Post-Brexit, the UK is actively working on rethinking its place in the world and what that will mean for its Indo-Pacific engagement.
UK Indo-Pacific policy development
UK foreign policy as a whole is undergoing epochal change. This is part of an ‘integrated review’ described by the UK government as the ‘biggest review of foreign, defence and development policy since the Cold War’. Brexit alone required a fundamental reassessment of British foreign policy. The geopolitical and geo-economic fallout of COVID-19 as well as crises such as events in Hong Kong have made the need for such a reassessment even more acute.
One developing policy seems to be trying to leverage unique Commonwealth relationships to reclaim some of the strategic influence lost over the past decades. At the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in the UK in 2018, then Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson announced the opening of nine new diplomatic missions in Commonwealth countries, including three in Oceania. All nine new UK missions are in countries with small populations and economies that are often overlooked by major powers. That means, for example, that any problematic Chinese influence is less apparent until it becomes a larger security concern. Johnson’s announcement seemed to mark the development of a ‘niche’ diplomatic and intelligence positioning in which the UK, at low cost, could quickly gain value in the eyes of its medium and larger-sized partners (and in particular Five Eyes partners) as a provider of information and engagement in otherwise less covered locations.
If this were an indication of the approach of Johnson as prime minister, it could signal an increasingly pragmatic foreign and security policy in which limited budgets are deployed to gain increased, focused influence. An obvious area to develop that reach would be the Indo-Pacific. However, at the time of the roundtable, there were still substantial internal divisions and uncertainties about how to engage with potential partners in the region.
Roundtable and interview summary
The foreign policy and business communities’ view of the UK in the Indo-Pacific
During the interviews and roundtable, conflicting assessments were writ large about ‘Global Britain’ and the UK’s place in the Indo-Pacific more specifically, with foreign policy and business communities tending in one direction, and defence and security communities in another.
When foreign policy participants were asked if the UK was a great power, there was often an awkward pause, followed by a variation on ‘not really’. That perception shaped the UK’s foreign policy ambitions. One participant said, ‘we should start thinking of ourselves as a middle power. What do middle powers do? Conflict, peacekeeping, diplomacy…’. Another talked about finding the right ‘niches’. In the business community, emphasis was placed on the City of London, which one participant called ‘one of our only real areas of power’, with another adding, ‘we have no other leverage – the perception is that we are strong in the financial and intelligence sectors.’
The premise was that the UK government had a balanced ‘all of Asia’ policy with hopes for working with ‘an independent, open, inclusive, prosperous, secure and resilient set of countries in the region that promote and uphold the rules-based order’. Some priority countries mentioned were Japan, Australia and Singapore. However, the talking points tended to be short on concrete implementation plans.
One exception was climate change, both in terms of mitigation and adaptation. The subject was seen as an entry point for the UK in the Indo-Pacific, in particular Oceania (where, due to the large number of countries, there are a substantial number of votes in international forums). The UK positions itself as a global leader in this matter, and first brought climate change to the UN Security Council in 2007. This stance dovetails with concerns in Oceania, where climate change is often referred to as an ‘existential’ threat. One participant described the policy as ‘an open goal politically… It’s a barometer to show our engagement in the region’. The 26th Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP26) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was seen as a chance to boost that positioning and open up areas of collaboration.
The defence and security communities’ view of the UK in the Indo-Pacific
Participants from the defence and security communities tended to have less broad-spectrum, more focused goals. Some also thought the ‘FCO language’ was not helpful in the region. One participant remarked that terms like ‘rules-based order’ irritate some Indo-Pacific partners, while another said, ‘They find it old-fashioned. They don’t recognize it.’
A sharp division existed domestically between those who thought economic penetration by China could be ‘contained’ and those who thought otherwise.
Their perception was that the UK could use its areas of military expertise, the potential to reinvigorate the Five Power Defence Agreements, and its position as a leader in intelligence to build or reinforce strategic relationships with specific countries in the Indo-Pacific.
For example, one participant said, ‘Japan had been prodding us [the UK] with a stick to engage more.’ It seemed to be working. The UK–Japan joint statement of 2019 referred to their ‘global strategic partnership’ and outlined a range of areas where the two could work together. One participant noted, ‘Japan has unique geographical positioning. There are lots of possibilities for collaboration with Japan, and to use influence to work together with other countries in that region.’ Already there had been joint training, collaboration with Tokyo on an air-to-air missile, and there were plans for more, including deeper intelligence-sharing.
Uncertainty, domestic division and hedging in the UK
Underpinning most of the discussions was uncertainty about trade deals, the evolving nature of relationships with regional organizations such as ASEAN, and priority areas. There was even uncertainty about terminology, with the term ‘Far East’ still often used for areas that other countries consider the Indo-Pacific.
A sharp division existed domestically between those who thought economic penetration by China could be ‘contained’ and would not have strategic implications, and those who thought otherwise. The resulting hedging was disrupting the UK’s relationship with partners, in particular the US, affecting not only strategic cooperation, but also trade.
Overall, there was the perception that the Indo-Pacific was a complex environment that would require flexibility, including bringing in non-state partners from the UK (including the private sector and education sector). It was essential not to take close allies for granted and to have a continuing, and committed, presence in the region, with one participant saying, ‘If the UK isn’t prepared to invest in the long term, we might as well not bother’. At the same time, it was important not to buy into the perception that ‘China is winning and we are losing’. Instead it was hoped that the UK could have something to offer and, especially if working with like-minded countries, it could make a difference and be seen as a reliable partner.
Analysis
In the months following the roundtable, the internal divisions and uncertainty came to a head over how to respond to China’s new security laws in Hong Kong and over whether to allow the Chinese company Huawei to be involved in the development of the UK’s advanced communications systems. The decisions taken on these matters resolved some of the hedging. The UK government decided to extend residence rights to up to 3 million British National (Overseas) (BNO) citizens in Hong Kong, as well to completely remove Huawei equipment from the UK’s 5G networks by 2027. Those two decisions were a major strategic statement; they were welcomed by the US, Australia and others, and were unequivocally denounced by China. The welcome to BNO citizens potentially put at risk Chinese investment in the City of London, but it opened another possible path for money that is fleeing Hong Kong. Meanwhile, the removal of Huawei reinforced the UK’s central role in the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network.
Substantial China-related issues are still to be addressed, such as China’s role in the UK nuclear sector. However, for now it seems that those who are concerned about Chinese influence are in the ascendant, opening the way for the UK to work more closely on defence and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific and possibly to play a larger role within groupings such as the Quad plus. In November 2020, the UK government announced billions of pounds in new funds for defence modernization, with Johnson declaring the goal of restoring the UK as ‘the foremost naval power in Europe’. Where is that navy most likely to be deployed? The Indo-Pacific, especially given the ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’ outlined by the government in the March 2021 integrated review.
