks the muscle to drive the system, resulting in momentum being lost; the Prevent strand of the government’s otherwise well-developed counterterrorism strategy is a case in point.
So far, the NSC’s record in developing a strategic approach to policymaking has been patchy
Much depends on the energy the prime minister puts into chairing. There is no doubt that David Cameron wanted the NSC to have a high profile, but even for him there were limitations. Having persuaded a reluctant William Hague to return to active politics as foreign secretary, he did not want the NSC – or the option of a politically appointed NSA, which he rejected – to interfere with that role. (Indeed, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) has benefited from the existence of the NSC, recovering some of the authority lost under Blair.) Meanwhile, Cameron was not interested in ‘strategizing’, as he disparagingly called it. His view was that once the NSS had been written – a periodic activity in which he took an interest – it should be good for the five years of the parliament, irrespective of what happened in the interim. What remained was to get on with action. At least one recent NSA takes the view that the main function of the NSC is to coordinate policy.34 So far, the NSC’s record in developing a strategic approach to policymaking has been patchy.
Regardless of its record, it is worth asking whether, within the bounds of its capacity, the NSC has led to better policy than might otherwise have been the case. It is hard to deliver a verdict on the counterfactual. The general view of those involved is that policymaking has improved and that the NSC has enabled government to cope better with the challenges of a turbulent period. There have been failures. An episode to which the measuring rod is frequently applied is the UK–French-led intervention in Libya in 2011. The UK decision was taken in the NSC and monitored by ministers in COBRA. The military intervention itself was largely successful but reforms of the political system were not. Adequate funding for the reconstruction effort was not available until 2015. However, without the NSC it is likely such funding would not have been agreed.
The NSC is only eight years old, and is not immune to challenge. Its lack of statutory footing means it can be bypassed by a future government. However, the signs are that it will survive a change of party. After Brexit, a vision for the UK’s role in the world and a national strategy to realize it will be needed. The foundation for this must surely lie in the continued defence of the rule of law and the promotion of the international order created by democracies in the wake of the Second World War. In this task, there is plenty that the UK and Japan can do together.
In Japan, the structure for security policymaking remained largely unchanged following the establishment of the Security Council in 1986.35 Nearly three decades later, in 2013, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s second cabinet reorganized the Security Council into the National Security Council (NSC).36 This marked a watershed in the history of Japanese policymaking, as the NSC became a platform for the prime minister to routinely influence the formation of security policies.
Before the reform, two ministerial councils were responsible for Japanese security policy: the National Defence Council (1956–86) and the Security Council (1986–2013). Their remit included formulating the principles of Japanese defence policy and responding to emergencies, such as direct attacks on Japan or international crises in its neighbourhood. In other words, they were not involved in the cabinet’s formulation of security and foreign policies on a daily basis.
The changing geopolitical environment was a major driver of this reform. In submitting the bill to establish Japan’s NSC, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga acknowledged in the lower house of the Diet that the aim was to enable the prime minister to exercise more effective leadership ‘in the international environment, which has become more serious’.37 At that time, North Korea was developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, China had recently accelerated its penetration of the South China Sea, and tensions continued to rise since 2010 between Japan and China in the East China Sea. Another reason behind this reform was a need to make communication between the governments of Japan and the US more effective regarding foreign and security policies. Shinzo Abe, who was then the chief cabinet secretary in the Koizumi administration, first revealed this objective when he proposed introducing the NSC in 2006, shortly before officially announcing his candidacy in the LDP presidential election.38
The development of the NSC is part of a series of institutional changes undertaken since the 1990s to enhance the power of the prime minister. The political clout of this office has now come to resemble that of the UK prime minister, although it remains much more limited in several aspects of policymaking.
These changes have attracted much attention in recent years. Many scholars argue that the reforms have allowed the prime minister to exercise stronger leadership in the policymaking process. Two earlier institutional reforms contributed to this expansion of power.39 In 1994, the single non-transferrable vote (SNTV) political system, also known as the system of medium-sized constituencies, changed to a combination of the first-past-the-post system and a proportional representation system. The second institutional reform in 2001 increased the prime minister’s legal authority and expanded the supporting institutions of the office, in terms of both formal legal power and organizational resources. While most researchers have focused on the prime minister’s leadership in domestic policies,40 those that have examined this role in formulating foreign and security policies41 agree that the reforms have increased the capacity of the prime minister. With these findings in mind, the following section analyses the creation and structure of the NSC from a historical perspective.
The NSC is composed of different ministerial committees, known as the Nine Ministers Committee and the newly created Four Ministers Committee and Emergency Situation Committee.42 The Four Ministers Committee in particular has increased the influence of the prime minister in formulating Japanese security policy. The objective of this meeting is to discuss important issues of foreign and defence policy related to national security. The main attendees include the prime minister, the chief cabinet secretary, the foreign minister and the defence minister, but the prime minister can also nominate other ministers to attend. Currently the deputy prime minister, who also serves as the finance minister, attends.
The Nine Ministers Committee consists of those present at the Four Ministers Committee as well as the minister of internal affairs and communications, minister of economy, trade and industry, minister of land and transportation and the chairman of the Public Safety Commission. They discuss basic defence policy, national defence programme guidelines, basic principles of response to a direct attack on Japan, participation of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in UN peacekeeping operations, and other defence and security issues. The Emergency Situation Committee involves the prime minister, the chief cabinet secretary and other designated ministers, and discusses responses to emergency situations.
In January 2014, Abe’s cabinet set up the National Security Secretariat (NSS) as the administrative office for the NSC. The NSS has six divisions – coordination, strategic planning, intelligence, the first policy division, the second policy division and the third policy division.43 The coordination division handles overall NSS organization. The strategic planning division formulates medium- to long-term strategy. The intelligence division pulls together information from various government ministries. The first policy division observes the Americas, Europe and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries; the second policy division oversees northeast Asia and Russia; and the third policy division surveys the Middle East and Africa.
Between 1955 and 1993, the LDP controlled both chambers of the Diet and ruled as a single-party government. Japan’s political system during this era is known as the ‘1955 system’. Under this arrangement, LDP cabinets were similar to coalition governments, consisting of several factions, each of which had strong autonomy within the party and were led by powerful politicians who aspired to become prime minister. However, these factions severely curtailed the prime minister’s power.
These autonomous factions persisted due to the SNTV electoral system for the lower house, in which several politicians were elected from each district. For the LDP to win a majority in the lower house, it needed more than one candidate elected in each district. This gave those candidates significant sway and contributed to the autonomy of the various factions, itself a product of the relative independence enjoyed by individual backbenchers compared to the prime minister.
In a parliamentary system the prime minister has various carrots and sticks to discipline backbenchers and the ultimate sanction can be expulsion from the party.44 However, the threat of expulsion had always been rather empty as the SNTV system makes it relatively easy to be elected as an independent. Likewise, the prime minister could not use this threat against any unified faction, each of which is made up of individual backbenchers. Thus there was no effective way to counter opposition to the prime minister’s policies. To ensure agreement, the prime minister eventually came to distribute ministerial portfolios among the various factions according to their relative size, and also considered their recommendations for ministerial candidates.
Furthermore, the prime minister, along with the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet Secretariat, had neither the legal power nor the resources to formulate policies. Legally, individual ministers had the power to propose policies, while the prime minister’s mission was to coordinate policymaking.
The electoral reform of 1994 and the reorganization of the government in 2001 enhanced the power of the prime minister and changed the nature of the cabinet, which now more closely resembles the UK’s single-party government.
The 1994 reform expanded the prime minister’s power to discipline backbenchers and factions. As a result, the LDP became a more cohesive party. The increase in the prime minister’s influence in the LDP is demonstrated by the expansion of their power in making ministerial appointments. In the past, most long-standing LDP politicians in the lower house were appointed to a ministerial position at least once. According to previous research, of the LDP politicians who had been elected more than six times, fewer than 15 per cent were not appointed ministers.45 This proportion has risen, before the 2014 election this figure stood at 27.5 per cent.46 Data for all cabinets after 2001 (see Figure 2.1) demonstrates the steady increase in the prime minister’s power in terms of ministerial appointments. Under the current Abe administration the proportion of long-term lower house members not appointed a ministerial role rose as high as 38.2 per cent.
The administrative reforms of 2001 gave the prime minister the right to propose new policies at cabinet meetings, and the authority to formulate policies even in areas that were already part of another minister’s portfolio. The reforms also officially empowered the Cabinet Secretariat to design policies and draft legislation.47 In addition, the ineffective Prime Minister’s Office was replaced by the Cabinet Office, which was established to support the prime minister in policymaking and implementation.
After the reforms, the Cabinet Secretariat has steadily increased its capacities and its role in policymaking, thus strengthening the prime minister’s authority within government.48 The number of civil servants working in the Cabinet Secretariat has grown (see Figure 2.2). Moreover, the number of sections under the cabinet affairs officer and assistant deputy chief cabinet secretaries expanded from 10 in 2001 to 39 in 2017. These sections formulate and coordinate policies that the cabinet deems important.
The number of bills drafted by the Cabinet Secretariat soared since the 2001 reforms. Between 1990 and 2000, the Cabinet Secretariat only drafted eight bills. It now prepares a number of bills every year, drafting more than 10 in both 2005 and 2012. The Cabinet Secretariat’s role has also expanded in the field of security policy since 2001. First it came to play a larger role in formulating security policies and prepared a number of important bills.49 This included the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, ratified in October 2001, which enabled the SDF to provide supplies to foreign troops engaged in war.
The Cabinet Secretariat also drafted legislation that would prepare for situations in which Japan was directly attacked by a third country. It finalized three bills by April 2002: the Situations for Armed Attack Bill, which stipulated the measures that the government could take when Japan was under armed attack or when the government could foresee such attacks; the bill to revise the SDF Law; and the bill to revise the Security Council Law. All three were passed in June 2003.
It also played an important role in preparing Japan’s response to the second Gulf war. It prepared the Special Bill to Carry out Reconstruction Activities and Security Preservation Activities in Iraq, which was passed by the Diet in July 2003, and the Land SDF were dispatched to Iraq in February 2004.
Abe’s first cabinet began attempts to restructure the Security Council in 2006. It drafted and submitted a bill to the Diet in April 2007 to reorganize the Security Council into the NSC. The structure of the NSC proposed at that time was similar to that of the current NSC, except for the inclusion of a permanent and independent secretariat for the council. However, the Abe cabinet could not pass the bill. When the prime minister’s health deteriorated, prompting Abe’s resignation, the cabinet was dissolved in September 2007. The succeeding Fukuda cabinet abandoned the bill in view of heavy LDP losses in the elections to the upper house of the Diet in June 2007. The resulting divided Diet, in which the opposition Democratic Party of Japan controlled the powerful upper house, derailed much of the LDP government legislation emanating from the lower house.
On becoming prime minister for the second time in December 2012, Abe quickly reaffirmed that he would strengthen the government’s security policy formulation capacity.50 In June 2013, the cabinet submitted two bills to the Diet to establish the NSC and amend certain laws to enable reform. Both bills passed into law in November 2013. In January 2014, the second Abe cabinet set up the NSS within the Cabinet Secretariat. It is worth noting that the NSS was crucial in drafting the legislation on collective self-defence, which became law in 2015.
By the end of 2018, the Four Ministers Committee had met two or three times a month to discuss national security since the formation of the NSC. Its agendas covered events in Ukraine, the Asia-Pacific area, the North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear tests, and security-related bills enabling Japan to exercise the right of collective defence.
The introduction of the Four Ministers Committee is a marked shift in the history of Japanese security policymaking, for two reasons. First, the regular meetings and its close proximity to the Cabinet Secretariat have enhanced the capacity of the prime minister to formulate security policies. Second, coordination of security policy among different ministries – mainly between the foreign and defence ministries – is more efficient, thanks to the way NSS deputy secretaries-general are assigned. Coordination between the two ministries had traditionally been a time-consuming process.
However, just as it is still unclear whether the UK’s NSC has achieved its objectives, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions about whether Japan’s security policymaking has become more effective. The establishment of the NSC is still fairly recent. Moreover, Japan has not yet experienced a crisis on the same scale as the Gulf conflict of 1990–91 or the 9/11 terrorist attacks and subsequent conflicts. Whether the NSC in Japan has made crisis response more effective is yet to be tested.
Nonetheless, there is evidence suggesting that the existence of a permanent body has enabled more effective security policymaking. For example, soon after the introduction of the NSC, the Four Ministers Committee swiftly decided to send ammunition to the South Korean Army, which was participating in peacekeeping operations in South Sudan with the SDF, in December 2013.51 The Four Ministers Committee also permitted Japanese companies to provide parts and intelligence for the manufacture of submarines in Australia if they were successful in securing a contract to supply submarines to the Australian government.52
As a result, ministers and ministries are much more inclined to take direction from the prime minister and the Cabinet Secretariat than in the past.
The current challenge for security policymaking is how best to include economic policy in cabinet level deliberations. Some countries may resort to international economic policy for security purposes. The NSC and the Cabinet Secretariat are for now centred around the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and the Ministry of Defence. In future, it may be necessary to create a new meeting group to include the finance minister and the minister for economy, trade and industry, in order to fully integrate international economic policy into Japanese security policymaking.
In future, it may be necessary to create a new meeting group to include the finance minister and the minister for economy, trade and industry, in order to fully integrate international economic policy into Japanese security policymaking
Japan’s strengthened national security process has opened the door for closer security cooperation with the UK. The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the US and Japan provides Tokyo with its security ‘anchor’. The relationship with the UK is not a substitute, but it can complement the formal defence alliance with the US. As the US ‘pivot’ to balance China’s rising power in Asia becomes an increasingly serious military undertaking, regional allies are expected to contribute more to their own defence and to uphold democratic values. Strengthening existing diplomatic consultations, cooperation within the UN and in peacekeeping missions, staff discussions and joint exercises would all contribute to this goal.
The UK–Japan bilateral security relationship has deepened steadily in recent years. The summit meeting held between prime ministers Yoshihiko Noda and David Cameron in April 2012 increased the momentum for deepening cooperation between the two countries.53 Areas for increased cooperation were specified at that meeting, and both governments signed a memorandum on defence cooperation in June 2013.
Since then, the leaders of both countries have continued to foster cooperation. A total of seven dialogues took place between October 2012 and late 2018. One meeting focused on strategic dialogues between foreign ministers to discuss the international and regional environment. In May 2014, at the Abe–Cameron summit, the two countries agreed to set up foreign and defence ministerial meetings. Three meetings have been held so far, in January 2015, January 2016 and December 2017.
Cooperation on defence-equipment development between the two countries has made steady progress. The UK and Japan signed an agreement in July 2012 on the transfer of arms and military technology necessary to implement the joint development of defence equipment, and an agreement on the security of information. The initial cooperation focused on developing clothing to protect against chemical weapons.54 In July 2014, joint research was initiated on the co-development of Joint New Air-to-Air Missiles (JNAAM). In December 2017, in the third foreign and defence ministerial meeting, the two countries agreed to extend this cooperation to pilot missile production and launch tests.
There has also been steady progress in the field of practical operations. In October and November 2016, the Japan Air SDF and the UK’s Royal Air Force carried out joint fighter exercises in Japan. In January 2017, the countries signed an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) to allow the mutual provision of supplies and services, joint training exercises, peacekeeping operations and other activities.
Cooperation is likely to expand further given that in August 2017, at the summit between Abe and May, the two countries adopted the ‘Japan–UK Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation’, which outlined a comprehensive set of areas for deeper cooperation between the two countries. The aim is now to expand joint military exercises, enhance mutual support through the ACSA, deepen cooperation on the development of defence equipment, and work together more closely on capacity-building in developing countries, for example in maritime security.
The available evidence regarding the impact of Japan’s NSC on deepening cooperation between the two countries is inconclusive. The record of NSC involvement in formulating Japanese security policy suggests that it will remain an important mechanism. In particular, for continued cooperation on the development of defence equipment and for SDF cooperation with UK armed forces in peacekeeping operations. More important, the implications of the legislation on collective self-defence in 2015 must be taken into account when considering the impact of the NSC on future security cooperation.
While the laws on collective self-defence made it possible for Japan to defend itself in certain conditions, it also expanded the scope of SDF activities. It has now become possible for the SDF to engage more flexibly in support activities for foreign armed forces in the event of an international crisis similar to the 1990–91 Gulf conflict or in an armed conflict in a region near Japan. If the UK is involved in such crises, the NSC will enable the Japanese government to make timely decisions on possible cooperation between the SDF and UK armed forces.
If the UK government’s proclaimed vision of a ‘Global Britain’ is to have meaning, it should include projecting power beyond Europe. There is an opportunity to achieve this with Japan, particularly as it is developing closer relations with Australia. The UK has a long-standing intelligence and defence relationship with Australia through the Five Power Defence Arrangements. The relationship was reinvigorated by a bilateral agreement signed in Perth in 2013, which broadened the range of regular consultations and activity. As such, tripartite naval exercises between the UK, Australia and Japan should be a possibility, especially when British aircraft carriers come into service.
In terms of cybersecurity, while the US is undoubtedly Japan’s primary partner, the UK has developed a working relationship in this area. As a result, there is scope to develop the private-sector side of cybersecurity particularly in the civilian sphere. Secure networks are an essential precondition for the development of robotics and artificial intelligence as well as the ‘internet of things’. Increased security, technological and regulatory cooperation would serve the interests of both countries. As a major exporter of electronic devices, Japan will benefit from international consumer and other regulatory standards. Post-Brexit, unless the UK is prepared to accept international standards decided by others, it should strive to retain its leading position in their formulation. There is room for cooperation here, as well as for joint investment in research and development in new technologies, and in nuclear energy.
The UK’s industrial strategy, which promotes advanced technologies such as big data, artificial intelligence, robotics, biosciences and fintech, and Japan’s ‘Society 5.0’, provides the ideal context for a long-term intergovernmental cooperation agreement. The two countries’ respective NSCs would be indispensable to such a cooperation agreement, since without good security and data protection many future technologies will not be socially acceptable in democracies like the UK and Japan. Both countries have the means and the intellectual resources, and should have the will to collaborate on such a wide-ranging future project.
