4. Is US Policy Working in Somalia?
Opinions vary greatly on the degree to which – if at all – US policy in Somalia has had any positive impact. Supporters of the current approach argue that US diplomatic, humanitarian and military actions have made a terrible situation somewhat better.44 This has been encapsulated in the idea that Somalia is now a ‘fragile’ rather than a ‘failed’ state. They point to the many negative legacies of over two decades of state collapse in Somalia, and claim that, for all its shortcomings, AMISOM’s successes and progress in improving the SNA mean that al-Shabaab no longer pose an existential threat to the government, as was the case in 2009. Moreover, since 2012 the pillars of a federal system of government for south-central Somalia have been established – i.e. the FGS and the FMS. In 2017 the Somali authorities finally agreed on a new national security architecture, which was endorsed at the London Conference in the form of the Security Pact.45 This provided the first blueprint and roadmap for how the Somali security sector should be organized and function. Moreover, although al-Shabaab continue to conduct many deadly attacks against Somali officials and civilians as well as international personnel, it is no longer the dominant political force in south-central Somalia, and controls less of the country’s population than a decade ago.46
In contrast, critics of US policy argue that its focus on re-establishing a central government in Somalia and its support for the 2006 Ethiopian intervention contributed directly to turning al-Shabaab from a small extremist faction into a powerful insurgency.47 From this perspective, US policy supported a largely ineffective and corrupt government that was sustained by external actors and often harmed Somali civilians, either through violence or extortion. This had two major negative effects. First, it strengthened local perceptions of the central government as a predatory entity, which, in turn, encouraged the subsequent regional administrations to push for greater autonomy. Second, it strengthened al-Shabaab’s propaganda machine and recruitment base.
Today, critics point out that the Trump administration views Somalia primarily through a counterterrorism lens, albeit with additional – often forced – rhetoric about ‘great power competition’ in Africa. The White House relies too heavily on airstrikes and special operations forces to eliminate al-Shabaab leaders, despite successive AFRICOM commanders and diplomats emphasizing that reforms to promote good governance hold the key to dealing with groups such as al-Shabaab.48 The bottom line is that US military actions have failed to blunt al-Shabaab’s ability to attack Somalis and international personnel using a combination of asymmetric tactics – including ambushes, IEDs, suicide commando raids and assassinations – and more conventional assaults on forward-operating bases. Nor have they curbed al-Shabaab’s ability to launch significant terror attacks abroad, as demonstrated by the attack on the DusitD2 hotel in Nairobi in January 2019 and regular smaller-scale attacks on civilians in northeast Kenya.49 In September 2019 al-Shabaab attacked the US base at Baledogle, not far from Mogadishu, with a huge vehicle-borne IED. And in January 2020 the group launched its first attack on a military base outside Somalia, at Manda Bay in Kenya, from which US forces conduct a number of their air operations. Ultimately, critics of the US’s present policy call for it to disengage militarily from Somalia in order to make way for what the country really needs: grassroots-led political reconciliation.
What, then, is the balance sheet for US policy on both the political and military tracks? On the political track, arguably Washington’s biggest problem is the lack of substantive agreement and genuine cooperation between the FGS and the FMS. This has made it very difficult to achieve US goals, in that it has revealed that the primary US objective of reducing the threat from al-Shabaab is not the top priority of Somalia’s key political leaders. As General Townsend put it, ‘political friction between the Federal Government of Somalia and Somali Federal Member States threatens to distract Mogadishu from the fight’.50 So too, for several FMS,51 and Somalia’s intended federal elections (through which a new president will be chosen) will only distract them further. In sum, while Washington’s priority is to reduce the threat of al-Shabaab and transnational terrorism, most of Somalia’s political leaders have been more concerned with fending off local political – often clan-based – opponents. This has meant that they have often been reluctant to work together to defeat al-Shabaab. To complicate the situation still further, neighbouring Ethiopia and Kenya have backed rival political leaders in some of Somalia’s regional administrations, such as Jubaland, and this has intensified domestic divisions.52
While Washington’s priority is to reduce the threat of al-Shabaab and transnational terrorism, most of Somalia’s political leaders have been more concerned with fending off local political – often clan-based – opponents.
In order to make real progress, the US (along with other international partners) should push for an agreement between the FGS and the FMS made up of two elements. First, in the short term, a deal needs to be reached on a viable model for the federal elections intended for 2020 or 2021 (with the latter now looking more likely). Such a breakthrough could pave the way for the constitution to be finalized, which would signal that Somali political elites had finally reached a workable consensus on how to define a federal system of government, including clarity on the respective roles of the FGS and the FMS. Second, there needs to be a detailed plan to operationalize and implement a comprehensive security strategy for Somalia, which will require a rethink of the federal government’s 2018 Transition Plan.53 To date, however, the leaders of Somalia’s political units have not reconciled with one another, and thus have not been pursuing a coordinated agenda to weaken al-Shabaab.54
One positive recent development for the federal government is the growing levels of support and financing it has received from the World Bank and the IMF. This has included disbursed aid to particular government programmes, including in the security sector, and, most recently, the declaration that Somalia is eligible for significant debt relief.55 In the longer term, if properly accounted for and distributed transparently, the new injection of financial resources to the FGS might provide some incentive for the FMS to cooperate with it. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent any such assistance from the Bretton Woods institutions may offset funds given to some Somali politicians by rival Gulf states as part of ongoing efforts to gain leverage in the region.56
On the other hand, increased resources for the FGS could simply increase its ability to dominate FMS administrations. Arguments between the FGS and the FMS are frequent, and sometimes even bloody – as has recently been the case in federal–regional standoffs in both Galmudug and Jubaland. In one instance, in late 2018 the FGS, with support from Ethiopian soldiers, arrested Mukhtar Robow, a former al-Shabaab senior figure who by this time was a leading candidate for the presidency of Southwest state, thus forcibly removing him from the electoral process. This example underscores some of the major political problems that have yet to be addressed as to how the Somali authorities might deal with al-Shabaab in the absence of a peace process. Moreover, the fact that the FGS subsequently expelled the head of the UN Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), who had raised legitimate concerns about the use of force against civilians in the Robow affair, highlights the government’s intolerance of criticism. Robow’s evident popularity among ordinary people in Southwest state also served to demonstrate that previous connections to al-Shabaab are not the crucial determinant of local support. Indeed, in some parts of Somalia al-Shabaab’s ability to dispense ‘justice’ through its informal courts is seen as more legitimate and effective than either the federal or regional authorities.
There are also considerable problems to be overcome on the military track. The main difficulty for the US is that of achieving a decisive victory over al-Shabaab, because military power alone cannot defeat an organization with many ‘faces’ – variously a social movement, a pseudo-government and a transnational criminal network, alongside elements of a more traditional insurgency.57 In tandem with AMISOM and some SNA activities, US strikes have delivered some positive operational and tactical gains. First, a number of al-Shabaab leaders have been captured or killed, creating some (albeit short-lived) operational disruption. Second, rank-and-file al-Shabaab forces have become increasingly worried about US airstrikes, and this has affected their freedom of movement and ability to muster for large attacks.58 US strikes are also important because they provide AMISOM and the SNA with a capability to strike al-Shabaab from depth and to defend their own forces.59
But these tactical benefits have not altered the strategic terrain, and US operations have sometimes backfired. Al-Shabaab have essentially weathered the comparative storm of airstrikes, have continued to make regular assaults on Mogadishu, and have retained most areas of territorial influence since 2016. There are also reports that al-Shabaab continue to operate a very effective underground extortion of businesses in Mogadishu.60 Building effective Somali security forces also remains behind schedule, with huge problems stemming from historical legacies of state collapse, clan politics, corruption, and a host of technical challenges.61 As a result, there still isn’t anything close to an effective national army. Most reliable assessments suggest that the SNA has an operational force of about 5,000 troops – a similar number to most estimates of al-Shabaab’s own fighting strength62 – and these personnel have widely varying levels of skills, and possess different types of equipment, depending on who was responsible for their training.63 This figure is all the more troubling given that tens of thousands of Somali fighters have received some form of military training from external actors over the last decade, with many having subsequently deserted or defected.64
Building effective Somali security forces remains behind schedule, with huge problems stemming from historical legacies of state collapse, clan politics, corruption, and a host of technical challenges.
The FGS has attempted to overcome these problems through various mechanisms, including replacing the SNA’s senior leadership, registering personnel more effectively through biometric forms of identification, and a new system for electronic payment of salaries, as well as paying greater attention to transitioning inactive soldiers by providing pensions and gratuities to enable retirement. However, it appears that most of the frequent leadership changes in the SNA and the intelligence services have been both politically motivated and somewhat haphazard. Furthermore, the recent clashes in Gedo, Galmudug and Baidoa suggest that the FGS has also prioritized fighting against certain FMS over the war against al-Shabaab. Clearly therefore, technical improvements will not produce effective forces if the FGS and FMS cannot resolve the fundamental issues of authority, financing, and command and control.
Finally, and probably most visible of all in terms of media and political discourse, have been controversies surrounding US airstrikes and offensive ground operations. Key issues raised about US strikes in Somalia have included AFRICOM’s earlier tendency to acknowledge strikes only after an explicit request for information; the failure of US officials to consistently provide fatality or casualty estimates, including for civilians; and the fact that strikes conducted by the CIA may go completely unacknowledged.65 The issue of civilian casualties has been particularly sensitive in the context of the increased number of strikes conducted under the Trump administration. Such deaths – seldom acknowledged by the US military – are often reported in Somali media, leading to some animosity from civilians who fear they will themselves become accidental victims of attacks.
Box 2: A case for negotiating an end to Somalia’s civil war
Both the FGS and al-Shabaab are reluctant to negotiate peace. Each hopes to endure the current stalemate better than the other, and perhaps make enough gains to compel their opponent to compromise from a position of weakness. Overall, however, the arguments for pursuing negotiations are more persuasive than those for not doing so.
There are four main reasons to pursue negotiations. First, a decisive victory is likely to prove elusive. Scholars agree that civil wars have broadly three possible futures: victory, negotiated settlement, or prolonged stalemate.66 And in the case of Somalia specifically, most analysts see victory as unlikely. As concluded by one former US official: ‘The inability to decisively defeat al-Shabaab leaves only negotiated settlement or prolonged fighting and the certainty of continued terrorist activity as plausible near-term outcomes to the ongoing conflict.’67 A Somali scholar reached a similar conclusion: ‘Without negotiating with Al-Shabaab, it is unlikely that the conflict will end but likely that Al-Shabaab will continue controlling the remote rural areas outside of the center.’68
Second, recent academic research has emphasized the importance of policy choices, concluding that civil wars tend to end the way key external actors think they should end.69 Hence, it matters whether important external actors such as the US promote or denounce the idea of peace talks in Somalia. Critically, however, the details of how to negotiate should not be determined by external actors.
Third, negotiations could avoid an even longer, more costly war – in terms of human lives, damage to infrastructure and the environment, financial losses, and opportunity costs.70
Fourth, negotiations might work, at least for some elements of al-Shabaab, and would be worth pursuing given the huge costs of ‘business as usual’. As Stig Hansen argued in 2013, negotiating with al-Shabaab ‘is a challenging task; and it should not be believed that the whole of the organization could be included in any negotiated solution, but it might be worth an attempt’.71
Moreover, the main arguments against the FGS pursuing negotiations are weak. First, the claim that negotiations will be likely to fail is unduly fatalistic. Negotiations in civil conflict have a good general track record worldwide, and have already taken place with al-Shabaab over specific issues such as the release of Kenyan prisoners of war72 and ensuring the safety of the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa.73 The FGS has also negotiated with senior al-Shabaab defectors such as Ahmed Madobe (the current president of Jubaland), Mukhtar Robow and Hassan Dir Aweys. While none of these cases has produced ‘ideal’ outcomes from the perspective of either the FGS or most international actors, the results are arguably significantly better than the status quo ante.
Second, the argument that the ‘international community’ has ‘closed any door for negotiation with al-Shabaab’ is not persuasive, because most international partners will likely follow the FGS lead on this issue.74 The often- declared principle that ‘we don’t negotiate with terrorists’ can be quickly dismissed. Refusal to negotiate with ‘terrorists’ is not a law of warfare: it is a public diplomacy tool for political leaders that holds true only until it doesn’t. With regard to ethical concerns about al-Shabaab’s use of terror tactics, transitional justice mechanisms could be built into any peace settlement.
Finally, the current legal restrictions that some states, including the US, place on what economic means might be used to incentivize al-Shabaab to come to the negotiating table could be addressed, especially once negotiations begin in earnest.
Negotiations offer the most viable way to break the longstanding stalemate and end the civil war in Somalia. Box 2 summarizes the main reasons why. At best, therefore, US military strikes could bring pressure to bear on al-Shabaab – or at least on major parts of the group – to negotiate peace with the Somali authorities. At worst, any tactical benefits from continued strikes will be outweighed by the boost civilian casualties can give to al-Shabaab recruitment, and their effect on undermining support from the Somali people for the FGS, the US and AMISOM.
The immediate policy challenge facing the FGS and FMS, the US and other partners is thus twofold. First, encouraging more of al-Shabaab’s rank and file to reject their irreconcilable leaders and instead align themselves with those who support talks, or leave the organization altogether. The latter would require far greater effort to engage those clan leaders who are currently working pragmatically with al-Shabaab, as well as addressing the major drivers of al-Shabaab’s recruitment of fighters.75 Second, persuading more of al-Shabaab’s senior figures that negotiations are a reasonable way forward.
44 For a generally positive assessment of US policy in Somalia, see Jones, S. G., Liepman, A. M. and Chandler, N. (2016), Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Assessing the Campaign Against Al Shabaab, RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1539.html.
45 London Conference on Somalia (2017), Security Pact.
46 For example, al-Shabaab conducted approximately 300 IED attacks in Somalia in 2016, 400 in 2017, and 500 in 2018. This is in addition to its commando raids, suicide bombings, ambushes of convoys, and attacks on AU and Somali forward-operating bases. United Nations Mine Action Service (2018), UNMAS in Somalia: 2018 Annual Report, p. 6, https://unsos.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unmas_annual_report_2018sml.pdf.
47 For a generally critical assessment of US policy in Somalia, see Suri, S. (2016), “Barbed wire on our heads”: Lessons from counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding in Somalia, Saferworld, January 2016, https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1032-barbed-wire-on-our-heads.
48 See for example United States Africa Command (2020), ‘U.S. Africa Command 2020 Posture Statement’, pp. 5–7.
49 Bryden, M. and Bahra, P. (2019), ‘East Africa’s Terrorist Triple Helix’, CTC Sentinel, 12(6): pp. 1–11, https://ctc.usma.edu/east-africas-terrorist-triple-helix-dusit-hotel-attack-historical-evolution-jihadi-threat/.
50 U.S. Africa Command (2020), ‘U.S. Africa Command 2020 Posture Statement’.
51 See Bryden, M. (2020), ‘Guerres par procuration en Somalie: qui manipule qui?’ [Somalia’s Proxy Wars: Who is Manipulating Whom?], Diplomatie, Les Grands Dossiers No.54: pp.76–77, https://www.areion24.news/produit/les-grands-dossiers-de-diplomatie-n-54/.
52 The role of regional players in Somalia is one of the keys to understanding (and influencing) the future of FGS–FMS relations. Jubaland’s President Ahmed Madobe has been a long-time ally of Kenya, which has supported his push for regional autonomy in order to maintain a buffer on the Kenya–Somalia border. Under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia has since 2018 supported Mogadishu’s desire for a more centralized governance structure, prompted in part by concerns about insecurity in its own Somali region. Kiruga, M. (2019), ‘Jubaland election results mired by conflicting regional interests’, The Africa Report, 23 August 2019, https://www.theafricareport.com/16524/jubaland-election-results-mired-by-conflicting-regional-interests/.
53 For a relevant discussion, see Blyth, F. (2019), Transitioning to National Forces in Somalia: More Than an Exit for AMISOM, International Peace Institute, April 2019, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/1904_Transitioning-in-Somalia.pdf.
54 These issues are unlikely to be substantively resolved until after Somalia’s presidential (s)election process. Nevertheless, some attempts to reconcile the FGS and the FMS continue. See for example U.S. Embassy in Somalia (2020), ‘Statement by the United States Calling for a Meeting Between the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States’, 10 June 2020, https://so.usembassy.gov/statement-by-the-united-states-calling-for-a-meeting-between-the-federal-government-of-somalia-and-federal-member-states/.
55 See, respectively, World Bank (2017), Somalia – Security and justice sector public expenditure review, World Bank, February 2017, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/644671486531571103/Somalia-Security-and-justice-sector-public-expenditure-review; and International Monetary Fund (2020), ‘IMF and World Bank Consider Somalia Eligible for Assistance Under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative’.
56 International Crisis Group (2018), Somalia and the Gulf Crisis, Africa Report no.260, 5 June 2018, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/260-somalia-and-gulf-crisis.
57 For overviews of al-Shabaab, see Maruf, H. and Joseph, D. (2018), Inside Al-Shabaab, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press; and Harper, M. (2019), Everything You Have Told Me Is True: The Many Faces of Al-Shabaab, London: Hurst.
58 Hiraal Institute (2018), ‘Al-Shabaab’s Military Machine’, December 2018, https://hiraalinstitute.org/al-shababs-military-machine/.
59 AMISOM did not have any of its own military helicopters until December 2016, when it received three Kenyan military helicopters that operated in only two of the mission’s sectors. AMISOM was slated to receive four Ugandan military helicopters in December 2019, but these remained delayed as of June 2020.
60 See for example Schaap, V. F. and Werner, C. (2017), ‘The business of fear in boomtown Mogadishu’, Der Spiegel, 27 October 2017, https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-business-and-violence-driving-the-boom-in-mogadishu-a-1174243.html; and Makori, A. (2020), ‘Al-Shabaab expands tax empire in Mogadishu under government control’, Garowe Online, 16 February 2020, https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/somalia-al-shabaab-expands-tax-empire-in-mogadishu-under-govt-control.
61 Williams (2020), ‘Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of Failure’.
62 A recent US Inspector General report noted that while most estimates suggest there are 5,000–7,000 al-Shabaab fighters, the Defense Intelligence Agency recently estimated there could be as many as 10,000. Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress (2020), East Africa and North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operations, p. 20.
63 Author’s communications with AU, UN and US officials.
64 Williams (2020), ‘Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of Failure’.
65 Amnesty International has provided the most thorough independent assessment of the level of civilian casualties caused by US operations, although its researchers were only able to examine a small number of strikes that occurred for a limited time period in Lower Shabelle region. Amnesty International (2019), The Hidden US War in Somalia, March 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr52/9952/2019/en/. See also Goldbaum, C. (2017), ‘Strong evidence that US special operations forces massacred civilians in Somalia’, The Daily Beast, 29 November 2017, https://www.thedailybeast.com/strong-evidence-that-us-special-operations-forces-massacred-civilians-in-somalia; Sperber, A. (2019), ‘Inside the secretive US air campaign in Somalia’, The Nation, 7 February 2019, https://www.thenation.com/article/somalia-secret-air-campaign/; Turse, N. (2020), ‘New data shows the US military is severely undercounting civilian casualties in Somalia’, The Intercept, 25 February 2020, https://theintercept.com/2020/02/25/africom-airstrikes-somalia/.
66 See, for example, Toft, M. (2010), ‘Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory’, International Security, 34(4): pp. 7–36, doi:10.1162/isec.2010.34.4.7; Nathan, L. and Toft, M. (2011), ‘Correspondence’ International Security, 36(1): pp. 202–10, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41289693.
67 Hartwig, J. (2019), ‘How to end the civil war in Somalia: Negotiate with al-Shabaab’, War on the Rocks, 13 May 2019, https://warontherocks.com/
2019/05/how-to-end-the-civil-war-in-somalia-negotiate-with-al-shabaab/.
68 Ingiriis, M. H. (2018), ‘Building peace from the margins in Somalia: The case for political settlement with Al-Shabaab’, Contemporary Security Policy, 39(4): pp. 512–536, doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2018.1429751.
69 Howard, L. and Stark, A. (2018), ‘How civil wars end: The international system, norms, and the role of external actors’, International Security, 42(3): pp. 127–71, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00305.
70 See for example Ingiriis (2018), ‘Building peace from the margins in Somalia’, pp. 514, 527.
71 Hansen (2013), Al-Shabaab in Somalia, p. 142.
72 Ingiriis (2018), ‘Building peace from the margins in Somalia’, p. 526.
73 Admittedly, the details of the South African–al-Shabaab dialogue on this issue are hazy. See Hansen (2013), Al-Shabaab in Somalia, p. 96.
74 See Ingiriis (2018), ‘Building peace from the margins in Somalia’, p. 526.
75 Such as underlying political and economic grievances, and ideological, social, and cultural issues, among other push and pull factors.