3. Analysis of Space-dependent Capabilities for NATO Missions and Operations
Position, navigation and timing (PNT)
PNT is a vital part of any NATO operation. It provides forces with the necessary means to conduct timely and effective operations. Thus, the loss of PNT would leave forces vulnerable to attacks.
NATO uses GPS for accurate timing and navigation in its PNT system. The accuracy of this data depends on the satellite geometry and the receiver system. In the tactical domain, alliance troops may not always have – or be able to rely on – space capabilities in conducting their missions. For instance, during a NATO exercise in Finland in 2018, Finland’s civilian air navigation services were disrupted through electronic means, which was later attributed to Russia.38 Loss of navigation capability was also reported in Norway at the same time. While these incidents were not cyberattacks, they illustrate the extent of NATO forces’ dependency on navigational signals, and the vulnerability of navigation systems to interference.
At the very beginning of its development, the US claimed that Galileo would be superfluous to the already existing GPS capability and that it would rival the capabilities of the US by creating a reduced European security reliance on that country.
In 2002, the EU initiated a European alternative to GPS, named Galileo,39 which is one of four existing Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). At the core of Galileo lies a European strategic determination to create a stand-alone system that is independent from but compatible with the US’s GPS system, thus providing much-needed resilience for both the US and Europe. At the very beginning of its development, the US claimed that Galileo would be superfluous to the already existing GPS capability and that it would rival the capabilities of the US by creating a reduced European security reliance on that country. Later, this policy was dropped as it became increasingly obvious that Galileo provided a necessary back-up system for GPS – a parallel route for space resilience, and therefore for trans-Atlantic security. There is a need for GPS/Galileo interoperability for NATO military capabilities that are dependent on space-based systems to ensure their reliability and integrity. Galileo has a civilian portion and a public regulated service (PRS), which is an encrypted navigation service, restricted to governments that use it mainly in military applications.40 PRS has anti-jamming and anti-spoofing capabilities, and is reserved for certain users within EU member states. The US needs to negotiate access to the PRS signals. When and if GPS fails to operate, Galileo is designed to provide civilian and military services for the US as well as for Europe. There is no interoperability issue between Galileo and GPS, as these points were discussed and solved in the framework of the EU–US agreement of 2004. The US needs to negotiate access to PRS signals. There is no agreement yet for Galileo to replace GPS in case of the latter’s failure.
Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)41
ISR provides information and imagery intelligence to allied forces about specific targets. It is used in air, land and maritime domains in order to supply accurate and timely information to the relevant commander to support decision-making.42 NATO’s intelligence-led operations rely fundamentally upon space-based ISR capabilities, and the effectiveness of the alliance’s operations is based upon the availability of these systems.
The imagery that ISR provides can be used both in conventional and nuclear weaponry command and control, and in targeting. ISR capability is composed of airborne imagery platforms, space-based assets and ground sensors. The information is collected through surveillance and reconnaissance sensors, which may be vulnerable to cyberattacks. Sensors could also be manipulated through physical or cyber means: this could even occur at the design stage within the manufacturing organization – a weakness all NATO countries should be aware of, especially if they rely on equipment sourced from non-NATO parties for the components of intelligence-gathering technologies.
NATO is working to improve the interoperability of ISR capabilities. To this end, in 2011, nine NATO countries voluntarily joined the Multi-intelligence All-source Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Coalition (MAJIIC-2) initiative, with the aim of increasing interoperability and information-sharing between each nation’s ISR capabilities.43 ISR technologies contribute significantly to national, regional and international security. Through surveillance systems, such technologies can observe and map adversary command, control and communication systems, thus providing invaluable strategic insights. Yet – as stated by a former battalion intelligence officer – collecting all the necessary information from multiple sources in a timely manner is not an easy task.44 That information may be received at different times from different outlets. Technology is an important factor in facilitating this analysis, and AI can overcome many existent analytical difficulties and analyse data in a compressed time frame. Any loss of ISR capability through cyberattacks would have dire consequences for strategic planning and policy.
Missile defence
Missile defence relies heavily on early warning capabilities otherwise known as integrated threat warning and threat assessment (ITW/TA): US space-based infrared sensors detect the hot plumes of ballistic missile launches and communicate the information to the service component command.
Theatre missile defence, which includes the Patriot missile defence system – a long-range surface-to-air missile system used by the US and NATO allies – and standard missile defence systems, and which is part of the naval component of the integrated Aegis weapon system, also serves as part of overall missile defence capability.45 The Aegis combat system operates in the maritime domain, using radar to track and guide weapons to destroy targets; its elements – which include a space tracking and surveillance system, the AN/SPY-1A radar, a command and decision system and a display system – could all potentially be exposed to cyberattacks.
The US Department of Defense conducted an auditing exercise in 2018 for the internal controls of its ballistic missile defence systems (BMDS). The aim of the audit was to ensure that systems and programmes were functioning as intended. The findings indicated that there were ‘internal control weaknesses related to protecting networks and systems that process, store, and transmit BMDS technical information’.46 These weaknesses could be exploited through insider threat and/or cyber means.
Missile defence systems may fail, or they may be activated due to false information sent from communication systems (such as ground-based radars) to the command unit. The Israeli anti-missile defence system Iron Dome, for example, is claimed to have a 90 per cent accuracy rate when intercepting targets. Yet there have been cases where a faulty response within the system has activated the launch of interceptor missiles erroneously, such as occurred in Gaza in March 2018, when it was triggered by machine gun fire.47 Thus the battle management and weapons control system was proved at that time to be unable to make proper threat assessments. Similar outcomes could result if the threat assessment control system is interfered with via cyber means; the consequences could be much higher, including the loss of civilian life. In the Israeli case, it was reported that Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, a supplier of technology to the Iron Dome system, together with Israel Aerospace Industries and the Elisra Group, both of which were also involved in the project, faced persistent cyberattacks during the period of October 2011 to August 2012. This resulted in the loss of sensitive data that was believed to include the specifications of the Arrow 3 missile, developed jointly by the US and Israel.48 Vulnerability to cyberattacks within the supply chain is not unique to NATO, and NATO and its allies should address this type of risk. Supply chain integrity (in terms of both hardware and software) is imperative for reliable military systems.
One of the core elements of a missile defence system is that it relies on the reception of near real-time information by a command centre to be able to identify and project the trajectory of an incoming missile. Through automated response it calculates the speed, velocity and location of the target in order to be able to intercept the incoming missile in a short time frame. Any deliberate interference with the information, for instance from the radar, could mean that the defence missiles fail to intercept an incoming threat, or could lead to a faulty decision based on falsified or spoofed information. Thus, for example, a defence missile could fail to hit the correct target and strike well beyond the intended target zone. In order to detect deliberate interference or cyber intrusion, it is important to put preventive measures in place. One such measure could be to conduct organized, simulated cyberattacks on a system to assess its performance: this is known as penetration testing. In the future, detection of anomalies could be possible through ML and AI, especially in closed networks.49
Communications
With the exception of anti-terrorism missions, all NATO missions rely on space-based communications. Within the NATO lexicon, an anti-terrorism mission is different to a counter-terrorism mission.50 Whereas an anti-terrorism mission involves preventive and defensive measures to protect the NATO alliance’s forces and reduce their vulnerability, a counterterrorism mission involves offensive measures that require space-based support.51 Communications support strategic, operational and tactical decision-making, as well as the planning and direction of operations.
With the exception of anti-terrorism missions, all NATO missions rely on space-based communications.
NATO owns and operates two Network Control Centres, which are responsible for satellite network planning, network control and ground segment management. Being able to rely on two facilities instead of just one increases resilience and the chance of system survivability (in the face of both physical attacks and cyberattacks).
NATO owns ground stations for SATCOM operations, but does not own satellites. It makes use of SATCOM assets, some of which are leased to NATO by the allies through memoranda of understanding, or by commercial service providers. For instance, the UK, French and Italian governments provide advanced SATCOM capabilities.52 Thus, NATO has high levels of dependency on key allies and on their willingness to provide space-sourced data, information and services in general. In addition, space service agreements face several challenges, such as distribution restrictions, data licensing issues, and regulations on selling national resolution data.53
NATO’s dependency on individual allies for the provision of such capacity creates problems, since different procedures may have to be followed in each case with regards to the types of data that can be shared with NATO. Thus, the dependency on communications assets rests more with the allies than with NATO. Yet, the vulnerability that may result from such dependency may equally affect NATO, all the allies and the individual member states that own satellites.
Space situational awareness (SSA)
Although space situational awareness (SSA) is not named as a core capability by NATO, its utility is acknowledged informally. Currently, NATO does not have a role in providing SSA; however, allies are developing their own capabilities.
SSA provides the necessary information about space assets, space weather conditions and debris that may pose threats to satellites. It is defined as ‘the ability to view, understand and predict the physical location of natural and manmade objects in orbit around the Earth, with the objective of avoiding collisions.’54 In other words, SSA provides information about natural and artificial objects in space, about the threats they pose and about the space environment in general.
SSA is used in both the civilian and military sectors. It has three specific purposes: providing space surveillance and tracking of space debris (objects) that circle around the Earth; providing space weather reports (see next section); and detecting near-Earth objects that risk causing damage on Earth. Through the observations made, the space-based infrastructure is prevented from colliding with space debris. Therefore, in order to avoid collisions with space debris or in order to move satellites, NATO and the allies require ongoing situational awareness in space. The US and the EU both conduct SSA activities so as to ensure safe and secure space activity.
Environmental monitoring
An area often neglected in discussions of space-dependent capabilities is the environmental monitoring of Earth: this process provides weather forecasting, geospatial and oceanographic information. Environmental monitoring is equally important during peacetime and during conflict. This capability supports mission planning, flight trajectories and targeting. For instance, in the context of NATO operations, environmental monitoring could supply information on flooding trends in a specific region, which a commander could access, allowing the latter to plan a mission accordingly. Weather information is also crucial to air defence planning and to the deployment of security against the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents. Real-time weather data is vital for missile launches and accurate targeting. NATO does not itself supply data or equipment for the provision of weather-related information. Instead, information about environmental conditions – and their potential impact on SATCOM and sensor accuracy – is provided to NATO by the US, through the meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) community.55
Possible consequences of cyberattacks for NATO’s space capabilities
Considering that digital technologies are fundamental to all six of the space-dependent capabilities described above, none of them is immune to cyberattacks. Moreover, any digital system that relies upon near real-time information is vulnerable to cyberattacks. The loss of one or more of these capabilities because of human or system error or through offensive cyber operations conducted by an adversary, could have severe strategic, operational and tactical consequences. In order to understand the value of each space-dependent capability, it is important to analyse the consequences of cyberattacks on each.
Cyberattacks on military weapons systems may have operational and strategic consequences that change the way the military operates in conflict. Although electronic warfare has been in use for more than a century,56 sophisticated cyberattacks on the systems of NATO or its key member countries have a new and distinct impact on decision-making and on how NATO conducts its operations. Cyberattacks on military systems could also have a paralysing effect on strategic military and political decision-making and could render NATO countries vulnerable to Russian or Chinese information and deception operations.
Timing is a crucial element of PNT capability. Most of the electronics used in military, civilian and commercial spheres depend on timing signals. By intercepting securely transmitted data through cyber means, an adversary may jeopardize the alliance’s missions and services. A compromised system would also diminish reliance on data received, as data confidentiality would be brought into question through possible acts of spoofing and deception.
The involvement of Russia and the US in the Syrian conflict, and the use of electronic techniques, such as signal jamming,57 and cyber means, such as hacking and spoofing, demonstrates the potential operational uses of cyberattacks. Russia’s electronic warfare capability involves not only an air defence capability but also integrates cyber operations.58
What type of consequences would result from cyberattacks within space-based systems? What would be the operational and strategic impact? The table below outlines some of the potential consequences for each capability:
Table 2: NATO space-dependent capabilities and potential consequences from their absence
|
NATO space-dependent capabilities |
Potential impact from the loss of capabilities |
|---|---|
|
Position, navigation and timing (PNT) |
|
|
Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) |
|
|
Missile defence |
|
|
Communications |
|
|
Space situational awareness |
|
|
Environmental monitoring |
|
38 Woody, C. (2018), ‘Finland and Norway are telling airline pilots to be ready to fly without GPS, and some think Russia is up to something’, Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/finland-norway-tell-pilots-to-fly-without-gps-and-some-blame-russia-2018-11?r=US&IR=T (accessed 17 Jun. 2019).
39 The UK’s decision to leave the EU creates a hurdle for Britain and the EU, as Britain was one of the biggest contributors of the Galileo programme. It is reported that the UK has invested around £1.2 billion into the Galileo system, which corresponds to one-ninth of the overall cost. During negotiations with the EU, Britain expressed its wish to continue to have access to the secure public regulated service (PRS) and to be involved in the development of Galileo even after leaving the EU. Michel Barnier, the EU chief Brexit negotiator, indicated that the EU would be open to negotiation with the UK on access to the PRS service, similar to the negotiations with the US and Norway over their access to Galileo. There is no obstacle for the UK to be a passive user of the Galileo system. In other words, the UK can still pursue the PRS access for defence and critical national infrastructure. The problem seems to be the UK’s ambition to be involved in the future developments of Galileo so that the British military would not be vulnerable to foreign design technology.
40 European Global Navigation Satellite Systems Agency (n.d.), ‘What is GNSS? PRS’, https://www.gsa.europa.eu/security/prs (accessed 27 Mar. 2019).
41 The US Department of Defense (DOD) defines ISR as ‘an […] activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations.’ See Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2019), DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, April 2019, p. 113, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf (accessed 30 May 2019).
42 Mitchell (2011), Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (P-ISR) p. viii.
43 These nine nations comprise of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, the UK and the US. See NATO Communications and Information Agency (2015), ‘MAJIIC 2: Enhancing technical interoperability’, NCI Agency video via YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-SnMTl0ajk4 (accessed 10 May 2019).
44 Mitchell, J. (2011), Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (P-ISR): Debunking the Myth, Establishing the Concept, and Achieving the Possible, p. viii.
45 US Department of Defense (n.d.), ‘Elements: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense’, Missile Defence Agency, https://www.mda.mil/system/aegis_bmd.html (accessed 28 Mar. 2019).
46 US Department of Defense (2018), ‘Security Controls at DoD Facilities for Protecting Ballistic Missile Defense System Technical Information’, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Dec/14/2002072642/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2019-034.PDF (accessed 17 Apr. 2019).
47 Ahronheim, A. (2018), ‘IDF Says Iron Dome Launch in Response to Gunfire Not a Malfunction’, Jerusalem Post, 26 March 2018, https://www.jpost.com/
Arab-Israeli-Conflict/IDF-says-Iron-Dome-launch-in-response-to-gunfire-not-a-malfunction-547133 (accessed 28 Mar. 2019).
48 Gibbs, S. (2014), ‘Chinese hackers steal Israel’s Iron Dome missile data’, Guardian, 29 July 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/29/chinese-hackers–steal-israel-iron-dome-missile-data (accessed 28 Mar. 2019). IAI refused this claim: please see Jerusalem Post Staff (2014), ‘IAI Refutes Claim that Iron Dome Makers Were Hacked’, Jerusalem Post, 31 July 2014, https://www.jpost.com/Defense/IAI-refutes-claim-that-Iron-Dome-makers-were-hacked-369505 (accessed 28 Mar. 2019).
49 Yet, it is possible to compromise the ‘learning’ process, especially in open networks. This may result in poor detection of anomalies. For more information on ML, see Mantere, M., Uusitalo, I., Sailio, M. and Noponen, S. (2012), ‘Challenges of Machine Learning Based Monitoring for Industrial Control System Networks’, 26th International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications Workshops, doi: 10.1109/WAINA.2012.135 (accessed 10 May 2019).
50 Please see NATO (2014), Space Support to NATO Operations: NATO Dependencies on Space.
51 Ibid.
52 NATO (2011), ‘SATCOM Post-2000: Improved Satellite Communications for NATO’, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50092.htm (accessed 10 May 2019).
53 Essad, R., Kreitmair, T. and Patten L. (2013), ‘Space Support to Operations-MAJEX13 Final Exercise Report’, NCI Agency, Technical Report TR/2013/SPW009274/02, The Hague, Unclassified.
54 Brancati, M. (2017), ‘Space Situation Awareness & Space Surveillance Tracking, Telespazio & ThalesAlenia Space’, presentation, http://www.cesmamil.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/9-_-Matarazzo-Brancati-_-Thales-Telespazio.pdf (accessed 10 May 2019).
55 US Joint Forces Command (2011), Joint Meteorological & Oceanographic (METOC) Handbook, 1st JMOC Edition, April 2011, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pams_hands/metoc_hbk.pdf (accessed 10 May 2019).
56 Evans, G. (2018), ‘The evolution of electronic warfare: a timeline’, Army Technology, 7 June 2018, https://www.army-technology.com/features/evolution-electronic-warfare-timeline/ (accessed 29 Dec. 2018).
57 Russia was reported to have deployed several electronic warfare capabilities in Syria for jamming airborne radars, for jamming unmanned aerial vehicles, and for jamming ground systems for mobile communications (GSM). See, McDermott, N. R. (2017), Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025: Challenging NATO in the Electromagnetic Spectrum, Tallinn: International Centre for Defence and Security, p. 13.
58 McDermott, N. R. (2017), Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025: Challenging NATO in the Electromagnetic Spectrum, p. v.
59 The US Department of Defense defines mission assurance as ‘[a] process to protect or ensure the continued function and resilience of capabilities and assets – including personnel, equipment, facilities, networks, information and information systems, infrastructure, and supply chains – critical to the performance of DoD [mission-essential functions]’: see US Department of Defense (2012), Mission Assurance Strategy, Washington, DC: Deputy Secretary of Defense, p. 1, https://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/MA_Strategy_Final_7May12.pdf (accessed 14 Apr. 2019); Bigelow, B. (2017), ‘Mission Assurance: Shifting the Focus of Cyber Defence’, in Rõigas, H., Jakschis, R., Lindstr öm, L. and Minárik, T. (eds) (2017), 9th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Defending the Core, Tallinn: NATO CCD COE Publications, pp. 6–7, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/CyCon_2017_book.pdf (accessed 30 May 2019).
60 Livingstone and Lewis (2016), Space, the Final Frontier for Cybersecurity?