NATO’s nuclear policy, with a delicate balance between deterrence and disarmament at its core, holds that as long as nuclear weapons exist, it will remain a nuclear alliance.
The main elements of NATO’s nuclear policy can be found in various decisions adopted over the years on the basis of consensus. Nuclear deterrence has been an essential part of NATO’s overall defence posture for 70 years, and the 2010 Strategic Concept directly referred to NATO as a nuclear alliance. NATO’s first strategic concept, adopted just a few months after the Alliance was established, referred to the importance of US nuclear weapons to the security of all Allies. Subsequent strategic documents adopted over the course of NATO’s history developed the major elements of the Alliance’s nuclear policy, ranging from the first deployments of US nuclear weapons to Europe in the 1950s to the flexible response strategy in the 1960s, the reinforcement of extended deterrence in the 1970s, and the ‘dual-track decision’ of 1979. The dual track combined deployments of new nuclear delivery systems in five European NATO members in response to the Soviet deployment of a new and destabilizing nuclear system, alongside a negotiating track that eventually led to the successful negotiation of one of the landmark arms control agreements of Cold War, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The easing of tensions in the final years of the Cold War ultimately enabled dramatic reductions in the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe.
Current NATO nuclear policy is based on the Alliance’s latest Strategic Concept, which was adopted at the Lisbon Summit of Heads of State and Government in 2010. While a comprehensive account of the Strategic Concept’s relevant language is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth highlighting some key language to illustrate the delicate balance between deterrence and disarmament that lies at the policy’s core.
The 2010 Strategic Concept sets out NATO’s three core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. Within the context of collective defence, the Strategic Concept states:
The 2010 Strategic Concept also confirmed Allies’ commitment to further disarmament:
Through regular declarations at the head of state or government and ministerial levels, and public statements by Alliance leaders, notably the secretary general, NATO consistently reaffirms the essential elements of its nuclear policy, while adapting to changes in the security climate. For example, the declaration adopted at the 2016 Warsaw Summit provided as follows:
The 2017 NAC statement on the TPNW specifically refers to the Warsaw Summit language, and the 2020 NAC statement draws on almost all of this language as well. Among the features of the security environment that are ‘not favourable today’, NATO regularly cites North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme; as well as Russia’s recent nuclear policy, including its violation of the INF Treaty, its development of new and novel nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and what Allies describe as ‘its irresponsible and aggressive nuclear rhetoric, military concept and underlying posture’. The latter takes place in the context of a larger-scale programme of Russian exercises in recent years. Other issues, such as the role of emerging technologies in discussions related to international security and stability, along with regional rivalry between India and Pakistan and instability in the Middle East, can all be cited as factors contributing to an unfavourable security environment. Beginning quite recently, China has featured more explicitly in NATO’s description of the security environment. For example, in November 2020 Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg pointed to the need to anchor China more firmly in the multilateral disarmament architecture. Since NATO’s opposition to the TPNW is closely linked to the Alliance’s assessment of the security environment, we will return to these issues in the next chapter.
It is crucial to note that NATO as an alliance does not possess nuclear weapons. Instead, the three individual nuclear weapon states of the Alliance maintain absolute custody and control over their weapons.
Over the years, NATO has translated these policy decisions into capabilities and structures. On capabilities, it is crucial to note that NATO as an alliance does not possess nuclear weapons. Instead, the three individual nuclear weapon states of the Alliance maintain absolute custody and control over their weapons, even where these weapons are assigned to NATO subject to national assurances or where they are stationed in other host countries under the Alliance’s long-standing nuclear sharing arrangements. NATO’s structures flow from its essential role of providing a unique multilateral forum to ‘[support and facilitate] policy-making among members, and consultations with partners and other countries, and [aid] in the implementation of international obligations’. The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) is the Alliance’s main multilateral forum on nuclear policy and includes all members with the exception of France, which has a long-standing decision not to participate. The NPG’s High Level Group (HLG) was formed in 1977 to address the challenges posed by new Soviet nuclear systems, especially the SS-20 ground-launched ballistic missile system. It continues to serve as the senior advisory body to the NPG on nuclear policy and planning issues, and also oversees nuclear weapons safety, security and survivability. While the NPG is chaired by the NATO International Staff and serves under the direction of the secretary general, the HLG is chaired by the US and is composed of decision-makers and experts.
Finally, from a legal perspective, it is worth noting that the Alliance’s foundational treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty, does not mention nuclear weapons, or any other type of weapon for that matter. Nor does it mention nuclear deterrence, even though this policy has been part of the Alliance’s overall strategic landscape from the time of the drafting of the Treaty to the present day. Rather, the obligations in the North Atlantic Treaty are formulated in general terms, and do not commit Allies to a particular means of achieving desired outcomes. For example, Article 3 provides that: ‘In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.’ However, the Treaty does not detail how this is to be done. This is also the case for Article 5, which sets out the fundamental collective defence pact at the heart of the Alliance. The legal obligation under that article is for each Ally to respond to an armed attack ‘by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary [emphasis added], including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area’. This does not mean, as some seem to argue, that NATO’s nuclear policy can be departed from without consequence. Rather, as described above, the policy decisions that make up NATO’s nuclear policy have been taken at the highest political level and reiterated over many years. This difference between law and policy is important in the context of whether the TPNW is compatible with NATO obligations.
