Most prominently in Mali and Burkina Faso, governments in the Sahel have repeatedly used informal militia groups as proxies for ineffective or unreliable military structures.
Responses to insurgent groups in the Sahel over the past decade seem to have drawn little on what has been learned from past experience. Instead of trying to win hearts and minds, governments have once again often resorted to emergency measures that impact on civilians – arbitrary arrests, restrictions on movement and economic sanctions – many of which still remain in place. In areas where fighting is taking place, these measures partly explain why the insurgents, now labelled jihadists and terrorists, continue to garner support from certain segments of the population. Sahelian armies have alienated people by repressive measures that have included killing civilians, banning motorcycles, extorting traders, closing borders, obstructing the passage of herds or goods, and stigmatizing entire communities, notably the Fulani of Macina, in Mali, or the Kanuri, in Niger’s Lake Chad region.
Most notable is the broad and continuing use of informal state-linked militia groups as proxies for ineffective or unreliable military structures. Available statistics show that, globally, governments used militias in nearly two-thirds of the civil wars recorded between 1989 and 2010; today, in the Sahel, their use is most prominent in Mali and Burkina Faso. Proponents of the use of local militias claim that they can be useful to supplement regular armies and are a pragmatic response to capacity shortfalls in national security forces. They know the terrain better and cost less than professional soldiers; and working with militias can avoid the need to take on, at speed, new regular recruits whose demobilization is difficult when a conflict ends. Militias can sometimes also react quickly to emerging threats, without needing to wait for clearance from an army’s chief of staff before taking action. Governments maintain, too, that their oversight of co-opted militias prevents collateral damage and civilian deaths.
In addition, such militias are often popular in their communities and in nationalist circles. In the transboundary Liptako-Gourma region, for instance, surveys have shown that two-thirds of respondents look to traditional authorities to secure areas bordering Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. In addition, almost a quarter are ready to set up self-defence units to compensate for the absence of government forces and the lack of official witness protection schemes. Surveys conducted across Burkina Faso in 2018 indicated that 90 per cent of the country’s population had a positive view of the so-called Koglweogo (‘bush guardians’) and Dozo vigilantes who were authorized to conduct security operations in rural areas to compensate for the capacity shortfalls of security forces.
However, these claims run counter to a pattern in which the creation of militia groups has led to rises in community violence. Most militias are unvetted, untrained and non-professional. They kill without authority, are not accountable to the state, and tend to exacerbate communal tensions. Indeed, they only defend their own community, and they sometimes use their powers to settle personal scores. In Burkina Faso, for example, the Dozo hunters protect the interests of the Dioula in the west; and the Koglweogo the interests of the Mossi in the centre and north, where the Ansarul Islam jihadist movement is active. In both Mali and Burkina Faso, Fulani cattle-breeders have been stigmatized and incited to join the insurgents by massacres at the hands of militias.
