Regardless of the tenacity with which NATO maintains its opposition to the TPNW, the reality is that the treaty, which entered into force on 22 January 2021, is now here to stay.
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) opened for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 20 September 2017. On the same day, in Brussels, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the NATO Alliance’s governing body composed of representatives of all Allies, issued a statement announcing that the then 29 Allies could not support the new treaty. The statement, which like all NAC documents was adopted on the basis of consensus, invited other states that might be willing to do so to ‘seriously reflect on its implications for international peace and security’. Since then, the Alliance has maintained its unified position in opposition to the TPNW. No NATO Ally has yet signed or become a party to the TPNW. In addition, several NATO partners have decided not to join the treaty, often citing the potential effect on their security and ongoing cooperation with NATO as grounds for this decision. On 15 December 2020, the NAC adopted a further statement on the TPNW. While the Allies ‘reaffirm our commitment to the preservation and strengthening of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation’, the statement read, ‘we collectively reiterate our opposition to this treaty, as it does not reflect the increasingly challenging international security environment and is at odds with the existing non-proliferation and disarmament architecture’. This statement followed the attainment, on 24 October 2020, of the threshold of 50 deposits of instruments of ratification required for the TPNW to enter into force. This figure includes several ratifications by members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme. The TPNW entered into force on 22 January 2021, and more ratifications can be expected in the future. Civil society organizations such as the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and its members will continue to exert pressure on countries where it has partner organizations. Domestic constituencies in several NATO Allies will continue to advocate in favour of the TPNW. While this pressure will not affect all Allies in the same way, it will be felt most acutely in certain European countries where there is already a considerable domestic constituency in support of the TPNW.
Regardless of the tenacity with which NATO maintains its opposition to the TPNW, the reality is that the treaty will now be here to stay.
As part of a project on understanding NATO obligations and how they relate to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, law and policy, this paper focuses on what the TPNW’s entry into force means for NATO. Regardless of the tenacity with which NATO maintains its opposition to the TPNW, the reality is that the treaty will now be here to stay. The hope – likely nurtured in many NATO capitals over the past few years – that the TPNW ‘should be left in limbo, as a protest vote for those with nothing to lose’ has not played out. Even if one assesses the prospect of a NATO Ally becoming a TPNW member as unrealistic, a too intense focus on opposing the TPNW may obscure NATO’s broader commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. As a multilateral institution, NATO itself has limited power to effect nuclear disarmament. Disarmament commitments are made by individual Allies, including both nuclear and non-nuclear states. It is in the best interests of NATO to continue to support the development of revived and innovative approaches to nuclear disarmament generally, while continuing to maintain the Alliance’s principled opposition to the TPNW.
The next chapter reviews the basic principles of NATO’s nuclear policy, which features a delicate balance between disarmament and deterrence. Chapter 3 then reviews the core arguments that NATO Allies have advanced against the TPNW. It asks whether these arguments hold weight in response to various criticisms that have been levelled against them. Chapter 4 considers broader questions of international law: can the TPNW create customary international law? If so, is the ‘persistent objector’ strategy adopted by NATO Allies an effective one? Chapter 5 provides a brief overview of NATO’s policies on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation (ADN), and suggests that the Alliance should increase its support for efforts in this area. In conclusion, Chapter 6 sets out recommendations as to how NATO can position itself on these issues into the future.
