5. Mitigating Conflict Dynamics and Reducing the Role of Armed Groups in the Economy
The launch of the LAAF offensive on Tripoli in April 2019 sank UN-led efforts to convene a national conference to agree a path of transition out of Libya’s governance crisis. The international response to the LAAF’s move was muted. There was neither a UN Security Council resolution over a ceasefire nor any efforts to enforce the arms embargo.149 A lack of sincere effort to prevent increasing external intervention in Libya has exacerbated the conflict.
At the time of writing, Libyan combatants are heavily reliant upon external actors for their survival on the battlefield. International escalation has been met with counter-escalation. By November 2019 the LAAF’s air superiority, combined with the support of mercenaries provided by the Kremlin-linked Wagner Group, appeared to have placed Haftar’s forces in a position to move into Tripoli. However, the signing of agreements between the GNA and Turkey in December redressed the balance, making Haftar’s military objectives appear distant once again. The deployment into the Tripoli theatre of Syrian fighters paid by the Turkish armed forces illustrates how far the conflict has expanded since April 2019. These developments have also heightened the propaganda war, prompting allegations that the GNA is bringing Islamist extremist fighters to Libya and that it has sold out to Turkey’s neo-Ottoman ambitions.
The signing of a communiqué at a conference in Berlin in January 2020, the first to bring together all of the external actors meaningfully engaged in Libya, has reiterated international commitment to the arms embargo. The signatories have sought to initiate a process for agreeing a lasting ceasefire and beginning political negotiations. The Berlin communiqué was endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2510 on 12 February, albeit with Russia’s abstention. Yet at the time of writing in March 2020, there was no indication that these commitments would be backed with tangible action. An oil blockade initiated only two days prior to the conference in Berlin remains in place and is having a catastrophic impact on Libya’s finances.
Without commitment to enforcing the arms embargo and preventing the economy from being weaponized, Libya will be consigned to sustained conflict, further fragmentation and potential economic collapse. This is a difficult context in which to draw lessons for policymakers. Nonetheless, this chapter seeks to articulate conclusions from the analysis presented in this paper and assess options for mitigating Libya’s conflict in the security, social and economic spheres.
Ultimately, Libya’s interlinked political, security and economic crises can be solved only through a political settlement that sustainably addresses security concerns and paves the way for fundamental reform of the rentier system of economic governance. The latter is a key driver of conflict, engendering violent competition for control of lucrative rent streams and the capture of state assets. Lessons from other contexts indicate that a political settlement that relies upon dividing the spoils among warring actors is not likely to be sustainable, as those excluded or who perceive themselves to have been disadvantaged will seek to redress the balance through violence.150 Developing a just and sustainable resolution should of course remain the priority of the international community.
However, in the likely absence of such a settlement in the short term, international policymakers should reassess how they engage with Libya’s security sector, in order to reduce its fragmentation and increase its professionalism and accountability. Policymakers should also seek to prevent the continued expansion of the conflict economy. In the context of the current war, however, engagement with the security sector comes with significant hazards, particularly if parallel processes of security sector development are pursued by the opposing blocs. A reduction in armed group engagement in the economy can be effected through pursuit of criminal justice-led approaches and support for the development of alternative livelihoods.
Security-based solutions: reforming the Libyan security sector
Internationally developed approaches to security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) have failed to respond effectively to the fragmented nature of Libya’s security sector or to the limited capacity of the national military and intelligence institutions intended to protect the Libyan state. Such institutions suffer from the absence of a social contract between citizens and the state, which goes a long way towards explaining why so-called ‘national’ institutions remain so weak.
Internationally convened meetings in London (2011) and Paris (2012) were part of a significant effort to engage the Libyan government and organize international support for SSR. This process was cut short by the 2014 conflict between the ‘Libya Dawn’ and ‘Libya Dignity’ alliances and by the subsequent governance split. Critically, the Libyan National Transitional Council’s approach to integrating armed revolutionary groups led to the creation of parallel institutions such as military councils and supreme security committees. These councils and committees in many cases sought not to support formal national institutions but to replace them (due to their connections to the Gaddafi regime). This left the integration of elements of the Gaddafi-era military and security apparatus to the discretion of these same structures rather than formal state institutions. The councils and committees integrated groups of combatants – and allowed them to retain their own chains of command – rather than recruiting fighters individually. The subsequent GNC oversaw a military training project that despatched recruits for training in over a dozen countries. However, the selection of recruits was flawed, their command and control limited, and the function of the forces unclear.
SSR and DDR attempts in the post-2014 period have been piecemeal and have repeated previous patterns, revolving around the creation of new forces rather than the integration of individuals and groups into formal branches of the armed forces and intelligence apparatus. For example, the creation of the al-Bunyan al-Marsus (‘Impenetrable Edifice’) operations room in 2015 to combat the growing threat of ISIS established yet another parallel force alongside the Counter Terrorism Force (an offshoot of the al-Bunyan al-Marsus operations room). A lack of political will and lack of alignment between the GNA and elements of these groups complicated their integration once ISIS was ousted from Sirte. Meanwhile, political settlement efforts have lacked a meaningful security component. An Egyptian-led process to negotiate army reunification was undermined by overt Egyptian support for Haftar, and was concluded without agreement in 2018.
There have been few serious attempts at DDR. Only one national programme – the Warriors Affairs Commission, later rebranded as the Libyan Programme for Rehabilitation and Development – has been deployed by the state to focus on the social, political and economic integration of ex-combatants in Libya’s post-war society. Yet this programme was not given the required resources and has been defunct since 2015.151
Power in Libya still lies in social connections rather than within powers theoretically accorded to state institutions.
The absence of consensus at national level means that attempts at SSR and DDR have mostly taken place locally (albeit not within a framework of democratic civilian control, as required by accepted international definitions of SSR and DDR).152 These initiatives have been of limited success in the west of the country, where integration of armed groups into state structures has been undermined by the fact that community loyalties continue to trump institutional capacity. The relative effectiveness and capability of local groups in providing security has created a de facto ‘revolutionary guard’ model, wherein influential leaders within the groups are able to coerce, mobilize and manage formal state institutions and deployments. Ministers, deputy ministers and other senior leaders in the defence and security sectors are often chosen or put forward by leaders of armed groups, and would not be able to operate effectively without them. This highlights the reality that power in Libya still lies in social connections rather than within powers theoretically accorded to state institutions.
In other cases, armed groups have integrated elements of the defence and security apparatus into their forces to boost their own effectiveness – i.e. recruiting professionally trained soldiers, police and intelligence officers – rather than the other way around. Many of the more effective armed groups have implemented this approach. In Misrata, the Military Council is led by senior military officers, and nearly all of the armed brigades there are either led by military officers or include such officers within their ranks. Yet for the most part, these armed groups are not operating as part of the national military. They draw instead upon Misratan social legitimacy. Misrata has not sought to integrate Gaddafi-era brigades and institutions, which largely fought against Misratan forces in 2011. The Zawiya Military Council and most Amazigh towns, which also fought against the Gaddafi regime in 2011, have followed a similar approach. Other groups have sought to integrate Gaddafi-era commanders and units. This occurred with the Kaniyet armed group in Tarhuna, which a number of former Gaddafi-era officers joined.153 Similarly, Zintan’s Military Council and military police integrated a number of former members of the Gaddafi-era 32 Brigade. The Qaaqaa Brigade also integrated former members of the 32 Brigade along with Maghawir Tuareg forces. In Tripoli, the SDF integrated former Gaddafi-era intelligence officers and police officers, while the TRB integrated a small number of former members of the Gaddafi-era Imhamed Brigade.
The result of these trends is antithetical to traditional goals of SSR (establishing a clear chain of command and a state monopoly over the use of force) and DDR programming. The approach can be said to more closely resemble a kind of inversion of SSR and DDR: the armed groups use their state affiliation to co-opt the state and professionals from the state security apparatus; and continue to arm themselves, mobilize and integrate into the state’s security apparatus without becoming subservient to it (rather than disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating into broader society).
The LAAF has had some success with a form of SSR in the east and south of the country – albeit without real civilian oversight and contingent on tribal alliances and without submission to a formal chain of command. In particular, the LAAF has established a monopoly over the control of heavy weapons and the flow of arms in eastern Libya. The LAAF has built alliances with existing armed groups, persuading them to join the LAAF’s newly established command structure. Where necessary it has coerced groups that have resisted its authority, starving rebellious groups of access to weapons and ammunition.154 The LAAF has used numerous conflicts since 2014 to create brigades, reorganize its command structures, develop international partnerships and gain regional military support. In the south, the LAAF has started to reshuffle the security sector, especially since 2019.
The LAAF has also strengthened and reactivated formal security structures and encouraged the re-enrolment of pre-2011 army and police. In the course of the South Liberation and Purge Operation, the presence of neighbourhood militias in Sebha was curtailed, according to multiple interviews. At the same time, most of the LAAF’s southern allies are armed groups with a tribal backbone and a large proportion of civilian fighters who are no more formal or disciplined than other groups labelled ‘militias’. In terms of security provision in Sebha and other areas of the south, much of the supposed ‘progress’ noted in March 2019 had been reversed as of March 2020. There is also some evidence to support the theory that the LAAF’s empowerment of certain armed actors in the south could result in increased violence when southern fighters return from their current deployments on the Tripoli front lines. Under LAAF guidance, southern armed groups are being restructured to have a more diverse tribal composition and greater geographical reach. In a process of centralization, groups accorded privileged status by the LAAF are absorbing smaller groups and discarding competitors. There is disagreement as to whether these restructuring and realignment processes can pave the way for deeper reform. The pro-LAAF view is that LAAF-affiliated southern actors now stand for a national project rather than narrow tribal or local interests, and that military training and deployment under central orders will replace local loyalties with a new esprit de corps. However, it is not clear how this would tackle the issue of civilian fighters who are uninterested in joining the military (and who otherwise have few employment opportunities) being deployed to other parts of the country, or the issue of vested interests in the local economy.
In the west of the country, the ongoing war presents a serious threat to armed groups aligned with the GNA, making functional SSR crucial in the short term. This increases the incentive and opportunity for the GNA to organize the military and security apparatus in ways that were less convincing prior to the Tripoli war. If the GNA can offer its financial and technical expertise and resources, plus legal cover, to armed groups under its leadership, it will increase the incentive for armed groups to be receptive to its plans for reform. A further incentive for armed groups is to avoid being labelled as ‘militias’ (in a disparaging sense) by Haftar’s forces and their international backers.
To build state capacity, improve the performance of allied forces and counter negative perceptions, GNA-affiliated units could do more to improve their structural coherence. This must include placing militarily effective armed groups that also possess social legitimacy within a security framework that transcends community loyalties and places sovereignty in the hands of state institutions perceived as socially and legally legitimate. Clearly this is a difficult task, yet the current path of developing parallel organizations and brigades nominally under the control of ministries is ineffective. Examples of groups that have a degree of formal military hierarchy along with social legitimacy include the Misratan Brigades 301, 302, 166, 55 and Mahjub Brigade; the SDF, the Counter Terrorism Force and Zintani brigades. The goal should be to reorganize, integrate and manage these groups to incorporate them in to a unified chain of command.
The GNA-affiliated forces might also learn from the LAAF’s integration of former Gaddafi-era military officers, something which ultimately remains necessary although politically highly sensitive. These men are mostly inactive in the west of Libya and their morale remains low. Such integration should be conditional upon vetting.
Any integration drive would need to enforce disciplinary measures against non-compliant groups, and remove ineffective and inactive personnel. A public campaign to promote these efforts would also be needed to place pressure upon groups, individuals and communities that refuse to integrate. The branches of the armed forces and the police should absorb these men as individuals. Offers of leadership roles within the formal institutions should only be made if the individuals concerned meet the standards and requirements.
In return for formal integration, the GNA needs to ensure that salary payments are at least kept at existing levels, and that greater technical resources and expertise are provided. Only groups currently engaged in active operations should be engaged; this is crucial to maintaining trust. Such a process would increase the capacity of the GNA to exercise command and control over western Libyan forces through the accumulation of social legitimacy with the armed groups, and by extension with the communities from which these forces are drawn.
Even though previous efforts to gain the support of Western governments for SSR have ended in failure, the GNA should seek to leverage its international recognition to obtain technical assistance from the UN and other actors. It should also seek agreements on training and the expansion of cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism. If the GNA is to learn from experience, then all training projects must have effective selection and vetting criteria (which also must be applied – and seen to be applied – to Syrian forces fighting in support of the GNA). The GNA must also insist on clear command and control of the individuals or groups in question, along with clarity over the function of each actor.
Provision of alternative livelihoods
The ongoing war undermines the case for the disarmament of armed groups and their members. In the current environment, it will be hard to convince armed actors to put down their weapons to engage in civilian life. Recent bouts of conflict have illustrated to communities the need to retain their military capability to avoid subjugation by other forces. Nevertheless, despite the challenges, it would be a mistake to assume that all DDR attempts must wait until a political settlement is reached. The fractured and competitive security environment continues to erode state capacity and complicate attempts to produce a durable political settlement. The international community can and should do more to support the development of alternative livelihoods that may make disengagement from armed groups attractive. Incentives could be created through a combination of financial tools (such as access to banking services, loans and microcredit) and educational tools (business training, professional training, assistance to those wishing to resume school and university education).
However, this requires structural reforms to Libya’s model of governance. Notably, given the dependence of Libyans upon state sector employment, will the demobilization of fighters mean their removal from the state’s payroll? Can the bloated Libyan state continue to pay employees for largely unproductive labour? What alternatives exist? For example, interviews conducted in the east indicate that employment within the LAAF is viewed in the same way as employment in other areas of the public sector. Rank-and-file members of the LAAF tend to have limited educational qualifications, which hinders their ability to obtain other forms of public sector employment. This suggests that investment would be required to improve their job prospects in the public and/or private sectors. It also suggests that, beyond an exclusive focus on human security, considerations of economic security should be factored into policy planning. Such reforms, moreover, potentially complicate demobilization efforts because they would mean the loss of public sector employment for the lower-level members of armed groups. The ability to provide access to economic opportunities is contingent upon SSR/DDR being matched by a wider plan for economic recovery.
The viability of providing alternative livelihoods varies by group and location. There is no one-size-fits-all approach. For example, in the case of the SDF and the Nawasi Brigade, whose forces remain relatively coherent, motivated and well compensated, SSR processes have a greater chance of success than do DDR efforts. On the other hand, the contemporary landscape and overall revenue-generation and -distribution mechanisms of the TRB in Tripoli suggest that an approach that distinguishes between the leadership, mid-level commanders and rank-and-file fighters may be effective. The threat of economic sanctions may also make high-level commanders more receptive.
Overall, the reliance on the state for jobs and incomes appears to be in decline, perhaps owing to the prolonged absence of state institutions and inefficient service provision.
The horizontal structure of many armed groups in the south, combined with the weakness of the formal economy, makes rank-and-file fighters there suitable targets for the provision of alternative livelihoods. The most viable approach to curtailing smuggling, for example, would be to adopt a multi-pronged, long-term strategy that aims to boost private sector development and licit sources of revenue. Despite the lack of state support or private business infrastructure, there is entrepreneurship in the Fezzan. Overall, the reliance on the state for jobs and incomes appears to be in decline, perhaps owing to the prolonged absence of state institutions and inefficient service provision. Manual jobs are not (or, at least, no longer) shunned, although they may not be a first choice for many former fighters, some of whom may aspire to higher-skilled professions. Some young people go into traditional trades, such as livestock herding and small-scale agriculture. One of the main difficulties is that most business ventures require significant starting capital, yet no system is in place to provide young entrepreneurs with loans, guidance and business support.155
Grassroots initiatives are under way to support the rehabilitation of ex-combatants. One such project, launched by an academic in Sebha in 2017, targets ex-combatants who wish to learn a manual craft or trade; the project finds a placement with on-the-job training, and delivers a certificate after successful completion of training.156 Trainees are incentivized with modest remuneration during the training period, with the added prospect of earning a salary equivalent to that paid in the security sector once they are employed full-time.157 In the south, both the oil and agriculture sectors provide opportunities for job creation and promotion of the private sector.158 There have been some efforts at capacity-building in the oil sector, such as setting up a technical training institute near Ubari, but these are insufficient.159 Further efforts should be invested into helping graduates apply for positions in the oil sector, without relying on NOC recruitment mechanisms or the state’s poorly performing labour offices. In particular, the commitment of oil companies to facilitate local hiring should be followed up upon.
Reducing armed group engagement in the economy
The militarization of Libya’s economy is a driver of conflict. While a focus on curtailing illegality may seem like the obvious way of reducing armed groups’ engagement in the economy, a more useful criterion for assessing which activities to target with enforcement measures is to focus upon activities and actors in closest proximity to violence.
Determining the focus of local and international policies to reduce armed group engagement in the economy requires a judgment on which practices can and should be targeted, as well as on the feasibility of doing so in the context of ongoing war. This is far from a straightforward calculation. The involvement of armed groups in illicit activities can be overestimated, and not all armed group engagement in the conflict economy is strictly illegal. For example, most armed groups are formally part of the state’s security apparatus and therefore legally recognized as recipients of salaries from the state payroll. In the east of the country, the LAAF’s economic activities in the public and private sectors are supported by legislation passed by the House of Representatives – though this endorsement is at best quasi-legal given the flaws in the House of Representatives and the unrecognized status of both the Interim Government and the eastern CBL.
At the same time, many of the economic activities undertaken by armed groups are demonstrably illegal. Even in the case of the LAAF, it is clear that the MAIPW is seeking to expand beyond its (contested) legal scope of operation. Armed groups within Libya’s fractured security environment compete against one another for resources and influence. Keeping a significant armed group running requires concomitantly significant spending on operational costs, beyond salary requirements. Yet, as the state’s support for these expenditures is often not forthcoming, armed groups claim that they need alternative sources of funding. In many cases, this argument is used to justify illicit coercive practices that include rent maximization and state capture. This has created a vicious cycle wherein armed groups cite insecurity and a lack of effective governance as proof of the need for their continued existence, even as many of their actions hinder effective governance.
The international community could do much to curb the growth of the conflict economy by restricting the capacity of Libyan actors to mobilize resources for the purposes of violence. This effort must begin closer to home – i.e. within the international policymaking environment itself – with enforcement of the arms embargo. Inside Libya, it means opposing the increasing entrenchment of actors such as the LAAF in the economy in the east. It also means opposing lower-level engagement, such as the collaboration between Ghneiwa’s forces in Tripoli and the local municipality. The international community should consider the use of sanctions to dissuade Libyan actors from employing state resources to escalate the conflict, as it previously did in the case of Ibrahim Jadhran.160
Prospects for enforcement by the Libyan state
Weak institutions, operational divides and a lack of capacity to enforce policies constrain the ability of the Libyan state to clamp down on illicit activities. Nonetheless, there have been efforts, via different authorities, to apply the rule of law in both the west and the east. The judiciary still functions to a certain extent, with prosecutors and judicial enforcement agents cooperating across political lines of division. This is something that the international community should seek to reinforce.
The Attorney General’s Office (AGO) in Tripoli has moved to prosecute crimes against the state, issuing arrest warrants against Libyans implicated in fuel smuggling and the sabotage of oil facilities, among other alleged crimes.161 Some of the indictments have targeted members or commanders of armed groups. Since the AGO’s authority has not been formally challenged by the House of Representatives, AGO rulings remain applicable throughout the country. Arrest warrants and travel bans are communicated to immigration police at land borders and airports, as well as to other law enforcement agencies (such as the judicial police, criminal investigations department and intelligence agencies).
The main difficulty for the AGO is to execute warrants, given Libya’s splintered security sector. It has various tools at its disposal, depending on the location, situation and type of crime. Often, executing a warrant requires the cooperation not only of official law enforcement agents but often also of irregular armed actors. In western and southern Libya, individuals suspected of relevant crimes are usually captured by armed groups within their own communities and then handed over to Tripoli, where the SDF places them in temporary detention awaiting prosecution. The success of such operations depends on the level of coordination and the relationship with the communities involved, including the SDF’s connections in other regions. Decisions are often the result of social consultations – local stakeholders weigh the options in determining whether to protect their charged ‘sons’ or comply with the orders of Tripoli, and the outcome is then connected to some form of trade-off.
Prominent figures are out of reach of the judiciary, however, especially if allied with the LAAF or GNA and playing a role in the current war. The ability of the AGO to enforce rulings also depends on the type of crime and individual targeted; rulings on crimes that are removed from the political and military domains have a greater chance of success.
Prominent figures are out of reach of the judiciary, especially if allied with the LAAF or GNA and playing a role in the current war.
In some instances, the AGO has been accused of bias or being a puppet of other actors. A case in point was its indictment of members of the Fezzan Anger Movement for anti-state action in the context of a sit-in at the Sharara oil field, which had prompted the NOC to declare force majeure on 10 December 2018.162 The protest movement, launched in Ubari in October 2018, demanded better public services, jobs, economic development and SSR. It quickly gained support among the general public and local officials.163 Between 26 November 2018 and 1 March 2019, the AGO indicted a total of 27 individuals in connection to the Sharara blockade, including the coordinator of the Fezzan Anger Movement, Bashir al-Sheikh (for incitement to blockade the field) and at least 14 other members of the movement.164
In the east, there has been increasing friction between the LAAF and civilian authorities over the LAAF’s expanding economic activities. Legal battles involving the MAIPW and the Interim Government in administrative tribunals in Benghazi and al-Bayda have covered issues such as migration control and management, as well as the operation of agricultural and industrial projects owned by the Social Security Fund and the Libya Local Investment and Development Fund.165
Both Libyan and international efforts to tackle predatory economic activities are undermined by the lack of transparency in governing structures, and by the atomization of the country’s anti-corruption bodies. In order to investigate and target individuals more effectively, greater efforts must be made to increase the transparency of the system and build the institutional capacity of anti-corruption authorities. Here, the international audit – requested in 2018 and now currently impeded by the Libyan Audit Bureau – of the records of the rival branches of the CBL would provide a potential opportunity to leverage international pressure to increase the transparency of state entities. For example, insistence on the disclosure of Libyan recipients of LCs and their partners (in other countries) would improve oversight of one of the most lucrative revenue streams within the conflict economy.
International enforcement
The international community has a mixed record on addressing Libya’s conflict economy. On the one hand, international actors continue to support the activities of armed groups, both directly in the form of military aid and support, and indirectly through the provision of diplomatic cover. These fault lines are of course well known in Libya, which makes it more difficult for international actors to appear as neutral arbiters in any criminal justice-led initiative. On the other hand, there have been some notable successes: in 2014, US marines were deployed to prevent exports of crude oil from the east; the policy has had a lasting effect despite continuing efforts by armed groups in that region to access the international oil market directly. In addition, joint Italian–Libyan efforts to apprehend the fuel-smuggling ‘kingpin’ Fahmi Salim Ben Khalifa proved successful in 2017. Here, the collaboration between Italian and Libyan authorities must be seen as a positive means of supporting the Libyan state’s capacity to apprehend conflict economy profiteers.
International actors should commission experts to analyse the supply chains for illicit activities. This could perhaps be done through providing additional resources to the UN Panel of Experts on Libya, or through commissioning sectoral expertise and attaching the experts to UNSMIL.166 The advantage of expanding the capacity of the UN Panel of Experts is that the panel’s mandate from the UN Security Council places it in a stronger position to compel Libyan actors to cooperate. The focus of the analysis should be to identify chokepoints along illicit supply chains that could be targeted to undermine specific activities.
International enforcement mechanisms have focused on the imposition of sanctions on individuals. These have served multiple functions to date: to increase pressure on certain Libyan players (e.g. the speaker of the House of Representatives, Agila Saleh) who were threatening to undermine negotiations ahead of the signature of the Libyan Political Agreement in 2015; to target individuals accused of involvement in human trafficking (e.g. Ahmed al-Dabbashi, Mohamed Kushlaf); to target individuals who have endangered civilians (Salah Badi); and to target those who have wrought economic damage upon the state (Ibrahim Jadhran).167
If properly used and enforced, sanctions can be an effective means of restraining Libya’s conflict economy. The international community should adopt criteria that can be consistently applied, and which place the interests of the Libyan state at the heart of its approach.
To date, two principal problems have characterized the use of international sanctions: first, they are perceived locally as arbitrary and politically motivated; and second, their implementation and enforcement have been ineffective. Consequently, there is little evidence that the use of sanctions against individuals in Libya since 2011 has had any real impact. There is no evidence to suggest that the ability of Saleh, Jadhran and Badi to travel or manage their finances has been impaired by UN Security Council sanctions – which included a travel ban and the freezing of their assets abroad.
Nonetheless, if properly used and enforced, sanctions can be an effective means of restraining Libya’s conflict economy. The international community should adopt criteria that can be consistently applied, and which place the interests of the Libyan state at the heart of its approach. While international actors may consider sanctions on individuals who block political progress or who have committed violations of human rights, such measures will undermine efforts to tackle the conflict economy if they continue to be applied inconsistently. For example, the sanctioning of Badi for impeding a political resolution to the conflict (and, to a lesser extent, for his role in the fighting in Tripoli in 2018) is inconsistent with the failure to sanction Field Marshal Haftar for derailing the proposed national conference with the launch of his offensive on Tripoli in April 2019. An approach that places the emphasis on targeting individuals who are plundering Libyan state resources and assets would be more likely to win support from the general population. Increased international pressure and oversight alone would likely reduce some of the excesses of Libya’s conflict economy. Indeed, the threat of sanctions should always be made clear before their actual application, in order to induce behavioural change (where possible) across networks of revenue-generation mechanisms. This could contribute significantly to tackling the conflict economy in cases where economic incentives outweigh other considerations.
Sanctions should target ‘rent maximizers’ (actors who have amassed significant resources from illicit practices) in particular. Such figures are better targets for sanctions than those engaged in activities where the profits are more widely distributed. Placing sanctions on rent maximizers is likely to be more effective at undermining illicit activity, and should not be limited only to those who bear arms. For example, applying sanctions to networks of profiteers engaged in financial crime is likely to be more effective than targeting fuel smugglers, because financial crime supply chains are shorter and resources are concentrated in fewer hands. Such actors are also likely to have more limited social legitimacy. Increasing transparency in the fuel sector is also a necessary first step before more effective criminal justice measures can be adopted. Efforts to target commanders in groups with vertical command structures are likely to be more successful. The activities of the MAIPW, along with joint ventures and holding companies created as subsidiaries of it, should be subject to extensive investigation.
Sanctions should also target actors with significant assets overseas. The most underutilized – but most powerful – point of leverage for international players is the ability to target assets held overseas by Libyan individuals. A wide range of actors have accumulated significant funds and assets overseas, particularly in the UAE, Morocco, Turkey and Europe. For many of the principal types of activity in the conflict economy, a foreign company is necessary to operationalize revenue-generation schemes. This also implies the existence of a paper trail that includes a record of transactions.
The ability to monitor such activities is hindered by the complexity of asset-tracing, a lack of transparency in Libya and the limited appetite of the international community to investigate. Yet if international players are serious about clamping down on the worst excesses of Libya’s conflict economy, they have the tools to do so. In particular, the reliance of Libyan actors on US dollar transactions in international markets means that the US Department of the Treasury is privy to the details of the sender and recipient accounts (along with the value of each transfer) involved in the import of goods to Libya.
Nonetheless, there are clear limits to what sanctions against individuals can achieve: most revenue-generation mechanisms require a network of participants across multiple institutions. Therefore, it would be very rare for one individual to be central enough to an entire revenue-generation scheme for the scheme to be significantly curtailed through the imposition of sanctions on that person alone. In an environment highly conducive to illicit activities, sanctions may even be redundant, as one individual may simply be replaced by another or remain in charge regardless of the sanctions imposed (as has been seen with the sanctioning of Mohamed Kushlaf). This underscores the need for sanctions to be used as part of a broader political, economic and social compact that would allow the overhaul of Libya’s official distributive system. At best, the threat of sanctions or their use could disincentivize economically motivated actors from engaging in particular revenue-generation mechanisms.
There is also a risk that sanctions and international pressure could lead to second-order effects. This was witnessed in Tripoli following cutbacks in spending by the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence in 2014, when armed groups appeared to partly offset reductions in official disbursements with revenues generated from illicit activities. Armed factions are likely to seek alternative mechanisms rather than simply accepting reduced income. Attempts to disrupt illicit activities also threaten to destabilize situations where there is a fragile status quo. For example, the control of trade and smuggling routes linking Libya to Egypt, Sudan and Chad has long been a source of contention between Zway and Tebu groups in Kufra. Since around 2015, in the wake of communal conflict, the Zway tribe’s dominance has enabled its kinsmen to assume exclusive control over smuggling operations south of Sarir – this development has been perceived by the Tebu involved as a humiliating defeat.168 Yet pragmatism prevails: traders from both tribes still interact when necessary, even paying road tolls to opposing armed groups when crossing areas controlled by those groups.169 Paradoxically, these developments have created a stability of sorts.
149 The UN Panel of Experts documented extensive and ongoing violations of the embargo by the UAE (which in any case had been violating the embargo consistently since at least 2015), Jordan and Turkey.
150 Eaton et. al. (2019), Conflict Economies in the Middle East and North Africa, p. 49.
151 Pack, J., Mezran, K. and Eljarh, M. (2014), ‘Libya’s Faustian Bargains: Ending the Appeasement Cycle’, Atlantic Council, 5 May 2014, www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Libyas_Faustian_Bargains.pdf (accessed 10 Feb. 2020).
152 Timothy Edmunds defines the security sector as the ‘provision of security within the state in an effective and efficient manner, and in the framework of democratic civilian control’, framing reform within this context. See Karkoszka, A. (2004), ‘The Concept of Security Sector Reform’, United Nations, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/Karkoszka.pdf (accessed 30 Jan. 2020).
153 The Political Isolation Law led to the dismissal of a large number of soldiers and officers from the Gaddafi-era military and security apparatus. These individuals subsequently lost their livelihoods.
154 In Tobruk, it was possible to sell military-grade weapons in shops in the city. However, since 2018 shops that sell military-grade weapons have been closed down with the help of the LAAF. There has also been a small buy-back scheme so that arms traders would give up their stock. Now there are stricter controls over small military-grade weapons such as AK47s at checkpoints manned by the LAAF’s Military Police. These weapons are now confiscated on the spot.
155 On paper, there are Libyan state entities mandated to support the creation of small and medium-sized enterprises and youth entrepreneurship. Back in 2014–15, they were running offices in Sebha and publicizing ambitious programmes for future development. However, few concrete steps were taken, and the current status of these initiatives is unclear.
156 Phone interview with the project director in Sebha, August 2019.
157 Ibid.
158 Oil field operators largely rely on contractors from outside the region, including for electrical or construction works that do not require a high level of specialization. Even for catering contracts, they often use companies from northern Libya.
159 The Higher Institute for Oil Technology opened in Germa (Wadi al-Hayat) in 2015 as part of a set of commitments made by the government in 2013–14. However, the Institute did not fulfil local expectations. Local interviewees’ main argument is that, unlike graduates of Libya’s oil academies in the north, graduates of this institute do not have direct access to NOC positions. Moreover, they complain that their job applications are rarely successful.
160 The blockade of the ‘oil crescent’ – a region which stretches along the coast from Sirte to Ras Lanuf, and which extends down to the Jufra district – by the forces of Ibrahim Jadhran from 2013 to late 2016 cost Libya $160 billion according to CBL figures. Although Jadhran and his forces were ousted from the ‘oil crescent’ by Haftar’s forces in September 2016, Jadhran had been able to obtain a payment of $42 million from the GNA some months prior to this. Jadhran would briefly capture the oil crescent again in June 2018, before Haftar’s forces once again recaptured the area. Following the June 2018 incident, UN and US sanctions were placed upon Jadhran for his actions.
161 For example, in January 2019 the AGO indicted six Libyans (including Ibrahim Jadhran) and 31 foreign nationals (Chadians and Sudanese) on charges including assault on oil ports and fields and banditry. In February 2019, the AGO issued a list of 103 individuals accused of smuggling fuel abroad, and instructed law enforcement agencies to detain them. Between November 2018 and March 2019, the AGO also indicted 27 individuals for a blockade at Sharara oil field.
162 National Oil Corporation (2018), ‘NOC declares force majeure at Sharara and demands the immediate withdrawal of the occupying militia’, news release, 10 December 2018, https://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/4291-noc-declares-force-majeure-at-sharara-and-demands-the-immediate-withdrawal-of-the-occupying-militia (accessed 13 Feb. 2020).
164 The AGO issued an arrest warrant against Bashir al-Sheikh and Abdulaziz Ighnima on 26 November 2018, followed by a list with 25 further names, which was disclosed at the start of March 2019 (date of issuance not stated on the document). Although some media reported that all 27 individuals were members of the Fezzan Anger Movement, it seems that only 15 were, the remainder being oil guards. Alharathy, S. (2019), ‘Attorney General’s Office orders arrest of 27 members of Fezzan Rage movement’, The Libya Observer, 2 March 2019, https://www.libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/attorney-generals-office-orders-arrest-27-members-fezzan-rage-movement (accessed 13 Feb. 2020).
165 In another example of concrete actions taken by the Libyan state, a new police and security forces law was adopted by the House of Representatives on 27 November 2018; it was subsequently reissued on 18 August 2019 after the House’s approval of additional amendments and provisions suggested by the Ministry of Interior, which had proposed the original bill. According to Interim Government officials, the law is intended to strengthen the police in the face of growing dominance by the military. The amendments introduced by the Ministry of Interior include an additional LYD72 million to support increases in police officers’ salaries. Libyan House of Representatives. Law No. (5) 2018. Full text in Arabic can be accessed here.
166 Other analysts suggest a formalised ‘International Financial Commission’ is the only way to realistically improve corporate governance in Libya. See Pack, J. (2019), It’s the Economy Stupid: How Libya’s Civil War Is Rooted in Its Economic Structures, IAI Papers 19/17, September 2019, Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaip1917.pdf (accessed 13 Feb. 2020).
167 UN Security Council (2018), ‘Security Council Committee concerning Libya Adds Six Individuals to Its Sanctions List’, press release, 7 June 2018, https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13371.doc.htm (accessed 13 Feb. 2020).
168 Phone interview with resident of Kufra, September 2019.
169 Ibid. Human smuggling has become less lucrative and has given way in many instances to drug smuggling – in particular of the opiod Tramadol, which is trafficked between the Sahel and Central Africa to Libya and Egypt.