Essential to the resilience of the ‘JCPOA plus’ process will be a set of crisis-resolution tracks, focusing on the wars in Yemen and Syria, Israel–Palestine, and rebuilding solidarity among the GCC states.
A follow on step, as identified by the majority of participants in the interviews for this paper, requires working towards resolving key conflicts. Yemen was considered to be the least difficult to resolve, but equally important are the Israel–Palestine and Syria conflicts. Respondents also discussed the significant security implications of the rift in the GCC, which was unresolved at the time the interviews took place.
The Yemen track
The majority of interviewees’ responses (52 per cent) suggested that there are relatively straightforward gains to be made in terms of resolving the conflict in Yemen, with many referring to the ‘low-hanging fruit’ to be harvested there. It was argued in 25 per cent of responses that Iran is far less invested in Yemen than it is in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria; and that the Houthis remain fiercely independent and – unlike other Iranian-backed proxies – are much less likely to consider Tehran’s calculus in their own decision-making. Moreover, 37 per cent of responses noted that whereas Tehran considers Iraq to be critical to its national security, and Lebanon essential to the regime’s legitimacy, Yemen has so far been an opportunity that it has been able to exploit with relative ease.
Respondents drew a distinction between the relationship shared by the Houthis and Iran, and that of the Houthis with Hezbollah. 22 per cent of interviewees’ responses made the case that, compared with Tehran, Hezbollah has in fact instrumentalized its relationship with the Houthis to greater effect, by offering regular support via logistics and operations; command and control; arms and munitions; and missile technology and know-how. While 77 per cent of Saudi responses expressed fears that if the Houthis become part of the formal governing apparatus in Yemen they will resemble Hezbollah in Lebanon – which is a legitimate concern – 28 per cent of responses overall considered that Iran shares no such an objective. The latter argued that the Iranian regime’s legitimacy has rested on investing heavily in building Hezbollah in Lebanon, and, by doing so, it has been able to challenge Israel directly – something no Arab state has been able to do since 1973 – and, more recently, shore up the Assad regime in Syria. As such, Tehran’s investment has served its national interest; threatening Israel’s security is an action intended to mobilize public support behind the regime, and is also used to justify domestic policies and failures.
Supporting the Houthis, on the other hand, does not serve the same purpose for Tehran. Indeed, the Houthis are a major thorn in Saudi Arabia’s side, and a means of threatening the kingdom’s security. The continuing barrage of Houthi missiles targeting the kingdom’s infrastructure and cities prove this point. They also act as a major drain on Riyadh’s resources, but there is no real desire or indeed benefit for them in fomenting a revolution or overthrowing the Al Saud. As such, Iran is content to provide limited support to the Houthis to create grave discomfort, or even embarrassment, for the Saudis, but it has little motivation to intensify its efforts or sponsor a deeply embedded proxy force or forces, as it has done in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. It has thus left much of the operational, organizational and materiel support for the Houthis to Hezbollah, which currently has its own issues of overstretch in both Lebanon and Syria. For the time being, Hezbollah’s capacity is constrained by its own major commitments; and the near collapse of the state in Lebanon has meant that its leadership is under severe pressure. Moreover, the vulnerability of high-profile Iranian figures, against whom Israel has carried out a campaign of assassinations, also poses a serious threat to Hebzollah’s leadership. This in itself will likely curtail some of the group’s adventurous dealings in the region.
In all, 68 per cent of Yemen expert responses asserted that the Houthis are neither an imported group, a proxy drawn from another country or region, nor a group willing to submit itself to Iran’s imperatives. They are an integral part of Yemeni society; and although they took part in six wars with the previous Saleh government between 2004 and 2010, they did so under their own aegis and without major external support. In other words, they are a group with a distinctive Yemeni identity, act in their own immediate interests, and – notwithstanding an increase in support from Hezbollah and Iran since 2015 – are not beholden to external actors. 84 per cent of Yemen expert responses considered the Houthis to be an independent group that has resisted interference from domestic and external actors, including Iran – especially when Tehran has issued requests to the Houthi leadership to exercise restraint in the conflict with the Saudi-led coalition. Iran’s ability to command and control the Houthis was repeatedly questioned by respondents.
68 per cent of Yemen expert responses asserted that the Houthis are neither an imported group, a proxy drawn from another country or region, nor a group willing to submit itself to Iran’s imperatives.
Among all interviewees, 65 per cent were of the opinion that although Iran places little strategic importance on Yemen, Saudi Arabia views it differently. For Riyadh, Yemen is a foreign policy priority, given its proximity and shared geographic, demographic, economic, familial and historical connections. Interviewees emphasized its importance in the eyes of the Saudi leadership, pointing to the number of conflicts that have taken place between the kingdom and combatants in Yemen over the years. Some regional experts argued that whereas Saudi Arabia had once had strong tribal ties with Yemeni society, as well as deep links within its security networks, these had been squandered in recent times. Furthermore, the policies of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had effectively diminished Riyadh’s ability to influence Sanaa. At the same time, most respondents argued that his hasty entry into the war in 2015 had cost the kingdom dearly, including through the loss of political and diplomatic influence. Along with direct costs estimated at $6 billion per month since the start of the war, there has been increased insecurity in border areas and population centres such as Yanbu and Jeddah, and the intervention has contributed substantially to the humanitarian disaster in Yemen. Moreover, war fatigue is growing among the Saudi people, who are increasingly frustrated by the ongoing missile attacks in the kingdom. Important as it is to Saudi Arabia, Yemen has in reality become a major drain on the kingdom’s resources, reputation and political capital. And especially under a Biden White House, it threatens to damage Riyadh’s relations with Washington. Hence, Saudi foreign minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud proposed a ‘new’ ceasefire plan in coordination with the new US special envoy to Yemen, Tim Lenderking, in late March 2021.
Iran’s perception of Yemen as a lower-order foreign policy priority, combined with Saudi Arabia’s desire to extricate itself from a costly war but still secure its interests there, was considered by 58 per cent of responses to be the key to unlocking the conflict. However, Iran has no incentive to ease the pressure on Saudi Arabia by drawing down support for the Houthis and encouraging Hezbollah to do the same unless Riyadh can offer something meaningful in return. Saudi Arabia has little scope to do this in Yemen, but there are other areas in the region where Riyadh could be in a position to ‘trade’. For example, 42 per cent of responses noted that, for Saudi Arabia, its interests in Syria are of a lower order of priority than is the case for Iran. Therefore, progress in one theatre, such as Yemen, could begin to unlock movement in another. That is to say, given that Iran is not highly invested in Yemen and attaches limited strategic importance to it, Tehran will be much more likely to take part in negotiations to help end the conflict there if Saudi Arabia is willing to either curb support for forces opposing Iranian influence, withdraw support for sanctions against Tehran or deploy diplomatic capital positively in countries that Iran considers of a higher priority. To that end, Yemen represents a critical de-escalatory track.
The GCC track
Divisions among the GCC states were regarded by 41 per cent of interviewees’ responses as a major regional security challenge, not just because these divisions limit the implementation of a coordinated Iran policy, but also because political competition between Doha and Abu Dhabi has created a regional proxy conflict in its own right. As one of the parallel tracks to addressing regional security, the GCC crisis was cited in interviews as important to resolve.
In late 2020, there were indications that a bilateral resolution between Riyadh and Doha could be forthcoming. Then, on 5 January 2021, the six GCC states met at Al Ula, Saudi Arabia, where they signed a security and stability pact that officially ended the rift. As part of the agreement, the Quartet states that had led the blockade (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain) agreed to open air, land and sea routes to Qatar. Doha, for its part, would rescind pending lawsuits against the four countries. Collectively, they agreed to restore diplomatic ties and to desist from negative media coverage and work towards mending their rift, which had caused immense reputational, social, financial and political damage for the GCC. While the GCC had continued to function at a lower level after the blockade was imposed in 2017, the rift exposed ideological and political divergences and competitive dynamics within the bloc that, without acknowledgment or meaningful repair, could easily resurface.
Washington had made some efforts at mediating between Doha, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh after 2017, but not in ways that would have compelled the parties to end their rift. The Trump administration saw resolution of the crisis as being tied to its Iran strategy. Respondents also saw the crisis as having benefited Tehran. Under the blockade, Doha had been paying Iran for use of its airspace, meaning that the latter was less isolated. Although Qatar, which shares the North Field/South Pars gasfields with Iran, has long maintained a pragmatic but cautious relationship with Tehran, there has been a consensus among the GCC countries that containing Iranian regional interference, in a sign of unity, particularly in Gulf affairs, is a priority. And, as seen during the Iran–Iraq war, GCC states have come together to manage external shocks. Notably, GCC leaders released a joint statement urging the UN to extend the arms embargo against Iran, ahead of its scheduled expiry in October 2020.
At the heart of the crisis have been deep tensions between Abu Dhabi and Doha. The UAE sees Qatar not only as an ambitious competitor, but as one that has sponsored, particularly since 2011, Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated groups across the region. Emirati leaders see the Muslim Brotherhood as being on the same destabilizing spectrum as radical Islamist groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS. Qatar’s support for actors in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Yemen and Libya, together with its growing relationship with Turkey and pragmatic ties with Iran, has brought it into open competition with the UAE. These dynamics have not been limited to the Gulf region: they have played out in Yemen, Syria and Libya, where Doha and Abu Dhabi have supported rival non-state groups. As one Emirati interviewee commented: ‘The more fragmented the GCC is, the more the competition between Doha and Abu Dhabi is projected outward, leaving the region more vulnerable.’
The crisis within the GCC also revealed concerns on the part of Oman and Kuwait over more assertive Emirati policies. These two countries have recently undergone succession, following the death of their long-standing leaders, Sultan Qaboos and Sheikh Sabah, in 2020. Both men were respected for their roles as mediators, and the loss of their influence has left both states more vulnerable to pressure.
Thus, as part of this track, GCC discussions should be supported and encouraged so that all six states work systematically with one another. For the parties to agree to accept the principles of sovereignty, an opening of borders and airspace, and mutual respect in media reporting were all identified as important climb-down and face-saving solutions during the interviews (which took place before the January 2021 pact was agreed). The Quartet, however, will need to accept that Doha will not turn its back on its strong relationship with Ankara, nor on its lesser one with Tehran. Furthermore, healing the rift will require social and political investment to soothe nationalist reactions and ease hardened popular perceptions.
The Israel–Palestine track
It has long been argued that the Middle East will only be peaceful and prosperous when the Israel–Palestine conflict is resolved. This assumption has been severely tested over the years, and especially now the region has become the site of so many other persistent conflicts. However, working towards a resolution of this decades-long conflict appears to be far out of reach, given continuing political uncertainty in Israel following four sets of parliamentary elections over the past two years; Netanyahu’s active pursuit of a narrowly defined national interest; the Palestinian leadership’s political weakness; and the impact of moves undertaken by the Trump administration such as relocating the US embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, cutting funding to UNRWA (which the interim US envoy to the UN, Richard Mills, said in late March 2021 would now be restored), and sidelining the Palestinians in any discussion of a peace deal.
The signing of the Abraham Accords has effectively undermined the Palestinian leadership once again, and placed agency in the hands – partially – of regional players including the UAE, Bahrain and Jordan.
Nevertheless, the signing of the Abraham Accords between Israel and the UAE, and Israel and Bahrain, in September 2020 – at the time the interviews for this paper were taking place – was presented by a number of respondents as paving the way for a new initiative. It is clear that the normalization deals between Israel and these Gulf states, and which will at some point include Saudi Arabia as well, mean a paradigm shift for how the Israel–Palestine conflict will be approached in future. Although the Saudi foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, and former Saudi ambassador to the US Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud have emphasized that Riyadh will only seek normalization on the terms agreed at the 2002 Arab Summit in Beirut, known as the Arab Peace Initiative, it appears that the future of the two-state solution (based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338) is in peril. There is an increasing likelihood that a resolution to the conflict may be reached, but it will be one that is imposed on Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza by regional states and accepted by a new Palestinian leadership supported by those same states.
The Palestinians spent many years taking ownership of their issue, which had once (most specifically in 1964–88) rested in the hands of regional players, rather than an independent Palestinian leadership. Now, the signing of the Abraham Accords has effectively undermined the Palestinian leadership once again, and placed agency in the hands – partially – of regional players including the UAE, Bahrain and Jordan. Jordan and Egypt have long been influential players and partners of the Palestinian Authority (PA), but the 2020 accords have changed the dynamic. It is no secret, for example, that the UAE would like to influence who succeeds Mahmoud Abbas, and has long backed former security official Mohammed Dahlan as the prime contender. Israel, for its part, would be more than comfortable with Dahlan becoming the next PA president, and so sees eye to eye with Abu Dhabi on this issue. The Abraham Accords, therefore, hold the possibility not only of imposing a new agenda on Israel–Palestine relations, but also of influencing Palestinian politics and shaping the PA’s future choices of action. This opens up new opportunities for reaching a resolution. However, it risks serious miscalculation as the core interests of Palestinians themselves may be completely overlooked, and without their buy-in any agreement will be quickly derailed and present a gift to the region’s many spoilers.
Although Saudi Arabia has yet to sign a normalization agreement with Israel, there are clear signs that a deal is imminent. That Mohammed bin Salman was reported to have met with Netanyahu in Neom in November 2020 sent a strong signal of the crown prince’s desire to reach an accord, even if it remains out of reach while his father, King Salman, is alive. The kingdom’s younger generation of leaders are less beholden to the Palestinian cause, and are critical of the Palestinian leadership for missing so many opportunities in the past. For example, Prince Bandar bin Sultan Al Saud, former Saudi ambassador to the US, and father of the current Saudi ambassadors to Washington and London, made clear his disappointment with successive Palestinian leaders in an extensive interview with the Saudi-owned Al Arabiya television channel in October 2020. His comments can be considered to reflect the views of the younger Saudi leadership; and, based on our interviews, are representative of those of many Saudis in influential government positions.
If the UAE and Saudi Arabia take the lead on the Palestine issue, and also lend significant financial support to underpin the development of the Palestinian territories, then a resolution of sorts could be reached. Without doubt, they would face resistance not only from Palestinian groups, but also from Jordan, Qatar and Iran. All of these would require significant diplomatic engagement and management. For example, Jordan’s key interests – which, after four years of neglect, will once again feature prominently in the US administration’s thinking – would need to be taken into account, including its continued guardianship of Jerusalem’s Islamic and Christian holy sites, preventing the annexation of the Jordan Valley, and ensuring that any final resolution does not come to resemble or lead to a ‘Jordan is Palestine’ outcome.
The extent of Iran’s ability to influence events in Palestine is important, too. A large majority of experts on Palestine (84 per cent of responses) argued strongly that Iran’s influence on Palestinian politics and society is marginal, though it can act as a spoiler. They pointed to relations between Iran and the PIJ, notably in Gaza, but all those interviewed characterized them as limited. Furthermore, Hamas’s dominance over smaller groups such as the PIJ has made it particularly difficult for Iran to penetrate Gaza and cultivate significant or sustained support among its population. Whereas Iran may have had more influence on Hamas in the past, its intervention in Syria to shore up the Assad regime has all but alienated the Hamas leadership. The cost of material support is just too high to endure. At the same time, Qatar has maintained a strong relationship with Hamas as well as with Palestinian institutions in Gaza; and although pragmatic vis-à-vis Iran, it exercises an independent policy – and one that is actively coordinated with Israel.
The fact that Iran has some influence, albeit limited in scope, opens up the possibility of trade-offs to be made between the different conflict zones in the region. So far, we have established that Iran is highly invested neither in Yemen nor in the Palestinian territories, and that it could therefore be open to negotiations on either issue that would not entail its having to make significant concessions. In such a scenario, compromises could then be reached by other players – such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE – in other theatres. Working towards an agreement on Israel–Palestine, however, requires buy-in not only from Palestinians and Israelis, but also from external actors to help guarantee it.
All of this would entail a fresh approach, and risk further compromising Palestinian sovereignty and more deeply entrenching the division between the West Bank and Gaza. But as Anwar Gargash – until February 2021 the UAE minister of state for foreign affairs – has argued, the current impasse between Israel and the Palestinians has caused a continuous erosion of Palestinian land, rights and prospects, meaning that new thinking is required before it is too late. As such, the Abraham Accords could help catalyse efforts towards a solution on Israel–Palestine, though that would require transforming the conflict and redefining the parameters of what is acceptable and workable to all parties. For two reasons, however, some 65 per cent of expert policymakers and analysts expressed scepticism. First, many considered the intent behind the Abraham Accords as being to meet the challenge from Iran; and second, neither the UAE nor Bahrain (nor in time Saudi Arabia) has the agency with Israel or the Palestinians to reach a deal, let alone enforce it.
Very few of those interviewed for this paper placed much faith in previous efforts at resolving the Israel–Palestine conflict, especially the ‘Deal of the Century’ promised by Trump while he was in office. The majority of responses (68 per cent) believed that the deal amounted to the imposition of a settlement on the Palestinians, which would not only compromise their interests, but also pose a threat to neighbouring states including Jordan. However, the deal is likely to be left behind now the Biden administration is in office.
The Syria track
Although the majority of interviewees’ responses (81 per cent) considered Syria to be in the category of ‘too difficult to solve’, 57 per cent argued that a new US administration could bring with it an opportunity not only to re-engage with Iran on ‘JCPOA plus’ issues, but also to work with other external conflict actors present in Syria, i.e. Russia and Turkey. Most US experts (71 per cent of responses) anticipated that a Biden administration would adopt a harder policy against Moscow, especially on issues such as Belarus and Ukraine, but saw scope for some cooperation on Syria, given Russia’s ability to influence the regime there.
Counterintuitively, the Syria process – or more accurately processes – could present opportunities to align domestic and regional interests if the major external actors, Russia, China, the EU and the US, commit to driving forward a regional process. As already noted, they all have an interest in arresting state collapse in Syria; and, in their own ways, they have in common an ability to influence local actors as well as regional ones. For example, most Syria analysts argued that Russia is the dominant external actor in the country, and that it will be the ultimate arbiter in ending the conflict because it has invested heavily in securing its interests there – and has done so largely unopposed. As one analyst described it: ‘Russia will continue to settle the political process in Syria, with an emphasis on calling on the international community for economic reconstruction.’
As the majority of respondents argued, it is not unreasonable to believe that Moscow can, if it coordinates closely with the US and the EU in particular, work towards ending the Syrian conflict.
The majority of interviewees who discussed Russia’s role in the region believed that Moscow is committed to upholding state sovereignty, Syrian institutions (however defined) and the regime. Upholding the latter, however, does not extend to Assad, and therefore, when the time is right, Russia will undercut its support for him. If he remains a block to a settlement that recognizes Russia’s interests, then a move against Assad by rivals within the regime would be allowed to go ahead. In other words, should the US, the EU and China reach an accommodation with Russia and guarantee that its key interests – identified by interviewees as securing access to the Mediterranean and to military bases and energy resources, among others – are met, then an end to the conflict could be in reach.
Moreover, Russia experts noted that if Moscow gains the recognition it seeks from the other major powers, then it is more likely to ‘deliver’ on Syria and be in a position to play a constructive role in other conflicts. Russia exercises a large degree of influence over Turkey at present – even though the two countries back different sides in Libya – and has when necessary been able to curtail Iranian influence in Syria. Thus, as the majority of respondents argued, it is not unreasonable to believe that Moscow can, if it coordinates closely with the US and the EU in particular, work towards ending the Syrian conflict. ‘Moscow has accepted that without some kind of relationship with Iran it is impossible to pursue its own interests in Syria,’ observed one Russian expert. Furthermore, Israel’s efforts to deconflict its military strikes against Iranian and Hezbollah targets inside Syria that it deems to pose a direct threat to its own security demonstrates the pivotal role played by Moscow in most aspects of the conflict. As a dominant force in the Syrian theatre, Russia is able to exert influence over its allies inside the country to both enable and curtail their activities there, as well as permitting third-country strikes against Iranian assets by Israel.
A successful coordinated approach to ending the Syrian conflict would not, however, be a case of the major powers dividing up the spoils of war and drawing up spheres of influence. Instead, it would involve creating a framework where the legitimate interests of external powers can be realized in accordance with the sovereign interests of the Syrian state (i.e. not those of the present regime). Indeed, many interviewees who might be considered Syrian opposition argued that external actors such as Iran would continue to have legitimate economic interests in Syria, but that these interests should be realized through formal diplomatic means.
Very few respondents doubted Russia’s ability to hold simultaneous, meaningful relationships with the regional powers engaged in Syria, while also exercising leverage over the Syrian regime. To that end, many interviewees from the region argued that Russia should play a leading role in helping resolve not only the Syrian conflict, but others in Middle East as well.
