6. Conclusions
Protecting humanity from the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons requires courage, sustained commitment and concerted action. Today’s complex security environment highlights both the challenges and necessity of such action. Nuclear weapons are often presented as promoting security, particularly during times of international instability. But weapons that risk catastrophic and irreversible humanitarian consequences cannot seriously be viewed as protecting civilians or humanity as a whole.
ICRC President Peter Maurer, 2015115
In the context of the forthcoming review of the NPT – the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime – the first practical reality that requires acknowledgment by all parties to the treaty is that papering over their differences will serve not only to discount the seriousness of the global security context that is being used as a brake on nuclear disarmament, but to weaken the standing of the NPT itself. As cautioned by Mary Robinson on behalf of The Elders: ‘Failure to reenergise negotiations at this juncture could put at risk the near-universal global commitment to non-proliferation and push more countries to seek their own nuclear weapons programmes.’116
Before participants at the Review Conference embark on the routine procedures and detailed aspects of its work, it is to be hoped that they will give careful consideration to three overriding challenges:
- Bridging widely differing perceptions of what underpins strategic stability – i.e. the spectrum that sees at one end few, if any, non-nuclear weapon states, other than those that rely on extended deterrence, accept that global security equilibrium is an essential condition for nuclear disarmament, and at the other end few, if any, nuclear weapon states or their allies accept that the pursuit of nuclear disarmament helps ameliorate the security environment.
- With regard to nuclear deterrence, wrestling with the questions: If existing nuclear arsenals are perceived as offering protection to their possessors and those in alliance with them, how can continued reliance on nuclear weapons by nuclear weapon states and their allies serve the cause of non-proliferation consistent with the NPT? What assurances can be provided – and what measures can be agreed – that this state of affairs is not tantamount to justifying the possession of nuclear weapons in perpetuity?
- Allaying humanitarian concerns, notably how best to recognize and reduce risks related to nuclear weapon detonations (whether accidental or deliberate).
As to issue 1, it is salutary to ask at what point in a deteriorating security environment might non-allied states regard the restraint of their NPT obligations as incompatible with their national security interests. The potentially self-defeating nature of a situation in which nuclear weapon states are putting nuclear disarmament efforts on hold, and indeed are pursuing modernization programmes as a response to the tense security climate, needs for the sake of the NPT to be recognized and acknowledged.
As to issue 2, whatever position one takes on the logic of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, reconciling it with disarmament and non-proliferation obligations under the NPT requires more openness and frankness from nuclear weapon states and their allies. Unless and until the consequences for the NPT of reliance on nuclear deterrence for their security by nuclear weapon states and their allies are articulated in terms of compatibility with the treaty, most non-nuclear weapon states are unlikely to be mollified. Although nuclear proliferation has remained largely in check to date, this may not be conclusively attributable to extended deterrence, but in any event ‘there is reason to doubt whether it will do so indefinitely’.117
Disagreement on whether the TPNW succeeds or fails as an ‘effective measure’ for nuclear disarmament in terms of Article VI of the NPT, or whether or not it is premature, masks deeper problems. These are rooted in concerns that the TPNW erodes international security by undermining the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.118 Until such factors are examined in a dispassionate manner, proponents of the respective points of view on them will continue to talk past one another. Harries makes the point that alliance members that wish to maintain extended deterrence ‘should articulate a clear rationale for why they believe it is necessary’.119
As to issue 3, there is growing recognition of the case that, irrespective of differences in how states perceive nuclear weapons, a closer understanding of the components of risk surrounding the safety and security of nuclear weapons is warranted – with a view to reducing the probability of the detonation of a nuclear weapon.120 Given the enormous lethality of nuclear arms and their potential for global disruption, all states share an interest in prevention, as was noted by ICRC President Peter Maurer in 2015.121 It is this commonality of interest among nuclear weapon states, their allies and all other non-nuclear weapon states that makes this issue a potentially fruitful one for building mutual trust, opening a valuable door for compromise.
These are complex and related matters. The 10th NPT Review Conference will need to lay basic groundwork for identifying and recognizing the sources of such fundamental differences, and chart a course for addressing them during the next review cycle. The question for NPT parties is whether it may be more profitable to confront divergence on this scale by acknowledging that, in and of itself, this state of affairs – this profound stand-off – is doing nothing to reduce existing tensions in the NPT process, let alone cool international tensions.
Dispelling distrust as to the readiness of nuclear weapon states and their allies to act consistently with the spirit and letter of the NPT is vital for the treaty’s future and wellbeing. And this is so irrespective of the existence of the TPNW. As noted by UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu:
The goals the TPNW pursues remain as necessary as ever. A deteriorating international security environment and rising nuclear risks continue to demonstrate the wisdom of the adage that the only guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination.122
Evidently, the NPT states parties need urgently to engage in a frank clearing of the air. The CEND initiative, with its three sub-groups currently working on issues similar to those outlined here, cannot be disregarded if NPT parties are sincere in their wish to forge common understandings. Acknowledging different perspectives, let alone resolving them, will take time. And as observed at the outset, for a significant number of states these are high matters of strategic security. By their very nature, however, the consequences of use of nuclear weapons potentially affect every state’s interests. Identifying what is at stake for the NPT if the differences highlighted in this paper are left unaddressed could provide a starting point both for stimulating efforts to shore up the NPT and for addressing strategic security needs in the next review cycle.
Encouragement can be taken from the fact that this is already happening outside the NPT review process. Efforts such as CEND and others noted in this paper have been undertaken for various reasons, but they have in common a tacit realization that seeking to mitigate an overwrought global security climate requires engagement among the protagonists for the health of the NPT. While these parallel initiatives are very much welcome as potential means of redressing global security dysfunctionality, they need to be cast, and measured, in ways that demonstrably strengthen the NPT. The international community’s stake in a world free of further detonations of nuclear weapons or their testing demands no less.
NATO members are well placed within and outside NATO (through the NPDI, for instance) to contribute to such efforts by using their alliance relationships to influence nuclear weapon states on the significance of addressing key divergences as outlined in this paper, and sketching out strategies and mechanisms that stand a realistic chance of attracting widespread buy-in among NPT states parties and of helping to reinforce the rule of law.
Specific recommendations as to how NATO Allies might conduct their engagement at the Review Conference are as follows:
- There will be considerable value in upholding the tenets of constructive, good-faith engagement that recognize the range of interests involved, and the need to identify and focus on points that are most likely to foster common ground and reciprocity.
- By extension, efforts should be made to avoid pressing positions that are unlikely either to improve prospects for compromise or for cultivating a negotiating atmosphere conducive to problem-solving; for instance, continuing to voice intra-regional or ‘local’ antipathies on a multilateral stage, or restating previously aired opposition such as to the TPNW. Conversely, in the latter regard, for example, an openness by non-parties to observing TPNW meetings, as provided for in Article 8.5, could be a positive step.
- A carefully calibrated tone in statements made in multilateral meetings can pay dividends. NATO has a part to play in this regard in weighing the manner in which its voice as a highly militarized Western bloc may be seen from non-aligned NPT states. This is relevant to perceptions of NATO’s openness to serious dialogue and engagement measured, for instance, in relation to the sincerity of nuclear disarmament ambitions by states that rely on nuclear weapons for their security. An area of promise in this respect is offsetting nuclear with conventional forces.
- A readiness on the part of NATO to engage on issues that some or all of its nuclear weapon states are opposed to, or uncomfortable with, will be seen by other NPT states as a test of the readiness of the bulk of Alliance members to contribute to consensus-building. Pertinent examples here would be a commitment to increasing transparency of nuclear arsenals and to abandoning expansion of those arsenals; and addressing the crucial question of how any use of nuclear weapons can be compatible with the requirements of international humanitarian law.
- Urge the ‘N5’ (P5) to intensify their work on nuclear doctrines and strategic risk reduction. These are areas that hold promise for constructive dialogue among NPT parties because they are matters of common interest to possessors and non-possessors of nuclear weapons alike. Reducing the potential for misinterpretation of military postures is fundamental to the avoidance of nuclear war.
- A concerted effort will be needed to help shape and harmonize current initiatives by NATO members and partners to become widely accepted vehicles for fostering common ground among NPT states parties. This means strengthening approaches that will serve to build bridges through open and constructive dialogue in which opposing views are aired and reflected representatively in feasible outcomes.
- Beyond reaffirming their commitment to the letter and spirit of all three pillars of the NPT, it would be significant if NATO could put forward for discussion specific ideas on how to implement the NPT in practical, time-bound ways. This could entail identifying various stages, at the end of which progress would be reviewed and, unless there were persuasive reasons to the contrary, work on the next stage would begin. The initial stage would deal with confidence-building activities such as settling on a list of general points of common interest. The next stages would deal with refining and prioritizing these issues. To be useful, such an approach would need to deal with current key and seemingly unsurmountable issues such as entry into force of the CTBT and the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. If these are acid tests for the NPT’s future, they must be imaginatively confronted and worked through or around.
115 ICRC (2015), ‘Nuclear weapons: Ending a threat to humanity’, Statement by Peter Maurer, president of the ICRC, to the diplomatic community in Geneva, 18 February 2015, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/nuclear-weapons-ending-threat-humanity (accessed 2 Apr. 2020).
116 Robinson, M. (2019), ‘The lack of concern and absence of political will risks [sic] nuclear catastrophe’, speech delivered at a panel discussion on the future of arms control at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC, 26 September 2019, https://theelders.org/news/lack-concern-and-absence-political-will-risks-nuclear-catastrophe (accessed 16 Oct. 2019). The Elders are an independent group of global leaders working together for peace, justice and human rights.
117 Brewer, E. (2019), ‘Will Nuclear Weapons Make A Comeback? Why the Global Nonproliferation Regime Is Fraying’, Foreign Affairs, 23 September, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-09-23/will-nuclear-weapons-make-comeback (accessed 16 Oct. 2019).
118 See Nystuen, G., Egeland, K., Hugo, T. G. (2018), The TPNW: Setting the record straight, p. 35: ‘Procedural and textual critique of The TPNW ends up masking the most important political fault line of the debate, namely a profound disagreement over the acceptability of nuclear weapons and the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence.’ See, for example, the United States’ Statement to the United Nations General Assembly First Committee, 12 October 2017, https://undocs.org/A/C.1/72/PV.12 (accessed 11 Oct. 2019).
119 Harries, M. (2017), ‘The ban treaty and the future of US extended nuclear deterrence arrangements’.
120 Borrie, J., Caughley, T., Wan, W. (eds) (2017), Understanding Nuclear Weapon Risks, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, https://www.unidir.org/publication/understanding-nuclear-weapon-risks (accessed 31 Mar. 2020).
121 Maurer, P. (2015), at a side event hosted by Norway on ‘The humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons: key findings on the consequences and risks of, and the response capabilities regarding nuclear weapons explosions’, 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 8 December 2015, cited in Borrie, J., Caughley, T., Wan, W. (eds) (2017), Understanding Nuclear Weapon Risks, pp. 18–19.
122 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (2018), ‘Statement by Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu High Representative for Disarmament Affairs At TPNW Ceremony’, 26 September 2018, https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/HR-statement-TPNW.pdf (accessed 16 Oct. 2019).