This paper maps the Chinese government’s restrictions on online freedom of expression, and explores their domestic, regional and international implications. It examines China’s model of internet control, censorship and surveillance, drawing on recent examples that have arisen in the COVID-19 context. It analyses the degree to which this approach shapes wider trends and online restrictions in the rest of Asia, looking also at the influence of Western policies and technologies. And it reviews China’s growing influence on global technology governance in multilateral and bilateral settings. This includes China’s increasing assertiveness in international debates about digital technology regulation, its promotion of a vision of ‘cyber sovereignty’ that emphasizes state surveillance and control, and the leadership’s ambitions for the ‘Digital Silk Road’ initiative.
The regional perspective: situating China’s position on online freedom of expression within trends in Asia
Restrictions on online freedom of expression are not unique to China; indeed, they are increasing in many countries worldwide.39 Among China’s neighbours in Asia, countries with diverse political systems have enacted laws placing tight controls on free expression online and enabling surveillance. As with China, these restrictions have worsened as a result of emergency measures introduced under COVID-19.
The restriction of internet freedoms is notably stringent in Asia. For example, of the 213 internet shutdowns documented across the world in 2019, 143 took place in Asian countries.40 Since 2019, two of the longest internet shutdowns have taken place in Asia: in India (in relation to Kashmir);41 and in Myanmar42 (in Rakhine and Chin states). In June 2020, the UN high commissioner for human rights, Michelle Bachelet, appealed to Asian countries to ensure their efforts to combat false information about the pandemic adhered to the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality. This was in response to the use of ‘fake news’ laws being used to criminalize freedom of expression.43
Unlike Africa, the Americas and Europe, which all have regional human rights treaties that enshrine the right to freedom of expression, as well as regional human rights courts to supervise the implementation of those rights by states parties,44 Asia has no regional human rights instrument, and no human rights court.
Restrictions on online freedom of expression in Asia
As with China, even before the pandemic a number of South Asian and Southeast Asian governments had enacted laws to stifle online dissent. For example, in 2008 Indonesia enacted a law on information and electronic transactions. Passed to protect consumers in electronic transactions, it has also been used to criminalize political dissidents.45 In 2018, Malaysia criminalized the sharing of misinformation, making it the first Southeast Asian country to do so.46
In 2019, Singapore passed the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act, which gives government authorities the power to demand corrections, remove content and block webpages if content is deemed to be against the public interest or to undermine public interest in the government.47 In November 2019, Thailand’s government launched an ‘Anti-Fake News Center’ to combat unverified news on social media;48 civil society organizations argue that it could be misused to suppress free speech and dissent.49
Internet censorship and emergency laws during COVID-19
As in China, the prevalence of such laws, and of government actions based on them, has increased in Asia during the COVID-19 pandemic. Emergency measures restricting online freedom of expression can be observed in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam.
For example, since mid-March 2020 authorities in Bangladesh have arrested at least a dozen people under the Digital Security Act 2018 for comments about the coronavirus; those detained have included a doctor, opposition activists and students.50 In the Philippines, the government passed Republic Act No. 11469, which criminalizes the making and spreading of false information on social media and other platforms.51 In less than a month after its implementation, the government arrested 47 people for alleged violations of the law.52
In India, criminal law has been used against doctors from a private hospital in Aurangabad for allegedly spreading rumours on WhatsApp. On 25 February 2021, the Indian government announced new rules to regulate social media that will (among other things) require social media companies to take down misinformation or unlawful or violent content within 24 hours. The new rules have been criticized by rights groups for increasing the government’s power over content on social media platforms.53
Like China, several countries in the region have also been pressuring social media and other technology platforms to combat ‘misinformation’ on their sites. In Vietnam, for instance, state-owned telecom companies throttled traffic to Facebook, effectively restricting access to the platform, until Facebook agreed to take down content the Vietnamese government deemed anti-state.54
Heightened surveillance during COVID-19 has raised concerns regarding the expansion, normalization and institutionalization of surveillance even after the pandemic ends.
Suppression of freedom of expression online is supported by growing state surveillance capacities, which are evident in several countries in Asia besides China. Indeed, Asia has been branded ‘the world’s surveillance hotspot’, with new surveillance powers being assumed in 2020 by governments in Cambodia, India, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand.55 Heightened surveillance during COVID-19 has raised concerns regarding the expansion, normalization and institutionalization of surveillance even after the pandemic ends.56
Not every government in the region has increased restrictions on online freedom of expression during the pandemic. Taiwan has emerged as an exemplar of the democratic practice of providing open spaces for free expression online, leveraging its existing digital infrastructure and strong state–civil society relations to create open channels of information regarding the pandemic. Rather than clamp down on free expression, the authorities have ensured the dissemination of factual information in an accessible form to the public. However, Taiwan remains the exception rather than the rule.
Diverse influences
The role of Chinese technologies and models
The scale and pervasiveness of China’s model of internet control, censorship and surveillance are unique. The evidence suggests that, in controlling, censoring and monitoring internet users, governments in Asia are generally using their own tactics and adopting restrictions selectively, rather than copying China’s stringent form of digital authoritarianism chapter-and-verse.
Nonetheless, some countries have sought to emulate the Chinese government’s draconian approach to the online space. Vietnam’s cybersecurity law draws directly from the Chinese model in stifling any form of political speech that the state deems undesirable rather than simply minimizing cybersecurity threats.57 Myanmar’s new draft cybersecurity bill, proposed by the military State Administration Council in the wake of the military coup of February 2021, reflects the same principles of the Chinese and Vietnamese laws in giving the junta extensive powers to access individuals’ data, restrict or suspend access to the internet, and detain critics.58 Calls for cyber sovereignty are by no means unique to authoritarian regimes in the region, having also been raised in India.59
The Chinese government also actively seeks to influence other countries in Asia on internet governance through development projects. Under the aegis of the ‘Digital Silk Road’, part of the Chinese government’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese companies have been entering into projects abroad to provide or improve ICT networks and capabilities, including through the laying of underground cables; the establishment of smart cities; and the installation of artificial intelligence (AI), cloud computing or surveillance technology capabilities. Chinese exports of surveillance technologies have found purchase among a wide range of countries in the region, including India, Malaysia and Thailand. Chinese-exported internet controls have been found to be most common in countries participating in the BRI, and spread more easily and often to countries with authoritarian or hybrid regimes.60 Myanmar and Nepal are both recipients of Chinese infrastructure projects to lay down fibre-optic links. In November 2020, President Xi Jinping pledged to further deepen cooperation with ASEAN countries through promotion of the Digital Silk Road.61
Media officials and journalists from the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam have also received training in China on ‘new media development’.62
Notwithstanding this influence in its various forms, there is a certain wariness among Southeast Asian countries about the purchase of particular types of Chinese-made hardware, such as equipment for use in 5G telecoms networks. There is also general awareness, at least in Southeast Asia, of the risks involved in China’s control over vast amounts of data.63
China is not the only influence on approaches to online freedom of expression in the region. Culture and history also play a role. Many states in the region have had an uneasy relationship with international human rights law and standards.64 The Bandung Principles, adopted in 1955, underline the central importance of mutual respect for sovereignty, the principle of non-interference in other states’ internal affairs, non-aggression, political self-determination and equality among the 29 participant countries from Asia and Africa, most of which had recently become independent after colonial rule. In an ‘Asian values’ approach to human rights, community is prioritized over the individual, and socio-economic rights, including the right to development, prevail over civil and political rights.65
Dignity, equality and fairness are a more dominant part of the discourse in Asia than, for example, the right to privacy, on which there has been so much focus in Western democracies during the pandemic. But the salience of the right to freedom of expression online is particularly resonant in the region when linked to socio-economic rights such as the right to health in the context of a pandemic.
The role of Western technologies and models
Western policies and technology have also influenced online freedom of expression in Asia. Amnesty International recently found that three companies, based in France, the Netherlands and Sweden respectively, have been exporting digital surveillance systems such as facial-recognition technology and network cameras to China’s state security agencies.66 Western companies have also exported surveillance technology to other countries in Asia, including India, the Philippines and Singapore.67 Due to concerns about the role that some Western technology exporters play in aiding human rights abuse overseas, the EU recently agreed to tighten rules on the sale and export of dual-use goods such as facial-recognition technology and spyware, where such technology could be used for human rights violations.68
There is also some evidence that certain legislation from Europe has influenced models for curtailing online expression in Asia. Research by the Future of Speech Project indicates that at least 13 countries – including India, Malaysia, Pakistan and the Philippines – have adopted or proposed models similar to the German Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG). This law obliges social media platforms with 2 million or more users to remove illegal content – including hate speech and speech causing religious offence – within 24 hours, or risk fines of up to €50 million.69 In practice, the laws in Asian countries allow far greater discretionary powers to governments than does the German law, but the latter has nevertheless become a reference point.70 For example, Singapore’s wide-ranging Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act allows a minister to issue directions to internet intermediaries to correct or disable ‘false statements of facts’.71 The vagueness of the language leaves it liable to abuse, including the targeting of political dissent. Prior to the adoption of the bill, a preliminary report referenced the German law.72
Freedom House notes that powerful US-based technology companies with significant penetration in Asia – including Facebook (which owns WhatsApp and Instagram), Twitter and Google – have contributed to restrictions on online freedom of expression. The failure of US and other policymakers to regulate these platforms has enabled them to be exploited by anti-democratic forces, including in Asia.73 For example, Facebook, which has more than 18 million users in Myanmar, has admitted that the platform was used to incite violence in Myanmar against the Rohingya people.74 Such platforms have also served as conduits for disinformation and hate speech in the region.
But dominant US-based social media platforms are at least taking some measures to tackle these online harms. Facebook and Twitter have instituted a number of policies to address hate speech, civic integrity and influence operations in the past year.75 Indeed, Western online platforms are increasingly coming into conflict with governments in Asia over demands to censor or restrict online content. In Thailand, Facebook and the government have threatened each other with legal action over whether content critical of Thailand’s royal family should remain online.76 In India, where Facebook has nearly 300 million users, a Facebook page for agitating farmers was taken down by Facebook in February 2021 then restored following public outrage on social media.77 In Myanmar, Facebook restricted the accounts of Myanmar’s military for spreading ‘misinformation’ in the wake of the imposition by the military of an internet shutdown that blocked access to Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.78
The EU and some Western democracies are striving to come up with regulation that tackles online harms of global platforms while preserving freedom of expression. The EU’s draft Digital Services Act79 and the UK’s proposals for an Online Safety Bill,80 both published in December 2020, are grounded in a proportionate, risk-based approach that seeks to regulate online systems as a whole, focusing on the policies and procedures of relevant technology companies rather than on specific online content. These proposals, which are still at an early stage, are the product of multi-stakeholder consultations, and aim to promote greater transparency for users and greater accountability of technology companies. Other countries, including Ireland and Australia, are seeking to adopt similar approaches in draft legislation on online harms.81
So while the reasons for tight controls on internet freedoms in Asia are complex and diverse (and draw on myriad influences), the gulf between the increasingly rights-centric approach favoured by some Western countries and companies, on the one hand, and the model pursued by the Chinese government, on the other, is widening.
Shahbaz, A. and Funk, A. (2019), ‘Freedom on the Net 2019: The Crisis of Social Media’, Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2019/crisis-social-media.
Access Now (undated), Shutdown Tracker Optimization Project (STOP) Dataset, www.accessnow.org/keepiton (accessed 3 Mar. 2021).
Wallen, J. (2021), ‘High speed internet restored in Kashmir after ‘world’s longest’ blackout’, Telegraph, 6 February 2021, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2021/02/06/high-speed-internet-restored-kashmir-worlds-longest-blackout.
The Wire (2020), ‘Human Rights Groups Criticise ‘World’s Longest Internet Shutdown’ in Myanmar’, The Wire, 28 June 2020, https://thewire.in/south-asia/myanmar-worlds-longest-internet-shutdown; and Hlaing, K. H. (2020), ‘People in Parts of Myanmar Are Living Under the World’s Longest Internet Shutdown. It’s Putting Lives in Danger’, Time, 16 November 2020, https://time.com/5910040/myanmar-internet-ban-rakhine.
UN News (2020), ‘Asian countries urged to honour right to freedom of expression, over pandemic fear’, UN News, 3 June 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/06/1065532.
Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Hamid, U. (2019), ‘Indonesia’s Information Law has threatened free speech for more than a decade. This must stop’, The Conversation, 25 November 2019, https://theconversation.com/indonesias-information-law-has-threatened-free-speech-for-more-than-a-decade-this-must-stop-127446.
Funke, D. and Flamini, D. (undated), ‘A guide to anti-misinformation actions around the world’, Poynter, www.poynter.org/ifcn/anti-misinformation-actions.
Wong, T. (2019), ‘Singapore Fake News law polices chats and online platforms’, BBC News, 9 May 2019, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48196985.
Tanakasempipat, P. (2019), ‘Thailand unveils ‘anti-fake news’ center to police the internet’, Reuters, 1 November 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-fakenews-idUSKBN1XB48O.
Zsombor, P. (2019), ‘Thailand’s Anti-Fake News Center Fans Fears of Censorship’, VOA News, 6 October 2019, www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/thailands-anti-fake-news-center-fans-fears-censorship.
Human Rights Watch (2020), ‘Bangladesh: End Wave of COVID-19 ‘Rumor’ Arrests’, Human Rights Watch, 31 March 2020, www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/31/bangladesh-end-wave-covid-19-rumor-arrests.
Joaquin, J. J. B. and Biana, H. T. (2020), ‘Philippine crimes of dissent: Free speech in the time of COVID-19’, Crime, Media, Culture, pp. 1–5, doi: 10.1177/1741659020946181.
Ibid.
See, for example, Access Now (2021), ‘Indian authorities tighten control over online content’, 25 February 2021, www.accessnow.org/indian-authorities-tighten-control-over-online-content.
Nguyen, A. (2020), ‘Vietnam’s Government is Using COVID-19 to Crack Down on Freedom of Expression’, Slate, 8 May 2020, https://slate.com/technology/2020/05/vietnam-coronavirus-fake-news-law-social-media.html.
Nazalya, S. (2020), ‘Asia emerges as world’s surveillance hotspot’, Human Rights Outlook 2020, Verisk Maplecroft, 30 September 2020, www.maplecroft.com/insights/analysis/hro-asia-emerges-as-worlds-surveillance-hotspot.
Chok, L. (2020), ‘The policy black box in Singapore’s digital contact tracing strategy’, LSE Southeast Asia Blog, 22 September 2020, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/seac/2020/09/22/the-policy-black-box-in-singapores-digital-contact-tracing-strategy.
Sherman, J. (2019), ‘Vietnam’s Internet Control: Following in China’s Footsteps?’, The Diplomat, 11 December 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/vietnams-internet-control-following-in-chinas-footsteps.
Human Rights Watch (2021), ‘Myanmar: Scrap Sweeping Cybersecurity Bill’, 12 February 2021, www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/12/myanmar-scrap-sweeping-cybersecurity-bill.
Leigh, K., Kravchenko, S. and Rai, S. (2019), ‘How ‘Cybersovereignty’ Splits the Once World Wide Web’, Bloomberg, 2 May 2019, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-02/how-cybersovereignty-splits-the-once-world-wide-web-quicktake.
Weber, V. (2019), The Worldwide Web of Chinese and Russian Information Controls, Washington, DC: Open Technology Fund, https://public.opentech.fund/documents/English_Weber_WWW_of_Information_Controls_Final.pdf.
Zhou, L. (2020), ‘Let’s build a digital silk road: Xi Jinping looks to cement China’s ties with Asean’, South China Morning Post, 27 November 2020, www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3111612/lets-build-digital-silk-road-president-xi-promises-ways-china.
Shahbaz, A. (2018), ‘The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism’, Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2018/rise-digital-authoritarianism.
Center for Strategic & International Studies (2019), ‘China’s Digital Silk Road and Southeast Asia’, Commentary, 15 February 2019, www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-digital-silk-road-and-southeast-asia.
Saul, B. (2019), essay in Security and Prosperity in Asia: The Role of International Law, Chatham House Conference Paper, November 2019, www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/CHHJ7378-International-Law-Research-Paper-INT-191031-WEB.pdf.
Ibid; and Moynihan, H. (2018), ‘Exploring Public International Law Issues with Chinese Scholars – Part 4’, Chatham House Meeting Summary, 2–3 June 2018, www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-06-02-Roundtable4-summary.pdf.
Amnesty International (2020), Out of Control: Failing EU Laws for Digital Surveillance Export, www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR0125562020ENGLISH.PDF.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2020), ‘AI Global Surveillance (AIGS) Index’, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/AI_Global_Surveillance_Index1.pdf.
Euronews (2020), ‘‘A win for global human rights’ as EU agrees on tighter rules for surveillance tech exports’, 9 November 2020, www.euronews.com/2020/11/09/a-win-for-global-human-rights-as-eu-agrees-on-tighter-rules-for-surveillance-tech-exports.
Mchangama, J. and Fiss, J. (2019), The Digital Berlin Wall: How Germany (Accidentally) Created a Prototype for Global Online Censorship, Justitia Report, Copenhagen: Justitia, http://justitia-int.org/en/the-digital-berlin-wall-how-germany-created-a-prototype-for-global-online-censorship.
The German NetzDG law does not create new categories of illegal content and is only an iteration of existing statutes in the German criminal code with regard to hate speech. In comparison, some of the laws in Asia are more restrictive and rely on broad and vague categories of content such as ‘blasphemy’ (Indonesia), ‘embarrassing or slanderous information’ (Vietnam), or ‘false statements of facts’ that the government considers to be harmful and untrue (Singapore).
Republic of Singapore (2019), ‘Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019’, Singapore Statutes Online, https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Acts-Supp/18-2019.
Mchangama and Fiss (2019), The Digital Berlin Wall: How Germany (Accidentally) Created a Prototype for Global Online Censorship.
Shahbaz and Funk (2019), ‘Freedom on the Net 2019: The Crisis of Social Media’.
BBC (2018), ‘Facebook admits it was used to ‘incite offline violence’ in Myanmar’, BBC Asia, 6 November 2018, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-46105934.
See for example, Clarke, C. (2020), ‘Facebook announces new hate speech policies after Unilever joins advertising boycott’, The Drum, 26 June 2020, www.thedrum.com/news/2020/06/26/facebook-announces-new-hate-speech-policies-after-unilever-joins-advertiser-boycott; Twitter (2020), ‘Expanding our policies to further protect the civic conversation’, 10 September 2020, https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/civic-integrity-policy-update.html; and Facebook (2021), ‘February 2021 Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour Report’, 3 March 2021, https://about.fb.com/news/2021/03/february-2021-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-report.
Holmes, O. (2017), ‘Thailand deadline for Facebook to remove illicit content passes’, Guardian, 16 May 2017, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/16/thailand-deadline-for-facebook-to-remove-illicit-content-passes; and Lloyd Parry, R. (2020), ‘Facebook forced to block page criticizing Thai royal family’, The Times, 25 August 2020, www.thetimes.co.uk/article/facebook-forced-to-block-page-criticising-thai-royal-family-c6ldt7ddq.
National Herald (2021), ‘Facebook restores farmers’ page but silent on why it was taken down’, 21 December 2020, www.nationalheraldindia.com/india/facebook-restores-farmers-page-but-silent-on-why-it-was-taken-down.
Disis, J. and Lockwood, P. (2021), ‘Facebook restricts Myanmar military’s accounts for spreading misinformation’, CNN Business, 12 February 2021, https://edition.cnn.com/2021/02/12/tech/facebook-myanmar-military-intl-hnk/index.html.
European Commission (2020), ‘The Digital Services Act: ensuring a safe and accountable online environment’, https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-services-act-ensuring-safe-and-accountable-online-environment_en.
Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport; Home Office (2020), ‘Online Harms White Paper: Full government response to the consultation’, CPN 354, 15 December 2020, www.gov.uk/government/consultations/online-harms-white-paper/outcome/online-harms-white-paper-full-government-response.
Government of Ireland (2020), ‘Online Safety and Media Regulation Bill’, published on 10 January 2020, www.gov.ie/en/publication/d8e4c-online-safety-and-media-regulation-bill; and Government of Australia (2020), ‘Consultation on a Bill for a new Online Safety Act’, www.communications.gov.au/have-your-say/consultation-bill-new-online-safety-act.