‘Broadening the discussions too early could doom the process to failure,’ in the view of one American analyst. It is thus critical that a JCPOA roll-out is accompanied by a clear plan of action to address the original deal’s deficiencies. To prevent a repeat of the mistakes made during the JCPOA negotiations, whereby Iran was able to expand its footprint in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon and Syria, respondents thought it crucial to establish a regional roadmap that would explain the next steps beyond the JCPOA and the parallel processes that would entail. With such a roadmap in tow, the Biden administration will be better able to placate congressional opponents and respond to regional concerns. With regard to the latter, it will be essential to commit to coordination and consultation, and to acknowledge the unease felt by Israel, the UAE and Saudi Arabia. One Emirati interviewee suggested that the Biden team ‘should learn from Obama’s mistakes’. Moreover, regional ‘buy-in for a wider regional plan is urgently needed, otherwise the whole scheme will fall apart’, said one Saudi expert. The challenge for Washington will be to prevent the Gulf states from playing the role of spoiler for a second time. Respondents recommended that the creation of parallel regional tracks, in addition to the focus on the JCPOA, would show GCC states and Israel that the Biden administration would be charting its own course rather than picking up where Obama left off.
Among the principal benefits of returning to the JCPOA is Iran’s recommitment to nuclear compliance. Biden has also stated that restoring the JCPOA, with the US and Iran returning to mutual compliance, would also avoid a nuclear build-up in the Middle East. This was identified by US and European interviewees as a significant step that would open the door to future regional discussions. Moreover, Israel experts also indicated that managing Iran’s nuclear advancements was the principal security challenge for Jerusalem. Tehran has repeatedly stated that all of its nuclear breaches have been designed to be reversed. A number of months will be needed for Iran to meet its 2015 commitments. It is expected that advanced centrifuges can be stopped, and higher levels of enriched uranium can be shipped to Russia, as was seen in the JCPOA implementation process. The only area that would be impossible to reverse is Iran’s research and development advancements since 2019. However, as stated by one Iranian interviewee: ‘Tehran has proposals prepared and in place for when those nuclear compliance discussions begin.’
Biden has stated that restoring the JCPOA, with the US and Iran returning to mutual compliance, would also avoid a nuclear build-up in the Middle East.
On the US side, compliance will be met by sanctions relief. Should the Biden administration choose to reverse the sanctions implemented since 2018, specifically those tied to the its predecessor’s maximum pressure campaign, it will require a few months of due diligence to work through the more than 1,500 designations. As summarized by one interviewee: ‘It won’t be easy to do a clean reversal of sanctions.’ The Biden team will also have to make a decision on whether it will reverse human rights, counterterror and proliferation sanctions that were also applied by the Trump administration. Another respondent stated:
At the outset of the process, the Biden administration could provide assistance for COVID-19 vaccination programmes, or facilitate humanitarian transfers. Trade channels such as the European Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) or the Swiss Humanitarian Trade Arrangement – would allow Washington to make such exports while sanctions relief is in progress. Biden may also opt to remove some of Trump’s designations of financial institutions to facilitate critical humanitarian aid. This could include reversing secondary sanctions on Iranian banks, or revoking the classification of the Central Bank of Iran as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. These initial conciliatory steps would help foreign pharmaceutical companies seeking to do business in Iran in sectors not covered by US secondary sanctions. Moreover, in absence of the full sanctions relief that has often been demanded by Tehran, these efforts would be seen as important gestures of US intent.
Re-entry to the JCPOA would, moreover, be a necessary step to refortify transatlantic relations. The E3 countries have been particularly aggrieved not only by the US’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA, but also by the Trump administration’s bullying approach that forced Europe to comply with the sanctions imposed under Washington’s maximum pressure policy. As already noted, the E3 unsuccessfully lobbied against the US withdrawal, warning that this would result in greater instability. The return of US sanctions resulted in the withdrawal of international business from the Iranian economy and the blocking of Tehran’s access to the international banking system.
The E3 was able to remain united in the face of the Trump administration’s maximum pressure policy, and has been committed to upholding the JCPOA. Despite Iran’s repeated breaches, the E3 made use of the dispute resolution mechanism provided for in the 2015 agreement, as part of a strategy to buy time pending the outcome of the 2020 US election. However, all this required continued investment and coordination. One French interviewee expressed deep frustration over the amount of time ‘wasted’ – as they put it – on the JCPOA process during this period, that could otherwise have been diverted to dealing with the active regional conflicts. Another spoke of having experienced ‘insulting‘ levels of conversation and communication from members of the Trump administration, even suggesting that an apology was warranted. On the other hand, fearful of US reprisals, the E3 was not able to stave off US sanctions, leaving European companies no choice but to withdraw from the Iranian market. It did initiate INSTEX, but the mechanism designed to facilitate transactions has not been operational due to similar issues of compliance with US sanctions. This transatlantic divide played out through 2019 and 2020, with the EU establishing its own Persian Gulf maritime security initiative, rather than joining the US operation, to avoid association with maximum pressure. Strikingly, the E3 refused to endorse US efforts to extend the Iranian arms embargo ahead of its scheduled expiry in October 2020, and rejected a request by the US for the imposition of snapback sanctions as incompatible with the E3’s ongoing support for the JCPOA.
Despite these efforts, the E3 was repeatedly accused by Tehran of not doing enough to push back against Washington. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei spoke witheringly of the Europeans in 2019, stating that they ‘do not have the same capabilities, hegemony and facilities [as the US]; but, the mentality of the European leaders is the same as that of the US officials. They enter the scene as mediators, they negotiate, contact, make calls, make lengthy speeches, and make commitments, but they are not truthful.’ Even so, in the same speech he held open the possibility of dialogue: ‘One point about Europe and the foreign policy affairs is that we have not closed the door for establishing relations and negotiating …’. One Iranian respondent expressed the view that the E3 has an important role to play as a ‘convener’ and an ‘investor’ in the Iranian market. This Iranian pressure strategy vis-à-vis the European signatories has been more about rhetoric than substance. Tehran has also leveraged the E3’s support for the JCPOA and opposition to Trump-era policies to foster international public sympathy.
The E3 states have been greatly frustrated in their position as guarantors of the JCPOA, by the pressure from both Tehran and Washington, by the escalation of regional tensions, and by the reactivation of Iran’s nuclear programme.
For the Biden administration, restoring multilateral cooperation on Iran should be seen as an essential element in the compliance-for-compliance process. The E3 states have been greatly frustrated in their position as guarantors of the JCPOA, by the pressure from both Tehran and Washington, by the escalation of regional tensions, and by the reactivation of Iran’s nuclear programme. Moreover, many respondents from the E3 expressed resentment at not having been able to focus more on regional security issues such as the wars in Yemen and Syria, alongside Tehran’s detention of dual nationals, developments within its missile programme, and arms proliferation around the region.
In summary, reviving the JCPOA would be a foundational and necessary step towards a regional security process. As part of the compliance-for-compliance negotiations and implementation, all parties should commit to participation in the second phase. Iran can be incentivized to participate with the promise of additional sanctions relief or investment. Securing Tehran’s commitment will be critical to alleviating regional concerns. ‘It is important that the JCPOA compliance process does not give Iran regional immunity,’ as one an Israeli respondent put it. Interviewees from the UAE and Saudi Arabia shared this view. Such a commitment will be important for the E3, too. French respondents worried that E3 unity might fracture, with France resuming the harder line seen in the initial JCPOA negotiations. UK respondents were unsure how the outcome of the US election, together with the repercussions of Brexit, might impact E3 solidarity. German, UK and French interviewees viewed the maintenance of the collaborative E3 approach as one of the positive outcomes of the Trump period that should be maintained. Biden could also draw on Tehran’s commitment to the process to placate opponents in the US Congress as the ground is laid to tackle the harder issues needed to lengthen and strengthen the deal and address broader deficiencies in the agreement as arrived at in 2015.