There is and will continue to be an edge of rivalry in Egypt’s relations with the dominant Gulf Arab powers. This paper will focus primarily on the Egypt–Gulf relationship during the Sisi era.
Future prospects for the Sisi–Gulf alliance
Many of the issues that formed the basis of the alliance that has developed between Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE since 2013 remain relevant today, but in a number of crucial respects the political and economic context has changed. President Sisi invoked the cause of fighting political Islam when asked, during a visit to the US in September 2019, about the recent protest demonstrations in Cairo and other parts of Egypt.37 However, there was no evidence of any active Muslim Brotherhood role in these protests, which had been inspired by allegations by a former contractor for the Egyptian army about corruption and the contrast between the lavish lifestyles of the military elite and the hardship endured by the majority of Egyptians. Egypt and the UAE are still aligned in Libya on the side of Field Marshal Haftar’s LNA against the Government of National Accord, which includes elements with Muslim Brotherhood roots; moreover, the UAE’s recent moves in Yemen to bolster the position of the Southern Transitional Council have been partly driven by a determination to block any resurgence of the Muslim Brotherhood-connected Yemeni Islah movement.
Yet the credibility of using the threat of a Muslim Brotherhood comeback as a pretext for continued suppression of political and human rights within Egypt and for military interventions around the region is starting to wear thin. The Gulf Arab states are now more preoccupied with dealing with the consequences of the Trump administration’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign against Iran, and with President Trump’s increasingly erratic policy interventions. Whereas President Obama may have been faulted for failing to provide any support to Mubarak, for withdrawing prematurely from Iraq, and for appeasing Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood and President Assad of Syria, Trump’s low-key reaction to Iran’s attack on the largest oil-processing facility in Saudi Arabia on 14 September 2019 has been profoundly unsettling for the Gulf Arab leaders. His sudden decision to pull US forces out of Syria the following month, apparently against the advice of his Middle East policy and military advisers, and to the advantage of Turkey, Assad, Russia and Iran, has only added to the consternation of the US’s traditional allies in the region.
Sisi, Mohamed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed were heavily invested in the Trump presidency. For Sisi, Trump afforded useful protection against critics in the US Congress of Egypt’s human rights record; the US president has also been receptive to Sisi’s arguments on the importance of combating political Islam. For the Saudi and UAE leaders, Trump’s hard line on Iran was welcome, and they even saw some merit in the so-called ‘deal of the century’ on Palestine that was being drawn up by the president’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner. Yet while Sisi and his Gulf allies may once have drawn assurance from the prospect of a two-term Trump presidency, any such confidence in the value of their strategic ties to the US has now been shaken. It will be hard to restore this confidence, no matter who is in the White House after the 2020 election.
On one level, this may reinforce the will of these three prominent Arab states to work together to resolve regional issues, without reference to the US or other outside powers. This cooperative approach has been used to good effect in the Horn of Africa and in Sudan, where UAE and Saudi finance, with Egyptian political support, has helped in brokering peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea and in managing the transition in Khartoum following the fall of President Omar al-Bashir. These initiatives have served a strategic purpose in checking the spread of Turkish and Iranian interests in that region.38
The Syria conflict and growing tensions with Iran in the Gulf present more formidable challenges. Saudi Arabia has long since relinquished any active role in supporting opponents of the Assad regime, but its previous involvement in financing and arming some rebel groups could disqualify it from leading any reconciliation moves with the Syrian president. Egypt, under Sisi’s presidency, has maintained an effectively neutral stance on Syria, and has on several occasions hosted visits from Ali Mamlouk, a senior Syrian intelligence official who was recently promoted to the position of vice-president for security affairs. The UAE, likewise, has not played an active role in the Syrian conflict, and a number of Emirati business groups are currently pursuing investment opportunities in Syria. Sisi has developed a close relationship with President Vladimir Putin of Russia, which could open the way for a broader Russian–Arab approach to resolving the Syria conflict. However, this would require dealing with other stakeholders, in particular Turkey and Iran. The chances of success for such an approach would depend on the readiness of the Gulf Arab states to provide finance. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE are major contributors to the UN-coordinated humanitarian aid disbursed within Syria and to refugees around its borders, but they might baulk at providing direct financial support to the Assad regime. There also appears to be no appetite among Egypt or its Gulf partners to contemplate any sort of peacekeeping military deployment in Syria.
Egypt, under Sisi’s presidency, has maintained an effectively neutral stance on Syria … There also appears to be no appetite among Egypt or its Gulf partners to contemplate any sort of peacekeeping military deployment in Syria.
The Abqaiq and Khurais attacks in Saudi Arabia exposed the extreme vulnerability of Gulf Arab energy installations and infrastructure. They also exposed the lack of credible military options available for the Gulf Arab states to back up their posture of trying to reduce Iranian influence in the region. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are now desperately searching for an exit strategy in Yemen, and are casting around for ways of easing tensions with Iran, including through enlisting the support of Russia. Egypt has little useful to offer in these areas. Despite heavy spending on military equipment over the past few years, the Egyptian armed forces have not demonstrated the capability to operate effectively in combat. Tens of thousands of Egyptian troops have been tied down for years in northern and central Sinai fighting a relatively small local insurgency. The new equipment purchased for the army, navy and air force is coming from a range of different sources: the US, Russia, France and Germany. This poses complicated challenges for systems integration. Another important consideration is that the recent rise in military spending has come after a long period of attrition in the armed forces. Hazem Kandil cites figures to show that military spending in Egypt fell from 33 per cent of GDP in the mid-1970s to 19.5 per cent in 1980 and just 2.2 per cent in 2010.39
The main concerns for Egypt in terms of regional security relate to Libya (although Egypt remains reluctant to become deeply involved on the ground, in contrast to the UAE), the eastern Mediterranean (in relation to Turkey’s efforts to impede natural gas development around Cyprus) and along the Red Sea. The possibility of military conflict with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam remains an extreme scenario, but Sisi has a domestic political imperative to back up his references to this issue as a matter of vital national interest with at least an implicit suggestion of a military option. Iran does not figure among Egypt’s regional security priorities.
The shift in the balance of power within the Arab world from Egypt to the Gulf since the 1973 war has been reflected in the chronic dependence of Egypt on financial support from its oil-rich neighbours. Egypt may have the largest population among Arab states and, arguably, the most potent armed forces, but its ability to project power and influence has been undermined by economic weakness. This is clearly an affront to the nationalist sensibilities of Sisi’s circle. Egypt may now have an opportunity to tilt the scales back in its direction, as the Saudi–UAE drive for regional dominance has started to falter and as Egypt, for the time being at least, is no longer so heavily reliant on external financial aid. However, the recent positive sheen on Egypt’s economic performance, as reflected in indicators such as solid GDP growth, a primary budget surplus, buoyant foreign exchange reserves, and falling inflation and unemployment, is offset by the harsh reality that poverty has risen sharply over the past decade and that Sisi’s administration is widely perceived as both corrupt and hideously repressive. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is also likely to put pressure on the Egyptian economy until such a time as restrictions on travel and daily life around the region (and beyond) are lifted. Further political convulsions in Egypt can by no means be ruled out, and in the event of a fresh political crisis, the Gulf Arab states would be expected to be on hand to pick up the economic pieces.
37 White House (2019), ‘Remarks by President Trump and President El-Sisi of Egypt Before Bilateral Meeting, New York, NY’, 23 September 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-el-sisi-egypt-bilateral-meeting-new-york-ny/ (accessed 17 Mar. 2020).
38 International Crisis Group (2019), Intra-Gulf Competition in Africa’s Horn: Lessening the Impact, Brussels: International Crisis Group, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/206-intra-gulf-competition-africas-horn-lessening-impact (accessed 17 Mar. 2020).
39 Kandil (2012), Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, p. 183.