3. How Is the US Implementing Its Mission in Somalia?
On the political track, US diplomatic engagement has been lacklustre. After officially recognizing the new Somali federal government in 2013, it took another three years for the Obama administration to appoint an ambassador to Somalia (the first since 1991). Subsequently, from 2017, the Trump administration was also slow to fill relevant diplomatic posts, including at the National Security Council and the State Department, where there was only an acting assistant secretary of state for African affairs until July 2018. It was not until November 2018 that the US ambassador took up full-time residence in Somalia, in a new embassy compound, rather than commuting back and forth from Nairobi as had been the routine for US representatives previously.23 In the interim, the then US permanent representative to the UN, Nikki Haley, and AFRICOM commander, General Thomas D. Waldhauser, influenced many of the key political decisions on the Trump administration’s Somalia policy.24 Waldhauser’s successor, General Stephen Townsend, appears to have been similarly influential in policy decisions.
There have not been elections under universal suffrage in Somalia since 1967, except in Somaliland, which has held a number of one-person-one-vote presidential and parliamentary elections.
The US has continued to support improved electoral processes in Somalia. There have not been elections under universal suffrage in Somalia since 1967 (just before the long-standing dictator Siad Barre took power in a coup in 1969), except in Somaliland, which has held a number of one-person-one-vote presidential and parliamentary elections. Instead, there have since the early 2000s (when the TFG was established) been various selection processes whereby different formulations of clan elders and elites have chosen the country’s politicians. In September 2012 the first ‘non-transitional’ federal government was selected by a small group of clan elders and Somali political elites. The next such process for a new FGS took place in late 2016 and early 2017, when some 14,000 Somali traditional elders and clan delegates elected 275 members of parliament and 54 senators. The process was marred, however, by reports of vote buying, intimidation and bribery, and of leading candidates taking money from external actors including Qatar, Turkey and the UAE.25 Notably, in both 2012 and in 2016–17 the incumbent president lost. Democratic (one person, one vote) federal elections have been slated for 2020 or 2021, but – even without the likely impact of the coronavirus pandemic – the prospects of the polls going ahead in 2020 are close to zero, given current security conditions and technical challenges (including voter registration) across much of the country.26 On 27 June 2020 the chair of the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC), Halima Ibrahim, outlined two electoral options to parliament, with elections concluding by March or August 2021 (depending on whether biometric voting was included). In response, some domestic opponents of the FGS criticized this move as an unlawful extension of its term, while most international actors, including the US, supported the delay.27
With regard to humanitarian assistance and foreign aid, the US has been one of Somalia’s biggest donors, making important contributions particularly in response to the major famines and droughts that have afflicted Somalia on a regular basis (see Figure 1).28 Assistance for humanitarian relief and good governance has represented the majority of US aid disbursements to Somalia since 2006, although since 2015 smaller amounts have been disbursed as part of USAID’s transition initiatives for stabilization.29 US humanitarian initiatives have been complicated by domestic counterterrorism legislation that makes it difficult to provide assistance across substantial parts of south-central Somalia – where there is deemed to be a risk that such aid might benefit al-Shabaab. In 2010, however, with a major famine looming, the humanitarian advocacy community persuaded the US and the UN to grant an exception for humanitarian action under the Somalia sanctions regime.30 This meant that relief was able to flow to all areas in need of assistance, including those under al-Shabaab control.
In early 2019 Kenya called for this exception to be revoked, presumably with the aim of reducing al-Shabaab’s access to resources, but the call came amid political tensions with Somalia, notably over the ongoing maritime boundary dispute. Kenya’s proposal would probably have made it much harder to engage in independent, impartial and neutral humanitarian activities in Somalia, and at least initially would have generated considerable uncertainty as to how to comply with any new legal framework. In due course the UN Security Council rejected Kenya’s proposal.31 At present, US contractors and grantees can engage in official assistance activities in Somalia under a system of controls aimed at preventing the diversion of humanitarian aid to prohibited groups or activities.32 Even so, organizations engaged in humanitarian assistance in areas where al-Shabaab are active have to navigate many operational risks and challenges.
On the military track, several hundred US troops are now regularly deployed in Somalia. They operate out of several commands, including AFRICOM, US Army Africa, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, Joint Special Operations Command, as well as a Military Coordination Cell based in Mogadishu since at least 2014. In 2016 the Obama administration moved to expand US military action in Somalia.33 The primary objective was to defend US, AU and some Somali security personnel in parts of Somalia that were not officially considered ‘areas of active hostilities’. The Trump administration went a step further in March 2017, designating parts of Somalia an ‘area of active hostilities’, which gave US military commanders greater leeway in defining targets and approving airstrikes.34 Under these expanded authorities, US troops have continued several longer-standing activities.
Figure 1: US foreign aid (obligations) to Somalia, $million, FY2001–20 (partially reported years 2019–20)
— Source: United States Agency for International Development (2020), ‘U.S. Foreign Aid by Country’, https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/SOM?measure=Obligations&fiscal_year=2019.
Figure 1: US foreign aid (obligations) to Somalia, $million, FY2001–20 (partially reported years 2019–20)
First, the US military and State Department have been involved in providing security force assistance to AMISOM. Since 2006 the US has spent nearly $2 billion on bilateral and multilateral forms of security assistance for AMISOM’s contributing countries.35 This has been in the form of training, equipment and advising programmes – often implemented by contractor firms – as well as the US contributions to the UN Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS), which since 2009 has provided AMISOM with logistical support.
Second, the US has since 2009 provided security force assistance to the SNA, including for tactical engagement for military operations, logistics, medical support and communications capabilities, and institutional reform (including civilian control of the military), as well as stipends to help offset the non-payment of soldiers’ official salaries.36 From 2014, and especially after the suspension of US security assistance for non-mentored SNA units in December 2017, the principal operational focus of US efforts has been the Danab advanced infantry units, which currently stand at about battalion strength.37 As envisaged in Somalia’s new national security architecture, the plan was to build a brigade-sized Danab force of 500 troops in each of the SNA’s sectors by the start of 2018.38 This did not happen, primarily because the Danab struggled to recruit sufficient numbers of soldiers from across Somalia’s regions, and sometimes suffered setbacks when the FGS ordered its units to perform tasks for which they were not prepared. In December 2017 the US government paused security forces assistance to all the non-mentored SNA units (i.e. excluding Danab) citing concerns about corruption. In July 2019, however, after some of these concerns had been allayed, Washington resumed some non-lethal assistance to SNA units engaged in Operation Badbaado with AMISOM in the Lower Shabelle region, southwest of Mogadishu.39 The US also provided information and surveillance support for these operations. Then, in February 2020, the US resumed lethal, direct security assistance to one SNA unit (the EU-trained 143rd battalion) engaged in those operations.40
Third, in addition to assistance packages, US forces have also conducted offensive ground and other kinetic operations, usually in partnership with Somali special forces and Danab units (see Figure 2), targeting important al-Shabaab figures and facilities. So far, two US soldiers have been killed in such operations, and several others injured.41
Broadly speaking, the Obama administration focused on conducting fewer strikes, mostly aimed at high-value targets. While the Trump administration has also targeted such figures, it has conducted many more strikes, often against rank-and-file al-Shabaab fighters – usually when they have threatened US, AMISOM or SNA personnel.
Fourth, since January 2007 the US has used airstrikes against various targets in Somalia. Between 2007 and June 2011 these were conducted by cruise missiles, gunships and attack helicopters. Since then, armed drones have also been used, with the number of US strikes increasing dramatically from 2015 (see Figure 2). Most US strikes have in recent years been conducted in defence of US personnel, in collective defence of AMISOM and SNA troops, or to deny al-Shabaab ‘safe havens’. A smaller number have been offensive strikes designed to kill ‘high-value’ members of al-Shabaab. Broadly speaking, the Obama administration focused on conducting fewer strikes, mostly aimed at high-value targets. While the Trump administration has also targeted such figures, it has conducted many more strikes, often against rank-and-file al-Shabaab fighters – usually when they have threatened US, AMISOM or SNA personnel. In February 2020 an AFRICOM spokesperson described the purpose of US strikes as being ‘to degrade the al-Qaida-aligned group’s ability to recruit, train, and plot terror attacks in Somalia and beyond’.42 Some of these strikes were coordinated out of the Manda Bay base in Kenya, which had been attacked by al-Shabaab forces in the previous month.43
Finally, the US has also been part of an international coalition engaged in various maritime security and counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. Countering sea piracy remains a US objective; although the severity of this problem was reduced significantly over the last five years, it remains a focus of some ongoing international operations.
Figure 2: Declared and alleged US actions in Somalia, 2007–20 (partially reported year 2020)
— Source: AirWars (2020), ‘Declared and alleged US actions in Somalia’, 23 June 2020, https://airwars.org/conflict-data/?belligerent=us-forces&country=somalia.
Figure 2: Declared and alleged US actions in Somalia, 2007–20 (partially reported year 2020)
23 It is worth noting that Ambassador Yamamoto has previous experience in the Horn of Africa, and was the most senior ambassador in the US foreign service at the time of his appointment.
24 Author’s interview with former US official, Washington DC, September 2019.
25 See for example Gettelman, J. (2017), ‘Fueled by bribes, Somalia’s Election Seen as Milestone of Corruption’, New York Times, 7 February 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/world/africa/somalia-election-corruption.html; Marqaati (2017), Somalia State of Accountability 2016, 7 February 2017, https://marqaati.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Marqaati-2016-Corruption-Report.pdf.
26 Under the terms of the new (but controversial) electoral legislation that was signed into law in February 2020, Somalis will vote directly for political parties, with seats in the federal legislature allocated according to each party’s share of the votes cast. The next president will then be voted on by the members of the federal parliament, and, in turn, the new president will select the prime minister. Hassan, M. O. (2020), ‘Somali President Signs Historic Election Bill Into Law’, Voice of America, 21 February 2020, https://www.voanews.com/africa/somali-president-signs-historic-election-bill-law.
27 See Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (2020), Finding a Way Out of Somalia’s Manmade Electoral Crisis, 1 July 2020, http://www.heritageinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/HIPS-commentary.pdf.
28 By way of comparison with other donors, OECD data suggest that from 2011 Somalia was receiving between $1 billion and $1.3 billion annually in total overseas development assistance. Office of the Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Somalia (2017), Aid Flows in Somalia: Analysis of aid flow data, Office of the Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Somalia Aid Coordination Unit, April 2017, p. 5, https://www.undp.org/content/dam/unct/somalia/docs/publications/Aid%20Flows%20Booklet%20FINAL.pdf.
29 For details, see United States Agency for International Development (2020), ‘Transition Initiatives for Stabilization + (TIS+)’, 10 March 2020, https://www.usaid.gov/somalia/fact-sheets/transition-initiatives-stabilization-tis-somalia.
30 ‘The obligations imposed on Member States … shall not apply to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia, by the United Nations, its specialized agencies or programmes, humanitarian organizations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly that provide humanitarian assistance, or their implementing partners.’ UN Security Council (2010), ‘Resolution 1916: The situation in Somalia’, S/RES/1916, 19 March 2010, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1916. It has been renewed annually e.g. in Resolution 2444 (2018).
31 See Baeder, L. (2019), ‘A Small Victory for Somalis at the UN Security Council Blocks Measure Jeopardizing Aid’, Human Rights Watch, 4 September 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/04/small-victory-somalis-un#.
32 U.S. Department of the Treasury (2020), ‘OFAC FAQs: Other Sanctions Programs’, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/sanctions/pages/faq_other.aspx#somalia.
33 Savage, C., Schmitt, E. and Mazzetti, M. (2016), ‘Obama Expands War With Al Qaeda to Include Shabab in Somalia’, New York Times, 27 November 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/27/us/politics/obama-expands-war-with-al-qaeda-to-include-shabab-in-somalia.html.
34 Savage, C. and Schmitt, E. (2017), ‘Trump Eases Combat Rules in Somalia Intended to Protect Civilians’, New York Times, 30 March 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/world/africa/trump-is-said-to-ease-combat-rules-in-somalia-designed-to-protect-civilians.html.
35 See Congressional Research Service (2015), ‘Statement of Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Specialist in African Affairs, Congressional Research Service, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health’, 4 June 2015, p. 2, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/060415_Blanchard_Testimony.pdf; and author’s calculations. AMISOM’s troop-contributing countries have been Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia.
36 Between 2010 and May 2017, the US obligated approximately $66 million for SNA stipend-related activities. Cited in Williams, P. D. (2020), ‘Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of Failure, 2008-2018’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 43(3): pp. 366–391, doi:10.1080/01402390.2019.1575210.
37 Williams, P. D. (2018), Fighting for Peace in Somalia, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.245–6; and Rempfer, K. (2019), ‘Lightning Brigade’, The Military Times, 27 March 2019, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2019/03/27/lightning-brigade-training-advanced-infantry-not-airstrikes-is-africoms-primary-effort-in-somalia/.
38 London Conference on Somalia (2017), Security Pact, 11 May 2017, p. 6, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/613720/london-somalia-conference-2017-security-pact.pdf. Although this did not happen, efforts continue to expand Danab forces, including by training additional companies in Kismayo and Galkayo, and by also referring to some Turkish-trained SNA ‘Eagle’ battalions as Danab.
39 For an overview of these operations, see Williams, P. D. (2019), ‘Stabilisation 2.0? Insights from the Somali and African Union operations in Lower Shabelle’, Wavell Room, 3 December 2019, https://wavellroom.com/2019/12/03/stabilization-2-0-insights-somali-african-union-operations-lower-shabelle/.
40 U.S. Embassy in Somalia (2020), ‘United States Restarts Limited Direct Assistance to the Somali National Army’.
41 The two US soldiers were killed in May 2017 and in June 2018.
42 Snow, S. (2020), ‘Record breaking US airstrikes pushing al-Shabab fighters into urban areas’, Military Times, 20 February 2020, https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2020/02/20/record-breaking-us-airstrikes-pushing-al-shabab-fighters-into-urban-areas/.
43 For details, see United States Africa Command (2020), ‘U.S. Africa Command Investigation Update: Al-Shabaab Attack in Manda Bay, Kenya’, US Africa Command Public Affairs, Stuttgart, 23 January 2020, https://www.africa-newsroom.com/press/us-africa-command-investigation-update-alshabaab-attack-in-manda-bay-kenya. In response, the US deployed the 101st Airborne’s 3rd Brigade Combat Team, a unit assigned to AFRICOM for crisis response, to Kenya.