As Japan and the UK face serious challenges at home and in their respective regions, this report makes the case that a stronger relationship could advance each country’s ability to address shared global concerns.
A Japanese translation of the report is also available as a PDF via this link.
Forecasting in international relations is, at the best of times, a challenging undertaking. In the current climate of global uncertainty – an environment shaped by shifting power relationships, doubts about the sustainability of long-term economic growth, concerns regarding the efficient functioning of international institutions, the risks posed by climate change, and the apparent vulnerability of liberal democracy as a system of government in the face of new populist and authoritarian challenges – anticipating future trends is especially difficult. The contributions in this extended report have analysed developments in Japan and the UK across a range of areas (economic, political, cultural and in the security context), while also considering how best the UK and Japanese governments might work together more productively. Without revisiting the concrete proposals addressed in the individual chapters and summarized at the start of the report, this concluding chapter takes a brief look ahead to provide an assessment of the political conditions in both Japan and the UK that might affect the general capacity and willingness of the two governments to work together to enhance their bilateral relationship. It makes the case, too, that given the gravity and immediacy of these challenges – particularly the threats to established norms of democratic governance and the vulnerability of states to foreign propaganda via the exploitation of social media – there are clear incentives for the UK and Japan to enhance their cooperation. There is scope for both countries to expand their joint efforts as international partners, if not formal allies, with a focus on common values and the importance of maintaining open, resilient societies and the safeguarding of liberal democratic norms.
This report is published at a time when Japan and the UK are at critical turning points in their respective domestic politics and roles in the world. For Japan, this has been marked very explicitly by the beginning, on 1 May 2019, of a new era associated with the abdication of former Emperor Akihito and the accession to the Chrysanthemum Throne of his son, former Crown Prince Naruhito. Japan’s Heisei era (1989–19) – a term that can be loosely translated as ‘achieving peace’ or ‘realizing peace’ – has concluded, and the country has now embarked on Reiwa – translated variously as ‘auspicious harmony/peace’ or ‘beautiful harmony/peace’.237
For the Abe administration, with its focus on reinforcing multilateralism, strengthening the rule of law and promoting liberal internationalism, the selection of the new era name appears to reflect a number of core objectives. The government is seemingly keen to encourage a forward and optimistic outlook on the part of the Japanese people, and to foster a climate of stability at home and abroad. Early indications are that the transition from one emperor to another – and the choice of the new era name – has been a success in terms of public relations.238
The Japanese public remains supportive of the monarchy, both as an institution and in terms of the occupants of the throne. Emperor Akihito was a highly popular figure, partly due to his success in humanizing the imperial institution during his 30-year reign, and also because of his firm commitment to peace – exemplified by his willingness to visit the sites of former wartime conflicts to recognize the suffering of all victims, both Japanese and foreign combatants and civilians. Naruhito will almost certainly continue the tradition of his father, and his cosmopolitan outlook – perhaps a function of having been educated in part overseas (he studied as a graduate student in the UK at Oxford for two years in the 1980s) – is well aligned with the outward-looking and internationally engaged stance that the Abe government wishes to promote. By all accounts, the Japanese public seems broadly supportive of this stance, while remaining concerned about the importance of maintaining economic growth at home, and cautious about the circumstances and conditions under which Japan’s armed forces might become involved, however tangentially, in any future security conflict.
Early indications are that the transition from one emperor to another – and the choice of the new era name – has been a success in terms of public relations
The Abe administration continues to be actively involved regionally and globally through a variety of initiatives, and the government has shown a sustained interest in proactively engaging in a range of policy areas. This in part reflects the direct challenges facing Japan, both in its immediate neighbourhood and further afield, but is also, arguably, a response to the emerging leadership vacuum created by the emergence of a more unilateralist US under the leadership of Donald Trump.
Japan’s policy activism is underlined in a number of areas: its support for CPTPP; the active promotion since 2013 of the concept of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific; its increased defence activism, symbolized by rising expenditure on defence, relaxation of the rules governing arms exports, and a commitment to participate in collective self-defence initiatives that transcend Japan’s traditional focus on the US–Japan alliance; the adoption of a more dynamic defence strategy focused on a broader range of security challenges that encompass traditional and non-traditional security threats, including ‘grey zone’ contingencies; and the government’s commitment to a range of ‘minilateral’ security partnerships, not just within East Asia but increasingly with a range of European partners – including most notably the UK.
Moreover, Japan’s hosting – for the first time – of the G20 leaders’ summit in Osaka in June 2019 offers Abe an important opportunity to underline the country’s commitment to multilateralism, the rule of law and an open and liberal trading system;239 and in the course of the year a number of important foreign visitors will travel to Japan for the G20 and other meetings. Donald Trump, for example, made a state visit to Japan in late May, becoming the first foreign leader to meet with Emperor Naruhito, and he is due to return in June for the G20 summit. Xi Jinping will also attend the G20 (the first visit by a Chinese leader to Japan since 2010, when Hu Jintao met with then Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama), and there has been talk of a follow-up visit by the Chinese leader in the autumn of 2019.
Given the deep uncertainty regarding the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, it remains unclear how much immediate scope there is for strengthened and lasting partnership between the UK and Japan. At an official level, the UK’s ‘Global Britain’ strategy is intended to signal its appetite to remain actively involved in international affairs, including close cooperation with Japan. Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the UK in January 2019, followed in April by UK Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt’s visit to Tokyo, have been useful opportunities for the two governments to emphasize their joint commitment to sustaining and enhancing the bilateral relationship. But there is no doubt that many in Japan, both within government and in academic and policy circles more broadly, are worried about the UK government’s ability to devote sufficient attention to global issues – including the partnership with Japan – given the ongoing failure to resolve the vexatious issue of Brexit.240
The UK’s original intended departure date from the EU, 29 March 2019 (two years after the triggering of Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union), has now passed. Prime Minister May’s failure to secure parliamentary support for the withdrawal agreement led her to request an extension of the negotiation period from the European Council, to avoid the UK leaving the EU without a deal. With a new deadline of 31 October 2019, the government is now under pressure to find a way of achieving a parliamentary majority for the withdrawal agreement, which the EU has said it will not reopen or renegotiate. However, the UK parliament remains deeply divided over how to implement the 2016 referendum decision, and, at present, there is no majority in support of May’s deal, a second referendum, a more abrupt, ‘no-deal’ exit, or a modified, ‘softer’ future relationship – whether in the form of a customs union or membership of the internal market via the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement, sometimes dubbed the ‘Norway model’.
The difficulties for the government partly reflect profound ambiguity about the substantive nature of the vote to leave the EU. While Prime Minister May had confidently proclaimed that ‘Brexit means Brexit’, it is clear that there is little consensus, either among the electorate or within parliament, on how to implement the 2016 referendum result. This definitional uncertainty has contributed to divisions within the UK’s two main political parties, the governing Conservatives and the main opposition Labour. With parliament gripped by political paralysis as it seeks to find a way out of the Brexit deadlock, voters appear to have become increasingly disillusioned with the mainstream parties and more inclined to back smaller parties and political independents, a trend reflected in the increased share of the vote achieved by the Liberal Democrats, the Green Party and independent candidates in the local council elections held at the beginning of May 2019.241 Not only did the Conservatives suffer a comprehensive loss of more than 1,300 seats, but Labour failed to capitalize on widespread disaffection with the government, losing 60 seats in total, an outcome far below their hoped-for gain of 400 seats.242
Lack of clarity over Brexit has also fuelled uncertainty regarding the leadership of the Conservative Party, with, at the time of publication of this report, Theresa May’s intended resignation as leader, effective from 7 June, now confirmed. The contest to succeed her, with multiple candidates in the running, has added to the political uncertainty, heightening the risk of a hard, no-deal Brexit – a position that has been endorsed by a number of May’s would-be successors. Allied to this internal party instability are concerns that a failure to break the Brexit impasse could prompt May’s successor to dissolve parliament and call a general election in an effort to establish a clear mandate with UK voters. Such a strategy may prove unwise given the poor showing of the Conservatives in the local elections, and their catastrophic performance in the EU parliamentary elections at the end of May, when the Conservatives saw their support slashed to 9 per cent of the vote, from 23 per cent five years earlier, and their elected MEPs cut from 19 to just four. If an election is judged too risky for the government, and if, therefore, the parliamentary arithmetic cannot be changed, then the only solution may be for the government to accede to demands for a second referendum, or ‘people’s vote’, in an effort to secure popular backing for the terms of the withdrawal agreement.
It is no coincidence that a number of prominent Japanese companies have meanwhile felt compelled to reassess their investment commitments to the UK. Two leading Japanese car manufacturers, Nissan and Honda, have cut back on their production in the UK, with Honda electing to close its Swindon factory altogether.243 Other companies have made similar decisions, with both Sony and National Panasonic, for example, announcing plans to move their European headquarters from the UK to the Netherlands.244 With some 1,000 Japanese companies based in the UK, employing around 140,000 UK workers, it is understandable that senior Japanese government officials have been particularly anxious to secure greater clarity from the UK government and have been especially exercised by the risk of a ‘hard’ Brexit. Abe himself, during his April 2019 visit to Europe, which included talks with European Council President Donald Tusk and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, laid out in stark terms the economic risks to the UK of the consequences of continuing decision-making paralysis or any outcome that might involve the possibility of a no-deal Brexit:
The position of Japan is that the UK is a country that is a member of the EU. Because of that, many Japanese companies have made investments in Britain. Under the backdrop of a no-deal Brexit, this is what we have to avoid by all means. For a certain period, legal stability is required, foreseeability and transparency are necessary for Japanese companies to continue to [sic] their business operations.245
While Prime Minister Abe can take comfort from having been successfully re-elected as president of the governing LDP in September 2018, his political fortunes are not necessarily impervious to risk. On the positive side of the political balance sheet, Abe benefits from relatively stable support for his government at around the 50 per cent mark. The country also is benefiting from one of its longest periods of sustained economic growth, albeit at a relatively modest level of approximately 1 per cent per year. Given Japan’s declining population, this translates into a relatively high per capita GDP; and with unemployment at historic low levels, it might be expected that this would be a source of strong political backing for the government, especially in a context where the country’s opposition parties appear divided and demoralized.
Less positively for Abe, there are reports of declining confidence in the political process on the part of both the general public and individual politicians
Less positively for Abe, there are reports of declining confidence in the political process on the part of both the general public and individual politicians, who feel themselves increasingly detached from political life. According to the political scientist Taichiro Mitani, Japan is experiencing a ‘two-fold political alienation’, in which, as cited by Masaki Taniguchi, ‘not only the public but also politicians, and in particular politicians centrally involved in government, lack a sense of agency’.246 This growing disillusionment with mainstream politics may be the result of the perception that the LDP administration is either complacent or arrogant. Damaging corruption scandals, such as the Moritomo and Kake controversies,247 and, in early 2019, a controversy regarding the reliability of government labour statistics, may be undermining support for the government.248 The Abe government has also been unsettled by the forced resignation, in April, of two cabinet ministers,249 as a result of politically clumsy and insensitive public statements, and the LDP has also suffered its own local election losses. Despite being able to capitalize on poor opposition performance in the April local elections, the governing party was defeated in two key by-elections in Okinawa and Osaka, and was defeated by the right-of-centre Japan Innovation Party (Isshin no Kai) in the Osaka mayoral and governorship contests.250
Prime Minister Abe will face a greater political challenge in July 2019, when voters will go to the polls again to elect just over half the membership of the House of Councillors, the powerful upper house of the Diet. The government is keen to build on its current tally of 124 seats out of 245, and in particular to secure a stable, two-thirds majority – a benchmark that is critical in being able to pursue constitutional reform, a key policy goal for Abe and his allies. As already noted, Japan will host the G20 summit in Osaka in June, and Abe has been hoping that the prominent role this gives his government in demonstrating its international leadership capacity – particularly in making the case for global cooperation and the multilateral rules-based order – will boost support for the LDP during the elections.
However, the mixed local election results, together with the drip-feed of negative news in the context of scandals and resignations, have caused some conservative politicians to suggest that Abe may need to implement more substantive measures to offset public disaffection – in the form of a delay to the planned increase in Japan’s consumption tax (which is scheduled to rise from 8 to 10 per cent in October 2019), or a dissolution of the lower House of Representatives. The latter would bring about joint elections to both houses of the Diet, which may, the calculation goes, boost voter turnout and thereby increase the government’s standing in both chambers. Neither would be without risks, including that the government will be judged as overly opportunistic or willing to defer electorally unpopular but fiscally sensible decisions (such as the consumption tax increase) designed to address the country’s parlous and persistent national debt problem.
It is too early to say how electoral calculations and political volatility at home will affect and potentially limit the opportunities for bilateral cooperation between the UK and Japan. There is evidence that voters in both countries are less committed and less ideologically aligned with mainstream, traditional parties, and more volatile in their voting behaviour. This creates additional challenges for the two national governments and their leaders in retaining the support of their electorates. One way of doing so is by maintaining economic prosperity at home while also demonstrating leadership abroad – two tasks that are seemingly all the more difficult in the context of doubts surrounding the long-term resilience of the global economy and the threats to international order and the viability of international institutions.
Shinzo Abe has, by the standards of the post-1945 period, been an especially proactive and engaged Japanese leader who has benefited from an unusually long tenure as prime minister. For the immediate future, his political position looks relatively secure, both within his party and in the country. Barring a political upset for the LDP in the July elections, Abe is likely to continue unchallenged as prime minister, and there is a good prospect that he will remain in office until 2021.
It is unclear who will succeed Theresa May as Conservative Party leader and, by extension, as prime minister. Several of the declared leadership contenders have spoken forcefully in favour of a no-deal Brexit should the UK not reach a deal with the EU that can secure parliamentary approval before the deadline on 31 October. The consequences for the UK’s foreign policy of a no-deal exit are hard to predict, but leaving without a deal would almost certainly be massively disruptive both economically and politically. Notwithstanding any existing or future hard-Brexit preparations, it seems unlikely that there will be much administrative capacity or political space to allow for meaningful foreign policy planning for some time.
In the case of Japan, when it comes to foreign policy, there is little sign that Prime Minister Abe has lost any appetite to remain fully engaged in promoting the diplomatic interests of his country. His visits to Europe and the US in April 2019 have provided multiple opportunities to emphasize Japan’s capacity for proactivism. Meeting President Emmanuel Macron in Paris on 24 April, Abe was able to underscore his commitment to upholding the multilateral trading system through Japan’s hosting of the G20 meeting in June and support for the G7 meeting that will be hosted by France in Biarritz in August. Franco-Japanese cooperation will also involve continued application of sanctions against North Korea, joint maritime deployments in the Indo-Pacific, and a commitment to promote new digital trade rules – the so called ‘Osaka Track’ – in part designed to address concerns about potential efforts by China to limit the free flow of information beyond its borders.251
Japan’s position on China is complex and nuanced. Its substantial trade and investment exposure in the Chinese market (China is a critical destination for Japanese exports, accounting for 19 per cent of Japan’s export earnings in 2017252) means that sustaining a positive bilateral relationship with Beijing is critically important – especially given the intensifying trade war between the US and China, which threatens to undercut the opportunities for Japanese firms based in China to export their goods to the US market.
It is no accident that Trump’s aggressive unilateralism, particularly on economic issues, has given rise to an improvement in Sino-Japanese ties as both countries have increasingly hedged against the risks associated with a more unpredictable and transactional US. Since October 2018, when Abe visited Beijing (the first time in seven years that a Japanese premier had visited China exclusively for summit-level bilateral talks),253 there have been a succession of high-level Japanese visits to China – a sign of warming ties that are likely to be reinforced when Xi Jinping visits Japan for the G20 summit. There is the possibility, too, of a state visit by Xi to Japan in the autumn of 2019.
Despite this convergence of interests, Japan’s leaders remain wary of China in other areas – whether over maritime security tensions in the South China Sea, territorial disputes in the East China Sea, cybersecurity challenges, or more general Japanese defence concerns over China’s expanding regional military capabilities. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and the expanding influence of the AIIB as an instrument for Beijing to deploy aid and development resources to enhance its geopolitical influence not just in Asia and Africa, but increasingly in Europe, are a persistent source of worry to the Japanese administration.
For this reason, Abe, on his visit to Europe, combined his meetings in Paris and Brussels with a trip to Bratislava on 25 April 2019 to meet with the leaders of Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. The meeting with these Visegrad Group leaders was an opportunity not just to sustain international pressure on North Korea and to guard against the risks of a ‘hard’ Brexit by the UK, but also, and most importantly, to counter China’s increased efforts to forge alliances in Central and Eastern European states as a leading development infrastructure partner.254
Prime Minister Abe has thus continued his energetic, peripatetic diplomatic style, following his trip to Europe with an important visit to Washington, DC, for meetings with Donald Trump, intended to address the challenging matter of bilateral trade talks (an area where Japan is anxious to avoid mercantilist pressure from the US administration), and also the perennial question of how to address the security risk of North Korea.
Japan and the UK, as long-standing allies of the US, and as mid-sized powers grappling with substantial security risks in their immediate neighbourhoods have powerful incentives to boost their bilateral cooperation
While the US–Japan security partnership remains strong, privately Japanese officials worry, given the impulsive and narrowly self-interested behaviour often displayed by the US president, about the reliability of US security guarantees and the danger that trade and defence issues will become intertwined and increasingly transactional.255
The Abe administration needs, therefore, to tread a fine line, maintaining as much diplomatic flexibility as possible, while remaining closely aligned with the US to limit policy initiatives that might compromise Japan’s interests. For Tokyo, this means, for example, avoiding US punitive tariffs on Japan’s car exports, blocking US Treasury-led moves to incorporate restrictive currency agreements in bilateral trade talks, or guarding against Japan’s marginalization in the negotiations with North Korea on issues such as preserving international sanctions or safeguarding the interests of the families of Japan’s abductees.
Japan and the UK, as long-standing allies of the US, and as mid-sized powers grappling with substantial security risks in their immediate neighbourhoods – as well as wider global, systemic, political, strategic and economic challenges – have powerful incentives to boost their bilateral cooperation. As this report has made clear, there is a great deal that the two countries are already doing, in a range of areas, that should be welcomed and celebrated. These include supporting international institutions such as the G7, the G20, the WTO and the International Criminal Court; strengthening ties between their respective armed forces and policy planning mechanisms; pursuing new bilateral trade accords; sharing innovative ways to address social challenges such as ageing or changing urban environments; and using cultural initiatives, education and foreign aid policy to address global problems.
Such cooperation represents a first step in the right direction. Arguably, much more could be done, particularly in respect of the broader issue of values rather than interests. Both the UK and Japan are committed to the rule of law and international order, but at a time when liberal democratic values and the values of tolerance associated with open societies are being threatened or undermined, not just by ‘familiar’ authoritarian regimes (such as China and Russia), but in some cases within established democracies such as Italy,256 much more could be done to combat the disturbing tendency to tilt in a more distinctly illiberal direction. How best to do this is open to debate, but at the very least, a forceful rhetorical defence of the importance of sustaining values of free speech and open debate, and of guarding against efforts by foreign powers to use social media and other means to distort such debate, is important.
Potentially, the UK and Japan could work together to make this argument more openly and more vigorously. They could also work together privately and – where appropriate – publicly to signal their reservations or, in some cases, their direct opposition to a more unilateralist posture by the US, or the worrying tendency by Donald Trump to implicitly condone or in some cases actively support the actions of authoritarian regimes. A coarsening of political rhetoric, and declining respect for institutional norms and democratic freedoms, are worrying trends in which the success of ‘populist’ figures such as Trump is both a symptom and a cause of the declining resilience and increased vulnerability of universal liberal values.257
It is worth noting that, alongside the measurable material interests of securing economic markets, global prosperity and protecting national territory, the norms and values of openness, tolerance and democratic accountability were key objectives – albeit, often imperfectly pursued – for the powers that prevailed in the key conflicts (the two world wars and the Cold War) at the heart of international politics in the 20th century.
The UK, including through its long support for the British Council and its network of international connections and support for self-governance via the Commonwealth, is well placed to defend and promote these values through the active use of its not inconsiderable soft power. Japan, with its considerable international status and resources as the world’s third largest economy, and as a country able to draw on an accomplished and highly professional civil service as well as a number of prominent charitable and educational foundations, is also well positioned to support these values. A sustained and energetic bilateral commitment to upholding common values would be an important way of demonstrating the lasting benefits of the global and proactive perspectives of the UK and Japanese governments, and would help to establish a new and appropriately ambitious agenda for addressing the critical challenges of the 21st century.
