No successful cooperative security model, where states work to manage regional challenges through consent, norms and codes of conduct, has been implemented in the region. Experts agree that this approach – which has underpinned the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, among others – has been lacking in the Middle East. As noted by Peter Jones, cooperative security models:
Ultimately, a cooperative security model is needed to underpin regional conflict management.
By our analysis, Middle East security efforts to date – be they regional or subregional – can be divided into three ‘baskets’, or groupings, based on threat perceptions: those directed to bolstering Arab unity and security; those seeking to address the Israeli–Palestinian peace process; and those focused on containing threats from Tehran. The models and initiatives discussed below share a common characteristic of being exclusive collective security efforts. In addition to these three groupings, external actors like the US and the former Soviet Union, during the Cold War and in the period after, used collective security organizations and initiatives to promote their own goals and wider competitive objectives in the region.
In the first basket, prioritizing the unity and security of the Arab states, sits the Arab League, formed in 1945, which has since its establishment become increasingly politicized, with repeated efforts at creating a joint military force failing to overcome regional competition. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) includes all regional actors other than Israel, along with other Muslim-majority countries outside the Middle East, but has no mediation structure. Following the 1990 Gulf conflict, the Damascus Declaration brought together the GCC states, Egypt and Syria with the ambition to establish a robust security organization, but this grouping failed to resolve tensions over financing and trust. The GCC, formed in 1981, remains subregional in scope, as a collective security initiative convened against Iran. Despite efforts (both internal and external) to empower and unify the bloc, the GCC has not managed intra-organizational crises or security threats against the smaller states; nor has it been able to address contending views on cohesion – as evidenced by the impact, from 2017, of the Qatar crisis on the bloc’s ability to function effectively. Most recently, the Trump administration sought to create a Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA), envisaged as a NATO-like Arab political and security organization, grouping the GCC states, Egypt and Jordan, with the objective of working together to stem Iranian regional activity. The MESA initiative failed to take shape because of challenges and disagreements among the Arab states over the goals, threat perceptions and structure of such an alliance.
In response to tensions in the Persian Gulf resulting from Iranian escalation during 2019, a flurry of regional security ideas were put forward by external powers keen to de-escalate. The US led the establishment of the International Alliance for the Safety and Protection of Maritime Navigation, which was joined by Australia, the UK, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE, with the goal of protecting maritime security and freedom of navigation. However, the EU states, wanting to distance themselves from the Trump administration’s Iran policies, chose not to join the coalition. Instead, they launched the European Maritime Situation Awareness mission in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH), with the participation of Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal.
In the second basket are peace initiatives directed towards managing the Israel–Palestine conflict. Beyond the 1979 Camp David accords, which brought the normalization of ties between Israel and Egypt, the 1990s saw intensive peace negotiations in, successively, Madrid, Oslo, Shepherdstown and Camp David. The only durable legacy of the latter period was the 1994 peace agreement between Jordan and Israel. These efforts critically failed to address imbalances towards the Palestinians in any meaningful way. The 2020 Abraham Accords brought together Israel, the UAE and Bahrain in new normalization agreements. These have been publicly sold as offering important bilateral economic, technological and commercial opportunities in a variety of sectors, among them energy, tourism, healthcare and ports. They also make official the long-observed, quiet collaboration under way since the 1990s between Israel and Gulf Arab states. Beyond the commercial and diplomatic opportunities, however, the agreement to normalize ties has its roots in wider Emirati and Israeli anxieties about the US’s longer-term commitment to the region, and their mutual ambitions to directly manage the multiplying regional conflicts in areas where they share related concerns – potentially offering a new regional alignment.
The agreement to normalize ties between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain has its roots in wider Emirati and Israeli anxieties about the US’s longer-term commitment to the region, and their mutual ambitions to directly manage the multiplying regional conflicts in areas where they share related concerns.
The Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group (ACRS) was created in 1991 through the Madrid process, bringing together 13 Arab states, Israel and Palestinians to discuss regional security, arms control and wider CBMs. This was the only cooperative arrangement undertaken, and the closest the region has come to working towards a cooperative security model, but this effort also did not include all regional states. The parties began discussing a draft agreement of principles, but ACRS eventually folded because of challenges within the Israel–Palestine process. Participants did succeed in establishing channels and communication protocols, including prenotification of military activities.
The third basket is made up of arrangements with a shared focus on constraining Iran’s security and regional challenges, and that seek to manage and improve Iran’s economic, political and security relationships in the region and international community. Fundamentally, the trade-off is that Iran reins in its most concerning security activities in return for Western economic benefits and reduced involvement in the region. UN Security Council Resolution 598, adopted in July 1987, succeeding in bringing together Iran and Iraq to end their eight-year war, with a ceasefire in 1988, and requested the Secretary-General ‘to examine, in consultation with Iran and Iraq and with other States of the region, measures to enhance the security and stability of the region’. This UN initiative has not yet manifested, but a number of interviewees saw this as a mandate to create a future process.
Following revelations of Iran’s clandestine nuclear programme in 2002, a series of initiatives emerged to manage tensions and the growing nuclear stand-off. From Iran’s ‘grand bargain’ proposal to the George W. Bush administration in May 2003, offering to negotiate on nuclear and regional issues, to the October 2003 Tehran declaration and the agreement reached in Paris in November 2004, these three efforts sought to avert, albeit unsuccessfully, a nuclear crisis.
A decade later, however, the JPOA and its broader finalized agreement – the JCPOA – did lay the groundwork for a successful multilateral agreement. Although solely focused on constraining Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief, the JCPOA was intended to lead to wider regional discussions. However, post-JCPOA inertia and, from 2016, uncertainty over the US’s future commitment to the deal, prevented regional discussions from advancing. There followed, in May 2018, as President Trump carried out his campaign threat to withdraw the US from the JCPOA, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s ‘12 demands’, which unsuccessfully sought to roll back Iran’s nuclear, ballistic and regional calculus.
