5. The Outlook for China’s Relations with Morocco and Tunisia
While China is gaining a foothold in the Maghreb, it cannot match US and European dominance in the region. In Tunisia, France has a particularly strong role:
With respect to culture, language, mentality, political and economic ties, the French presence has deeply shaped Tunisia. China does not have the will nor the capacity to compete with, or replace, France. China’s strategy is to maintain its presence in the region to reassure its ambition as a global emerging power.130
The same is true of Morocco, which also has longstanding ties to the US and France. However, a wave of anti-Americanism has washed over the region in recent years. According to a recent survey, for example:
only 45 percent of Tunisians prefer stronger ties with the United States–compared to 63 percent for China, 57 percent for Turkey and 50 percent for Russia. Additionally, more Tunisians say they want foreign aid from China and Russia to increase (50 and 46 percent, respectively), than from the United States (45 percent).131
The populations of Morocco and Tunisia generally have scant knowledge about China’s politics and culture. China has tried to tackle this with the establishment of Confucius Institutes in these two countries. Language and cultural barriers still impede the development of relations. Cultural exchanges are still sparse between China and the two countries, compared to those China has with other countries in Africa. Furthermore, significant Chinese migration to the Maghreb region, particularly in Algeria, which hosts up to 80,000 Chinese citizens,132 has occasionally caused conflicts with the local populations and emphasized cultural barriers.133 However, in the context of the wider Arab world, China’s image has improved considerably in recent years.134
The Moroccan and Tunisian governments share concerns that China either views the Maghreb as a place to primarily sell inexpensive and low-quality products, or merely as a source of vital raw materials and resources.
The distribution networks of Chinese products could improve in Morocco and Tunisia, but local protectionist policies make their establishment difficult.135 Although Morocco has made progress in attracting new business from outside the country, there are still many challenges for foreign companies operating in the country. For example, despite its relative stability and business-friendly policies, domestic companies and government agencies tend to be slow in making payments, which incurs long delays for private enterprises.136 Meanwhile, Tunisia continues to struggle to regain the level of foreign investment it had prior to its political transition.
Although China can comfortably compete with India, Russia, Brazil and Turkey on the economic front in the region, it faces formidable challenges from the EU and the Gulf states. For instance, France and the United Arab Emirates hold three-quarters of the FDI stock in Morocco.137 In response to China’s increasing presence in Africa and the Maghreb, the EU launched the Africa–EU Strategic Partnership in 2007. At the 5th EU–Africa Summit in Abidjan in 2017, the two sides expressed a willingness to adopt a partnership model based on reciprocal trade, which is worth more than $300 billion at present.138 The EU has pledged to provide €44 billion in ‘sustainable’ investment in Africa by 2020.139 It is also buttressing its commercial position in the continent with a network of free-trade agreements or Economic Partnership Agreements, which it is negotiating or has signed with 40 sub-Saharan African countries. The EU is in a strong position when it comes to African economies, due to its historical ties to the region and its comprehensive trade strategy, the stage is set ‘for continued growth and influence by European firms in the African market. In addition, the EU is well positioned to share lessons learned from its decades of experience with regional economic integration’.140
130 Author telephone interview with Chinese researcher living in Tunisia, who wished to remain anonymous, 28 July 2019.
131 Yerkes, S. (2019), ‘As the U.S. and Tunisian Delegations Meet, Anti-Americanism is on the Rise’, The Washington Post, 14 July 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/14/us-tunisian-delegations-meet-anti-americanism-is-rise/ (accessed 10 Jan. 2020).
132 The figures on the number of Chinese in Algeria vary considerably. In part, this is due to the fact that these are mainly temporary workers who return home once their work in Algeria is complete. Another reason is that neither the Algerian nor Chinese governments disclose the number of Chinese citizens in Algeria. In November 2019, the French newspaper Mediapart estimated the number was between 40,000 and 80,000, see Brahim, N. (2019), ‘En Algérie, la vie en marge des ouvriers chinois se déroule loin de l’agitation du ‘hirak’ [‘In Algeria, life on the sidelines for Chinese workers takes place far from the unrest of the ‘hirak’], Mediapart, 4 November 2019, https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/041119/en-algerie-la-vie-en-marge-des-ouvriers-chinois-se-deroule-loin-de-l-agitation-du-hirak (accessed 10 Nov. 2019).
133 Abtroun, S. (2018), ‘Expatriés chinois en Algérie : l’amour au bout du voyage’ [‘Chinese expatriates in Algeria: love at the end of the journey’], Paris Match, 14 September 2018, https://www.parismatch.com/Actu/International/Expatries-chinois-en-Algerie-l-amour-au-bout-du-voyage-
1574387 (accessed 11 Dec. 2019).
134 Friedrichs, J. (2019), ‘Explaining China’s Popularity in the Middle East and Africa’, Third World Quarterly, 40(9), pp. 1634–54, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2019.1592670.
135 Lafargue, F. (2018), The Economic Presence of China in the Maghreb: Ambitions and Limits, Paris: Foundation de la Recherche Stratégique, https://www.frstrategie.org/en/programmes/observatoire-du-monde-arabo-musulman-et-du-sahel/the-economic-presence-of-china-in-the-maghreb-ambitions-and-limits-293 (accessed 10 Jan. 2020).
136 Klasa (2019), ‘Morocco positions itself as more independent FDI portal to Africa’.
137 Lafargue (2018), The Economic Presence of China in the Maghreb: Ambitions and Limits.
138 Buckland, J. (2019), Investing in Africa – Our Outlook for 2019/2020, London: Hogan Lovells Publications, https://www.hoganlovells.com/en/publications/investing-in-africa-our-outlook-for-2019-2020 (accessed 12 Aug. 2019).
139 Ibid.
140 Schneidman and Wiegert (2018), ‘Competing in Africa: China, the European Union, and the United States’.