About this Paper
This paper is based on approximately 200 interviews carried out by the authors – in person and remotely – with a wide range of Libyan actors between November 2018 and September 2019. Data on the economic models of armed groups combine testimony from members of the armed groups themselves, smugglers, black-market traders, businessmen and officials. Data on the community relations of armed groups are drawn from 47 interviews with individuals from a variety of social and professional backgrounds, in the following locations:
- West – Tripoli, Zawiya, Zwara, Hun (13)
- East – Benghazi, Tobruk, Derna, Ajdabiya (13)
- South – Sebha, Ubari, Murzuq, Qatrun and Kufra (21)
The project developed a series of selection criteria for interviewees in order to attract as diverse a range of viewpoints as possible. However, this paper does not claim to present a fully representative view of citizens in the areas in question.
Similarly, the paper does not claim to cover all armed groups in the country. Moreover, there are some differences in approach to the analysis of groups in different target areas, a consequence both of variances in local context and of the challenges of ensuring a consistent scope of enquiry. For Tripoli and southern Libya, we cover the principal armed groups in operation, whereas we concentrate squarely on the LAAF in the east. The significant space devoted to Tripoli reflects the importance of the capital in the political and economic system, yet this has come at the cost of assessing dynamics in other key power centres such as Misrata, Zintan and Zawiya. Overall, this has led to a degree of unevenness in coverage, but it has allowed for detailed analysis of the studied areas.
The focus is on understanding how armed groups relate to the communities they claim to represent, how they have built their economic bases, and how this connects to their capacity for violence.
As far as possible, the paper seeks to use a non-normative nomenclature, thus preferring the term ‘armed groups’ to ‘militias’ or ‘regular state forces’ (armies), either of which would imply judgment as to their legitimacy.1 The focus is on understanding how armed groups relate to the communities they claim to represent, how they have built their economic bases, and how this connects to their capacity for violence. For the purposes of this paper, we define a conflict economy as ‘a system of producing, mobilizing and allocating resources to sustain competitive and embedded violence, both directly and indirectly’.2
Similarly, this paper does not seek to judge the claims to legitimacy of rival political actors, notably in relation to the administrative split since 2014 that has involved rival governments operating in the east and west of the country. Both the Government of National Accord3 (the internationally recognized government based in Tripoli) and the Interim Government4 (which is based in al-Bayda in the east and viewed as a parallel institution by the international community) are treated as ‘state’ entities here. This is to facilitate a structural analysis of the country’s conflict economy, particularly when discussing the ‘official’ nature of armed groups’ affiliations and local perceptions of ‘official’ status. Recognition of the difficulties around the term ‘official’ is central to the analysis in this paper.
The paper begins by exploring the nature of armed group–community relations and the sources of revenue that have allowed armed groups to continue to operate and – in certain cases – grow in power and influence. Subsequent chapters focus on these developments in specific geographic areas in more detail. The final chapter seeks to draw out the implications for policy. It identifies several options for mitigating conflict dynamics, including: a) prospects for reform of Libya’s security sector; b) the use of legal enforcement mechanisms to constrain groups’ capture of the economy; and c) the development of approaches that focus on individual, active members of armed groups, with a view to providing opportunities for alternative livelihoods.
The research for Tripoli was conducted by Emadeddin Badi. Ahmed Shalghoum explored elements of the models of financial crime. Mohamed Eljarh conducted research on eastern Libya. Valerie Stocker researched armed groups in the south, supported by a group of four research assistants based in that region of the country. Along with Tim Eaton, each of these authors jointly developed both the conceptual approaches framing revenue generation and the policy recommendations. Concepts surrounding the social embeddedness of armed groups and prospects for security sector reform were developed by Abdul Rahman Alageli. Khadeja Ramali undertook interviews to explore issues relating to gender and diversity. Tim Eaton developed the research framework, conducted additional interviews and took the lead in drafting this paper.
Figure 1: Map of Libya
Figure 1: Map of Libya
1 The term ‘regular state forces’ refers to individuals who underwent military training and received military registration numbers either in the Gaddafi era or post-2011.
2 Eaton, T., Cheng, C., Mansour, R., Salisbury, P., Yazigi, J. and Khatib, L. (2019), Conflict Economies in the Middle East and North Africa, Chatham House Report, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, p. iv, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/conflict-economies-middle-east-and-north-africa (accessed 11 Dec. 2019).
3 The Government of National Accord (GNA) was formed in March 2016 following the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement, also known as the Skhirat Agreement, in December 2015. Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj heads the nine-member Presidency Council that spearheads the GNA.
4 The General National Congress (the parliament elected in 2012) appointed the Libyan Interim Government. This government resigned in August 2014, after the House of Representatives was elected and set up base in Tobruk. The House of Representatives then formed a new government, based in al-Bayda, which is also called the Libyan Interim Government and is headed by the same prime minister from the previous cabinet (Abdullah al-Thinni).