6. Conclusion
China has made a notable entry in the Maghreb. Although its engagement with Morocco and Tunisia can potentially support the two countries’ economic growth, industrialization and social development – particularly through purchases of raw materials and the construction of infrastructure – there is little evidence that this is happening. Morocco and Tunisia have important geopolitical value in Beijing’s eyes due to their location in Africa, their role in the Arab-Muslim world and their proximity to Europe. Their inclusion in the BRI is significant only insofar as it is a strategic project for China. For their part, the two countries see cooperation with China as an opportunity to reduce Western influence in the context of multi-centric globalization.
Like other outside actors engaged in the Maghreb, China must deal with the instability of existing regimes. Political upheavals may threaten its interests at any time, as occurred in Libya in 2011. China and Libya have yet to restore normal trade relations since the fall of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. China’s policy of non-interference and neutrality has until now served its interests in the region. Nevertheless, there is a question as to whether it can maintain this stance indefinitely, which amounts to supporting the regimes in place, without being seen negatively by civil society in the region. Similarly, China has so far managed to maintain relative impartiality on the issue of Western Sahara, thus maintaining the balance in its relations with Algeria and Morocco.141 However, Western Sahara Resource Watch has alleged that China is participating in the illegal purchase of phosphates and fisheries in the Moroccan-occupied territory of Western Sahara.142 This could hurt relations with African countries, including Algeria, and confirm suspicions that China is a neo-colonialist power.
As geopolitical and geo-economic factors have become intertwined across the Maghreb since the Arab uprisings, China’s diplomatic approach, which consists of seeking only economic solutions, might prove difficult to implement. With the exception of Algeria, China’s diplomacy has yet to achieve bilateral relations at a real strategic level in the Maghreb, in terms of the political and military dimensions. Despite efforts to develop China’s cultural diplomacy in the region – in the form of exchanges between academics, the media, youth organizations and think-tanks – levels of cultural exchange remain low. As a result, the establishment of China’s strategic relations in the Maghreb is still a distant objective.
141 Zhou, H. (2018), ‘China’s Balancing Act in the Western Sahara Conflict’, Africana Studia-International Journal of African Studies, 29, pp. 145–56.
142 Western Sahara Resource Watch (2019), P pour Pillage: Les exportations marocaines des phosphates du Sahara Occidental occupé [P for Pillage: Moroccan exports of phosphates from occupied Western Sahara], Brussels: Western Sahara Resource Watch, https://www.wsrw.org/files/dated/
2019-04-23/p_pour_pillage_2019_web.pdf (accessed 30 May 2019).