Behind the US–China Trade War: The Race for Global Technological Leadership
Even if the US and China agree on a deal that would end their on-again, off-again trade war, the economic and trade relationship between these two countries will be fraught for years to come. This is because the current dispute is not so much about trade, but rather about larger structural issues. The US and China are locked in a race for economic and technological dominance in the long-term. Resolving this new rivalry will require both sides to find a mutually acceptable middle ground. This chapter focuses on the US demands in the current US–China trade war and ‘tech race’ as a starting point and outlines some solutions from the US perspective.
US concerns in the trade war with China
The Trump administration has raised various concerns regarding trade with China. While some are legitimate, others are less valid.
US trade deficit with China
The one area that President Trump has often lamented is the large and persistent US trade deficit in goods with China. Standing at $419 billion in 2018, it accounted for approximately 48 per cent of the US’s global goods trade deficit.1 However, the Trump administration’s focus on this metric is misplaced for two reasons: first, it only takes into account the trade deficit in goods, while ignoring that the US had a $40 billion surplus in trade in services with China in 2018.2 Second, while overall global trade imbalances matter (with China’s structural trade surplus being a case in point), most economists believe that trade deficits are largely the result of macroeconomic forces (i.e. savings and investment) and not due to trade policy.
As US–China trade tensions intensified over the course of 2018, the US trade deficit in goods widened to the highest level ever recorded. Because of President Trump’s fixation on the trade balance, the US and China have announced steps to adjust it – for instance in January 2019, when Beijing pledged to ‘purchase a substantial amount of agricultural, energy, manufactured goods, and other products and services from the United States’.3
Currency manipulation
On the 2016 US presidential election campaign trail, Trump vowed to label China a currency manipulator. Until recently, the Treasury Department kept China on the ‘Monitoring List’ of economies that ‘merit close attention to their currency practices’.4 But while most pundits still believe that China does not meet the criteria set for determining currency manipulation,5 Treasury Secretary Mnuchin, under the auspices of President Trump, named China a currency manipulator in August 2019.6
China has manipulated the renminbi in the past, but direct interventions by the People’s Bank of China have been limited in recent years. While the latest depreciation of the renminbi vis-à-vis the dollar helps China’s exports, and thus widens the country’s trade surplus with the US, the real driver is the strength of the US dollar as a result of President Trump’s fiscal and trade policies.
In short, the issue of currencies has now become another front in the US–China trade war. But the currency feud is more a sideshow reflecting the reality that the trade war has economic consequences. Nonetheless, China’s lack of currency transparency requires further scrutiny.
Market-distorting forces and overcapacity in the steel sector
The Trump administration has repeatedly criticized China for flooding global markets with cheap steel and aluminium. To tackle this trend, President Trump – at the recommendation of the US Department of Commerce – introduced near-blanket tariffs of 25 per cent on steel and 10 per cent on aluminium in March 2018, citing national security reasons. The recent US tariffs on steel and aluminium have affected $2.8 billion of Chinese products (based on 2017 export values), and the retaliatory tariffs that China introduced in response, in April 2018, hit $2.4 billion of US products (based on 2017 export values).7
However, while the current metal tariffs are aimed at China, they have little impact on the country and primarily hit US allies.8 While South Korea received a permanent exemption from the tariffs in May 2018 in exchange for quotas, Canada and Mexico only saw tariffs lifted in May 2019 to pave the way for ratification of the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement. Steel and aluminium exports from the EU and Japan to the US are currently still subject to the tariffs.
The tariffs do little to address the real problem of China’s market-distorting practices and policies such as subsidies and state-owned enterprises that fuel severe excess capacity in the steel sector.
Practices regarding technology transfer, intellectual property and innovation
China’s policies and practices related to technology transfer, IP and innovation are at the heart of the ongoing tariff escalation, which overshadowed the US and Chinese – and indeed global – economies in 2018 and 2019. Following a Section 301 investigation and report by the Office of the US Trade Representative,9 the US subsequently imposed tariffs on approximately $250 billion of Chinese imports over the course of three rounds in 2018. China retaliated by increasing tariffs on $110 billion worth of imports from the US. In June 2019, the Trump administration raised tariffs from 10 per cent to 25 per cent on $200 billion of imports from China that were previously targeted; and China in retaliation raised the tariff rate on $60 billion of imports from the US that it had previously targeted.10 In August 2019, the tit-for-tat tariff trade dispute escalated further – with both sides announcing more tariffs.11 The Trump administration is also preparing to raise duties on an additional $300 billion worth of goods, which would cover all remaining imports from China.12 The US and China are pursuing dispute settlements at the World Trade Organization (WTO) over those tariff measures imposed.
The US has raised four primary concerns regarding China’s practices and policies – most prominently laid out in the Section 301 report:13
- Foreign ownership restrictions
China’s restrictions on foreign ownership, such as joint-venture stipulations and foreign equity limitations, are seen by the US as requiring – or at least pressuring – technology transfer from American to Chinese companies.
- Regime of technology regulations
The US alleges that American companies that seek to license technologies often are forced to do so on terms that favour the Chinese recipient.
- Cybertheft
According to the US Trade Representative, cyber intrusions into, and theft from, computer networks of US companies provide the Chinese government with unauthorized access to US trade secrets and sensitive commercial information.
- Outbound investment
China’s strategic investment in and acquisitions of US companies and assets in order to obtain cutting-edge technologies and IP is viewed with great concern in the US.
The current US administration believes that these four categories of policies and practices undermine the value of US investments and technology, and thus weaken US firms’ global and long-term competitiveness.14 The administration also contends that the Chinese government seeks to obtain cutting-edge US technologies and IP in order to advance its industrial policy goals.
While lawmakers – including leading Republicans in Congress – and American businesses agree with the concerns that the current administration has raised, they largely think that tariffs are not the best approach to address China’s trade and technology policies and practices.15 Instead, they believe that the US tariffs are counterproductive because they are effectively a tax on US businesses and consumers. Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that President Trump’s pressure tactics have proven effective in terms of getting the Chinese to the negotiating table.
While lawmakers and American businesses agree with the concerns that the current administration has raised, they largely think that tariffs are not the best approach to address China’s trade and technology policies and practices.
China is adamant that it is taking steps to address these concerns, for instance by abiding to the terms of a 2015 agreement between US President Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping that ‘neither country’s government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property’.16
The tech race and strategic competition – issues and US actions
Many of the US–China tensions in the area of technology transfer, IP and innovation arise because of American concerns over China’s ambition to become a global leader in a wide range of technologies. In particular, the industrial policy ‘Made in China 2025’ – which is aimed at expanding the high-tech sector in such fields as aerospace, robotics, and information and communications technology – is seen as a threat to US technological leadership. The Trump administration has described such Chinese policies as ‘economic aggression’.17
Another reason for the Trump administration’s increasingly confrontational approach to China is that many of the next generation technologies have both civilian and military applications. Thus, US apprehensions go beyond purely commercial issues.
In order to address concerns of Chinese outbound investment, the US has taken steps in recent years involving the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). This interagency committee reviews certain transactions involving foreign investment in the US that raise potential national security concerns.
For instance, based on the recommendation by CFIUS in 2017, President Trump prevented a Chinese purchaser with alleged links to the Chinese government from acquiring the US firm Lattice Semiconductor.18 In 2018, President Trump blocked Singapore-based Broadcom Limited from purchasing the US chipmaker Qualcomm in a hostile takeover, citing CFIUS concerns that the acquisition would weaken Qualcomm’s technological leadership and give an edge to Chinese competitors.19
Moreover, President Trump signed the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) into law, which expands the jurisdiction of CFIUS. Although this recent legislation did not mention China directly as a target of the measures, it was driven by concerns over the risks to US technological leadership stemming from foreign investment by primarily Chinese firms in American high-tech companies.20 One of FIRRMA’s objectives is to allow for greater scrutiny of ‘transactions that involve a country of special concern that has a demonstrated or declared strategic goal of acquiring a type of critical technology or critical infrastructure that would affect United States leadership in areas related to national security’.21 Without express reference, this nonetheless signals China is a focus of concern.
In May 2018, President Trump intervened to overturn a ban imposed by the US Department of Commerce that barred the Chinese telecommunications giant ZTE from buying American technology for seven years.22 This came after ZTE was found not to abide by the rules of a previous settlement agreement over violations of US sanctions on Iran and North Korea.
In the case of Huawei, another Chinese multinational technology company, the US Department of Justice filed a number of criminal charges against the company and its chief financial officer in January 2019, including for the alleged evasion of sanctions on Iran and the alleged theft of robotic technology.23 Moreover, the Trump administration has asked US allies – including Germany, Italy, and Japan – not to use the company’s 5G network equipment, citing espionage concerns.24 In May 2019, President Trump declared a national emergency and signed an Executive Order that prohibits US companies from using any information and communications technology and services from ‘foreign adversaries’ that are considered to pose ‘an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States’.25 Though the Executive Order does not name any company, it has been widely seen as targeting Huawei.26 At the same time, the US Department of Commerce put Huawei and its affiliates on the so-called ‘Entity List’ – which forbids US individuals and companies from exporting goods, technology or services to the listed entities without a licence from the US government.27 Despite the recent crackdown, the Commerce Department has extended a temporary reprieve for US companies to do business with Huawei.28 President Trump has also raised the possibility of easing restrictions on Huawei as a bargaining chip in ongoing US–China trade talks.29
President Trump’s willingness to use Huawei as leverage in the trade talks with China has blurred the lines between US legal processes, the US–China trade war, and the quest for technological leadership. Nonetheless, the export blacklisting of Huawei shows that the US’s aim is not simply about reducing the trade deficit, but about decoupling from China.
The concerns of the Trump administration make reaching an agreement between the US and China difficult, particularly regarding strategic and long-term considerations related to tech supremacy.
President Trump’s willingness to use Huawei as leverage in the trade talks with China has blurred the lines between US legal processes, the US–China trade war, and the quest for technological leadership.
To complicate matters, infighting between two broad factions on Trump’s trade team makes any progress with China even more difficult. On the one side are National Economic Council Director Larry Kudlow and Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin. They are (seen in relative terms) the voices most in favour of free trade – even though both have shifted away from their internationalist outlook held prior to joining the Trump administration.30 In order to calm financial markets, Mnuchin has reportedly been a proponent of easing up on tariffs on China.31 Most importantly, the individuals in this camp want to stop China’s unfair trade practices and policies – in particular the theft of IP and forced technology transfers.
On the other side are President Trump’s trade adviser Peter Navarro and US trade representative Robert Lighthizer, and – to some extent – the Secretary of the Commerce Department Wilbur Ross. Though Lighthizer is focused on structural changes and enforcement when it comes to trade with China, he is also interested in managing and enforcing the rules of the global trading system more broadly. Navarro (who currently is assistant to the president and director of the Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy) is best known for his book Death by China and is particularly hawkish on China. He believes that it is in the US’s long-term interest to ‘decouple’ from China.32 According to this line of thought, ceasing trade, capital and technology flows with China would make US IP and technology less vulnerable to theft and forced transfer. This, in turn, is thought to help limit China’s challenge to the US’s global technological leadership. However, as explored in the next section, the consequences of decoupling would be severe.
Due to this perceived long-term strategic rivalry between the US and China, the Trump administration designated China a ‘strategic competitor’ and ‘revisionist power’ in the 2017 National Security Strategy.33
Solutions from the US perspective
Many of the Trump administration’s concerns regarding China reflect long-standing worries that are widely shared by both political parties and business groups. Thus, even future administrations are likely to pursue similar objectives and push for a hard line on China.
Avoid self-inflicted wounds
Many of the recent actions by the Trump administration have caused self-inflicted damage to the US economy and the country’s technological leadership.
The imposition of tariffs comes with costs to the US economy – US tariffs raise the price of inputs for its own firms (making their products costlier and thus less competitive internationally) and prices for American consumers. China’s retaliatory tariffs (particularly targeted at US agricultural goods) hurt the competitiveness of US products in China.
The US’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) under President Trump also left a self-inflicted wound. The agreement was an opportunity for the US to strengthen its influence on setting the rules relevant for 21st century trade – and to address issues presented by China’s policies and practices that currently are not dealt with under WTO rules.
In particular, TPP would have included new rules in areas such as state-owned enterprises, IP and digital trade. Most of those rules now live on in the trade deal’s reconstituted successor that does not include the US – the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Because the CPTPP could play an important role in addressing concerns raised by China’s practices and policies, the US should reconsider joining. Although this is very unlikely under the current administration, President Trump has not ruled it out entirely.34 Should the Trump administration or its successor choose to rejoin the agreement, the US would want to address about 20 provisions (many of which its negotiators pushed in the original TPP) that have been suspended under CPTPP. While reinstating the suspended provisions is technically possible, it would be hard to get all CPTPP members to agree to the reinstatement and even more difficult for the US to extract further concessions.
Decoupling from China’s economy would amount to the US inflicting economic self-harm. The US technology sector is deeply intertwined with China’s. A fencing off would have adverse consequences for the innovation and competitiveness of US firms and raise costs for American consumers.35 Thus, a balance must be struck between protecting important US technology sectors for national security reasons, protecting FDI in the US, and protecting US innovation.
Focus on own competitiveness
China’s technological rise cannot be attributed solely to ‘unfair practices’. It is also a result of China’s market size and large amounts of private and public venture capital. Against this background, the US should invest more in those areas that underpin its own innovative strength. For instance, it should advance efforts to strengthen its education system and boost STEM learning, promote research and development in future industries, invest in infrastructure, reform the immigration rules and processes to make it easier for entrepreneurs and innovators to come to the US, and develop policies that will retain and attract new investment. But one hurdle will be to find consensus and provide the necessary funding for these initiatives at a time of partisan politics.
Washington should also move forward with regulatory reform to promote 5G deployments.36 To accelerate progress on artificial intelligence (AI), dedicated resources are needed for research and development and to promote collaboration between academia, industry and government labs. In this regard, it is noteworthy that President Trump signed an Executive Order launching an American AI Initiative – arguing that continued leadership in AI is critical for maintaining the economic and national security of the US.37 This Executive Order from February 2018 came almost one year after China unveiled plans to become a world leader in AI by the year 2030.38
Finding middle ground with China
The US and China should identify solutions that allow both sides to claim victory and save face. In the short term, part of the solution could include persuading China to lower its trade barriers and open the Chinese market to majority-owned foreign investment. In order to advance the latter goal, the Trump administration could renew efforts for a US–China bilateral investment treaty, which has been under negotiation since 2008.39
But this additional opening of China’s market (for instance in the finance, energy and agricultural sectors) cannot stand alone. It should be combined with increased efforts by China to enforce the protection of IP and technology. China has in the past vowed to do better under various memorandums of understanding (MoUs), but not always complied.40 In recent months, China has reportedly made proposals that would go further than past offers, including on forced technology transfer, but then allegedly backtracked.41 Going forward, the key will be to agree a deal that is binding, verifiable and enforceable.
Beijing is very unlikely to give up on its ‘Made in China 2025’ strategy as it is at the heart of its industrial development agenda. Hence, the US should not ask China to part with this strategy, but demand that China open up the sectors central to the ‘Made in China 2025’ policy to increased foreign participation.42 Reports that China is rewriting its strategy to allow for more international competition are a positive step,43 but it remains to be seen whether real change will follow.
The US should also be willing to offer some concessions so that Chinese negotiators, with their strong sense of national dignity, can claim a more balanced deal.
The fact that Beijing is willing to (at least notionally) consider structural reforms can be presented as a win-win for both the US and China. They should not be framed by the Trump administration as a concession by the Chinese to US pressure, but as actions in line with years of official rhetoric from Chinese officials about domestic reform and opening up.44 At the same time, the US should also be willing to offer some concessions so that Chinese negotiators, with their strong sense of national dignity, can claim a more balanced deal. In this regard, the Trump administration is reportedly considering agreeing to a Chinese proposal, which would reduce the data protection for certain US pharmaceutical products – though this move would be opposed by US industry.45
Work with like-minded partners
Many of the Trump administration’s concerns regarding China’s policies and practices related to technology transfer, IP and innovation are shared by other countries. To some extent, the Trump administration has recognized this: the US has issued a number of joint statements with the EU and Japan since 2017 to tackle ‘unfair market distorting and protectionist practices’ by China (though without naming the country directly).46 But while there are many areas of shared concern, the trilateral meetings have not yet produced a set of common solutions to tackle China’s unfair trade practices.
International cooperation regarding China’s behaviour is fragile. The EU and Japan (and other trading partners) oppose Trump’s use of unilateral tariffs as a negotiating tactic to force Beijing to change its practices as they are at risk of becoming collateral damage in the US–China ‘trade war’ and have great concerns about the implications of the US’s actions for the rules-based international trading order. The economic and political fallout resulting from President Trump’s pursuit of trade wars on multiple fronts – with the current US unilateral metal tariffs hitting US allies and the threat of car tariffs still looming – risks undermining the willingness of international leaders to work together with the current US administration regarding China.
Another area where increased international cooperation would be useful concerns foreign investment screening. For the implementation of FIRRMA to be effective, allied countries should exchange information with the US, coordinate action and adopt similar investment screening provisions for national security risks – otherwise the recent US reforms will hurt US competitiveness.47 Notably, a new framework for screening FDI in the EU entered into force in April 2019, building on national review mechanisms in some member states.48
Strengthen international trading system
As part of a strategy that aims at getting China to adhere to a rules-based international trading system, the architecture and rules of the system need to be updated in the first place.
The WTO is currently not fit for purpose to deal with the challenges posed by China’s economic system and its policies and practices. New rules are needed to keep up with technological advancements – including in such areas as digital trade and e-commerce. But the current crisis at the WTO make achieving reform more difficult. The Trump administration’s actions (in particular the blocking of appointments to the WTO’s Appellate Body) threaten the functionality of the institution that is at the heart of the international trading system.
The WTO is currently not fit for purpose to deal with the challenges posed by China’s economic system and its policies and practices. New rules are needed to keep up with technological advancements.
In order to bring about reform, the trilateral cooperation between the US, EU and Japan should be strengthened. The three parties are among China’s most important trading partners, and hence joint efforts could put necessary pressure on Beijing to change its policies and practices. The trilateral cooperation could be the basis for a ‘big, bold, comprehensive case at the WTO filed by a broad coalition of countries that share the United States’ substantive concerns about China’.49
At the centre of this case should be China’s technology transfer and IP policies and practices. A specific ruling – but also a broader discussion about how to reform the WTO rules – has the potential to restore confidence in the organization and its ability to update the rules of the international trading system.50
But despite the benefits of this approach, the odds for launching a case against China in which the EU, Japan and others would join the US as co-complainants are slim because it would require a US approach that emphasizes cooperating with allies on trade matters instead of alienating them.
Conclusion
The headlines regarding the US–China trade war have focused on the tit-for-tat tariffs and President Trump’s fixation with the US trade deficit. But the so-called trade war between the world’s two economic superpowers is not really a fight about trade – in fact, the primary source of the current commercial tensions between the US and China is technology competition.
The US and other countries have legitimate concerns about China’s IP and technology practices. The development of new transformative technologies such as 5G and AI will remain a critical source of tension between the US and China. But as the relationship is simultaneously based on competition and interdependence, the US and China should seek a compromise in order to move forward. Instead of a temporary resolution to the current trade conflict that only masks the underlying structural issues, the US–China relationship should be set on firmer foundations. Otherwise, a prolonged period of confrontation would likely lead to decreased trade and investment in the US and China – a lose-lose result for both sides and indeed the rest of the world.
1 US Census Bureau (2019), ‘Top Trading Partners – December 2018’, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1812yr.html (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
2 US Bureau of Economic Analysis (2018), ‘U.S. Trade in Goods and Services by Selected Countries and Areas, 1999-present’, https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-12/trad-geo-time-series-1018.xlsx (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
3 Office of the United States Trade Representative (2019), ‘Statement on the United States Trade Delegation’s Meetings in Beijing’, 9 January 2019, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2019/january/statement-united-states-trade (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
4 US Department of the Treasury, Office of International Affairs (2019), Report to Congress: Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States, 28 May 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/2019-05-28-May-2019-FX-Report.pdf (accessed 29 May 2019).
5 Horsley, S. (2019), ‘U.S.-China Trade War Spreads From Tariffs To A Battle Over Currencies’, NPR, 6 August 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/
08/06/748775639/u-s-china-trade-war-spreads-from-tariffs-to-a-battle-over-currencies (accessed 29 Aug. 2019).
6 US Department of the Treasury (2019), ‘Treasury Designates China a Currency Manipulator’, 5 August 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm751 (accessed 29 Aug. 2019).
7 Lu, Z. and Schott, J. (2018), ‘How Is China Retaliating for US National Security Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum?’, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 9 April 2018, https://piie.com/research/piie-charts/how-china-retaliating-us-national-security-tariffs-steel-
and-aluminum (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
8 US steel imports come primarily from Canada, Brazil and South Korea – whereas China is not among the top 10 supplier countries (mostly because of the prior imposition of US antidumping and countervailing duties). See US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (2018), The Effect of Imports of Steel on the National Security, Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce, https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/the_effect_of_imports_of_steel_on_the_national_security_-_with_redactions_-_20180111.pdf (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
9 Office of the United States Trade Representative (2018), Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 22 March 2018, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
10 Bown, C. and Kolb, M. (2019), ‘Trump’s Trade War Timeline: An Up-to-Date Guide’, The Peterson Institute for International Economics,
https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trump-trade-war-china-date-guide (accessed 29 May 2019).
11 Ibid.
12 Reuters (2019), ‘Factbox: Tariff wars – duties imposed by Trump and U.S. trading partners’, 13 May 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-tariffs-factbox/factbox-tariff-wars-duties-imposed-by-trump-and-us-trading-partners-idUSKCN1SJ1ZJ (accessed 29 May 2019).
13 Office of the United States Trade Representative (2018), Update Concerning China’s Acts, Policies and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 20 November 2018, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/301%20Report
%20Update.pdf (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
14 Ibid.
15 See, for example, US Chamber of Commerce (2018), ‘U.S. Chamber’s Donohue Statement on New Tariffs against China’, 15 June 2018, https://www.uschamber.com/press-release/us-chamber-s-donohue-statement-new-tariffs-against-china (accessed 8 Mar. 2019); Johnson, K. (2018), ‘Trump’s Trade Wars Prompt Congressional Pushback’, 19 June 2018, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/19/trumps-trade-wars-
prompt-congressional-pushback/ (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
16 The White House – Office of the Press Secretary (2015), ‘Fact Sheet: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States’, 25 September 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-jinpings-state-visit-united-states (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
17 White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy (2018), How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World, June 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
18 US Department of the Treasury (2017), ‘Statement On The President’s Decision Regarding Lattice Semiconductor Corporation’, 13 September 2017, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0157.aspx (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
19 See US Department of the Treasury (2018), ‘Statement by Secretary Mnuchin on the President’s Decision Regarding Broadcom’s Takeover Attempt of Qualcomm’, 12 March 2018, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0309 (accessed 8 Mar. 2019); Rappeport, A. and Kang, C. (2018), ‘U.S. Calls Broadcom’s Bid for Qualcomm a National Security Risk’, New York Times, 6 March 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/business/qualcomm-broadcom-cfius.html (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
20 Jackson, J. and Cimino-Isaacs, C. (2018), ‘CFIUS Reform: Foreign Investment National Security Reviews, Congressional Research Service’, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF10952.pdf (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
21 Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) of 2018 (Title XVII, P.L. 115-232).
22 Ballentine, C. (2018), ‘U.S. Lifts Ban That Kept ZTE From Doing Business With American Suppliers’, New York Times, 13 July 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/13/business/zte-ban-trump.html (accessed 8 Mar. 2019); US Department of Commerce (2018), ‘Commerce Department Lifts Ban After ZTE Deposits Final Tranche of $1.4 Billion Penalty’, 13 July 2018, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/
2018/07/commerce-department-lifts-ban-after-zte-deposits-final-tranche-14 (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
23 US Department of Justice – Office of Public Affairs (2019), ‘Chinese Telecommunications Conglomerate Huawei and Huawei CFO Wanzhou Meng Charged With Financial Fraud’, 28 January 2019, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-telecommunications-conglomerate-huawei-
and-huawei-cfo-wanzhou-meng-charged-financial (accessed 8 Mar. 2019); US Department of Justice – Office of Public Affairs (2019), ‘Chinese Telecommunications Device Manufacturer and its U.S. Affiliate Indicted for Theft of Trade Secrets, Wire Fraud, and Obstruction Of Justice’, 28 January 2019, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-telecommunications-device-manufacturer-and-its-us-affiliate-indicted-theft-trade (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
24 Woo, S. and O’Keeffe, K. (2018), ‘Washington Asks Allies to Drop Huawei’, Wall Street Journal, 23 November 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/washington-asks-allies-to-drop-huawei-1542965105?tesla=y (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
25 The White House (2019), ‘Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain’, 15 May 2019,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-securing-information-communications-technology-services-supply-chain/ (accessed 29 May 2019).
26 Stewart, E. (2019), ‘The US government’s battle with Chinese telecom giant Huawei, explained’, Vox, 21 May 2019, https://www.vox.com/technology/2018/12/11/18134440/huawei-executive-order-entity-list-china-trump (accessed 29 May 2019).
27 US Office of the Federal Register (2019), Addition of Entities to the Entity List, 16 May 2019, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/
2019/05/21/2019-10616/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list (accessed 29 May 2019).
28 Sonmez, F. (2019), ‘Commerce Department will extend Huawei reprieve, Ross says’, Washington Post, 19 August 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/commerce-department-will-extend-huawei-reprieve-ross-says/2019/08/19/82a11436-c275-11e9-9986-1fb3e4397be4_story.html (accessed 29 Aug. 2019).
29 Pham, S. and Phillip, A. (2019), ‘Trump suggests using Huawei as a bargaining chip in US-China trade deal’, CNN, 24 May 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/24/tech/donald-trump-huawei-ban/index.html (accessed 29 May 2019).
30 Schneider-Petsinger, M. (2019), US–EU Trade Relations in the Trump Era: Which Way Forward?, Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2019-03-08US-EUTradeRelations2.pdf (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
31 Davis, B. and Wei, L. (2019), ‘U.S. Debates Lifting China Tariffs to Hasten Trade Deal, Calm Markets’, Wall Street Journal, 17 January 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-weighs-lifting-china-tariffs-to-hasten-trade-deal-calm-markets-11547754006 (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
32 Without directly referring to it as ‘decoupling’, Peter Navarro laid out his vision of ‘Economic Security as National Security’ in a recent speech. Center for Strategic and International Studies (2018), ‘Economic Security as National Security: A Discussion with Dr. Peter Navarro’, 13 November 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/economic-security-national-security-discussion-dr-peter-navarro (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
33 The White House (2017), National Security Strategy of the United States, December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
34 Trump, D. (@realDonaldTrump) (2018), ‘Would only join TPP if the deal were substantially better than the deal offered to Pres. Obama. We already have BILATERAL deals with six of the eleven nations in TPP, and are working to make a deal with the biggest of those nations, Japan, who has hit us hard on trade for years!’, tweet, 12 April 2018, https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/984631073865953280?lang=en (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
35 Laskai, L. and Sacks, S. (2018), ‘The Right Way to Protect America’s Innovation Advantage’, Foreign Affairs, 23 October 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-10-23/right-way-protect-americas-innovation-advantage (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
36 Federal Communications Commission (n.d.), ‘The FCC’s 5G FAST Plan’, https://www.fcc.gov/5G (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
37 The White House (2019), ‘Executive Order on Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence’, 11 February 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-maintaining-american-leadership-artificial-intelligence/ (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
38 Metz, C. (2018), ‘As China Marches Forward on A.I., the White House Is Silent’, New York Times, 12 February 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/02/12/technology/china-trump-artificial-intelligence.html?module=inline (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
39 Lawrence, R. (2018), ‘US-China Trade Frictions and the Global Trading System’, in Jiming, H. and Posen, A. (eds) (2018), US-China Economic Relations: From Conflict to Solutions – Part 1, PIIE Briefing 18-1, https://piie.com/system/files/documents/piieb18-1.pdf (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
40 See, for instance, the MoUs from 1992 and 1995 concerning intellectual property rights, which China has failed to implement. Rogin, J. (2019), ‘Trump is headed for a bad trade deal that China won’t honor’, Washington Post, 27 February 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
2019/02/27/trump-is-headed-bad-trade-deal-that-china-wont-honor/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1d0bd5dda5dd (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
41 Lawder, D., Mason, J. and Martina, M. (2019), ‘Exclusive: China backtracked on almost all aspects of U.S. trade deal – sources’, Reuters, 8 May 2019, https://in.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-backtracking-exclusiv/exclusive-china-backtracked-on-nearly-all-aspects-of-u-s-trade-
deal-sources-idINKCN1SE0WJ (accessed 29 May 2019).
42 Lawrence (2018), ‘US-China Trade Frictions and the Global Trading System’.
43 Wei, L. and Davis, B. (2018), ‘China Prepares Policy to Increase Access for Foreign Companies’, Wall Street Journal, 12 December 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-is-preparing-to-increase-access-for-foreign-companies-11544622331?mod=hp_lead_pos4 (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
44 Williams, R. (2019), ‘Is Huawei a Pawn in the Trade War?’, Foreign Affairs, 30 January 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/
2019-01-30/huawei-pawn-trade-war (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
45 Leonard, J. (2019), ‘U.S. Considers Concessions on Drug Protections in China Talks, Sources Say’, Bloomberg, 25 April 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-25/u-s-said-to-mull-concessions-on-drug-protections-in-china-talks (accessed 29 May 2019).
46 Office of the United States Trade Representative (2017), ‘Joint Statement by the United States, European Union and Japan at MC11’, 12 December 2017, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/december/joint-statement-united-states (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
47 Meltzer, J. and Shenai, N. (2019), ‘The US-China economic relationship: A comprehensive approach’, The Brookings Institution and American Enterprise Institute, Policy Brief, February 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/us_china_economic_relationship.pdf (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
48 European Commission (2019), ‘EU foreign investment screening regulation enters into force’, 10 April 2019, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-19-2088_en.htm (accessed 29 May 2019).
49 Hillman, J. (2018), ‘Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Review Security Commission’, 8 June 2018, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Hillman%20Testimony%20US%20China%20Comm%20w%20Appendix%20A.pdf (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
50 Ibid.