As Japan and the UK face serious challenges at home and in their respective regions, this report makes the case that a stronger relationship could advance each country’s ability to address shared global concerns.
A Japanese translation of the report is also available as a PDF via this link.
Japan and the UK seem to be at opposite ends of the soft-power spectrum. While the UK reaps disproportionate benefits from its soft-power efforts, Japan receives dramatically less credit than its efforts often merit. Part of the disparity is structural: the UK is a soft-power ‘superpower’ owing to the global prevalence of English, and the country’s dominance in news media, publishing and university education. It is also seen as a major proponent of international institutions and the rules-based international order. Although Japan is second to none in its support for and adherence to international institutions, rules and norms of the post-Second World War order, it struggles to overcome the legacy of its colonial and wartime history. Those struggles have inhibited its ability to work with Asian neighbours and have diminished the effectiveness of its national brand. It has also caused the government of Japan to work modestly, without trumpeting its contributions from which so many benefit.
This apparent disparity provides a basis for much closer soft-power collaboration between Japan and the UK – in fact, there has been no more propitious moment for such collaboration since the US forced the termination of the Anglo–Japanese Alliance in 1923. In its efforts to cut itself loose from the European Union, the UK is in need of partners that share its liberal political and economic principles – and given the criticism of the May government’s cantankerous negotiations with Brussels, bilateral agreements between Japan and the UK would serve to restore some lustre to the British reputation for pragmatic and mutually advantageous compromise.
The government of Japan has been pushed by security challenges in Asia to take a more active role on the hard-power front, revising its national perspective on military force, increasing its defence spending, and moving beyond defence of its nation and into cooperation with allies for mutual security. These are momentous changes that will be more readily accepted both in Japan and beyond if they are part of a broader strategy to reinforce Japan as a global proponent of soft power. It would also benefit from the UK’s public championing of Japan’s good work more than its own modesty would normally allow.
Cooperation on trade between Japan and the UK has the potential to set the foundation for a much broader soft-power partnership between the two countries, and to invite cooperation from others in Asia and beyond
The other factor encouraging closer cooperation between Japan and the UK is the abdication by the US of its role in marshalling international cooperation. Its specific withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and more generally its hostility to multilateral arrangements, have left an America-shaped hole at the centre of the liberal trading order. Japan, along with Australia, has taken a leadership role in preserving the TPP, which has been reconfigured as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), despite the US absence; the UK’s support for that leadership would strengthen the ability of Asian countries to set standards and norms that shield against Chinese dominance. Cooperation on trade between Japan and the UK has the potential to set the foundation for a much broader soft-power partnership between the two countries, and to invite cooperation from others in Asia and beyond. For both the UK and Japan, there is an opportunity for more soft-power activism and cooperation.
For Joseph Nye, the concept of soft power, as distinct from hard power, can be defined thus:
The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions. This dimension can be thought of as soft power, in contrast to the hard command power usually associated with tangible resources like military and economic strength.205
Soft power is comprised of those elements of government activity that cannot coerce or compel others: art, moral authority, reputation, and voluntary economic decisions. While Nye considers economic strength to be hard power, he and most other political scientists consider trade policy to be soft power. Gross domestic product in its raw form is hard power; the arrangements that states negotiate with each other to open markets and achieve mutual gain are soft power, as is the reputational value of being considered a fair trader and a country that abides by the rule of law and the terms of treaties to which it is a signatory.
Soft power is not something that governments can always command as it is mainly about the perception of government actions. Soft power shapes how a state’s policies and actions are understood by others. It can be a force multiplier (to use the US military’s jargon), accruing greater effect to actions undertaken. It can also be a force minimizer, subtracting credit that ought to accrue to a country for its actions.
At first glance, it might seem that the benefits of soft-power cooperation between the UK and Japan will accrue predominantly to Japan. But there are enormous reciprocal benefits for the UK. First, Japan is a major power in Asia, something the UK no longer is, but it will be seeking to become one with its increasing estrangement from Europe and with Asia’s continued economic dynamism. Working with Japan will facilitate entry points for the UK into the economies and cultures of Asia. Second, the magnitude of the two economies – especially if joined by Australia and other similarly structured economies – is sufficient to establish norms and terms of trade that can dilute Chinese economic power. The UK itself is too small an economy and too marginal in Asia to accomplish that independently. But cooperation with Japan can be a catalyst to achieve this. There are parallels, too, beyond economics.
London and Tokyo could forge better synergy in agendas of mutual significance, such as development assistance, as exemplified by the collaboration between Crown Agents206 and the government of Japan.
The idea has gained renewed salience of late. Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept, its own brand of a new grand strategy that looks at the Indian and the Pacific Oceans as a single inseparable confluence, and the UK’s emphasis on its Commonwealth connections should work to bring both nations closer together. Whether it is about building infrastructure or human capacity, London and Tokyo could do more for developing nations to foster accountability and transparency, key foundations for democratic governance, project by project. They have ‘talked the talk’, such as the idea of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and Crown Agents working more closely together. Now it is time for them to ‘walk the walk’.
The JICA channels Japanese taxpayers’ money into aid for developing countries, either in building infrastructure or by providing such countries with assistance in the form of human capacity-building, governance reforms, and by helping to facilitate universal health coverage and the like. Japan began its official development assistance (ODA) programme only after it finished paying reparations for its wartime conduct in Asian countries, in the mid- to late 1960s. At one point the assistance programmes that the JICA provided were allegedly tied to business opportunities for Japanese civil engineering companies. However, such arrangements only made up 4.8 per cent to 17.7 per cent between 2011 and 2015.207 In the context of Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept, it is currently focusing more on this region than it did in the past, but is said to be open to cooperating with China, as hinted publicly by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.208
London plays a key role in the Japanese government’s pursuit of soft-power diplomacy. This was demonstrated in June 2018 by the opening of a ‘Japan House’ in a prestigious London location,209 serving as a gateway to all things Japanese for English-speaking culture connoisseurs.
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) will spend JPY 2.4 billion to JPY 3.2 billion210 (£16.5 million – £22.1 million211) in 2017–18 to run three Japan Houses worldwide.212 The mission of London’s Japan House is to reach out to audiences in the English-speaking world and London-based media outlets, hence making it the most ambitious of the three. It is significant that the BBC, among other international media outlets, reaches the largest audience worldwide213 and that the UK is home to some of the world’s highest-ranked universities.214
The UK is the second biggest recipient of Japan’s FDI, after the US.215 This alone makes it a focus for Tokyo’s public diplomacy. Yet the latest project to establish a Japan House in London stands out in that its target audience is not only the UK public but also the wider English-speaking community across the world; it is anticipated that the UK will play the role of force multiplier for Japan’s public diplomacy.
Japan’s focus on the UK in its pursuit of stronger public diplomacy is being reciprocated, and is likely to increase due to Brexit. The two countries’ soft-power projections have thus become mutually reinforcing in an unprecedented way.
After Brexit, should the UK wish to forge bilateral free-trade agreements with the aim of maximizing economies of scale, the US, China and Japan are respectively its three biggest potential partners. As a member of the EU, the UK could not seek such bilateral agreements, but once outside the multilateral framework, it will regain its sovereign power to do so. Brexit therefore serves to highlight Japan’s value as a partner for the UK. It is, after all, a large economy and, unlike China, a long-established democracy.
While scarcely any solid evidence has been available, one poll, taken in early September 2016, indicates that in the UK the public appears to be of a similar view. Asked the question: ‘Following Britain’s decision to leave the EU, how much of a priority is it for the UK to agree a trade deal with Japan?’, 27 per cent of the 1,673 respondents considered it ‘a top priority’. Clearly, Japan remains an important trade partner for the UK.216
Prime Minister Theresa May sought to reassure the Japanese business community in a speech during her August 2017 trip to Japan that a post-Brexit Britain should still be their favoured partner:
I believe that this is a good moment for like-minded partners such as Britain and Japan to be doing more together. For as we become a Global Britain – a European nation still, but one that is outside the European Union – so we will be free to engage more actively and independently, particularly in key Asian markets like Japan. And against the backdrop of a more uncertain world, it is dependable and like-minded partners such as the United Kingdom who will stand with Japan in defending the rules-based international system and the open markets on which so much of our business is based.217
During that visit she also made the case that her vision of ‘Global Britain’ was not merely about enhancing the UK’s commercial interests across the world, but also about the projection of military might. As a symbolic gesture, she flew from Tokyo to the naval port town of Yokosuka aboard a Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force helicopter and landed on one of the biggest Japanese naval ships, the helicopter carrier Izumo. There she saluted both British and Japanese officers, as liaison officers from the British Royal Navy were stationed aboard the vessel.
The relationship between Japan and the UK has strengthened to the extent that their renewed partnership evokes a revival of the early 20th century Anglo–Japanese Alliance.218 Post-Brexit Britain will find in Japan a receptive and trustworthy ally to help preserve its status as a global power.
At the time of writing, the trajectory for the UK’s exit from the European Union remains unclear. Equally it is uncertain whether any successor to May would share her vision of ‘Global Britain’. However, it is very likely that views similar to May’s will continue in the UK, and that the rules-based international order will depend on the combined efforts not only of the UK and Japan but of such countries as Australia, France, India and the US.
It serves each country’s national interests to jointly recognize, as both the UK and Japanese prime ministers did in their joint declaration on security cooperation, ‘that Japan and the UK are global strategic partners which share strategic interests and fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law’.219 To communicate national identity, or more precisely in this context, to let it be known to the rest of the world what values the country wishes to uphold, is an exercise in public diplomacy. Here again, the UK and Japan can find in each other a force multiplier that mutually strengthens recognition of each other’s identity.
Defining national identity is no simple matter. Shinzo Abe, to the surprise of some who viewed him simply as a right-wing nationalist, has chosen to open the country to the rest of the world on an unprecedented scale. Tokyo played an instrumental role in bringing the TPP negotiations (minus the US) to a successful conclusion in the form of CPTPP. It was equally proactive in negotiations with Europe on the Japan–EU Economic Partnership Agreement.
Immigration is an area in which Japan has looked to learn from the UK. As a result, Japan has relaxed its residency criteria to allow for the sustainable inflow of immigrants that meets the needs of Japanese society. Tokyo has introduced a points-based system in which immigrants can obtain a permanent residency visa and for high-point earners the visa can be obtained faster than in any other country. Japan is pursuing greater openness and diversity, and continues to uphold the norms of the liberal international order that it still holds dear.
By close association with the UK and its strong soft-power status, Japan can seek greater recognition from the rest of the world for its own brand of national identity. Tokyo is urging overseas citizens, including students and young government officials, wishing to build professional careers to make use of the country’s government-funded scholarship programme to come to Japan for extended periods. The JICA-supported JDS programme220 has focused on some of the transition economies in Central Asia. The African Business Education Initiative for Youth, otherwise known as the ABE Initiative, after the prime minister initiated the programme at the fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development, has already brought more than 1,200 people from African countries, many from the private sector, to Japan to study at graduate level. However, these programmes remain relatively unknown in the UK. Tokyo needs to make London more aware of its human capacity-building activities among developing nations, and both London and Tokyo should work together to maximize impact. The first step might be to launch a small, highly selective scholarship programme for an elite group of young leaders from Africa and elsewhere to enable them to seek dual degrees in both the UK and Japan.
A little-known actor in UK–Japanese cooperation is Crown Agents, a not-for-profit business that works in development assistance.
In 1967, not long after Japan’s emergence as a growing donor nation, Crown Agents established its representative office in Kobe. Twenty years later, Crown Agents started to work as an agent on behalf of the Japanese government to provide developing nations with non-project grant aid. In 1997 the representative office moved to Tokyo, and in 2013 it became a private company incorporated under Japanese law. Crown Agents has offices in a host of developing countries, yet among advanced countries it only has fully owned subsidiary companies in Japan and the US.
In the area of development aid Japan and the UK are already undertaking a number of joint initiatives, but there is potential for expansion. In locations where the provision of development assistance has political ramifications, such as Ukraine, Crown Agents and the government of Japan are making progress in procuring and delivering medicines, including those for the treatment of neonatal respiratory distress syndrome.221
In the area of development aid Japan and the UK are already undertaking a number of joint initiatives, but there is potential for expansion
Elsewhere, Crown Agents manage Japanese non-project grant aid to provide fertilizers in Bolivia. The Japanese government and Crown Agents are also managing forest conservation programmes in Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi and Mozambique; in Tanzania, Ghana and Bosnia and Herzegovina they are helping to expand small businesses, farming and fishing enterprises.
With the Japanese government’s aid delivery organ JICA, Crown Agents delivered seminars to local JICA offices in Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, India, Jordan (for Iraq), Kenya, Pakistan, Romania and Zambia. Crown Agents’ team of procurement specialists trained participants in a range of procurement processes, from preparing terms of reference to tender evaluation, contract negotiations and management.
For Japan and the UK, development assistance has been a valuable soft power tool. The Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteer (JOCV) programme, launched one year after Tokyo held the 18th Olympic Games in 1964 as the country’s coming-of-age event, and the UK’s VSO activities increasingly find in each other a similar dedication to helping to eradicate poverty and other problems in developing countries.222 There is now an encouraging trend in both countries where there is a growing number of non-governmental and non-profit organizations, many of which are run by young volunteers focusing on development aid in Africa and elsewhere.
Not long ago Japan was often referred to as an ‘economic giant’ and a ‘political pygmy’.223 The country’s economic prowess has suffered since and its focus has shifted to its global political standing. One way to pursue that goal is to use its soft-power assets. The country is ranked highly in the world’s soft-power league table.224
If it is possible for Japan to partner with another established democracy, this should help to make its own brand more robust. This chapter has indicated that one such partner could well be the UK, and that what Japan and the UK already do together in development aid should be emulated in other areas.
The UK remains a permanent member of the UN Security Council and is home to top-ranking universities, media organizations and think-tanks. All of which have allowed the country to ‘punch above its weight’ on the global stage, but as it seeks to exit the EU it is debatable how long it can sustain this capacity. The ‘Global Britain’ branding exercise can be seen as a pre-emptive move to counter accusations of parochialism in the future.
Events scheduled for 2019 and 2020 in Japan are destined to bring the UK and Japan closer together. A number of ceremonies marking the change of the Japanese throne will see members of royal families from around the world invited to Tokyo, among whom the British are likely to stand out.
The UK is also ratcheting up its cooperation with Japan to help it better prepare for terror attacks – both cyber and physical – in the run-up to Japan hosting the Olympic and Paralympic games in 2020. BAE Systems, which first detected cybertheft by North Korea, is providing Japanese companies with consultancy services, and dialogue has intensified between the police and the military of both countries. Never before has there been such a strong rationale propelling both the UK and Japan to join forces to enhance each other’s soft power. The next two to three years will give them a golden opportunity to do exactly that.
