4. Tunisia and China: An Evolution of Relations
China’s relations with Tunisia are relatively undeveloped, especially compared to those with Algeria or Morocco. China has a low-level economic presence in Tunisia concentrated in the ICT, infrastructure and oil sectors.96 According to the eminent Tunisian journalist Hichem Ben Yaiche, ‘Tunisia is a small market. Only the port of Bizerte might be of interest as a hub for trans-shipment’.97 Nonetheless, Sino–Tunisian relations are growing, albeit at a slow pace.
During the long presidency of Habib Bourguiba (1957–87), Tunisia had a rather distant, and even antagonistic, relationship with China. His anti-communist and pro-Western policies made it difficult to develop close ties. Throughout the 1960s, Bourguiba condemned China for its foreign policy actions, particularly the border dispute with India. However, in 1961, it began to vote in favour of China’s participation in the UN Security Council. Tensions over foreign policy issues did not prevent trade relations from being established as early as 1958. In 1983, the two countries signed the Sino–Tunisian Joint Committee of Economic, Trade, and Technological Cooperation to facilitate trade relations. Both made efforts to consolidate bilateral ties.98
In line with its policy of non-interference, China did not react to the ‘medical coup’ that ousted Bourguiba in 1987. Beijing recognized the new regime led by President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, which maintained cordial relations with China. The regime’s anti-communist position notwithstanding, the two countries maintained good relations and exchanged high-level official visits. The most important visit was President Jiang Zemin’s in 2002, while Ben Ali visited China in 1991. Until 2011, China and Tunisia shared a security outlook and were both governed by authoritarian, one-party rule.99
Prior to the 2011 Arab uprisings, China saw Tunisia as a stable Mediterranean state and overlooked its authoritarian regime. The fall of Ben Ali surprised Beijing. Soon after the revolution, Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun visited the country and said that, ‘The Chinese government respects the choice of the Tunisian people and is willing to cement and develop the bilateral traditional friendship [between China and Tunisia] and the mutually beneficial cooperation as always.’100 During a meeting with Foreign Minister Mouldi Kefi, a couple of months later, President Xi stated that ‘China believes the Tunisian government and its people have the ability, wisdom and ways to find an economic system and road of development suitable for the country’s conditions’.101 At that time, the Chinese authorities were more concerned about the situation in Libya, from which they had to repatriate 38,000 nationals from the conflict zone. They were able to do so effectively with the assistance of Tunisia, which opened its ports and airports to Chinese vessels and aircraft.102 Although the Tunisia–China relationship is negligible, potential instability following the Arab uprising was a major concern for China as it feared losing the support of another friendly regime in the MENA region.103 China supported the political and economic transition in Tunisia to mitigate this risk.
Economic relations: Rhetoric versus reality
Tunisia’s main export markets are in Europe.104 Despite efforts to diversify the economy, the EU accounts for more than 50 per cent of Tunisia’s imports and exports. France is its main trading partner, with 30.6 per cent of exports and 15.1 per cent of its imports. Italy is its second largest trading partner, and others include Germany, Spain and Turkey, which although not a member of the EU has a customs union.105
Table 3: Tunisia–China trade, 2014–18
|
($ billion, unless stated) |
2014 |
2015 |
2016 |
2017 |
2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Imports from China |
1.24 |
1.24 |
1.30 |
1.30 |
1.40 |
|
Total imports |
38.07 |
30.88 |
29.86 |
32.43 |
34.66 |
|
Imports from China/total (%) |
3.25 |
4.01 |
4.34 |
4.09 |
4.08 |
|
Imports from EU |
n/a |
n/a |
13.33 |
14.00 |
14.50* |
|
Imports from EU/total (%) |
n/a |
n/a |
44.66 |
43.17 |
41.83* |
|
Exports to China |
0.21 |
0.18 |
0.14 |
0.20 |
0.19 |
|
Total exports |
16.63 |
14.36 |
13.95 |
14.68 |
16.38 |
|
Exports to China/total (%) |
1.27 |
1.31 |
0.99 |
1.35 |
1.19 |
|
Exports to EU |
n/a |
n/a |
12.89 |
13.22 |
12.63* |
|
Exports to EU/total (%) |
n/a |
n/a |
92.4 |
90.07 |
77.1* |
* European trade figures include goods only, and is missing trade in services.
Source: Compiled by the author. Imports/Exports from/to China: World Bank (n.d.), ‘World Integrated Trade Solution, China Exports/Imports by Country, 2018’, https://bit.ly/2RacJ52 and https://bit.ly/365rb2l; Total Imports/Exports: World Bank (n.d.), ‘World Integrated Trade Solution, World Exports/Imports by Country, 2018’, https://bit.ly/3asixyz and https://bit.ly/2v3wCC9; European Commission (n.d.), ‘Imports/Exports from/to Europe: European Commission, Trade with Tunisia’, https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/tunisia/, converted from Euro to USD using World Bank, Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period average), https://databank.worldbank.org/ reports.aspx?source=2&series=PA.NUS.FCRF&country=EMU.
Since 1958, China and Tunisia signed numerous trade agreements. In addition, mechanisms such as the China–Tunisia Cooperation Forum and the Tunisia–China Investment and Trade Forum were developed to strengthen their relations.106 In 1984, a number of Chinese companies came to Tunisia to build highways, ports and other facilities.107 However, total trade between the two countries has remained small. In 2005, for example, it was around $340 million. In 2017, the total trade volume between the two reached $1.5 billion.108 China accounts for 9 per cent of Tunisia’s imports, making it the country’s third-largest supplier of products. In 2017, Tunisia’s imports from China amounted to $1.3 billion, including electrical and electronic equipment, nuclear reactors, iron and steel, plastics and organic chemicals.109
Tunisia is ambitious to increase cooperation with China. In 2018, the government said, ‘Chinese Direct Investment in Tunisia, which represents 12.9 million TD [Tunisian Dinars, $4.5 million], remains below the Tunisian aspirations and the real capacities of the Chinese economy’.110
Tourism, culture, agri-food, renewable energy and automotive sectors are all of interest to Chinese investors, but they are hesitant to invest because of political uncertainty, insecurity, a conservative business climate, and restrictive fiscal measures.
Tunisia’s officials and business community argue that Chinese firms can benefit from doing business in the country as this would enable them to enter European markets. They often highlight the fact that Tunisia is the first southern Mediterranean country to have obtained a free-trade agreement with the EU. In addition, according to Mohamed Ben Rhouma, president of the Tunisian–Chinese Business Council, ‘instead of competitors, Chinese companies are partners… We can establish a true partnership by sharing customers and strategic positions.’111 Undoubtedly, China is interested in Tunisia’s Bizerte port because it provides easy access to Europe; in addition, the port is located at a critical hub of fibre optic submarine network cables.112 However, Chinese investors have been looking for development opportunities in Tunisia for years without major success.113 Tourism, culture, agri-food, renewable energy and automotive sectors are all of interest to Chinese investors, but they are hesitant to invest because of political uncertainty, insecurity, a conservative business climate, and restrictive fiscal measures. In 2015, the two countries signed a strategic framework to launch a free-trade zone in Tunisia that was hoped would increase China’s interest in ‘leveraging North Africa’s location to strengthen its economic ties with the EU’.114 The project has not yet materialized and Tunisian authorities continue speaking about the creation of free-trade zones, one of which is along the border with Libya.
Tunisia has made significant efforts to attract foreign businesses – it ranks 80th in the World Bank’s Doing Business Index 2019 – but it is still short of meeting its targets. In addition, political and economic instability deter foreign multinationals. There are just 10 Chinese companies operating in Tunisia, with a combined annual revenue of about $10 million, while there are more than 4,000 European companies, with a combined annual turnover of about $12 billion.115
Tunisia has demonstrated its determination to develop relations with China by joining the BRI and becoming a member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.116 According to China’s ambassador to Tunisia, Wang Wenbin, through participation in the BRI, ‘bilateral cooperation should be strengthened in five areas: policy coordination, interconnection of infrastructure, trade facilitation, financial integration as well as mutual understanding’.117 Tunisia has signed various BRI agreements since September 2018, with a view to reinforce cooperation with China and to attract Chinese investment, particularly in infrastructure. Tunisia is hopeful that this closer cooperation marks a shift in relations between the two countries.
During the FOCAC summit in Beijing in September 2018, the Tunisian delegation signed agreements with China for various projects, including turning the port of Zarzis into an economic and commercial centre; the construction of a railway line linking Médenine, a region rich in minerals in Gabès, the heart of the petrochemical and processing industries of phosphates, and Zarzis; establishing a production plant for SAIC Motor Corporation Ltd, a Chinese state-owned company, to build and export cars to the countries around the Mediterranean and in Africa. In addition, China is currently building a hydraulic dam in the Kef region.118
Tunisia has also called upon Chinese expertise to build a solar power plant. Tunisia is a country with huge unexploited capacity in this sector and plans to develop at least 835 megawatts of solar power plants by 2030.
Tunisia has also called upon Chinese expertise to build a solar power plant. Tunisia is a country with huge unexploited capacity in this sector and plans to develop at least 835 megawatts of solar power plants by 2030.119 In July 2019, the Tunisian authorities signed a memorandum of understanding with Chinese corporations with expertise in renewables to develop solar energy and to continue importing equipment and products from China. This reflects the shift in emphasis in China’s regional policy, as highlighted by the Arab Policy Paper, towards energy cooperation, infrastructure construction and the ‘new tech fields of nuclear energy, space satellite and new energy’.120
Like Morocco, Tunisia is seeking to attract Chinese tourists. Chinese tourism in Tunisia had increased from 2,000 in 2016 to 15,000 in 2018.121 By August 2019, citing official statistics from the Tunisian Ministry of Tourism, it was reported that the number of Chinese tourists visiting Tunisia had increased by 10.1 per cent year-on-year, reaching 18,935.122 However, this represents a small proportion of the 5 million tourists that visited Tunisia in 2019. This relative growth has likely been boosted by the removal of visa restrictions for Chinese tourists visiting the country.
However, Chinese tourism in Tunisia will fail to develop further without regular flights between the two countries. In September 2018, as part of Tunisia’s participation in the BRI, the two countries signed a cooperation agreement to start direct flights to boost numbers of Chinese tourists visiting Tunisia.123 Though, at the time of writing, these direct flights have yet to be realized. According to Minister of Tourism Salma Elloumi Rekik, the authorities ‘are trying to draw more Chinese tourists, by upgrading payment methods, setting up Chinese logos, launching direct flights, as well as running Chinese restaurants, to make Chinese visitors’ trips in Tunisia more convenient and enjoyable’.124
One area where Sino–Tunisian cooperation has been relatively strong is security, notably in counterterrorism since the collapse of the Ben Ali regime and in light of the instability in Libya. Although Tunisia imports most of its weapons from France, in 2013, it received an $8 million grant from China for the acquisition of Chinese equipment for the army to boost its operational capabilities in the fight against terrorism and other illegal activities.125 In 2015, China provided another grant to Tunisia for an undisclosed number of weapons.126 In May 2019, the two countries announced their intention to develop their security cooperation in health services and training for Tunisia’s military.127 However, Tunisia’s security cooperation with China pales in comparison to what it has with the US and France. Despite decreasing from $241.4 million to $86.4 million in the 2019 fiscal year, US assistance to Tunisia still dwarfs support from China. The US’s considerable security involvement in Tunisia is not only in military supplies but also in the form of a discreet military presence in the country.128 France annually provides €10 million in military aid to Tunisia and it has closer military cooperation with Tunisia than China.129
96 Author telephone interview with Chinese researcher living in Tunisia, who wished to remain anonymous, 31 July 2019.
97 Author telephone interview with Hichem Ben Yaiche, geopolitics expert and editor of the magazines New African and African Business in French, 8 August 2019.
98 Rakhmat, M. Z. (2014), ‘China and Tunisia: A Quiet Partnership’, The Diplomat, 28 June 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/china-and-
tunisia-a-quiet-partnership/ (accessed 10 Jan. 2020).
99 Olimat, M. S. (2014), China and North Africa Since World War II: A Bilateral Approach.
100 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America (2011), ‘Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun Meets with Beji Caid-Essebsi, Prime Minister of the Tunisian National Unity Government’, 7 March 2011, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zgyw/t804639.htm (accessed 11 Aug. 2018).
101 China Daily (2011), ‘China believes Tunisia can realize social stability’, 30 May 2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-05/20/content_12550621.htm (accessed 11 Aug. 2018).
102 Sun, D. and Zoubir, Y. H. (2014), ‘China’s Response to the Revolts in the Arab World: A Case of Pragmatic Diplomacy’, Mediterranean Politics, 19(1), pp. 2–20.
103 Kandil, A. (2012), China and the ‘Arab Spring’: A New Player in the Middle East?, Euromesco Brief 47, Barcelona: European Institute of the Mediterranean, https://www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/201207-EuroMeSCo-Policy-Brief-47.pdf (accessed 12 Sep. 2014).
104 Trading Economics (2019), ‘Tunisia Exports’, https://tradingeconomics.com/tunisia/exports (accessed 11 Dec. 2019).
105 Nordea Trade (2019), ‘Tunisia: Economic and Political Overview’, https://www.nordeatrade.com/en/explore-new-market/tunisia/trade-profile (accessed 11 Dec. 2019).
106 Rakhmat, M. Z. (2014), ‘China and Tunisia: A Quiet Partnership’.
107 Ibid.
108 World Bank (n.d.), ‘World Integrated Trade Solution, China Exports/Imports by Country, 2018’, https://bit.ly/2RacJ52, https://bit.ly/365rb2l.
109 Ibid.
110 Republic of Tunisia Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018), ‘Bilateral relations between Tunisia and China’, https://www.diplomatie.gov.tn/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Bilateral_relations_between_Tunisia_and_China.pdf (accessed 15 Nov. 2019).
111 China Daily (2018), ‘Tunisia to enhance partnership with China in expanding markets: official’, 17 May 2018, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
a/201805/17/WS5afcdecda3103f6866ee8ed9.html (accessed 15 Aug. 2019).
112 Souli, S. (2018), ‘Tunisia hopes boost in Chinese investment can ease economic woes’, Al-Monitor, 19 March 2018, https://www.al-monitor.com/
pulse/originals/2018/03/boost-china-investment-tunisia-europe-trade.html (accessed 15 Aug. 2019).
113 Author telephone interview with journalist, who wished to remain anonymous, based in Beijing, 5 August 2019.
114 Eid-Oakden, F. (2017), ‘China’s Growing North Africa Footprint’, ACT Middle East Treasurer, summer 2017, https://www.treasurers.org/system/files/Summer17MET_freetradezones08-09.pdf (accessed 15 Aug. 2019).
115 Ghanmi, L. (2018), ‘Tunisia joins China’s Belt and Road Initiative as it seeks to diversify trade, investment’, The Arab Weekly, 9 September 2018, https://thearabweekly.com/tunisia-joins-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-it-seeks-diversify-trade-investment (accessed 11 Nov. 2019).
116 China Daily (2019), ‘AIIB approves membership of Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Tunisia and Uruguay’, 22 April 2019, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/
a/201904/22/WS5cbd9f06a3104842260b7990.html (accessed 15 Aug. 2019).
117 China Daily (2018), ‘Tunisia to enhance partnership with China in expanding markets: official’.
118 Ghanmi (2018), ‘Tunisia joins China’s Belt and Road Initiative as it seeks to diversify trade, investment’.
119 CGTV (2019), ‘Tunisia Energy: Chinese experts help build solar power plant: Transcript’, 28 July 2019, https://news.cgtn.com/news/314d
544f784d4464776c6d636a4e6e62684a4856/index.html (accessed 18 Aug. 2019).
120 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2016), ‘China’s Arab Policy Paper’.
121 COTRI China Outbound Tourism Research Institute (2018), ‘Tunisia turning towards the Chinese outbound tourism market’, https://china-outbound.com/2018/08/29/tunisia-turning-towards-the-chinese-outbound-tourism-market/ (accessed 17 Jan. 2020).
122 Kapitalis (2019), ‘Tunisie: le nombre de touristes chinois progresse de 10% au 19 aout 2019’, 21 August 2019, http://kapitalis.com/tunisie/
2019/08/21/tunisie-le-nombre-de-touristes-chinois-progresse-de-10-au-10-aout-2019/ (accessed 17 Jan. 2020).
123 Ghanmi (2018), ‘Tunisia joins China’s Belt and Road Initiative as it seeks to diversify trade, investment’.
124 Xinhua (2018), ‘Chinese tourists to Tunisia witness boom in 2018’, 28 October 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-10/28/
c_137562912.htm (accessed 17 Aug. 2019).
125 Tunisie Agence Presse (2013), ‘Tunisie: Don chinois de 8 MD au profit de l’Armée nationale’ [‘Tunisia: Chinese donation of 8 MD for the benefit of the National Army’], 2 December 2013, https://chinaafricaproject.com/china-tunisia-grants-cooperation-military-development/ (accessed 15 Oct. 2014).
126 L’Economiste maghrébin (2015), ‘La Tunisie reçoit un don d’armes chinois’ [‘Tunisia receives donation of Chinese weapons’], 28 April 2015, https://www.leconomistemaghrebin.com/2015/04/28/tunisie-don-armes-chinois/ (accessed 15 Aug. 2019).
127 Xinhua (2019), ‘China, Tunisia to strengthen military training cooperation’, 30 May 2019, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-05/30/content_9518641.htm (accessed 21 Aug. 2019).
128 Nsaibia, H. (2018), ‘US Special Operations Forces Are Quietly Expanding Their War In Tunisia’, Task & Purpose, 20 September 2018, https://taskandpurpose.com/marine-special-operations-forces-tunisia (accessed 30 Sep. 2019).
129 La France en Tunisie (2019), ‘Mission de Defense’, https://tn.ambafrance.org/Mission-de-defense (accessed 10 Jan. 2020).