India is pivotal to strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific and it is in the process of actively assessing its reach, interests and focus.
India’s Indo-Pacific policy development
The ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’ speech by the then Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe, to the Indian parliament in 2007 was credited with jump-starting New Delhi’s Indo-Pacific policy discussions. Since then, administratively, the most visible component of this shift has been diplomacy, with the lead taken by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). India created an Indo-Pacific division within the MEA, integrating work related to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), ASEAN and the Quad. (By comparison, in the US, the most visible, active and best-funded Indo-Pacific presence is not in the Department of State, but in the Department of Defense.) As with many other countries, while India’s defence and security communities expressed concerns about China, its foreign policy, business and political sectors were more accommodating. However, a fundamental shift has occurred since the emergence of COVID-19, and especially since June 2020, when Chinese troops initiated a clash near the Himalayan border in which 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese troops were killed. India’s strategic community is now one of the most vocal about the need to defend against Chinese aggression.
Indian Ocean focus
While the Himalayas have recently become increasingly strategically active, a secure Indian Ocean is also critical for India. Approximately 90 per cent of both Indian trade by volume and India’s oil imports pass through the area, and it has been an entry point for terrorist infiltrators, most notably during the 2008 Mumbai attacks. India’s strategic community has been disconcerted by increased Chinese maritime activity in the region, which is often seen as dual use, such as Chinese military activity at the ‘commercial’ Gwadar port in Pakistan.
Roundtable and interview summary
India’s limitations and aspirations in the Indo-Pacific
Indian policymakers and its strategic community said that they were very aware that the ‘Indo’ part of the Indo-Pacific was there to encourage New Delhi’s participation. However, since independence in 1947, participants said that India’s security focus has been largely land-based. As a result, the Indian Navy, which is the leader on Indo-Pacific defence, is under-resourced in comparison to the army and air force.
Another constraint observed was that ‘India is too slow’. Even for modest policies related to shipping, for example, decisions need to go through the MEA and then be vetted by national security, before going to the Ministry of Shipping. Participants said that all of the issues that complicated India’s relations with international partners also frustrated India’s internal strategic community. This included an understaffed MEA, a sometimes sclerotic if not outright obstructionist bureaucracy, and a vast array of vested interests both internal and external.
In spite of this, participants said, there was substantial activity on the ‘Indo-Pacific file’, with plans for even more. These activities included: improving maritime domain awareness, including in partnership with the US, Japan and France; using the Indian Navy to develop interoperability through a wide range of joint exercises (including with the US, Japan, Australia, Myanmar, Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and a range of multinational exercises); creating regional partnerships through port access and/or logistics agreements (including with the US, Oman, Singapore, South Korea and Indonesia); the successful completion of Tiger Triumph, the first India–US air, sea, land exercise; capacity-building with countries in the region (including defence lines of credit for Vietnam, Seychelles, Mauritius and Bangladesh, as well as building naval capabilities with Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Mauritius); and fulfilling the role of net security provider, including with regional humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations (most recently in Yemen in 2018). One participant said that part of India’s positioning was to make partners feel that ‘if they think China is scary, India is reassuring’.
India and the Quad
The Quad was important to participants. There was a stated desire to expand aspects of the Quad to other like-minded countries (including possibly Indonesia, Vietnam and France), and to put more emphasis on the economic component. Economically, the perception was that there were two supply chains developing in the region, one driven by the US, and the other by China. China had successfully disrupted some of the US linkages, for example in Central Asia and through ASEAN.
One participant said that part of India’s positioning was to make partners feel that ‘if they think China is scary, India is reassuring’.
However, it was said, there was an opportunity for India to find ‘plug points’ for integration in the supply chains, especially the more ‘organic’ US supply chain – as opposed to China’s state-driven chain – which could also act to reinforce Quad linkages. (For example, after China exerted political pressure on Australia by putting high tariffs on Australian barley imports, India stepped in to buy some of the crop.)
There was an acknowledgment that, at least in the medium term, India’s maritime capacities were limited, and collaboration would be essential, possibly involving lend-lease type arrangements. For example, one interviewee motioned the benefit to both sides that was accrued from the free-of-cost transfer of the USS Trenton to the Indian fleet, noting that more such transfers of naval platforms (ageing to the US, but perfectly serviceable to India), would be a major step forward and would quickly increase Indian capacity to act as an effective partner.
India and Japan
While participants were nearly unanimous in saying that they thought the already strong India–US strategic relationship would continue to grow, and that relations would improve with Australia, there was a deeper, almost civilizational interest in partnering with Japan as another ‘old’ culture in the region. Additionally, Tokyo was perceived as willing to share knowledge and take on complex projects. For example, one participant said, ‘Japan is active in the northeast of India whereas the British just come to Mumbai, make deals and leave.’ It was added that Japan also appreciated India, as it was one of the few Asian countries where Japan had popular support.
France versus the UK in India’s strategic outlook
Participants saw France as one of India’s important partners, with close cooperation in science and technology, particularly on space. Indian private and public sector companies had good relations with French counterparts, and France was considered a major actor in the Indo-Pacific. The relationship was seen as largely politically risk-free, with no direct tensions, and was projected to grow even deeper.
This was in contrast to the near-unanimous agreement among participants that the India–UK strategic relationship would not grow stronger, at least in the short term. There was appreciation for the UK’s naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and joint exercises. However, while India had been told that the UK was ready to support the development of India’s defence capabilities, those efforts remained ‘underpowered’, particularly on sharing high-end military technology. In that area, France was considered a more reliable partner. Reflecting a common perception, one participant said, ‘the UK cannot have a successful Indo-Pacific strategy without a flourishing strategic relationship with India. Such a relationship has not yet been built.’
The Russia factor
Participants in India were the only ones to mention Russia as an Indo-Pacific power, noting its long Pacific coast, a coast that was India’s main maritime entry point into the increasingly important Arctic. Soviet–Indian relations had been deep, and there was substantial residual nostalgia and technological cooperation, especially in high-tech defence. Some also said that Russia’s role in areas of concern to New Delhi, such as the Middle East and post-US withdrawal from Afghanistan, would increase, leading to the necessity for collaboration. They knew Russia and China were growing closer strategically, and that China benefited from India–Russia relations as these created a wedge in India–US relations. Notwithstanding, the ‘Russia lobby’ in India is still strong.
Analysis
Until recently, India had the same issues with internal division, uncertainty and hedging as other countries, exacerbated by the strong influence of foreign arms lobbies. That noticeably changed following the June 2020 border conflict with China. Popular sentiment, already febrile because of an extended lockdown due to COVID-19, turned strongly against China. As seen elsewhere, this amplified the influence of Indian policymakers, especially those in the defence and strategic communities, who wanted to shift away from China. A series of decisive actions took place, including banning Chinese apps on security grounds, restrictions on foreign direct investment, restrictions on visas for certain Chinese people, and a shift to a more forceful military strategy.
Additionally, Indo-Pacific partnerships in defence and economics became that much more important and urgent. This resulted in increased outreach from New Delhi to Indo-Pacific partners, in particular Quad members. In some cases, it built on already strengthening ties, for example, the June 2020 joint declaration with Australia that the two countries were elevating their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership and India’s invitation to Australia to join it with Japan and the US for the Malabar military exercises. In other cases, the initiatives were new and responding to changing circumstances, such as the supply-chain resilience initiative with Japan and Australia.
It has also resulted in increased activity around the Quad, most visibly with the previously mentioned Quad vaccine diplomacy initiative, and some Indian analysts have even suggested a Quad headquarters be set up on India’s Andaman Island. There have been calls for an India–US ‘alliance’ – though not the sort of alliance ‘recognized by lawyers’ but the sort ‘recognized by generals’. This took a leap forward when, in October 2020, India and the US signed the last of the four foundational defence agreements required by Washington for deep defence integration with New Delhi. India even reached out to the UK, most visibly with an invitation to Prime Minister Boris Johnson to attend India’s 2021 Republic Day ceremonies as chief guest.
The tone in India has shifted substantially. However, existing lobbies still have substantial influence over some policymakers. Overt hedging has diminished, however, internal divisions, fuelled at times by outside backers, may still undermine India’s unequivocal strategic realignment.