A regional security framework for the Middle East can be arrived at only if all regional actors, enabled by critical external partners, fully commit to participate in an incremental process that is driven by the regional actors themselves.
It is clear that a regional security framework is urgently needed to lower tensions, resolve wars, and reduce regional competition across the Middle East. We have argued through this paper, based on our analysis of interviewees’ responses and recommendations, that regional stability can and must be built, but that rather than starting with a top-down process, it can only be arrived at through mutual commitment to participation in an incremental process driven by regional actors themselves. Breaking apart regional conflicts, with the focused, multilateral participation of relevant actors, can build trust from the ground up and promote smaller-scale solutions. Only through de-escalation and conflict management can the ground be laid to begin discussions on regional security processes.
Although not all of equal weight or importance, Iran has developed deep regional networks that are multifaceted. Unravelling its ties – with Hezbollah for example – will be extremely difficult. The Trump administration’s strategy of maximum pressure has served to deepen Iran’s regional reach, as Tehran has doubled down on these networks to demonstrate strength, develop leverage and offset the impact of sanctions. Tehran has operationalized its ability to develop nimble networks, and has capitalized on political crises in ways that are both opportunistic and cost-effective. Because this approach is low-cost, mutable and defensive in orientation, Tehran has not needed to make positive infrastructure investments or seek to develop local capacity. As such, its activities and influence are seen as predatory, and will over time become counterproductive.
There is no one clear pathway to addressing Iran’s role in the region. What can be achieved is a series of agreements in multilateral conflict areas that would see concessions from Tehran alongside other regional actors. Rather than marginalizing Tehran and allowing it to play the role of a spoiler, all actors should accept that Iran needs to be involved in multilateral regional discussions in the key conflict arenas of Syria and Yemen. Tehran’s influence in Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon can be curtailed through regional empowerment and support of local governance and multilateral economic and civil society investment in these countries.
Tehran’s influence in Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon can be curtailed through regional empowerment and support of local governance and multilateral economic and civil society investment in these countries.
As set out in this paper, the foundational step will now be the US’s re-entry to the JCPOA and Iran’s return to compliance. Critically, however, this is not an end in itself. The deal as signed in 2015 is fragile, and committed efforts are needed to secure regional buy-in and ensure the agreement’s long-term resilience. This entails a commitment by JCPOA signatories to engage in multilateral regional security processes. The follow-on step, then, involves parallel tracks for Yemen, the GCC, Israel–Palestine and Syria. And allied to all these processes are the confidence-building measures that have the potential, over time, to enable critical issues like Iran’s support for militias, proliferation of missiles and lethal arms, and its ballistic missile programme to be addressed. Through a pattern of increased cooperation, trust can be built and nurtured. Boosting intra-regional trade should be seen as an important path to tying in shared investments and outcomes.
The role and commitment of the US is a critical variable in managing and motivating a regional security agenda. The new administration under President Joe Biden presents an opportunity to turn the page on four years of transactionalism under Donald Trump, in favour of multilateral engagement and conflict stabilization. But the US can neither shoulder nor shepherd through this strategy alone. Focused American engagement should be complemented by that of Europe, Russia and China, all of which have expressed concerns over regional security dynamics and put forward their own recommendations to manage regional tensions.
Regional states have a role in and responsibility for regional security dynamics, or lack thereof. For too long, conflicts have continued unabated, and competitive dynamics between regional states have reached new lows. The impact of COVID-19, the deepening economic downturn that acutely impacts energy-rich Middle East states, and the climate crisis are all resetting fortunes and redistributing the costs of regional tensions. This is a critical juncture for the region, and a unique time-sensitive moment at which the international community is reinvesting multilaterally. Regional buy-in and participation to support conflict management is urgently needed. Without investment in new thinking and de-escalation processes, the Middle East could descend into protracted decline.
Drawing on the findings of our research, we conclude this paper with a set of recommendations to key external and Middle East stakeholders involved in, and impacted by, the regional tensions and security challenges.
For the US
Unequivocal and sustained US engagement is needed to lessen the scope and scale of regional conflicts. Military drawdown and planned departures have resulted in the loss of US regional leverage. Countries like Iran have no incentive to engage regionally, and Gulf Arab countries are increasingly anxious. A clear US commitment to regional stabilization and multilateral engagement on regional conflicts is a necessary precondition to managing Middle East security.
- Regular bipartisan congressional consultation and buy-in is needed to shield agreements such as the JCPOA from electoral and partisan swings and to build a sustainable JCPOA.
- Restoration of transatlantic ties and multilateral cooperation with the E3 and the EU more widely should be seen as a precursor to any JCPOA and regional security discussions. Multilateral engagement can prepare the ground for the parallel-track regional processes.
- Outlining a clear regional roadmap to address wider issues with Iran, alongside stabilizing the wars in Yemen and Syria, will help align messaging and secure support from Israel, the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Regular communication with Israeli and Gulf Arab policymakers will be important to manage and address their security concerns, understand their red lines and offset their ‘spoiler’ effect.
- To manage the multiple tracks, bipartisan envoys should be appointed to shepherd and bring consistent voices and engagement to the various discussions.
- Regional conflicts should be looked at holistically but dealt with separately. Viewing the Middle East through the prism of Iran, and thus subjecting regional states such as Iraq and Lebanon to one ‘Iran policy’, should be understood as destabilizing and counterproductive. Military and security engagement should be complemented with economic and civil society assistance and investment. Nurturing support for local governance and accountability across the region will empower local actors.
- Policy towards Iran itself should include a more diverse toolkit that goes beyond sanctions. Establishing clear red lines and deterrence alongside a strategy of engagement can, over time, build a more transactional relationship with Tehran. Expectations that short-lived agreements can be transformational are counterproductive, and play into Tehran’s security fears. Regime change – as policy, threat or rhetoric – should, more than four decades on from the Iranian revolution, be laid to rest. In exchange, Iran should be asked to drop its inflammatory calls like ‘death to America’.
- Considering the bleak human rights record of most Middle East states, human rights issues should be regionalized. The release of all dual nationals held in Iran should be secured as a precondition for sanctions relief.
- Preparing the ground to provide Tehran with incremental sanctions relief is a necessary precondition to move this time-sensitive process forward.
- Efforts should be made to ensure that Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) licences to allow trade and investment in Iran are granted in a productive and timely manner.
- Russia and China must be included in these interlinked multilateral processes. Involving them in discussions early on, and encouraging them to engage and work as a back-channel with their regional partners, will support dialogue and de-escalation.
For the E3
Due to its proximity to the Middle East, Europe’s security is more directly impacted by Middle East conflicts and instability. Dedicated long-term engagement in drawing down tensions and stabilizing conflicts should be seen as a priority for European domestic, economic and security interests.
- As the Biden administration defines its regional approach, the E3 should be ready to turn the page on the Trump period and work collaboratively with Washington. Congressional outreach would be important to support the Biden strategy of JCPOA re-entry.
- In anticipation of movement from Washington on renewal of the 2015 nuclear agreement, an E3 JCPOA strategy and regional security plans need to be not only already in the pipeline, but actively developed to an advanced state, with E3 red lines clearly established.
- Maintaining alignment among the E3 states is necessary to securing the JCPOA and the follow-on regional processes. France might resurrect its hard-line position seen in the JCPOA negotiations. The UK, distracted by the impact of Brexit and the need to secure global trade deals, might see Middle East security as less of a priority. However, like its partners in the JCPOA, the UK government should outline a strategy for the region that includes engagement on regional security – and with a view to a wider commercial interest, too.
- The E3 should prepare the ground for aligning Middle East regional strategy with Moscow and Beijing. Discussion on Middle East security should be separated from wider European divergences over responses to Russia and China.
- Regionalizing demands with regard to human rights violations, missiles programmes and militia support will be more productive than singling out Iran or Saudi Arabia.
- The appointment of E3 envoys and a European commission envoy would provide consistent investment to this multi-track multilateral process.
- Given its record of maintaining more balanced relationships around the Middle East, Europe should take the lead in managing the CBM steps.
- European policymakers should engage with diverse policy actors across the Iranian political spectrum. Regional and European economic engagement with Iran should be encouraged to lower the threshold of tensions and build sustainable economic linkages. The E3 should work to ensure that INSTEX is able to function as intended.
- Local engagement with civil society actors, the private sector and multiple political players across the Middle East can broaden networks with a common goal of working towards governance and accountability.
For Iran
- Develop and promote coherent policy positions that derive from an internal consensus reached across all agencies and government departments.
- Recognize that current policies focused primarily on security carry a high cost, and will ultimately undermine any gains enjoyed by Iran today. Tehran thus needs to engage and invest more constructively in the region in ways that win public support and ultimately lead to greater regional integration.
- Avoid grandstanding at the negotiating table and be a productive actor. All negotiators appreciate Iran’s negotiating skills, but it is essential to move beyond posturing to address the core issues on the table.
- Understand that all around the negotiating table are aware of Iran’s past trials and, indeed, its glorious past. However, they are equally aware of transgressions carried out by Iranian-supported non-state actors. Play neither the victor nor the victim, and negotiate in good faith.
- Recognize the connectivity between regional policies and the JCPOA, and that regional destabilization is not an effective leverage-building strategy. Rather, increased missile activity, as seen in Iraq and from Yemen, emboldens those arguing against the removal of sanctions.
- Realize that human rights will be a more central feature of US foreign policy under the Biden administration, and that it will apply to all countries across the region. It is an opportunity to reset and re-engage, and to ensure that all regional actors give careful consideration to human rights. Tehran can take the initiative by releasing all dual nationals currently in detention in Iran.
- Desist from further developing and deploying precision-guided missiles against targets in neighbouring states. Iran’s asymmetric capabilities are well understood, and exercising restraint in accordance with a coherent policy shaped by internal consensus will better support an environment conducive to successful talks.
- Comprehensive sanctions relief can only be granted if broader regional negotiations are undertaken and compromise solutions are found.
- Be aware that Saudi, UAE and Israeli economic ties with Asia are strengthening; and that, in a zero-sum competition, Tehran will lose out. Washington’s increasing focus on its competition with China in the Indo-Pacific will create political and economic space for Asian powers. In other words, a shift in US priorities will hurt rather than help Iran.
For the GCC countries
- Recognize that Middle East fatigue is growing across the international community, and now is the time for GCC states to reconcile their own differences and capitalize on renewed US mediation efforts to make the most of opportunities available.
- Consider that without a stable regional environment, GCC diversification plans that require significant foreign investment will be unable to move forward.
- Focus on the long game. Engage directly with Iran now, rather than relying on the US to take and maintain the initiative.
- Continue to invest in and develop diplomatic capability, in order to be ready to sit and negotiate with multiple actors at the table.
- Invest more energy and effort in better understanding Iran, and develop more creative policies towards it. In doing so, accept that, after 40+ years, regime change is not an option.
- Adopt a more transactional approach to regional politics, and identify a hierarchy of issues on which all sides can agree or disagree without undermining efforts to reach a broader agreement. In other words, cultivate policy options that move away from zero-sum demands.
- Accept that Iran has a regional role, and that, while curtailing its influence might be a goal, its ties cannot be completely rolled back. Identify which aspects of Iran’s regional role are acceptable and unacceptable, and work towards helping realize the former and deterring the latter.
- Recognize that conflict in regional states fosters the development and spread of radicalism, which presents a threat to the security of the GCC and Iran alike. There is a common interest in preventing the causes and spread of radicalism.
- Prioritize collective over cooperative security, and desist from independent military engagement. Learn lessons from independent action taken in Libya, Yemen and other theatres, and develop new GCC mechanisms drawing on cumulative conflict resolution experience acquired in Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia, among other conflict zones.
- Understand that cooperative security arrangements with Israel will not address Iran’s influence in the region. Israel’s objectives differ substantially from GCC goals.
- Promote trade between the GCC and Iran; and encourage and support people-to-people exchanges, such as business associations, educational programmes and cultural visits. The GCC countries and Iran are home to unique and distinctive tourist destinations, all of which would benefit enormously from mutual investments and the dialling-down of regional tensions.
- The development of collaborative climate change policies is urgently needed to reduce the impact of global heating and environmental degradation.
- Adopt a more holistic approach to engagement, and seek to foster relations with a wide range of actors in Iran.
- Do not gamble on the outcome of the 2024 US presidential election. The moment to strike out for regional agreement is now, before Middle East fatigue takes further hold and Washington focuses on its competition with China solely in the Indo-Pacific.
