NATO could continue to marry its opposition to the TPNW with a willingness to double down on its own engagement in the global arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation space.
One key feature of both the 2017 and 2020 NAC statements is an emphasis on broader arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation (ADN) policy. The 2020 statement reads as follows:
Like NATO’s nuclear policy, the Alliance’s ADN policy dates back to NATO’s founding. In the early days of the Alliance, NATO Allies engaged in the five-nation disarmament talks in London (later also participating in the 10-nation talks), and made the first allied proposal in this space in 1957. At the NATO Summit in December of that year, the Allies called on the Soviet Union to negotiate, and formed a group of disarmament experts to meet at NATO headquarters. That group has met under different names continuously since 1957, and is now known as the Committee on Proliferation, meeting in politico-military format.
The Committee on Proliferation is the most senior NATO body dedicated to ADN policy, and meets regularly with Allied experts, as well as experts and decision-makers from NATO partner countries, officials from all related international organizations, and experts from think-tanks and academia. NATO also contributes to ADN through its Science and Technology Organization, which gathers thousands of scientists from Allied and partner countries to work on scientific approaches to Allied security concerns, and its Science for Peace and Security Programme, which directs funding towards innovative scientific contributions to Allied security.
NATO’s current ADN policies are summarized in the declarations adopted at NATO summits and other high-level meetings. The most recent such statement was agreed at the 2019 Brussels Summit:
The Declaration goes on to describe NATO’s commitment to WMD non-proliferation, the NPT, and other agreements across all the pillars of the global ADN regime.
Given the clear links between NATO’s nuclear policy and its ADN policy, NATO could continue to marry its opposition to the TPNW with a willingness to double down on the Alliance’s role in the global ADN space. There are several ways that Allies could use existing NATO structures to do so.
One proven strength of NATO structures is that they can help Allies develop and/or coordinate their negotiating positions. This might be useful as Allies prepare for the upcoming NPT Review Conference in 2021. For example, NATO could invite the chairpersons-designate of the three main committees and of any subsidiary bodies at the Review Conference for discussions with Allies at NATO headquarters. Another way for NATO Allies to demonstrate their commitment to disarmament would be to develop outreach activities that give greater insight into the technical challenges related to disarmament, especially those associated with verification. This could consist of publicizing and broadening the base of support for ongoing work being organized by France and Germany on how to improve verification, as well as engaging with efforts such as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), a public-private partnership between the US State Department and the Nuclear Threat Initiative. NATO’s Science and Technology Organization has begun examining scientific challenges to nuclear disarmament verification, and the NATO Committee on Proliferation has initiated dialogue with IPNDV, the Stepping Stones Approach, the Quad Initiative, and the Franco-German project. Outside of NATO, Allies should also continue to consult with the Allied P5 representatives to identify ways to support the P5 process, and to meet with the working group chairs of the multilateral Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND) initiative.
