This paper maps the Chinese government’s restrictions on online freedom of expression, and explores their domestic, regional and international implications. It examines China’s model of internet control, censorship and surveillance, drawing on recent examples that have arisen in the COVID-19 context. It analyses the degree to which this approach shapes wider trends and online restrictions in the rest of Asia, looking also at the influence of Western policies and technologies. And it reviews China’s growing influence on global technology governance in multilateral and bilateral settings. This includes China’s increasing assertiveness in international debates about digital technology regulation, its promotion of a vision of ‘cyber sovereignty’ that emphasizes state surveillance and control, and the leadership’s ambitions for the ‘Digital Silk Road’ initiative.
International implications of China’s position on online freedom of expression
The Chinese government aims for China to become a technological superpower in the coming years. This aim includes leading in the development of AI, super-apps, 5G, smart cities and surveillance technology. But it also involves seeking to shape the global rules of technology governance. China is increasingly exporting its own approach to technology governance in the international context – through a vision of ‘cyber sovereignty’ that entails tight control of internet gateways, data localization and robust restriction of online freedoms.
China’s ability to shape global technology governance has expanded significantly in the past 10 years. At the international level, this is a product of two factors: China’s growing presence and influence at the UN; and its provision of digital infrastructure in a significant number of countries around the world as part of the ‘Digital Silk Road’ initiative. China’s approach to online freedoms, including freedom of expression, is thus an important factor in global debates on the future of the internet.
Advancing the ‘cyber sovereignty’ model in international forums
Two bodies at the UN – the Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace, and an Open-Ended Working Group working on a similar mandate82 – are currently debating the rules and norms that should apply to state behaviour in the digital realm. China is advocating for government control of the internet as the basis for international cooperation. This stance frames technology governance through a sovereignty and national security lens, without reference to individual freedoms. It promotes multilateral cooperation purely between states, as opposed to a multi-stakeholder model, favoured by many Western states, that also involves technology companies, civil society organizations, academics and other non-state actors.
China is increasingly exporting its own approach to technology governance in the international context – through a vision of ‘cyber sovereignty’ that entails tight control of internet gateways, data localization and robust restriction of online freedoms.
China has leveraged its networks in a series of minilateral forums, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the BRICS grouping, as well as in the BRI, to garner support for its approach to technology governance. The SCO submitted a Code of Conduct for Information Security, spearheaded by China and Russia, to the UN General Assembly in 2011, which proposed rules of behaviour in cyberspace. The draft code, which was revised and resubmitted in 2015,83 has so far failed to attract widespread support because it is seen by some states as an attempt to entrench greater state control of the internet. But China and Russia continue to lobby strongly and consistently for ‘cyber sovereignty’ in the UN and other international forums.
Other actions by China on global technology governance also reflect manifestations of an overall vision of ‘cyber sovereignty’ based on state control of the internet at the expense of individual freedoms. China supported Russia’s resolution, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2019, to establish a committee of experts to consider a new cybercrime treaty. The draft resolution has been criticized by human rights groups for raising serious human rights concerns, including vague language that could facilitate the criminalization of legitimate expression online.84
Additionally, in September 2020, China put forward an international Data Security Initiative, consisting of a framework with eight elements. The framework is premised on data localization, and the idea that states control the personal data of their citizens, as opposed to individual users having a contract with their service providers that is underwritten by human rights standards on freedom of expression, privacy and data protection.85
China has rapidly increased its influence on standard-setting at the UN, and at other international standardization bodies for emerging technology such as AI, the Internet of Things and blockchain, including through securing leadership positions at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and putting forward a greater number of technical proposals to the ITU than any other country.86 Chinese diplomats and technology companies have been advocating at the ITU for a decentralized internet infrastructure, which would lead to a more centralized, top-down version of the internet.87 There are concerns that, as well as giving states more control over the internet, this ‘New IP’ could ultimately drive the fragmentation of the internet, which would increase cybersecurity threats while reducing legal certainty and predictability in cyberspace. Even based on existing Internet Protocol, several countries have followed China’s lead in asserting greater government control over the internet, as with Russia’s Sovereign Internet Law,88 which entered into force in January 2021.
China has also been creating new institutions on technology governance, including an International Research Centre for Big Data in support of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).89 The location of the centre in China represents a counterbalance, in an increasingly multipolar world, to the multiplicity of international institutions created by and based in the West. But it remains to be seen to what extent the centre will uphold the goal of SDG 16.10, ‘to ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements’. In 2016, China was one of a number of countries that opposed a UN Human Rights Council resolution adopted on the promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the internet. The opposing countries had suggested amendments that would have removed from the resolution key language from the ICCPR on the right to freedom of expression regardless of frontiers.90
In the five years since that resolution, China has strengthened its influence in the UN Human Rights Council, evolving from a passive participant to an active rule-shaper.91 China’s growing ‘discourse power’ in this area is reflected in the adoption by the council of two resolutions, proposed by China in 2018 and 2020, that reposition international human rights law as a matter of state-to-state relations without a meaningful role for civil society, rather than as an area of law centred on the individual.92
This positioning on human rights in turn informs China’s approach to online freedoms and technology governance. Many authoritarian and illiberal governments are attracted to a model that promotes the economic benefits of the internet while neutering the risk of citizens speaking up or protesting online. This is particularly the case during the current pandemic, when states are seeking to exert greater control over their citizenry, and over the narrative of their handling of the crisis.
Export of the ‘cyber sovereignty’ model through the Digital Silk Road
The ‘Digital Silk Road’, which provides a vehicle for the export of both China’s technology and its approach to technology governance, is an increasingly important part of China’s foreign policy. While China has a number of Digital Silk Road projects on its own doorstep, increasingly the initiative is focused further afield, particularly in Africa.93 China provides more financing for ICT in Africa than all multilateral agencies and leading democracies do across the continent.94
China has also expanded its Digital Silk Road into the Middle East,95 where many countries favour a sovereign and controlled internet and have enacted cybercrime laws incompatible with international human rights law, including freedom of expression.96 At a joint investment forum in 2019, China and Saudi Arabia signed 35 economic cooperation agreements, including for the development of smart cities.97
However, China’s foreign policy ambitions in relation to the cyber sovereignty model are complicated by the fact that, in practice, multiple actors are involved – not just the CPC, but also technology companies and their users. China’s approach to internet regulation, both within and outside the country, is therefore a constant process of negotiation between the government, ‘big tech’ and citizenry. Any idea of the Digital Silk Road as cohesive and powered purely from above is thus oversimplistic.98 Investment does not always turn into influence,99 and in practice there are tensions between what Chinese companies want (including profit and some transparency) and what the CPC and central government want.
China’s approach to internet regulation, both within and outside the country, is a constant process of negotiation between the government, ‘big tech’ and citizenry.
We are nonetheless starting to see greater centralization and institutionalization of the BRI, as reflected in the evolution of the initiative between the first summit in May 2017 and the second in April 2019.100 The degree of control that China exerts over Chinese technology companies is also reflected in the suspension of technology firm Ant Group’s initial public offering in November 2020,101 and the fact that the group’s high-profile founder and former executive chairman, Jack Ma, a leader in UN norm development in digital cooperation,102 disappeared from public view for three months.103
The idea of a straight dichotomy between the approach of the ‘sovereign internet’ group of states on the one hand, and states that support an open and global internet on the other, can also be overblown. The reality is more nuanced, with many states (including democracies) increasingly striving for some degree of ‘data sovereignty’ to protect their own companies and markets from US and Chinese technology giants,104 and to create a secure data ecosystem governed by their own laws. The trend for data sovereignty has seen governments blocking apps by foreign providers (in 2020, India blocked 59 Chinese apps, including the popular TikTok and WeChat),105 banning foreign telecoms providers (for example, the measures against China’s Huawei by Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, the UK and the US),106 and restricting cross-border data flows. Where data sovereignty involves a government impinging on the privacy and personal data of individuals without adequate safeguards, it can be harmful to individual rights. But data sovereignty need not be incompatible with internet freedoms – for example, the GAIA-X initiative, the EU’s plan for a unified cloud ecosystem, aims to preserve privacy and civil liberties.107
Nevertheless, the increasing divide between the group of states, led by China and Russia, that advocate for greater state control of the internet and those advocating for an open and global internet has led to fears of a fragmented internet in the future.108 Now that China is seeking to realize its technology ambitions on a global scale, the differences between China’s ‘cyber sovereignty’ model on the one hand, and Western proposals for internet regulation rooted in international human rights standards on the other, are likely to come into sharper relief.
The full titles are the ‘Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace in the Field of Information Security’ and the ‘Open-Ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of Information Communication Technologies in the Context of International Security’.
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) (undated), ‘An Updated Draft of the Code of Conduct Distributed in the United Nations – What’s New?’, https://ccdcoe.org/incyder-articles/an-updated-draft-of-the-code-of-conduct-distributed-in-the-united-nations-whats-new.
‘Open Letter to UN General Assembly: Proposed international convention on cybercrime poses a threat to human rights online’ (undated), www.apc.org/sites/default/files/Open_letter_re_UNGA_cybercrime_resolution_0.pdf.
Mueller, M. (2020), ‘China’s Data Security Initiative: Still Stuck in the Sovereignty Box’, Internet Governance Project, 16 September 2020, www.internetgovernance.org/2020/09/16/chinas-data-security-initiative-still-stuck-in-the-sovereignty-box.
Von Wijnen, A. (2020), ‘The new power of technical standards’, FreedomLab, 25 September 2020, https://freedomlab.org/the-new-power-of-technical-standards.
Hoffmann, S., Lazanski, D. and Taylor, E. (2020), ‘Standardizing the splinternet: how China’s technical standards could fragment the internet’, Journal of Cyber Policy 5(2), 29 August 2020, pp. 239–64.
Human Rights Watch (2020), ‘Russia: Growing Internet Isolation, Control, Censorship’, 18 June 2020, www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/18/russia-growing-internet-isolation-control-censorship.
Chinese Academy of Sciences (2020), ‘CAS to Launch Int’l Research Center of Big Data for SDGs’, 27 September 2020, http://english.cas.cn/newsroom/news/202009/t20200926_244297.shtml.
Article 19 (2016), ‘UNHRC: Significant resolution reaffirming human rights online adopted’, 1 July 2016, www.article19.org/resources/unhrc-significant-resolution-reaffirming-human-rights-online-adopted.
Piccone, T. (2018), China’s Long Game on Human Rights at the United Nations, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/FP_20181009_china_human_rights.pdf.
Richardson, S. (2020), China’s Influence on the Global Human Rights System, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/FP_20200914_china_human_rights_richardson.pdf.
Feldstein, S. (2020), ‘Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Strategic Aims in Africa’, 8 May 2020, www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Feldstein_Testimony.pdf.
Arcesati, R. (2020), ‘The Digital Silk Road is a development issue’, Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), 28 April 2020, https://merics.org/en/analysis/digital-silk-road-development-issue.
Zinser, S. (2020), ‘China’s Digital Silk Road Grows with 5G in the Middle East’, The Diplomat, 16 December 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/chinas-digital-silk-road-grows-with-5g-in-the-middle-east.
Hakmeh, J. (2018), Cybercrime Legislation in the GCC countries: Fit for Purpose?, Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, www.chathamhouse.org/2018/07/cybercrime-legislation-gcc-countries/freedom-expression-online-under-gcc-cybercrime-laws.
Hoffman, Lazanski and Taylor (2020), ‘Standardizing the splinternet: how China’s technical standards could fragment the internet’, p. 254.
Triolo, P. and Greene, R. (2020), ‘Will China control the global internet via its Digital Silk Road?’, SupChina, 8 May 2020, https://supchina.com/2020/05/08/will-china-control-the-global-internet-via-its-digital-silk-road. See also Jones, L. and Hameiri, S. (2020), Debunking the Myth of ‘Debt-trap Diplomacy’, Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, www.chathamhouse.org/2020/08/debunking-myth-debt-trap-diplomacy.
Segal, A. (2017), Chinese Cyber Diplomacy in a New Era of Uncertainty, Aegis Paper Series 1703, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2 June 2017, p. 11, www.hoover.org/research/chinese-cyber-diplomacy-new-era-uncertainty.
Tiezzi, S. (2019), ‘Who Is (and Who Isn’t) Attending China’s 2nd Belt and Road Forum?’, The Diplomat, 27 April 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/who-is-and-who-isnt-attending-chinas-2nd-belt-and-road-forum.
Sender, H. (2020), ‘Jack Ma vs. the Party: Inside the collapse of the world’s biggest IPO’, Nikkei Asia, 18 November 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Big-Story/Jack-Ma-vs.-the-Party-Inside-the- collapse-of-the-world-s-biggest-IPO.
United Nations (2019), The age of digital interdependence: Report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation, https://digitalcooperation.org/report.
Bram, B. (2021), ‘Jack Ma was China’s most vocal billionaire. Then he vanished’, Wired, 13 January 2021, www.wired.co.uk/article/jack-ma-disappear-ant-group-ipo.
Scott, M. (2019), ‘What’s driving Europe’s new aggressive stance on tech’, Politico, 27 October 2019, www.politico.eu/article/europe-digital-technological-sovereignty-facebook-google-amazon-ursula-von-der-leyen.
Griffin, A. (2020), ‘Tiktok banned in India along with 58 other mostly Chinese apps amid border tensions’, The Independent, 29 June 2020, www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/tiktok-ban-india-china-wechat-uc-browser-a9591941.html.
Goodier, M. (2020), ‘The definitive list of where every country stands on Huawei’, Tech Newstatesman, 29 July 2020, https://tech.newstatesman.com/security/where-every-country-stands-huawei.
Palantir (2020), ‘Palantir and GAIA-X’, Palantir Blog, Medium, 18 December 2020, https://medium.com/palantir/palantir-and-gaia-x-85ab9845144d (accessed 25 Jan. 2021).
For discussion of the emerging camps, see Morgus, R., Woolbright, J. and Sherman, J. (2018), The Digital Deciders: How a group of often overlooked countries could hold the keys to the future of the global internet, Florida International University – New America Cybersecurity Capacity Building Partnership (C2B Partnership), www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/reports/digital-deciders.