5. What Future for US Engagement in Somalia?
There are, broadly, three plausible scenarios for the future of US engagement in Somalia:
Status quo
In this scenario, the US continues along much the same path as now, and is stuck investing more resources in a stalemated war. On the political track, the prospects for achieving genuine reconciliation between Somalia’s elites and resolving tensions between the centre and regions remain slim, particularly in the run-up to the federal elections through which a new president will be selected (probably sometime in 2021). Greater numbers of Somalis suspect that the US is too willing to support FGS domination of the regions through manipulated electoral processes and forcibly preventing opposition candidates gaining power. As a result, the chances of arriving at a finalized national constitution and a path to operationalize a new security strategy for the FGS and the FMS look remote.
On the military track, the bulk of US resources deployed to – and in support of operations in – Somalia continue to be directed at supporting AMISOM’s counterterrorism operations against al-Shabaab, and to a much lesser degree the Islamic State in Somalia. This would include maintaining a high tempo of US airstrikes and some targeted ground operations, as well as a continuation of the resumption of security force assistance for the SNA and Somali police – starting with those engaged in joint operations with AMISOM. It remains an open question as to whether the US would or should directly support ‘regional forces’ in Somalia (i.e. the largely clan-based militias and paramilitary forces that have not been officially integrated into the SNA).76 However, certain other factors might undermine the case for the US maintaining a ‘business as usual’ approach on Somalia. Notably, US policy may be undermined if AMISOM’s continued drawdown accelerates dramatically; if the EU significantly cuts its financial support for the mission following Brexit and the envisaged ending of the African Peace Facility commitments after 2021; or if other external actors assumed the role of Somalia’s principal security partner.
Negotiations
A second scenario involves the US exercising considerably more diplomatic and political muscle in order to conclude the two deals outlined in this paper. First, the US would work to build a coalition of international partners with the common goal of facilitating a deal whereby the FGS and FMS would reconcile, agree on a new comprehensive security strategy and prioritize the fight against al-Shabaab. Securing such an arrangement would probably entail the US placing significant conditions on continued security force assistance, airstrikes and debt relief, in order to push the FGS to initiate this process. Ideally, this would see the FGS – either before or after the upcoming (s)election process – accept that it does not have the power to consistently dominate outcomes in the FMS.
Under this scenario, the administration in Mogadishu would accept a political status more in line with its real power projection capabilities. The US, for its part, would treat the FGS and the FMS more even-handedly, recognizing the sovereignty of the national government as defined by the provisional constitution, but also that none of these political administrations has the legitimacy of being elected by democratic (one person, one vote) elections. A new power-sharing agreement concluded between the FGS and the FMS would be a real opportunity to establish a genuine federal system of government across south-central Somalia, based on a more realistic assessment of power dynamics across the region. It would also open up an opportunity to conduct more unified – and hence more effective – cross-sector military operations against al-Shabaab.
Even with a revitalized deal between the FGS and the FMS, there is no quick and clear path to decisive victory over al-Shabaab.
Even with a revitalized deal between the FGS and the FMS, however, there is no quick and clear path to decisive victory over al-Shabaab. The US would therefore also support the principle of negotiations between the Somali authorities and al-Shabaab. This would raise a long list of complicated issues and questions, including whether negotiations could be concluded by the FGS alone, or only in partnership with the FMS; whether there should be preconditions; whether there should be phased or ‘back-channel’ talks, perhaps targeting particular clan representatives within al-Shabaab; what role would clan leaders have in such talks; whether the US would play a public or a behind-the-scenes role in the talks; and what other countries, if any, should be involved in the process.
It would remain to be seen whether the start of peace talks with al-Shabaab would attract important regional supporters, or whether some external actors might emerge as would-be spoilers. The response of leaders in Ethiopia, Kenya, Turkey, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar would be particularly salient. As for the US, it is unlikely to follow the approach adopted in Afghanistan, where Washington engaged in direct negotiations with the Taliban separately from the Afghan government.
In the meantime, the US would continue its current support to AMISOM, and be open to imposing more conditionalities on security force assistance to the SNA if its corruption concerns are not addressed. In the event of dialogue starting between the Somali authorities and al-Shabaab, Washington could signal a conditional ceasefire, and make clear that it would use airstrikes and other kinetic operations only for collective self-defence against insurgent attacks.
Disengagement
A third scenario involves a significant degree of US disengagement from Somalia, prompted by Washington concluding that al-Shabaab do not pose a major threat to its national security interests. Under this scenario, although AFRICOM continues to voice concerns about the threat posed by al-Shabaab, the general downgrading of the post-9/11 ‘war on terror’ and the Pentagon’s pivot to a focus on great power competition would see the US’s engagement in Africa diminish across the continent. As part of this shift, Washington would decide to ramp down its kinetic operations in Somalia, arguing that they were too costly and that their political impact was minimal because Somali political elites continually refused to reconcile and focus on combating al-Shabaab. Corruption and political in-fighting would also continue to wreck the chances of building effective Somali national security forces. As Washington disengaged, the FGS would turn increasingly to Turkey, and to a lesser extent the EU, for its security force assistance. The war against al-Shabaab would remain at best stalemated. However, if US disengagement came at the same time as a weakened or significantly drawn-down AMISOM, then an al-Shabaab surge would be more likely. And if, under such a scenario, the US continued to focus on its other priorities, the likelihood would be that Washington would maintain limited political engagement and a reduced degree of humanitarian assistance, but with the Somalia file deprioritized and US diplomats lacking any serious leverage to shape local outcomes.
A way forward
Pursuing negotiations while preparing for other negative contingencies is the most prudent course of action for the US in Somalia. This will require a recalibration of US resources that emphasizes sustained high-level political leadership to help forge the necessary negotiated settlements. Greater willingness to place significant conditions on kinetic operations, security force assistance and even debt relief may also be needed to catalyse a reconciliation process between the FGS, the FMS and other relevant political actors.
Of course, this scenario is not without its pitfalls. Nor is it likely to occur before the federal elections through which Somalia’s next president will be selected – or indeed ahead of the upcoming US presidential election. But the plausible alternatives are worse. More than a decade of ‘business as usual’ has not stabilized Somalia, and there is little prospect of existing policies producing radical change. Rapid US disengagement would raise significant moral issues given the level of sunk costs and huge sacrifices made by AU and Somali security forces. It would also undermine elements of US military support that have proved critical to the operational effectiveness of elements of both AMISOM and the SNA. Without AMISOM, even the limited progress of the last decade might be lost, and the FGS would be less able to withstand sustained al-Shabaab assaults or significantly recover the territory it currently controls.
76 For an overview, see Felbab-Brown, V. (2020), ‘The Problem with Militias in Somalia’, in Day, A., Felbab-Brown, V. and Haddad, F. (2020), Hybrid Conflict, Hybrid Peace, New York: United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, pp.112–146, https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/post/3895/HybridConflictFullReport.pdf.