1. Introduction
Kazakhstan has come a long way since independence, but prosperity gains and astute foreign policy have not been matched by political or institutional modernization.
For most people, even for most students and practitioners of international relations, the world’s ninth-largest country by land area rarely appears on their radar. Kazakhstan is often overlooked as a regional backwater, not yet shed of its Soviet past, dismissed by some as a state that was never designed to evolve into independence. At the same time, a small minority of specifically interested parties tend to exaggerate Kazakhstan’s strategic potential, bestowing upon it an unmerited level of geopolitical and economic importance.1 This Chatham House report, researched and written by Western and Kazakhstani analysts, aims to correct both of these inaccuracies and offer a realistic analysis of the country’s condition and prospects. Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition seeks to present a balanced view of the country’s politics and society, and to provide facts, insight and assessment of a polity both under-analysed in the West and facing substantive change. Both credit and criticism are given where due, reflecting the complex contemporary picture of development in the country.
The diversity of expert and popular impressions of Kazakhstan largely reflects differences in the motivations of observers, not all of whom are impartial. But it is also a function of the country’s mixture of genuine achievements and obvious shortcomings after 28 years of independent, post-Soviet existence (and less than a century with its current recognized borders).
The ruling elite’s official statements suggest that the leadership is ambitious – that it sees Kazakhstan not as an ex-Soviet state, nor even as a Central Asian country or ‘bridge’ between East and West. Kazakhstan is keen to transcend these definitions and become a more multi-dimensional, world-class player with a modernized economy and society. To do this, however, the country will above all need to overhaul its political system and improve governance. Without deeper and more extensive reforms than those effected to date, Kazakhstan risks falling into economic stagnation and squandering its progress.
Assessing the post-independence record
Relatively speaking, Kazakhstan has modernized and stabilized to a far greater extent than its four Central Asian neighbours – Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In most respects, as noted by Nigel Gould-Davies in Chapter 3, it has been among the top-performing economies in the former Soviet Union (FSU), if one excludes the Baltic states. Protests over land laws and workers’ rights in recent years have had little systemic political impact. Partly, this reflects state-led repression, but it is also because demonstrations have prompted policy climbdowns by a nervous government that has observed severe unrest in Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Georgia and even Russia. A ‘colour revolution’ or upheaval equivalent to the Arab uprisings remains unlikely in Kazakhstan in the near future. Yet the political protests of 2019, although minor by the standards of many democracies, have been larger and more sustained than most observers expected when Nursultan Nazarbayev – the country’s leader since before independence in 1991 – resigned as president in March 2019.
The political protests of 2019 have been larger and more sustained than most observers expected when Nursultan Nazarbayev – the country’s leader since before independence in 1991 – resigned as president in March 2019
Having made it through the chaos of the 1990s, Kazakhstan saw its prosperity increase rapidly – outpacing the world average – throughout the 2000s on the back of high oil prices and innovative reforms.2 It was hit by the global financial crisis in 2008, however, and suffered a further sharp slowdown in full-year GDP growth in 2015.3 Nonetheless, enough progress had been made in the previous two decades for Kazakhstan to continue as Central Asia’s economic leader. The country’s uneven, albeit broadly upward, economic trajectory in recent years is reflected in the stop-start process of privatization. The government has successfully transitioned some parts of the economy away from the Soviet-era model, selling off large chunks of approximately 800 (mostly smaller) state-owned enterprises. At the same time, it has instinctively attempted to retain control of key sectors and companies. The need for liberalization is of particular salience given the slightly improved prospects for reform in neighbouring Uzbekistan, which – as Annette Bohr explores in Chapter 6 – could provide a catalyst for the development of a healthy dynamic between the two countries. Moves by Kazakhstan’s authorities to develop the private sector and establish more effective markets could help the country to make the most of opportunities presented by potential increases in bilateral or regional economic cooperation.
Kazakhstan’s similarity – in essence, not scale – to Russia is notable. Both countries are regional heavyweights with analogously structured economies, comparable levels of GDP per capita, and political systems designed to allow the elite to retain power through managed elections. Both are or were until recently formally led by ‘strongmen’ with ambitions for something more than their countries have already achieved. Both those men – namely Nazarbayev and Vladimir Putin – are presumably satisfied with their performances as leaders (though many of their people are not). Yet the two countries are also in relative economic decline compared to, say, China and the US. This is partially a result of Nazarbayev and Putin being less comfortable with political than economic reform, and having established social contracts – now increasingly under strain – in which the promise of prosperity is exchanged for centralized control. Most obviously of all, both men are products of a Soviet upbringing, culture and political system.
But the clear difference between Kazakhstan and Russia is that, in working towards his country’s relatively modest goals, Nazarbayev has not made external enemies as Putin has. During the crisis around Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Nazarbayev made a point of endorsing the territorial integrity of Ukraine but was also careful not to criticize Putin. And just as Nazarbayev maintained domestic control by balancing the interests of various financial-industrial and ethnic groups,4 he adopted a similar approach to navigating external pressures. His much-lauded ‘multi-vector foreign policy’ has been highly successful. There are surely limits to Kazakhstan’s freedom of geopolitical manoeuvre, but Nazarbayev was comfortable with, or at least accepted, these limits during his presidency. His foreign policy was above all pragmatic: Kazakhstan is unlike Georgia, for instance, and seeks neither European Union nor NATO membership. Russia, for its part, may not be overjoyed with some of the trade and investment deals that Kazakhstan signs – which are more often with Chinese partners than the West – but the Kremlin tolerates this and is careful not to overreact.
Changing times
With the change of president, however, the pre-existing power dynamics may no longer apply. There is no guarantee that the strategies and policies that worked for Nazarbayev will work for his successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. The new president has clearly been selected to follow in his patron’s footsteps. However, contemporary Kazakhstan very much remains Nazarbayev’s country, moulded in his image. As Kate Mallinson explores in Chapter 2, Tokayev seems unlikely to be able to replicate that level of dominance. Russia and China are anxious that any political transition in Kazakhstan remain compatible with their interests (chiefly, access and control), and so far their wish seems to have been granted. Kazakhstan’s ties with and orientation towards the West today are weaker than at any time in the post-Soviet era. US and European interlocutors thus risk having less influence over the future of the country, even though Kazakhstan is now at a critical juncture and needs Western support more than ever.
Russia’s historically strong leverage in the country is also evolving, although efforts to ‘de-Russify’ Kazakhstan in recent years have been mixed. While the written language is to be moved from a Cyrillic to a Latin base by 2025, and many signs and government posters are already in Latin script, the principal language of business and government is likely to remain Russian for the foreseeable future. Due to a century of rule from Moscow, a majority of Kazakhstanis remain more comfortable with Russia’s embrace than that of any other external power.5 This is especially true of the older generation. A younger generation without the same historic attachment to the Soviet yoke is beginning to think differently. Youngsters appear to have less of an inferiority complex about Russia than their elders. Not that Western democracies fare much better: research by Marlène Laruelle shows that younger Kazakhstanis do not consider the West to have a superior political and social model.6 (In 2018 more than 40,000 people left the country, according to data from the research agency Finprom, although many leavers return.)7 These attitudes may change, however, if liberal Western policies see a resurgence and Kazakhstan’s own reforms fail to spark.
So far, the most significant laying to rest of Soviet-era ghosts has come in the form of China’s increasing economic presence and political assertion in the region. This is evident in projects associated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a sweeping investment programme designed to boost transport and trade links between China, Central Asia, Europe and (increasingly) other regions.
As with Kazakhstan itself, the BRI is variously dismissed and overhyped by observers. For some – not least, Nazarbayev himself – the BRI is the defining modernization project of the 21st century, with the potential to generate $26 billion worth of joint projects in industry and infrastructure for Kazakhstan by 2021.8 According to this school of thought, the BRI will provide Kazakhstan with the long-term means to achieve the prosperity denied to it under Soviet rule.
Despite risks both real and perceived, the government is forging ahead with deals with Chinese state entities on numerous transport infrastructure projects
For others, however, the BRI merits a more cautious embrace. There are concerns that it risks indebting Kazakhstan over loan repayments for costly projects, and that it may be the next step in a Chinese agenda of ‘regional capture’. In the 1990s, Western oil companies were chosen over Chinese ones as partners, as Kazakhstan considered only Western firms to have the know-how to extract hydrocarbons from the country’s most promising deposits. But this is no longer the trend. Despite risks both real and perceived, the government is forging ahead with deals with Chinese state entities on numerous transport infrastructure projects (not all are proceeding smoothly). This report addresses some of the BRI’s implications for Kazakhstan, especially in Chapters 6 and 7, although it does not aim to do so in full.
Authoritarian legacies
Kazakhstan is not a hard-line dictatorship, but its state machinery undoubtedly has a darker side – as Joanna Lillis makes clear in her chapter on the country’s political, civil and human rights record (see Chapter 4). As in many authoritarian states, the regime seeks to police information, and has stepped up its efforts in this area. Internet access, once widely available in towns and cities, has been restricted. The authorities have been heavily blocking the internet in the evening hours, with the resultant disruption the subject of much frustration and debate. This has especially been the case since the political protests of 2019.9
Current levels of repression remain a far cry from past abuses – such as a series of unexplained killings in the early to mid-2000s – and the coercive power of the deep state has been less overt of late. Nonetheless, a wide range of political rights and freedoms are effectively non-existent. In addition to access to information, these include political plurality; media freedom; freedom of assembly; the freedom of civil society to operate without pressure, intimidation or official consent; and freedom of association for trade unions and political parties other than the ruling Nur Otan party and ‘accepted’ political organizations. At the same time, other freedoms are often unchallenged and modern luxuries widely available, at least in the cities of Almaty and Nur-Sultan.
If another common feature of autocratic regimes is a weakness for grand projects or monuments, Kazakhstan under Nazarbayev has been true to type. The extent to which some of the country’s showier ‘achievements’ can be described as such is debatable, however. Many events and initiatives appear to be status symbols rather than content-driven. Examples include EXPO-2017, the Astana International Financial Centre (yet to prove its worth), the country’s unsuccessful 2022 Winter Olympics bid, its take-up of a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2017–18, the hosting of Syria peace talks, and the 2010 chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). This is to say nothing of the gravity-defying architecture of Nur-Sultan, a purpose-built and now rebranded capital city in the steppe.
It is easy for Westerners to scoff at such apparent vanity projects, yet the underlying ambition is genuine and impressive. No other Central Asian country – indeed, perhaps no other FSU country save Russia – is capable of turning such aspiration into reality. A more merited criticism is that these projects divert resources from everyday issues that matter more to the average Kazakhstani.
If a new generation and an emergent middle class feel ready for power before the elite is ready to bequeath it, transition will not come as peacefully as everyone desires
In time, more rational, needs-based policymaking is likely to be driven by quiet generational change in the lower levels of the administration. Younger people appear more promising future stewards of Kazakhstan’s society and economy, and less susceptible to domestic and Russian propaganda than many of their counterparts elsewhere in the FSU. The effects of the government’s Bolashak programme – which has sent thousands of students to study abroad – are already beginning to feed into public administration, and will be more visible as younger leaders take the reins. If, however, a new generation and an emergent middle class feel ready for power before the elite is ready to bequeath it, transition will not come as peacefully as everyone desires. Such tensions are what we appear to be witnessing now.
A transition with multiple risks
Until March 2019, the most striking feature of the political system was Nursultan Nazarbayev’s unchallenged rule since independence. That is a long time for any leader, even by the standards of post-Soviet countries. His near-neighbour counterparts from the early days of independence had mostly died off or been deposed. Though Nazarbayev’s regime was neither as cruel as that of Islam Karimov (Uzbekistan) nor as erratic as that led by Saparmyrat Nyýazow (Turkmenistan), the president occupied a position that in many respects was of questionable legitimacy, given routine abuses of the electoral process.
Yet that is only half the picture. Nazarbayev was also genuinely popular. According to local observers, he would most likely have won all the elections in which he stood (see ‘Appendix: Facts and Figures’), even had they been held democratically. He had always enjoyed a broad support base – although he might perhaps have won ‘only’ 70 per cent of the vote in an open contest, instead of the 95 per cent or more officially recorded for most elections. Whatever the real level of support, Nazarbayev’s cult of personality was – and still is – manifest.
The appointment of 66-year-old Tokayev10 as his successor has done nothing to quell uncertainty over the future, or to encourage internal innovation and foreign investment. The leadership claims to want to modernize and reform. Yet for now it means to do so with the politicians of yesteryear and a vertical power system. Notwithstanding the potential longer-term impact of an influx of youth into the system, as mentioned above, this contradiction remains unresolved.
The centralization of power means that civil society and political opposition are largely a sham – that is to say, they are not so much tolerated as manipulated, approved and exploited for show and expediency. Kazakhstan does not have a genuine, high-profile opposition figure, although it does have notable free-thinking analysts, not least two of the co-authors of this report.
The failure of the Eurasian Economic Union to bring tangible economic benefits has elicited popular resentment towards both Russia and the Kazakhstani government
A further challenge for the regime is that Kazakhstan’s resource export-dependent economy no longer looks so buoyant, despite a partial recovery since 2016 (see Chapter 3).11 The tenge crashed in 2014 and has been devalued. Dependence on the oil sector lies behind many problems that will not be masked simply by a higher oil price, currently hovering at around $60/barrel for Brent crude. The banking sector is weak. Privatization – as mentioned – has had mixed results, with the resistance reformers have encountered in part due to the job cuts involved. Further afield, Chinese growth has slowed, and the Russian economy is stagnant – with negative knock-on effects for Kazakhstan’s growth and trade. The economy has also suffered heavily from corruption-related inefficiencies, declines in global commodity prices and the fallout from international sanctions on Russia. Economic reforms are also harder to implement than they are to announce. The failure of the unloved Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) – originally Nazarbayev’s idea, but enacted by Putin – to bring tangible benefits has elicited popular resentment towards both Russia (its undisputed leader)12 and the Kazakhstani government. This, in turn, has increased nationalist fervour and reduced the leadership’s appetite for constructive engagement with Russia – the regime would now prefer to deal with Beijing directly, without Moscow looking over its shoulder.
Although Kazakhstan has implemented limited governance reforms, lately these have been of a technocratic nature and have targeted less senior tiers of the administration. Personnel in the upper levels of government are often shuffled, but the system essentially remains unchanged. There are few women in senior positions. The pool of talented recruits to senior government posts is shallow, as a patronage system ensures that positions are distributed among business interests, often as a way of balancing out rivalries. Major decisions and strategy are determined within a close-knit circle and in deference still to Nazarbayev. Political liberalization has yet to occur to any substantive degree. While reform brings its own dangers, Nazarbayev has amassed as much security for himself as is surely possible, especially with his new positions as senator for life and head of the government’s Security Council – giving him the power to make significant ministerial appointments. Nonetheless, in such a personalized system a more powerful future leader could one day turn against him.
Kazakhstan’s Central Asian neighbours, each with at least some experience of political succession, are not necessarily good indicators of where Tokayev (or future leaders) may take the country, assuming the new president ever acquires real power to wield as his own. The other Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan aside, have political systems that are even less open than Kazakhstan’s, and each transfer of power in the region has been sui generis. The continued uncertainty in Kazakhstan is a disincentive not just to investors, but also to those who genuinely wish to help the country with more substantial economic or political reforms – as opposed to facilitating the orchestrated enthronement of a pretender.13 The issue of the presidential succession, though more headline-grabbing, has always been less important than the question of whether there can be a new political configuration. This report addresses the latter topic in Chapter 2 in particular.
Why should the West care?
One of the West’s primary interests in Kazakhstan since 1991 has been in making money there. This has not so much been about accessing the country’s relatively low-income domestic market, but rather about extracting and exporting natural resources – oil primarily, but also uranium, other precious metals, grain and phosphates. In itself, this is not a bad thing. Western companies have contributed to Kazakhstan’s economic success, and at times have borne great risks to do so. The EU is Kazakhstan’s biggest trade partner, with a 40 per cent share of the country’s external trade in goods.14 However, the activities of some less-than-scrupulous foreign investors have made Kazakhstan’s leadership and its people suspicious of the West, reinforcing beliefs about double standards and the perception that foreigners talk democracy but pander to the regime to make money.
Western policymakers’ commitment to Kazakhstan, likewise, has been uneven. Kazakhstan’s distance from Afghanistan meant that it never was a prime object of the West’s renewed interest in the broader Central Asian region after the 9/11 attacks. But the drawdown of Western forces from Afghanistan in 2014 has led to further detachment from the region by Western governments, which see no terrorist threat substantive enough to require deeper security engagement. Terrorist attacks in Kazakhstan, mostly against the domestic security services, have been few and far between – although the secular government sometimes exaggerates the threat to justify tighter controls. (Some blame is directed at Moscow for stirring up trouble and, more implausibly, at the West for supposedly fomenting ‘colour revolution’.) The souring of US relations with Pakistan has not, as some predicted in 2017, led to a commensurate increase in US activity in Kazakhstan as an alternative strategic jumping-off point for the region, despite some terrorist attacks in Europe having been traced back to Central Asia.
Revisionist powers like Russia and rising powers like China will fill geopolitical vacuums if they appear. The more the West retreats from Central Asia, the more other global actors will move in – and potentially clash. There is conflicting evidence as to whether China or Russia is the more dangerous of the two. Russia’s actions abroad have caused the deaths of tens of thousands in Ukraine, Syria and beyond. China, meanwhile, is clearly flexing its muscles, and some of its actions – for example, in the South China Sea – are certainly provocative. But in recent years, unlike Russia, it has not embarked on any expansionist adventures that have directly resulted in deaths beyond its borders.15 On the other hand, China’s domestic behaviour – in particular towards the Uighurs, and even towards ethnic Kazakhs16 – is far more problematic, and the Kazakhstani population’s fears on this matter cannot easily be assuaged. Alarm over Chinese expansionism is being fed by Kazakh nationalists, the Russian media, and China’s increasing presence in Kazakhstan through land rental and acquisition.17 This suggests that Beijing will struggle to be seen as a trusted power in Kazakhstan. But it also presents an opportunity for the West, if it so wishes.
Western efforts to balance humanitarian concerns against the need to cultivate Kazakhstan’s government (and ensure access to mineral rights) have always seen human rights lose out. This pattern seems set to continue for the immediate future as legislation – for example, on religious freedoms – becomes ever more repressive, as explained in Chapter 4. But as similar issues elsewhere enrage publics and topple governments, the West may be forced to redress that imbalance in the medium to long term.
The West has arguably more pressing concerns elsewhere, so it is unrealistic to expect it to shift significant attention and resources to a country that presents much less of a threat to stability than many others. Yet there are also perils with the other extreme: the near-complete disregard for anything other than profiteering. These perils are made clear throughout this report, considering the prospect of increased political turbulence for Kazakhstan in the near future. But the ‘tyranny of the immediate’ means that Western politicians are currently unlikely to heed this warning; paying no heed is a serious policy mistake occurring right now.
Stasis, reform or revolution?
Since 2012, when Nazarbayev announced ‘Strategy Kazakhstan-2050’, it has been an official policy goal of the government to turn Kazakhstan into one of the world’s top 30 economies by 2050.18 (It entered the top 50, measured in terms of nominal GDP, in 2011 but slipped back just four years later.)19 In 2015 the government published an institutional reform plan – dubbed ‘100 concrete steps’ – designed to help the country meet its development targets.20 But implementation has been patchy, and the plan itself, while laudable in principle, is not particularly ambitious, especially in terms of political reform.
Kazakhstan is undoubtedly a hard country to govern, perhaps more so now that it has a technocratic new president who is not yet, and may never be, fully in charge. But things can turn quickly. Following an explosion at an ammunition warehouse in the southern town of Arys in June 2019, Tokayev flew to the scene of the incident within hours and met with displaced residents. For Kazakhstan, this was an unprecedented response by a president. Shortly afterwards, a number of people had written on social media: ‘Tokayev – our president.’21
Kazakhstan is reaching the limits of politically palatable reform. The policy of ‘economy first, politics later’ has run its course
The judgment of this report is that Kazakhstan has done well to get where it has in unfavourable conditions. It has had to deal with challenging topography (only 10 per cent of the agricultural land is under arable cultivation),22 heavy environmental damage from the Soviet era, the sheer distance from any major sea port, a political legacy of authoritarianism, and a relative lack of interest from outside powers.23 But the difficulties the country now faces have come as Kazakhstan reaches the limits of politically palatable reform. The policy of ‘economy first, politics later’ has run its course. The irony of the worst-case scenario for Kazakhstan’s leaders is that a combination of inadequate reform momentum and, conversely, ‘dangerous’ political liberalization could induce change at the top faster than they wish, as recent events indicate.
The long rule of Nazarbayev, often referred to as the ‘Father of the Nation’, is nearly at an end. Now Kazakhstan faces a critical and emotionally turbulent period in its history. It will not progress further as things stand, yet to get back on track will require time and political reform beyond the cosmetic.
About this report
This report claims to be definitive of its type, but it is not exhaustive. The seven principal chapters (in addition to this introduction) offer a multi-dimensional assessment of Kazakhstan’s development and progress, considering its size, complexity, position and history. They cover governance, the political economy, political and civil liberties, society and identity, relations with other Central Asian states, relations with Russia and China, and relations with the West. Each of the authors – of whom six are Western and two Kazakhstani – is responsible for his or her own chapter. But the authors have collectively written and agreed the executive summary and the report’s modest policy recommendations. We have striven to be fair-minded, but we have not held back.
1 For a hagiographic exposition of Central Asia’s potential, and Kazakhstan’s in particular, see Cohen, A. and Grant, J. (2018), Future Calling: Infrastructure Development in Central Asia, Washington, DC: International Tax and Investment Center (ITIC). On another level entirely is Jonathan Aitken’s widely criticized Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan. See Aitken, J. (2009), Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan, London: Bloomsbury.
2 Kazakhstan’s GDP per capita overtook global GDP per capita in 2011, peaking at $13,891 in 2013 compared to a world level of $10,764. In 2016, Kazakhstan’s GDP per capita fell below the world level again, to $7,715, before rising to $9,331 in 2018. World Bank (undated), ‘GDP per capita (current US$) – Kazakhstan, World’, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?end=2018&locations=KZ-1W&start=2000 (accessed 11 Sep. 2019).
3 World Bank (undated), ‘GDP growth (annual %) – Kazakhstan’, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=KZ (accessed 1 Nov. 2019).
4 Kazakhstan has more than 100 ethnicities. Nazarbayev’s success in maintaining peace among them is the principal justification for his title of Elbasy – ‘Leader of the Nation’.
5 See Chapter 5 by Dosym Satpayev. In a recent survey, 72 per cent of Kazakhstanis polled were supportive of Vladimir Putin.
6 Laruelle, M. (2018), ‘Kazakhstan’s Nationhood: Politics and Society on the Move’, lecture at the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies (CERES), Georgetown University, 8 February 2018, https://voicesoncentralasia.org/kazakhstans-nationhood-politics-and-society-on-the-move/ (accessed 11 Sep. 2019).
7 See Chapter 5.
8 Kazinform (2016), ‘Kazakhstan, China to create 50 joint enterprises’, 21 September 2016, https://www.inform.kz/en/kazakhstan-china-to-create-50-joint-enterprises_a2951403 (accessed 31 Oct. 2019).
9 Recently the government called upon all citizens to download an ‘internet security certificate’, which allows full access even to encrypted information. The move was widely questioned (and criticized at a global level) for being more about surveillance than security. The government subsequently backed down from implementing the scheme.
10 At the time of his actual appointment, Tokayev was 65 years old.
11 Real GDP increased by 1.2 per cent and 1.1 per cent in 2015 and 2016 respectively, and by 4.1 per cent in both 2017 and 2018, according to World Bank data. World Bank (undated), GDP growth (annual %) – Kazakhstan’.
12 Russia’s share of the combined GDP of the five economies of the EAEU is 86.9 per cent. World Bank (undated), ‘GDP (current US$) – Russian Federation, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic’, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2018&locations=RU-AM-BY-KZ-KG&start=1988 (accessed 11 Sep. 2019).
13 As noted elsewhere in this report, several Western consultancies were hired over the past two decades, supposedly to help develop modernization plans – though in reality, more to help Kazakhstan gloss over its glaring democratic deficit. The fact that one of these firms was Tony Blair Associates actually increased scrutiny of human rights issues where the leadership did not desire it, having the opposite effect of what was intended.
14 World Trade Organization (2019), ‘Kazakhstan’ trade profile, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/daily_update _e/trade_profiles/KZ_e.pdf (accessed 1 Nov. 2019).
15 I am grateful to Bobo Lo for this point on relative death counts caused by Russia and China.
16 There are more than 1 million ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang. Many have escaped and crossed the border, seeking refuge and support from the government of Kazakhstan.
17 Proposed changes in the Land Code that would have allowed foreigners (in this case, Chinese) to lease land for 25 years were retracted by the government after widespread opposition in 2016.
18 Official Site of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2012), ‘Strategy “Kazakhstan-2050”: new political course of the established state’, state-of-the-nation address, 14 December 2012, http://www.akorda.kz/en/addresses/addresses_of_president/address-by-the-president-of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-leader-of-the-nation-nnazarbayev-strategy-kazakhstan-2050-new-political-course-of-the-established-state (accessed 11 Sep. 2019).
19 International Monetary Fund (2019), World Economic Outlook Database, October 2019, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/index.aspx (accessed 1 Nov. 2019).
20 Ostensibly aimed at shoring up the legal system, professionalizing the civil service, boosting the economy, strengthening national identity and, allegedly, increasing transparency. See Consulate General of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Sydney (2015), ‘The 100 concrete steps set out by President Nursultan Nazarbayev to implement the five institutional reforms’, 20 May 2015, http://mfa.gov.kz/en/sydney/content-view/100-konkretnyh-sagov-sovremennoe-gosudarstvo-dla-vseh (accessed 25 Oct. 2019).
21 Note that this is hard to verify. There are always some pro-government trolls.
22 Farchy, J. (2016), ‘Kazakhstan unrest highlights reform conundrum’, Financial Times, 6 June 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/34e688d4-2bbf-11e6-bf8d-26294ad519fc.
23 Sullivan, C. J. (2018), ‘Kazakhstan at a Crossroads’, Asia Policy, 13.2, April 2018, pp. 131–34. Sullivan points out that no one is looking to make Kazakhstan into an economic powerhouse as the US did for Japan after the Second World War; and especially while China’s intentions in the region are unknown.