While some chiefs have challenged the implementation of SRAs in accordance with the new regulations, district forest officers have reported positive changes in the attitude of many chiefs. For example, in Juaso Forest District, communities were included in recent SRA negotiations, whereas for the preceding 20 years these had taken place between the companies and the paramount chief. Similarly, in Nkawie Forest District, the Chiraayaso community has signed an SRA following 27 years during which the traditional authority had dominated the SRA process; and in Bekwai Forest District, chiefs have begun supporting community access to SRA payments.
Improved transparency of forest sector data has been an important factor in bringing about improvements in the implementation of SRAs, through providing a clear basis for negotiations between communities and companies, and in making the capture of SRA payments by traditional authorities more difficult. Clarification of the legal requirements for SRAs regarding the roles, responsibilities and rights of the various parties has also been important, resulting in more transparent and equitable negotiation processes. Civil society played an important role in pushing for these reforms, documenting the lack of implementation and subsequently working with the Forestry Commission to develop guidelines. It also worked closely with communities, building their capacity to enable them to negotiate effectively for their rights. Thus, the Forestry Commission has been fulfilling its role of providing support to communities and overseeing negotiations; and communities have been able to assert their rights to negotiate these agreements, rather than the traditional authorities.
Underlying this process has been the political commitment of the Forestry Commission. This has resulted in an increase in the budget allocation in support of SRA implementation and the establishment of management systems to encourage this, including active monitoring of SRAs. There was reportedly some initial scepticism among officials at the district level that SRA implementation would be improved; however, the national government’s commitment to the VPA process has proved to be a significant factor in driving reform.
Long-term impact
As with the previous case study, the VPA has been a critical factor in the changes seen. It opened up space for governance reforms while the desire within the Forestry Commission to begin the licensing of legal timber for export has helped to boost the momentum for these. The resulting legal reforms, training and transparency improvements have all helped to establish a system in which many of the stakeholders have seen benefits – for example, reduced conflict between communities and companies; increased funding for infrastructure within communities; and improved legal compliance (with respect to the requirement to implement SRAs) by companies. The fact that there have been multiple beneficiaries should make these changes more robust. The multidimensional nature of the reforms also makes it less likely that the improvements seen will be short-lived.
As progress has been made with the SRA system, CSOs have continued to work on this issue, seeking to build on the advances made. To improve monitoring of the SRAs, CSOs are currently collaborating with the Forestry Commission to develop a database of SRAs, ultimately to be linked to the WTS public portal (see the previous case study). As of the end of 2019, 11 forest districts out of 36 in the high forest zone, have provided data on SRAs to the RMSC, including information on how communities have decided to use SRA payments. It is possible that further improvements in transparency will facilitate closer monitoring of SRAs by communities as well as by CSOs. Better monitoring should in turn encourage continued progress with the implementation of these agreements.
Case study 3. Enforcement gains in Cameroon through civil society-led forest monitoring
The change in accountability
In 2015, a group of CSOs that were engaged in independent forest monitoring (IFM) launched the Standardized System of External Independent Observation (Système normalisé d’observation indépendante externe; SNOIE). SNOIE provides a rigorous approach for civil society to investigate and report infractions in the forest sector.
This system has enabled CSOs to advocate more effectively for government enforcement as indicated by an increase in responses to reported cases of non-compliance. Thus, this case study focuses on changes in how civil society has sought to strengthen social accountability through more effective participation, rather than on changes in transparency, although the latter has been an important enabling factor.
Background
IFM has been running in Cameroon since 2000. Initially the government and donors contracted one organization at a time to undertake IFM (although national CSOs were also carrying out independent investigations into illegal practices in parallel). Government contracts ceased from 2013, and instead the role was taken on by a number of national CSOs. The importance of IFM was formally recognized in the country’s VPA, in which it is listed as one of the sources of information that can be used for auditing the national timber legality assurance system. Nonetheless, IFM was repeatedly criticized and contested by the private sector and by the government; the private sector doubted the neutrality and objectivity of IFM reports, while the government questioned their quality. In fact, there was some basis to these criticisms: non-standardized methods were used by the various CSOs engaged in forest monitoring and reporting was similarly varied.
The civil society response to this predicament, led by the non-governmental organization FODER (Forêts et Développement Rural), was to devise a standardized system, SNOIE. This aims to provide independent, documented evidence in a systematic and consistent way and use this as a basis for demanding government accountability. The theory of change envisaged by the SNOIE assumes that more robust civil society forest monitoring will result in improved engagement with government and stronger advocacy, which in turn will lead to increased transparency and an improved enforcement response by the government. This will strengthen the IFM system, and so maintain the change cycle.
The process of increasing transparency and participation
The effectiveness of IFM depends on transparency and cooperation between civil society and enforcement officials in Cameroon’s Ministry of Forests and Wildlife (MINFOF). Thus, much of the functionality of IFM depends on access to information – for example, on the permits allocated, and logging volumes or harvest areas approved so that the compliance of operators can be checked. Furthermore, it requires the authorities to review the findings of investigations and to respond to these.
The effectiveness of IFM depends on transparency and cooperation between civil society and enforcement officials in Cameroon’s Ministry of Forests and Wildlife. Thus, much of the functionality of IFM depends on access to information.
Since the VPA between Cameroon and the EU was signed in 2010, MINFOF has taken steps to improve the availability of information. For example, the ministry now publishes lists of valid logging permits and their geographic distribution, and reports on infractions, although these were last updated in 2014 and 2018, respectively, and the information is not comprehensive. MINFOF also established a website to present the information that is required under the VPA although the site is not regularly updated or complete – for example, no information is provided in the section for the VPA transparency index. Geographical information on logging permits is also made available on the National Forest Atlas (this includes 2020 data), established by MINFOF with the support of the World Resources Institute (WRI). Under their agreement with MINFOF, WRI is able to publish these data on the Global Forest Watch platform and Open Timber Portal, two transparency instruments that make locally and independently sourced data and information available to a global audience.
These improvements in transparency have taken place in parallel with the development of SNOIE. Established in 2015, the SNOIE system operates on the basis of a clear definition of roles and responsibilities among participating CSOs. These include: observers, usually trained community members who provide ‘alerts’ about infractions; verifiers, who are charged with identifying and documenting priority cases, and then disseminating their reports; and advocacy organizations that are responsible for follow-up campaigns. The clear definition of roles was devised to avoid potential conflicts of interest, for example, between the need for establishing a good working relationship with government to investigate cases, and the need to advocate for the government to take action.
SNOIE has been designed and implemented according to the quality standards of ISO 9001:2015, and obtained its certificate in 2018. The ISO 9001 certificate is a general quality-assurance standard applicable to businesses and other systems, but this is the first time that a civil society monitoring system has been certified. It provides a guarantee of the quality of IFM, from the observation and verification processes, through to reporting and advocacy, and so addresses the criticisms raised about the lack of methodological standards for IFM. Critical to achieving this was the provision of training for member CSOs, which included data-gathering techniques, requirements for documenting observations and the quality management system.
Once drafted, IFM reports are subjected to validation by a multi-stakeholder Technical and Ethics Assessment Committee (Comité d’évaluation technique et éthique des rapports d’observation), as a way of building trust in the objectivity and verifiability of IFM reports. This committee is made up of six experts; one from the private sector, one from MINFOF (from the enforcement unit), one forester, one researcher and two legal experts. For a meeting to be held, it requires at least four of these six experts to be present.
After validation by the assessment committee, the observation reports are then disseminated to the government minister and copied to relevant MINFOF officials at the regional or departmental level. Between 15 days and one month later, a letter is sent to those officials responsible for taking action to find out how they have responded to the report. The IFM report, along with the official response, are then made public by emailing them to a distribution list (which includes national and international enforcement agencies and CSOs) and by posting it on the Cameroonian website for IFM and on WRI’s Open Timber Portal. Key target audiences for this outreach are the competent authorities within the EU that are responsible for enforcing the European Union Timber Regulation, as well as certification bodies and timber traders. Advocacy campaigns are also implemented, aimed at ensuring that MINFOF carries out enforcement actions in response to the findings documented in the IFM reports.
How did transparency and participation improvements lead to greater accountability?
There are some indications of better enforcement by government as a result of the improved system for IFM, although the evidence for this is not extensive. An analysis of FODER’s internal tracking matrix shows that a higher proportion of IFM reports have prompted government action since SNOIE was first put in place in 2015 (Table 2).
|
|
|
|
|
|
2013–14
|
8
|
2
|
25%
|
|
2015–16
|
23
|
23
|
100%
|
|
2017–19
|
54
|
43
|
80%
|
Source: FODER.
The responses ranged from enforcement missions to imposing financial and administrative sanctions, including the seizure and auction of timber and the suspension of permits. However, there are not sufficient data available to determine whether there has been any change in the types or levels of sanctions being applied (either tougher or less stringent), or in the extent of illegal activities. According to FODER, the perception of SNOIE members, however, is that enforcement has improved and that this has also occurred more widely across the sector, and is not just limited to infractions reported under the SNOIE system.
FODER attributes the government’s increased responsiveness to the improved quality of monitoring reports since 2013. More broadly, the improved professionalism of civil society has also boosted levels of trust among state officials in their work, resulting in improved cooperation. This has facilitated the work of enforcement agents, who have increasingly come to recognize the network of CSOs as a valuable source of intelligence. This has been backed up by the advocacy work of SNOIE, which has helped to maintain pressure on the government for action.
Long-term impact
Through stronger transparency and more effective participation, there are some indications that Cameroon’s civil society-led independent monitoring system, SNOIE, has contributed to improved enforcement. However, although the response of the government to civil society reports has improved, enforcement remains very weak. Furthermore, previous eras of IFM in Cameroon would suggest that the sustainability of these changes in enforcement is fragile. Continued advocacy from national CSOs will be important in shoring up the improvements seen, as will pressure from international buyers and donors. However, more systemic reforms will also be needed, including strengthened mechanisms for horizontal accountability.
