This paper maps the Chinese government’s restrictions on online freedom of expression, and explores their domestic, regional and international implications. It examines China’s model of internet control, censorship and surveillance, drawing on recent examples that have arisen in the COVID-19 context. It analyses the degree to which this approach shapes wider trends and online restrictions in the rest of Asia, looking also at the influence of Western policies and technologies. And it reviews China’s growing influence on global technology governance in multilateral and bilateral settings. This includes China’s increasing assertiveness in international debates about digital technology regulation, its promotion of a vision of ‘cyber sovereignty’ that emphasizes state surveillance and control, and the leadership’s ambitions for the ‘Digital Silk Road’ initiative.
China’s domestic restrictions on online freedom of expression
The Chinese government‘s restrictive online regime relies on a combination of legal regulations, technical control and proactive manipulation of online debates.2 The online environment has tightened considerably under President Xi Jinping, with heavy investment in the ‘Golden Shield Project’.3 Such initiatives are a key element in a government vision of ‘cyber sovereignty’ that allows it to strengthen state surveillance and control.
While Chinese citizens can sometimes access information and communication on the internet through workarounds such as virtual private networks (VPNs), the vast power imbalance between the state and individuals means that freedom of expression online is illusory. In China, there are practically no legal or practical barriers to surveillance online. The various techniques used by the government to restrict online freedom of expression are discussed below.
Restrictions on content in China
China was already home to one of the world’s most sophisticated and restrictive systems of internet control prior to Xi’s leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC). However, regulations and restrictions governing online content have proliferated under his tenure. Since 2015, the spread of false information that seriously disturbs public order constitutes a crime punishable by up to seven years in prison. In 2017, the government implemented a new Cybersecurity Law, which requires social media platforms to republish and link to news articles from state-approved news media.
In order to be permitted to operate, online platforms must abide by state-imposed constraints and cooperate on implementing heavy-handed restrictions on political, social and religious discourse. For example, in January 2018 Weibo suspended several of its accounts after authorities ordered it to ‘clean up “wrong-oriented” and “vulgar” information’.4 Citizen Lab, at the University of Toronto, has documented how WeChat uses monitored content to train censorship algorithms.5
The growing connectivity of Chinese mobile applications means that the consequences of controls on online freedom of expression may play out in other walks of life.
In 2018, the Chinese authorities abolished the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television – a ministry-level executive agency – and transferred its powers to the Propaganda Department, which is under the direct control of the CPC. Further online content regulations came into effect in March 2020. The Cyberspace Administration of China can suspend or shut down online platforms deemed to breach rules, such as the ban on content deemed ‘exaggerated’, ‘improper’ or containing ‘sexual provocations’, and content ‘promoting indecency, vulgarity and kitsch’.6
The growing connectivity of Chinese mobile applications means that the consequences of controls on online freedom of expression may play out in other walks of life. Chinese ‘super-apps’ such as WeChat enable users not just to talk but also to pay for utilities, shop and send money. Such apps make a huge amount of personal data available for analysis by WeChat itself, third parties or the Chinese government.7 This data-harvesting capability is only set to increase as WeChat seeks to embed its platform into the Internet of Things (cars, domestic appliances, etc.).
The Chinese government is also running local pilot projects of a ‘social credit’ system, under which Chinese citizens are scored based on the desirability of their online and offline activity. While the system has yet to be fully rolled out,8 there are concerns that criticizing the government on social media could decrease a person’s score and trigger wide-ranging implications, including restrictions on free movement.9 This would constitute a further chilling effect on online freedom of expression. The cumulative impact of these differing measures is self-censorship online.
There is also an extraterritorial element to the Chinese government’s restrictions on online expression. WeChat is not only subject to surveillance and censorship within China, but extends government controls to users around the world.10 There is evidence that surveillance and political interference are increasing on the international version of the app.11
State-sponsored content and state pressure on content providers
State control over online platforms and content extends to propaganda and the manipulation of information. For example, during the 2019 Hong Kong protests on the proposed Extradition Bill, pro-Beijing news outlets in Hong Kong such as Wen Wei Po and Ta Kung Pao were mobilized in defence of the proposed measures.12 Such measures speak to the CPC’s broader agenda of trying to influence public debate, media and news reporting within mainland China. These actions also extend globally. Examples include pressure on cable television executives in the US to prevent broadcasts by a station founded by Chinese American Falun Gong practitioners; and a partly Chinese-owned South African newspaper’s termination of a column because of the author’s writing on Xinjiang.13
A related trend is the state’s encouragement of, and support for, the amplification of nationalist voices that distort public debates. A prominent example is the online backlash against a Wuhan-based author, Fang Fang, over the English publication of her diaries of the city’s coronavirus lockdown.14 As of 2017, China reportedly had between 500,000 and 2 million internet commentators employed to shape public opinion along the party line.15
In contrast, the use of internet shutdowns and blackouts to curtail freedom of expression online – a rising trend in illiberal regimes around the world – is less prevalent in China. The government’s more advanced and sophisticated system of internet control and censorship reduces the need for such a blunt tool. Nonetheless, there continue to be sporadic media blackouts in China, including in relation to protests in Hong Kong.16
The relationship between business and the state
In addition to the requirement to censor sensitive content, social media companies operating in China have obligations to the government in relation to the data that they hold on users of their platforms. In China, all social media platforms must be licensed, and users must register their identity information with service providers. This data must be made available to the state. The transfer of information between business and the Chinese authorities is ‘comprehensive and systematic … potentially conferring on the government swift and unfettered access to personal data of increasing intimacy and breadth’.17 Therefore, individuals’ rights to privacy and control over their own data are significantly restricted.
Some technology companies in China have been hesitant to release such data. However, they can be legally compelled to do so.18 Technology companies that do not operate in China have shown more resistance to Chinese efforts to restrict and control the online sphere. For example, Facebook, Google and Twitter have refused to hand over data on Hong Kong protesters to the Hong Kong police.19
Internet service providers are also expected to cooperate with Chinese national security agencies when requested. For example, in 2017 Apple removed 60 VPN apps from its online store in China, on the basis that it was legally required to do so as the VPNs were not compliant with new regulations.20 The 2020 Hong Kong National Security Law has further increased pressure on technology companies to hand over data to the authorities,21 negatively impacting freedom of expression online in the territory.
Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on freedom of expression
The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated restrictions on online freedom of expression. A notable case was that of Dr Li Wenliang, who was arrested in January 2020 in connection with messages sent to a private social group on WeChat alerting his medical friends to signs of the virus. He was required to sign a statement that he would stop activity that ‘severely disturbed social order’.22 Dr Li later died of COVID-19. This sparked calls for greater freedom of expression in China, with thousands of posts across WeChat and Weibo mourning his death. However, this brief opening was followed by a severe crackdown on content critical of the Chinese authorities’ actions. Citizen journalists have been arrested and jailed for videoing or blogging about the coronavirus lockdown in Wuhan.23
Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD), a network of Chinese and international NGOs, documented 897 cases involving Chinese internet users penalized for their online speech between 1 January and 26 March 2020.24 According to CHRD, ‘In the vast majority of these cases, or 93% of the total, police cited “spreading misinformation, disrupting public order” as the pretext for punishing online speech related to [the] COVID-19 outbreak in China.’25
Chinese authorities have given online news outlets strict orders on the coverage of COVID-19 that effectively prevent deviation from the CPC’s version of events.26 Technology companies are expected not only to comply with laws restricting content27 but also to promote news from pro-government outlets, including general health information about the virus. Chinese authorities have also restricted publication of academic research on the virus without prior state approval.28 These restrictions have had significant international as well as domestic implications.
Chinese authorities have given online news outlets strict orders on the coverage of COVID-19 that effectively prevent deviation from the CPC’s version of events.
For certain minority groups, such as the Uighurs, who have faced increased persecution and detention since 2014, the impact of online restrictions has been immense. Their use of information and communications technology (ICT) – including minority-language websites and social media – was already strictly controlled, but the pandemic has provided cover for further repression. Information and media blackouts in China’s Xinjiang region have undermined the Uighurs’ ability to access relevant health information, as well as obscuring the extent to which the virus has affected Uighur communities.29
The position under international human rights law
The UN Human Rights Council has held that ‘… the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online, in particular freedom of expression, which is applicable regardless of frontiers and through any media of one’s choice’, in accordance with article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).30 The UN and other international organizations have emphasized that freedom from censorship, including freedom from blocking or filtering of the internet, is central for the exercise of freedom of expression.
The right of access to information is an important part of the right to freedom of expression, as it is needed in order to build opinions and express them. Blocking, filtering and censorship, plus the possibility of criminal prosecution, limit access to information and stifle online debate. State manipulation of the information that citizens are permitted to see (and not see) online also impedes the right of access to accurate information.31
Some 173 UN member states have recognized freedom of expression as a legally binding human right by ratifying the ICCPR. While China signed the ICCPR in 1998, it has not ratified the treaty and there is no prospect of it doing so in the short term. However, China is a party to other core UN human rights treaties containing provisions that protect the right to freedom of expression, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child32 and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.33 In relation to the protection of minority groups, China is a party to treaties that enshrine the right to equal treatment and non-discrimination, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,34 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women35 and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.36
Strict regulation of the internet, and government manipulation of the online narrative to enable citizens only to receive the state’s version of events, implicates other rights beyond freedom of expression. These include not only civil and political rights such as freedom of association, freedom of assembly, freedom of thought and opinion, and privacy, but also economic and social rights such as the right to health.
The right to information is particularly important in the context of a pandemic, so that citizens can understand the risks to their health and how to protect themselves from the virus. The right to health – set out in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – includes the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas regarding health issues, and the right to have personal health data treated with confidentiality.37 China’s restrictions on online discussions of the handling of the virus meant that some citizens were unable to access adequate information or medical care in the early days of the outbreak.38 In some cases, such as that of Dr Li Wenliang, a lack of free expression also implicated the right to life.
OpenNet Initiative (2012), ‘China’, http://access.opennet.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/accesscontested-china.pdf.
Economy, E. (2018), ‘The great firewall of China: Xi Jinping’s internet shutdown’, Guardian, 29 June 2018, www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jun/29/the-great-firewall-of-china-xi-jinpings-internet-shutdown.
Human Rights Watch (2019), World Report 2019, New York: Human Rights Watch, www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/hrw_world_report_2019.pdf.
Kenyon, M. (2020), ‘WeChat Surveillance Explained’, Citizen Lab, 7 May 2020, https://citizenlab.ca/2020/05/wechat-surveillance-explained.
Zhang, B. and Barata, J. (2020), ‘Order of the Cyberspace Administration of China (No. 5)’, World Intermediary Liability Map (WILMap), 1 March 2020, https://wilmap.law.stanford.edu/entries/provisions-governance-online-information-content-ecosystem.
Privacy International (2017), ‘Case Study: Super Apps and the Exploitative Potential of Mobile Applications’, 13 August 2017, https://privacyinternational.org/case-studies/789/case-study-super-apps-and-exploitative-potential-mobile-applications.
Sun, Q. (2021), ‘China’s social credit system was due by 2020 but is far from ready’, AlgorithmWatch, 12 January 2021, https://algorithmwatch.org/en/story/chinas-social-credit-system-overdue.
Vinayak, V. (2019), ‘The Human Rights Implications of China’s Social Credit System’, Oxford Human Rights Hub, 6 September 2019, https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/the-human-rights-implications-of-chinas-social-credit-system.
Wang, Y. (2020), ‘WeChat Is a Trap for China’s Diaspora’, Foreign Policy, 14 August 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/14/wechat-ban-trump-chinese-diaspora-china-surveillance.
Impiombato, D. (2020) ‘“Page not found”: what happens when diplomatic statements meet the WeChat censor’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 23 September 2020, www.aspistrategist.org.au/page-not-found-what-happens-when-diplomatic-statements-meet-the-wechat-censor.
Nip, J. (2019), ‘Extremist mobs? How China’s propaganda machine tried to control the message in the Hong Kong protests’, The Conversation, 15 July 2019, https://theconversation.com/extremist-mobs-how-chinas-propaganda-machine-tried-to-control-the-message-in-the-hong-kong-protests-119646.
Cook, S. (2020), Beijing’s Global Megaphone, Washington, DC: Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/beijings-global-megaphone.
Cook, S. (2020), ‘5 Predictions for Beijing’s Assault on Internet Freedom in 2021’, The Diplomat, 10 December 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/5-predictions-for-beijings-assault-on-internet-freedom-in-2021.
King, G., Pan, J. and Roberts, M. E. (2017), ‘How the Chinese government fabricates social media posts for strategic distraction, not engaged argument’, American Political Science Review, 111(3): pp. 484–501, doi:10.1017/S0003055417000144.
Tan, D. W. (2019), ‘Media blackout of Hong Kong protests in China’, Straits Times, 2 July 2019, www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/media-blackout-of-hong-kong-protests-in-china.
Khalil, L. (2020), ‘Digital Authoritarianism, China and Covid’, Lowy Institute Analyses, 2 November 2020, www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/digital-authoritarianism-china-and-covid%20.
Ibid.
BBC News (2020), ‘Hong Kong: Facebook, Google and Twitter among firms “pausing” police help’, 6 July 2020, www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-53308582.
BBC News (2017), ‘Apple ‘pulls 60 VPNs from China App Store’’, 31 July 2017, www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-40772375.
Kirchgaessner, S. (2020), ‘Big tech firms may be handing Hong Kong user data to China’, Guardian, 30 September 2020, www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/30/big-tech-firms-may-be-handing-hong-kong-user-data-to-china.
Nip, J. (2020), ‘The politics of the coronavirus crisis’, East Asia Forum, 15 February 2020, www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/02/15/the-politics-of-the-coronavirus-crisis.
Davidson, H. (2020), ‘Wuhan citizen journalist jailed for four years in China’s Christmas crackdown’, Guardian, 28 December 2020, www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/28/wuhan-citizen-journalist-jailed-for-four-years-in-chinas-christmas-crackdown.
Chinese Human Rights Defenders (2020), ‘COVID-19 and Human Rights in China’, 3 June 2020, www.nchrd.org/2020/06/covid-19-and-human-rights-in-china.
Chinese Human Rights Defenders (2020), ‘“A Healthy Society Should Not Have Just One Voice” – China Must End Crackdown on Online Speech in Response to COVID-19’, 1 April 2020, www.nchrd.org/2020/04/a-healthy-society-should-not-have-just-one-voice-china-must-end-crackdown-on-online-speech-in-response-to-covid-19.
Freedom House (2020), Freedom on the Net 2020: The Pandemic’s Digital Shadow, Washington, DC: Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/10122020_FOTN2020_Complete_Report_FINAL.pdf.
Matsakis, L. (2020), ‘How WeChat Censored the Coronavirus Pandemic’, Wired, 27 August 2020, www.wired.com/story/wechat-chinese-internet-censorship-coronavirus.
Gan, N., Hu, C. and Watson, I. (2020), ‘Beijing tightens grip over coronavirus research, amid US-China row on virus origin’, CNN, 16 April 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/04/12/asia/china-coronavirus-research-restrictions-intl-hnk/index.html.
Chaudry, V. (2020), ‘The Impact of Covid-19 on Uighur Muslims: An Ignored Crisis’, LSE Human Rights blog, 23 April 2020, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/humanrights/2020/04/23/the-impact-of-covid-19-on-uighur-muslims-an-ignored-crisis.
UN Human Rights Council (2012), ‘Resolution on The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet’, 29 June 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/20/L.13.
Milanovic, M. (2020), ‘Viral Misinformation and the Freedom of Expression, Part II’, EJIL Talk! Blogpost, 13 April 2020, www.ejiltalk.org/viral-misinformation-and-the-freedom-of-expression-part-ii.
Article 13 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted on 20 November 1989, entered into force on 2 September 1990, www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx.
Article 21 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted on 13 December 2006, entered into force on 3 May 2008, www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-with-disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-with-disabilities-2.html.
See Articles 1 and 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted on 16 December 1966, entered into force on 3 January 1976, www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cescr.pdf.
See Article 3 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force on 3 September 1981, www.ohchr.org/documents/professionalinterest/cedaw.pdf.
See Article 5 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted on 21 December 1965, entered into force on 4 January 1969, www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cerd.aspx.
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2000), ‘CESCR General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12)’, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 11 August 2000, www.refworld.org/pdfid/4538838d0.pdf.
Human Rights Watch (2021), ‘China: Seekers of Covid-19 Redress Harassed’, 6 January 2021, www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/06/china-seekers-covid-19-redress-harassed.