1. Introduction: The Development of Armed Groups Since 2014
Since the overthrow of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya’s multitude of armed groups have followed a range of paths. Many have gradually demobilized, others have remained active, and yet others have expanded their influence. Some of the armed groups currently wielding power contain few fighters from the 2011 civil war. Local power struggles and conflicts have been ongoing since 2012, before a second bout of civil war led to a national governance split in 2014. Since that point, Libya’s security sector has evolved significantly.
In the east, an alliance known as the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) has emerged from bloody campaigns in Benghazi and Derna as the dominant political, security and economic actor. In the west, four principal armed groups have consolidated control over Tripoli, although this control has subsequently been undermined by the reverberations of the current war for the capital. Co-existing with the Government of National Accord (GNA) based in the capital, these groups have developed their economic interests largely through privileged access to state resources. However, they are now increasingly dependent on Turkish-supplied forces, along with forces from Misrata, Zintan and other northwestern coastal cities, to preserve their position. In the south, where militarization has been fuelled by sporadic local conflicts since 2011, a multitude of armed actors have carved out territory, typically seeking sponsorship from state and security bodies in the north on a largely opportunistic basis. Many such groups have increasingly preferred engagement with the LAAF, enabling the latter to enlist a large number of southern fighters for the current war for Tripoli.
The Tripoli conflict was ongoing at the time of writing. The coalitions of combatants on each side have remained divided largely along the same lines as in 2011, although their alliances have been affected by the developments of the post-2014 period.
The evolving relationship between armed groups and local communities
Policy discussions on Libya have commonly identified armed actors as key inhibitors of political progress. Prevailing narratives presuppose that the interests of armed actors are distinct from those of the communities they claim to represent. While divisions between some of the principal armed groups and local communities have widened since 2014, armed groups continue to rely significantly on social legitimacy in order to function. The current institutional fragmentation of the security sector is a symptom of wider fragmentation of state sovereignty.
Prior to 2011, Libya’s internal sovereignty – including the monopoly on force and sole agency in international relations – had been personally vested in the figure of Gaddafi himself. After his death, these elements of sovereignty reverted to local communities, which have created armed organizations to fill that central gap.5
Libyan communities had organized militarily both with and against Gaddafi in 2011, gradually establishing armed social organizations as a result of the escalation of the conflict, along with direct relations with external powers. This led to different groups assuming control over smaller local geographical areas (sometimes as small as streets, with control regularly contested through violence) and pursuing semi-independent cooperation with state actors. These constituencies did not, however, develop uniformly. Different types of armed group emerged, ranging from those formerly regularized in Gaddafi’s army and security apparatus, on the one hand, to those associated with ideological currents and communities (geographic and tribal) on the other.
As a result of these dynamics, social legitimacy remains crucial to the military effectiveness of armed groups, and to their ability to project force. Greater consolidation of control by the LAAF in the eastern region has diluted this imperative somewhat, as the group has combined and amalgamated locally legitimate forces under a central command. Yet even the LAAF remains substantively reliant on local and tribal alliances. As has been demonstrated by experience with the Misratan Counter Terrorism Force in western Libya, an armed group with strong legitimacy in the local community can gain legal authority by manoeuvring its members and affiliates into positions in state institutions, particularly when it benefits from international support. From here, a group can leverage legal and financial authority to serve the interests of its leaders, and develop capability through experience.
In this way, armed groups formed during or after the revolution of 2011 have capitalized on their battle victories and/or track record of counter-crime operations to support the notion that they are more capable and effective than present-day state security forces. They bargain with the state to provide services in return for legal recognition and resources. State institutions and authorities continue to rely on these groups to provide security, even as the state itself at times seeks to delegitimize armed groups by presenting them as militias (in a derogatory sense) and as threats to stability and the rule of law. This process in turn inhibits the development of a strong ruling coalition that would enable the state to exert command and control over armed groups theoretically under its security apparatus. As a consequence, the capacities of state institutions are reduced to managing the distribution of financial resources.
When armed groups are stripped of legal authority by the state – through mandates being retracted or commanders blacklisted – the reduction of financial support can inhibit their capacity; however, their social legitimacy can still allow them to maintain their presence on the ground. On the other hand, after 2011, state-affiliated forces such as the military and police that possessed legal legitimacy along with the training and experience necessary to fulfil their role still lacked social legitimacy and access to resources and thus could not be effective.
Most armed groups formed through local social mobilization have the legitimacy and capabilities to ensure security at a local and, less frequently, regional level – but not at a national one.6 This explains why most groups have remained localized in nature since 2014, with their scope for expansion dependent on military and social alliances that tend to be short-lived (or that reflect mobilization against a common adversary, as currently witnessed in Tripoli). The LAAF is an exception, seeking to develop a nationalist narrative to underscore its expansion across the country and its absorption of armed groups.
Consequently, it may be better to describe Libya as an amalgam of armed or potentially armed communities rather than as a network of disparate armed groups. While a network of armed groups certainly exists, and these groups own the bulk of medium to heavy weapons, there are enough weapons in circulation for the population to arm and mobilize new groups at any time.
As a result, communities hold the ability to influence and, at times, constrain the behaviour of armed groups. Yet the development of armed groups’ capacities, along with increasing access to autonomous means of generating revenue, has steadily diluted their accountability to local communities. Tripoli residents, for instance, have limited leverage over the capital’s armed groups: many residents appear to accept the presence of armed groups as necessary for providing security, with known engagement in criminal activity tolerated provided that overt violence remains low. In the east of the country, many residents appear to accept or even welcome the LAAF’s expansion beyond the security realm provided that it performs such roles effectively. That said, an accurate assessment is difficult to reach. Owing to the degree of control exerted by the LAAF, public opposition to its activities or agenda is often met with intimidation or violence. In the south, social protections shield armed group members from arrest and/or from being held accountable for their actions.
Given the degree to which some armed groups are embedded in local society, domestic and international strategies to engage them must seek to address the fears, grievances and desires of the communities such groups claim to represent.
Nonetheless, given the degree to which some armed groups are embedded in local society, domestic (i.e. state-level) and international strategies to engage them must seek to address the fears, grievances and desires of the communities such groups claim to represent. For groups such as those that have remobilized following the LAAF offensive on Tripoli that began in April 2019, only a political settlement will meet these requirements. Beyond the need for security guarantees, demands and grievances commonly relate to employment entitlements (particularly senior civil service or diplomatic appointments and perks), as well as to modalities for sharing the state’s resources. Failure to address local grievances will continue to enable armed groups – as an extension of their social bases – to recruit, mobilize and arm young men. Security sector reform (SSR) programmes that simply absorb armed groups into state structures are insufficient to address community grievances. Similarly, policies of appeasement that allow armed groups autonomy ignore the potential for communities to simply arm and remobilize.
Armed group revenue generation in Libya since 2014
Armed groups must mobilize resources to operate effectively and build and expand their power bases. To varying extents since 2014, armed groups have developed networks that enmesh political and business stakeholders in order to cultivate sources of revenue. Although ideology and personal connections can play a role in cross-network alliance-building, the need to obtain resources to achieve military objectives (and sometimes vice versa) tends to supersede ideological considerations.
The revenue-generating mechanisms utilized by Libyan armed groups vary according to four factors. The first is the structure of the economic opportunity that exists in a particular territory. Access to state resources and assets is a key determinant of revenue opportunities in Libya’s conflict economy. Leverage generated from the control of state institutions has been monetized by armed groups through the development of protection markets and extortion schemes, and through the enactment of legislation to open further avenues of revenue generation. Groups able to extract wealth from the state in this way are largely able to eschew other forms of financing. In areas where access to state revenues and assets is limited, armed groups typically seek to profit from economic activity via protection markets and taxes on movement.
The second factor determining armed groups’ revenue-generating activities is the nature of each group and its goals. Groups with ‘official’ recognition – whether from authorities in the west or east – can usually access direct state payments. The LAAF also receives some funds from Tripoli for fighters registered before 2014. At the same time, it operates more intricate and systematic financing and transfer mechanisms through its deeper and more formalized role with relation to eastern authorities in the public and private sectors. The ideological stance of a given group and its leadership also plays an important role. For example, ideologically motivated groups such as the Nawasi Brigade have selectively focused on infiltrating state institutions, based on each institution’s strategic value rather than revenue-generating potential alone.
Third, the relationship to the community is key in determining what is viewed as a legitimate source of revenue. For example, armed groups in southern Libya vary the tolls they levy at road checkpoints according to the type of merchandise and tribal affiliation of the transporter. Groups that perform security functions and have public support in a particular area can obtain recognition and funds through or from local authorities (although some groups exploit their connections without providing services to the community). Even groups criticized for being unaccountable to local populations must take public opinion into account. Attempts by Tripoli’s so-called ‘quartet’ of dominant armed groups to manage public relations following clashes in the capital in 2018 involved actions such as clamping down on the black market and supporting hospitals. Tax-raising initiatives, in contrast, typically encounter resistance from local communities; this makes it more likely that armed groups will seek to tax illicit activity only, or at least do so at a higher rate than for licit economic activity.
Finally, external pressure and the extent to which armed groups have access to external funding have a significant impact upon local activity, particularly in the current phase of the war. External pressure has visibly shaped some armed groups’ approaches to revenue generation. An example of this is the emergence of an ‘anti-human smuggling market’7 in western Libya, where armed groups have switched from taxing human smuggling to preventing it in return for financial support. Attempts to extend this model to southern Libya have not succeeded, although some armed groups have tried to position themselves as potential partners both for the GNA and for EU countries seeking to reduce migrant flows. In other areas of the country, such as in the east, external support through the provision of both non-military and military aid has reduced the need for local revenue generation: non-military aid has included the supply of Russian-printed banknotes and -minted coins through the eastern Central Bank of Libya (CBL) – the unrecognized central bank affiliated with the eastern authorities – while military aid has included assistance from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for the LAAF’s air force. In the context of the ongoing war, this external support has become crucial.
Access to state salaries
The revenue-generating models of armed groups in specific regions are explored in subsequent chapters of this paper. First, however, it is important to understand how affiliation to the state (and, consequently, access to state salaries) has become a key income source for armed groups across the country.
Access to state salaries varies by region and type of actor. One set of people have salaries paid directly into their personal bank accounts. These include members of the regular army and police, as well as civilian employees of the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior. By contrast, members of armed groups paid by the government usually receive salaries indirectly, via their group’s leadership. Irregular fighters who are not on (direct or indirect) state payroll may be compensated from additional revenue collected by their armed group. Some people registered with the authorities do not receive salaries, either because of administrative problems or because they are from segments of the population that have not been allocated national ID numbers (and are thus, in principle, barred from the public payroll).
Overall, the post-revolution transformations and the first attempts to place thuwwar under state control led to the emergence of a complex web of semi-autonomous armed groups, supported by diverse financial streams.
The expansion of the security sector after the 2011 revolution opened up multiple avenues for accessing state salaries. While the Gaddafi regime’s army disintegrated, and military salaries were partially suspended or remained low, the revolution was followed by a massive inflow of civilians into the security sector. Transitional authorities in early 2012 opened up registration with the state sector to thuwwar (‘revolutionaries’), both to reward these personnel for their role in overthrowing Gaddafi and with the ultimate aim of integrating former rebels into the armed forces and police. But salaries were not paid directly to individuals. Rather, payments were distributed via local military councils, and later via armed group leaders who submitted membership lists to the Ministry of Interior’s payment committees and military accounts offices.8
This system was widely abused. Commanders enlisted non-combatants, some individuals claimed multiple salaries, funds were often misappropriated, and the number of people on the state payroll exploded. By the end of 2012, the number enrolled through these mechanisms had exceeded 200,000. Overall, the post-revolution transformations and the first attempts to place thuwwar under state control led to the emergence of a complex web of semi-autonomous armed groups, supported by diverse financial streams both to individual recruits and to armed group leaders.
State spending on salaries post-2014 was drastically reduced as a result of SSR initiatives and through austerity measures introduced by the CBL. The introduction of the national ID number system enabled the General National Congress (GNC) – Libya’s parliament between 2012 and 20149 – and its Interim Government to cut down on salary fraud. These measures are clearly reflected in changes to state expenditure between 2013 and 2016, as shown in reports by the Libyan Audit Bureau. In 2013, the Ministry of Defence allocated LYD3.5 billion (approximately $2.5 billion at the official exchange rate) to salaries, and the Ministry of Interior LYD2.1 billion. By 2016, these figures had fallen to LYD1.6 billion and LYD870 million respectively (see Figure 2), suggesting that armed groups would need to find alternative sources of financing to offset the reduction.
Figure 2: Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior spending on salaries, LYD million
— Sources: Libyan Audit Bureau (2017), ‘2016 Annual Report’ (Arabic), April 2017, http://audit.gov.ly/home/pdf/LABR-2016.pdf (accessed 13 Feb. 2020); and Libyan Audit Bureau (2018), ‘2017 Annual Report’ (Arabic), May 2018, http://audit.gov.ly/home/pdf/LABR-2017.pdf (accessed 13 Feb. 2020).
Figure 2: Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior spending on salaries, LYD million
The freezing of military salaries has exacerbated national divisions and spurred recruitment among irregular armed groups, though steps have been taken to address this. The Ministry of Defence’s disbursement of salaries to regular army members is centralized through the General Administration for Military Accounts (GAMA) in Tripoli.10 Salaries are based on military rank and years of service, as stipulated in relevant laws and regulations. The salary grid was amended by Cabinet Decree 441 of 2013,11 setting salary levels for different ranks as well as annual raises, allowances and benefits. However, the decree was not implemented consistently throughout the country, meaning that for many soldiers rank progression and salary raises were frozen at the pre-2013 levels. This created frustrations, leading many military personnel to neglect their service duties or even join armed groups. Starting from late 2016, the LAAF raised its military salaries to an average of LYD2,000–3,000 per month; this compared with an average of only LYD1,000–1,500 per month for personnel registered with the GAMA in Tripoli.12 The move has made a significant difference in eastern Libya, where higher salaries have boosted military recruitment. The GNA reconfirmed Decree 441 only in September 2018, when it announced a pay rise of 15–20 per cent for army personnel registered with the Ministry of Defence in Tripoli.13 The updated salaries started to be paid in late 2018 and early 2019, alongside a new allowance for outstanding service allocated to individuals of lower ranks.14 This means that today there is no longer a significant gap between regular military salaries paid through the GNA and those paid by the LAAF.
Box 1: Combat bonuses and lump-sum disbursements as part of the Tripoli war
As a result of the Tripoli war, both pro- and anti-LAAF camps have increased ad hoc financial payments to regular combatants, auxiliaries and mercenaries. These payments can be differentiated by form of disbursement and type of beneficiary.
Bonuses for front-line fighters are officially announced and wired to the accounts of combatants registered under the Ministry of Interior or Ministry of Defence, supplementing their regular salaries. The GNA has allocated LYD40 million to its Ministry of Defence to sustain the war effort and is granting troops a one-off LYD3,000 reward for battle duty.15
On 22 October 2019, the LAAF general command issued a decree on ‘granting a financial bonus for military members taking part in the current war operations and for the duration of their engagement in the fighting’; this favours lower-ranking army personnel.16
Both the GNA and LAAF also make unofficial lump-sum payments to armed group commanders and intermediaries, who distribute the money among their networks with little, if any, oversight and control. Recipients include unregistered fighters, volunteers, people without national ID numbers, and foreign nationals. Interviewees have claimed that both sides are taking advantage of vulnerable groups – specifically, Tuareg and Arab Libyans without national ID numbers – in the Fezzan region. These groups include former regime-era army or police personnel who were left without salaries after 2011, and disenfranchised youth from local communities whose access to the formal economy is severely curtailed. While Libya’s armed factions have drawn fighters from these groups in previous conflicts,17 the presence of members of the Mahamid tribe stands out in the Tripoli war.18
The GNA is believed to have funnelled money to unregistered Libyan and foreign fighters via senior military commanders such as Osama al-Juwaili and Ali Kanna, and via intermediaries such as Hassan Musa Keley, a Tebu military figure from Kufra now based in western Libya.19 Chadian mercenaries are said to be embedded with pro-GNA groups from Zintan and groups from the Fezzan – such as the South Protection Force, which formed in February 2019 as a Tebu-led coalition of anti-LAAF elements. At the start of the Tripoli war in April 2019, the GNA supposedly received a group of Chadian mercenaries through the South Protection Force and other intermediaries in Sebha.20 Overall, mercenaries played only a minor part on the GNA side during the first months of the war.21 This has begun to change: since December 2019, Turkey has sent approximately 2,000 Syrian fighters to back the GNA in Tripoli, a number which continues to increase.22
Of the six Darfur rebel factions that are present in Libya, all but one are currently allied with the LAAF.23 Hosted by pro-LAAF armed groups in central and southern Libya, they take part in military operations and guard oil and military facilities on behalf of the LAAF. The Darfur rebels were initially reluctant to join the Tripoli war, but the LAAF has been able to deploy some elements to the front since November 2019.24 In September, reports began to circulate regarding the deployment of mercenaries employed by the Kremlin-linked Wagner Group in support of the LAAF. The numbers of operational Wagner mercenaries has been hotly contested, with estimates ranging from a few hundred to 2,000 by the close of 2019.25
Ad hoc payments may incentivize combatants in the short term, but their duration is limited to the period in which open warfare is taking place. The degree to which such payments influence the allegiances of rank-and-file fighters is likely to depend on the ability of the fighters to generate revenues from other sources.
5 Alageli, A. (2016), ‘Libyan Statelessness: Past and Present’, unpublished dissertation, p. 63.
6 This has been compounded by the willingness of international actors to engage local forces to help meet policy objectives, such as the removal of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and reductions in human smuggling.
7 Micallef, M. and Reitano, T. (2017), The anti-human smuggling business and Libya’s political end game, North Africa Report 2, Institute for Security Studies, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Libya_ISS_Smuggling.pdf (accessed 10 Feb. 2020).
8 Lacher, W. and Cole, P. (2014), Politics by Other Means: Conflicting Interests in Libya’s Security Sector, The Small Arms Survey, Geneva: Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-SANA-WP20-Libya-Security-Sector.pdf (accessed 11 Dec. 2019).
9 As mentioned in footnote 4, the GNC was Libya’s first democratically elected parliament, which in 2012 appointed the Libyan Interim Government. This government resigned in August 2014, after the House of Representatives was elected and set up base in Tobruk. The House of Representatives then formed a new government, based in al-Bayda, which is also called the Libyan Interim Government, and headed by the same prime minister from the previous cabinet (Abdullah al-Thinni).
10 Except for LAAF members added to the payroll after 2014, who are paid through the LAAF’s military accounts department. See GAMA official Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/الإدارة-العامة-للحسابات-العسكرية-طرابلس1590836731031809-/.
11 Libya Ministry of Justice (2013), ‘Cabinet Decree 441 to issue salary grid and raises for army members’ (Arabic), 21 August 2013, http://itcadel.gov.ly/2013/08/قرار-مجلس-الوزراء-رقم-441-بإصدار-جداول-مر/ (accessed 10 Feb. 2020).
12 The pay rise was broadly in line with Decree 441, although the LAAF’s salary grid differs somewhat. Phone interview with an employee at the Armed Forces’ Department for Morale Affairs, Sebha, November 2019.
13 Al-Khamisi, A. (2018), ‘Libya raises the salaries of 205,000 soldiers by 15–20%’ (Arabic), The New Arab, 23 September 2018, httpsukترفعآلافبين (accessed 17 Dec. 2019).
14 The ‘distinction bonus’ of LYD240 per month for military members of varying ranks was approved in 2016, but only started being paid out in 2019. It is granted to individuals based on recommendation by their commander. Budget Department of the Ministry of Finance of the Government of National Accord (2018), ‘Notice’, 7 December 2018, https://www.facebook.com/BMF.NAG/photos/a.361019177754849/486231818566917/?type=3&theater (accessed 17 Dec. 2019).
15 Elumami, A. (2019), ‘Libya’s U.N.-backed government steps up defence spending as war drags on’, Reuters, 6 August 2019, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-libya-security-idUKKCN1UW1ZY (accessed 11 Dec. 2019).
16 The LAAF general command’s Decree 463 of 2019 ‘on granting financial bonuses’ provides for bonuses to be paid to army members, calculated as a percentage of their basic salary and decreasing with seniority in the military hierarchy. The bonus is equivalent to 100 per cent of salary for ranks from soldier to unit sergeant-major; 50 per cent for ranks from second lieutenant to lieutenant-colonel; and 25 per cent for ranks from colonel upwards. Africa Gate News (2019), ‘Haftar grants a financial bonus to all army members taking part in combat’ (Arabic), 29 October 2019, https://www.afrigatenews.net/article/حفتر-يمنح-علاوة-مالية-لكل-العسكريين-المشاركين-في-القتال/ (accessed 25 Feb. 2020).
17 For instance, fighters from these groups were mobilized in the 2015–16 war led by the Misratan al-Bunyan al-Marsus coalition against ISIS in Sirte, and were also rewarded informally at the time.
18 The Arab Mahamid tribe is present in Libya, Chad and Sudan. Most of the Mahamid fighters involved in the war are embedded with pro-LAAF groups. Social media reports claim to show pro-LAAF Mahamid fighters mobilizing in late 2019, for example: Facebook page ‘Voice of the Mahamid’ (Arabic), 13 December 2019, https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=518974952025596 (accessed 25 Feb. 2020). According to interviewees, other Chadian Mahamid fighters are embedded with pro-GNA groups from Zintan.
19 Hassan Musa Keley has long been the main coordinator between anti-LAAF groups and certain Sudanese – as well as Chadian – rebel factions. According to interviewees, Keley mobilized some of these fighters on behalf of pro-GNA groups fighting against the LAAF in the Fezzan at the start of 2019, but it is unclear what role they played – if any – in the Tripoli war.
20 Phone interviews with sources in the Fezzan, August 2019.
21 Lacher, W. (2019), Who is fighting whom in Tripoli?, The Small Arms Survey, August 2019, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-SANA-BP-Tripoli-2019.pdf (accessed 25 Feb. 2020).
22 The number of fighters is based upon Guardian estimates. See McKernan, B. and Akoush, H. (2020), ‘Exclusive: 2,000 Syrian fighters deployed to Libya to support government’, Guardian, 15 January 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/15/exclusive-2000-syrian-troops-deployed-to-libya-to-support-regime (accessed 12 Feb. 2020). For more on the Syrians’ deployment, see Wehrey, F. (2020), ‘Among the Syrian Militiamen of Turkey’s Intervention in Libya’, New York Review of Books, 23 January 2020, https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2020/01/23/among-the-syrian-militiamen-of-turkeys-intervention-in-libya/ (accessed 10 Feb. 2020).
23 The only Sudanese group currently allied with the GNA is the Justice and Equality Movement. According to information obtained in March 2019 by the UN Panel of Experts on the Sudan, the largest of the Darfurian rebel factions (Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi) negotiated with pro-GNA actors in Misrata around that time, in view of switching sides, but this deal did not materialize. Wanjala, T. B., Ciesay, P., Darracq, V., Dobronravin, N. and Yadav, R. (2020), Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan, 14 January 2020, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/S_2020_36_E.pdf (accessed 10 Feb. 2020).
24 Wanjala, T. B., Ciesay, P., Darracq, V., Dobronravin, N. and Yadav, R. (2020), Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan, 14 January 2020, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/S_2020_36_E.pdf (accessed 10 Feb. 2020).
25 Jégo, M., Vitkine, B. and Bobin, F. (2020), ‘En Libye, le grand marchandage entre Moscou et Ankara’ [In Libya, the great bargain between Moscow and Ankara] (French), Le Monde, 24 January 2020, https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2020/01/24/en-libye-le-grand-marchandage-entre-moscou-et-ankara_6027114_3210.html (accessed 12 Feb. 2020).