6. Conclusion
As this paper has shown, although the government has tried to mitigate some of the problems with Russia’s transport infrastructure in the RFE, its efforts to date have been mainly confined to increasing funding. Such funding is often misallocated and does not always translate into specific improvements in the quality of infrastructure. The reasons for this include fundamental structural weaknesses, such as corruption in tendering processes and shortages of skilled engineers.
Many of Russia’s transport development strategies are not accompanied by specific indicators for what ‘success’ might look like, nor by guidelines for how the transport sector could be developed (aside from through increased funding). The piecemeal allocation of funds, the lack of policy alignment with nuanced regional needs, and the reluctance of foreign investors to take on high-risk projects mean that realization of the RFE’s economic potential is being restricted. Moreover, the Kremlin has long since prioritized the promotion of grand infrastructure projects such as the Sochi Winter Olympics, the FIFA World Cup or the Crimea Bridge over smaller-scale projects that should generate greater connectivity within Russian territory.
These inhibiting factors are exacerbated by a dearth of scientific research on transport infrastructure in Russia, despite the historic importance of these networks in Russia’s security thinking. Only three organizations in Russia specifically conduct research on road and railway construction, and they are based in Moscow and St Petersburg – none in the RFE itself.119 This limits the scope for developing innovative construction materials, for finding ways of configuring roads, ports, railways and airports in remote territories, or for identifying new specialists. The fact that Russia has stopped investing in such scientific research organizations is to its detriment. While engineering was once a prized profession during the Soviet era, the growing knowledge gap and ‘brain drain’ (in terms of the departure of some of the country’s best engineers to Europe) will mean that Russia’s engineering sector will increasingly lag behind those of other countries. More specifically, this research gap is likely to have a deleterious effect on the future of the RFE’s transport networks, which will have to rely on domestic expertise if foreign investment is not guaranteed in the coming years.
While an assessment is beyond the scope of this paper, Russia’s infrastructure deficiencies will probably only worsen over time, especially as climate change begins to have a more tangible impact on the RFE. As the Ministry for the Environment and Natural Resources acknowledged in a 2019 report, severe flooding and forest fires are an annual occurrence across the country, and the melting of the permafrost that covers northern Russia means that the construction of railways and roads under more challenging environmental conditions will require significant technological advances.120 Cognizant of this fact, potential investors from Asian countries are likely to hold off from making large-scale commitments until the Russian government formulates a more coherent strategy towards the development of infrastructure – and is able to prove that Russian infrastructure projects are viable.
Although a comparative study has not been conducted in this paper, Russia could learn useful lessons on improving its infrastructure from territories and countries with similar geographical challenges. Alaska, Canada and Finland all have to deal with hostile climates, dispersed populations and interconnectivity problems. Finland in particular has difficulties arising from ageing and poor-quality infrastructure, an overconcentration of the population in urban areas, and sparsely connected rural regions.121 However, the Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communications has established a specific company to develop the railway sector and help manage new major projects, which include the manufacture of new rolling stock and the development of high-speed rail links with neighbouring countries.122
Although the RFE has often been overlooked by Russia’s policymakers as a domestic backwater, this seems likely to change. As recent constitutional reforms indicate, Russia’s regions are likely to become increasingly important as key implementers of Putin’s national projects, which are designed to stimulate economic growth and are in many ways intended as one of his main legacies. Aside from its importance in linking the RFE to Asia, if regional connectivity is not addressed as a priority, then Putin’s legacy could be under threat.
119 Galitskiy, Kh. (2019), ‘Мосты не спрятать: почему конструкции в России рушатся всё чаще’ [No hiding of bridges: Why Russia’s structures are crumbling more often], Izvestiya, 18 March 2019, https://iz.ru/856855/khariton-galitckii/mosty-ne-spriatat-pochemu-konstruktcii-v-rossii-rushatsia-vse-chashche (accessed 18 Feb. 2020).
120 Minprirodi (2019), ‘Доклад о ходе выполнения в 2018 году комплексново плана реализации Климатишеской доктрины Российской Федерации на период до 2020’ [2018 Report on the fulfilment of the comprehensive implementation plan for the Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation up to 2020], 20 March 2019, http://www.mnr.gov.ru/upload/iblock/da1/Доклад%20по%20итогам%202018%20г.pdf (accessed 4 Apr. 2020).
121 Ministry of Transport and Communications Finland (2002), Transport Infrastructure 2030, Meeting the challenges of concentrating population and industrial changes, https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/78399/transport_infrastructure_2030.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 19 Feb. 2020).
122 Railway Gazette (2019), ‘Project company to support Finnish rail reforms’, 4 February 2019, https://www.railwaygazette.com/europe/project-company-to-support-finnish-rail-reforms/47985.article (accessed 20 Feb. 2020).