Advancing human rights through trade

Why stronger human rights monitoring is needed and how to make it work

Research paper Updated 27 May 2021 ISBN: 978 1 78413 476 1

Dr Jennifer Zerk

Associate Fellow, International Law Programme

Email Jennifer

Rosie Rowe

Consultant researcher

Political shifts, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the struggle for a shared vision of how to ‘build back better’, have reignited the debate about trade and human rights.

Although many trade agreements take human rights impacts into consideration, the monitoring systems that have emerged so far are not comprehensive. Without robust human rights monitoring, trading partners have little chance of ensuring that their counterparts are meeting their commitments.

While there are considerable structural, political and resource-related challenges to conducting more systematic and effective human rights monitoring, recent experiences in this field can help policymakers design more effective monitoring mechanisms for the future.

04 Could human rights monitoring of trade agreements be improved?

While the negotiation of robust human rights monitoring arrangements is an important and worthwhile aim, imbalances in power and resources often present intractable political, structural and practical challenges.

4.1 Assessing the status quo

How do we go about assessing the usefulness, performance and impact of the different types of human rights monitoring systems that may be used in the trade context? One immediate challenge is that, as discussed in Chapter 1 (see section 1.3), human rights monitoring is done for a range of different purposes, meaning that the criteria for assessing success (or lack thereof) may not (and often will not) be the same from mechanism to mechanism or from activity to activity.

A second challenge, necessary to take into account in any discussion about whether a mechanism can be improved or enhanced (or should be replaced altogether), is understanding the extent to which deficiencies are inherent to a process, or likely to have been caused by (or may be exacerbated by) poor implementation, e.g. due to a lack of political will, or lack of resources.

Unpacking this second challenge is the focus of the second part of this chapter (see section 4.2). However, as a first step to a better understanding of how the success criteria for different types of monitoring activity might vary, it is worth considering, in broad terms, the potential relevance and responsiveness of different types of monitoring activity identified in this research paper (see chapters 2 and 3 above) to different types of monitoring needs (see section 1.3 above). This is the purpose of Table 3 below. As can be seen, each type of activity has been ranked for different purposes from ‘highly relevant’ to ‘less (or not) appropriate/relevant’. In several cases, the reasons for the chosen rankings will be self-explanatory. However, where this is not the case, further explanation can be found in section 4.2 below.

As can be seen from Table 3 below, different types of monitoring mechanisms and processes can be more relevant to addressing some needs than others. For instance, periodic evaluations of compliance with human rights eligibility criteria for non-reciprocal trade preferences are necessarily administered on a unilateral basis, although these are likely to draw also from joint processes (e.g. ongoing dialogue). Periodic evaluations, against a clear set of targets benchmarking criteria, whether conducted on a joint, reciprocal or unilateral basis, are more likely to yield the information needed for robust human rights risk management than more consultative and dialogue-based mechanisms (particularly those with fairly open-ended terms of reference), though all have potentially useful contributions to make. On the other hand, if the primary goal is to foster greater engagement (e.g. with a view to advancing human rights more generally), then consultative arrangements (of the type described in section 2.1 above) clearly have a particularly important role to play. In some cases, adopting a combination of approaches may be most effective. For instance, as the EU has found in the contest of administration of its GSP+ scheme, the deeper contextual knowledge obtained from country visits and in-country meetings, as well as the opportunity to hear directly from stakeholder groups and ministerial officials, not only enhances evaluation processes, but can also help to advance human rights agendas in their own right, for instance by providing occasions for further dialogue, capacity-building and empowerment.

Table 3. Key attributes of different types of human rights monitoring activities relevant to the trade context, arranged by type of activity and objective

— Notes: Type of activity in the first column are drawn from the different types of monitoring activity described in chapters 2 and 3 of this research paper. The objectives are taken from Chapter 1 (see section 1.3).

4.2 Structural, practical and political matters

The discussion in the previous section on the potential relevance of different types of monitoring activity to meeting different needs and objectives is obviously subject to the caveat that much depends on practical implementation. Understanding the difference between the inherent limitations of a particular approach and the problems that come from poor implementation is important, not only for a realistic comparison between different available options but also to be able to identify the extent to which complementary approaches (e.g. in the form of an injection of resources, a declaration of political support, or different forms of capacity-building) are likely to make a difference.

Moreover, in comparing the different options that may be available there will often be, as shall be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, numerous dilemmas and trade-offs that need careful consideration. The remaining sections of this chapter are an attempt to unpack:

the different ways in which the various potential methods of organizing and undertaking human rights monitoring, identified in Chapter 2 above, may suffer from inherent limitations, as opposed to the limitations that come from poor implementation;
the key dilemmas and policy trade-offs that may need to be taken into account in designing and implementing these kinds of mechanisms and activities (i.e. that may have a bearing on their effective functioning as human rights monitoring bodies); and
the various measures and options that could be considered (and indeed are already under consideration in some contexts) to help address the problem of poor implementation in particular.

For the purposes of the discussion below, the various systems and initiatives discussed in Chapter 2 above have been divided into three generic categories: consultative bodies (section 4.2.1), unilateral evaluations (section 4.2.2) and joint evaluations (section 4.2.3). A summary table is provided at the end of each sub-section to highlight the key points made.

4.2.1 Consultative bodies created under trade agreement terms

As noted in section 2.1 above it is now not uncommon for trade agreements to provide for the establishment of consultative bodies through which different stakeholder groups can raise concerns and share views about social and environmental issues arising from the relevant agreement’s implementation. As far as human rights monitoring is concerned, those consultative bodies established under chapters on ‘trade and labour’, ‘trade and the environment’ or, in a more recent innovation, ‘trade and gender’ have a potentially important role to play.114 However, without a clearly defined role and proper resourcing their practical impact may be limited.

This appears to have been the experience with consultative bodies established under the ‘trade and sustainable development’ chapters of EU trade agreements,115 although commentators differ in their analyses of where the main problems lie and what the best solutions might be. As a starting point, there seems to be broad agreement that the present lack of clarity surrounding the role of these consultative bodies vis-à-vis the monitoring of human rights issues has been less than helpful.116 EU FTAs, for instance, express the roles of consultative bodies (i.e. Domestic Advisory Groups under trade and sustainable development chapters) in very general terms, such as ‘conducting dialogue’,117 ‘seeking advice’118 and ‘identifying the need for action’.119 While this very flexible framing has the advantage of being potentially far easier to negotiate than a series of very prescriptive monitoring regimes, the lack of clear priorities or direction for the various consultative bodies that may be established under the agreement risks creating monitoring mechanisms that are both everything and nothing, with consequences for their credibility among stakeholders as well as between the trading parties themselves. The European Economic and Social Committee has suggested that the functioning of these consultative bodies might potentially be enhanced, at least in part, through some procedural improvements, for instance by tightening up rules around time frames for responses by consultative bodies to submissions, information and complaints.120

While reforms of this kind are certainly worth exploring, there may be some more fundamental problems to take account of. Some commentators have drawn attention to the implications of certain structural features of EU trade agreements for the credibility, performance and impact of these consultative bodies; specifically the provisions that are designed to ensure that complaints about non-compliance with commitments made under the specialized ‘trade and sustainable development’ chapters are dealt with under a special set of consultative arrangements, rather than under general dispute resolution processes (and under which a more targeted set of retaliatory or compensatory remedies may be invoked or imposed).121 This, it is argued, results in a relatively weak accountability framework for social, environmental and human rights issues arising under the agreement. (See the case study in Box 8 below on enforcement of human rights-related commitments under the EU–South Korea trade agreement.)

This is not to suggest that consultative methods of dispute resolution can never be as effective as methods of dispute resolution that carry the threat of sanctions (and indeed there are circumstances, such as where breaches of commitments occur as a result of a lack of resources and capacity, where consultative methods may prove more effective). However, concerns have nevertheless been raised that the reduced enforceability of the commitments made between trading partners in these specialized chapters, coupled with the lack of a clear role for the consultative bodies in ensuring that the applicable standards are met, may be contributing to a devaluing of the human rights-related elements of the agreement, compared to other, market-related commitments.122 For the consultative bodies themselves, this can have implications, not only for their credibility, but also for the amount of resources and attention they receive and the willingness of interested parties to invest time and effort in engaging with them.123

Box 8. Dispute resolution processes over workers’ rights in South Korea under the EU–South Korea FTA

The EU and South Korea have clashed on the issue of workers’ rights. The dispute arose from claims by the EU Commission (DG Trade) that South Korea has failed to fulfil some of its core commitments in labour rights under the 2011 EU–South Korea agreement. The 2011 agreement commits South Korea to ratifying and effectively implementing all of the fundamental ILO Conventions as well as establishing effective guarantees under domestic law of the rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining.124 Although the government had submitted legislation to the National Assembly to ratify these conventions and to enact certain labour reforms, the EU claimed that the National Assembly had not taken formal steps to discuss or vote on these bills.125 The dispute resolution procedure under the 2011 EU–South Korea agreement was activated after previous efforts – including formal government consultations in January 2019 – failed to provide a satisfactory solution.126

A panel of experts to resolve the dispute was appointed in December 2019. The global coronavirus pandemic led to a number of procedural adjustments with the planned in-person hearings due to take place in Geneva replaced by virtual hearings that took place on 8 and 9 October 2020. The panel of experts eventually reported its findings on 24 January 2021. The panel found that South Korea was under an obligation to take continued and sustained efforts toward the ratification of the ILO Conventions arising from the commitments it has given under the trade agreement with the EU and irrespective of whether it was a party to the relevant ILO treaties themselves. The panel concluded that South Korea had not been acting consistently with its trade and sustainable development commitments of the EU–South Korea FTA and that South Korea needs to adjust its labour laws and practices and to continue swiftly the process of ratifying four fundamental ILO Conventions in order to comply with the agreement.

The Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development established under the EU–South Korea trade agreement is tasked with monitoring the implementation of the recommendations of the panel of experts. While the outcome has been hailed by the European Commission as a vindication of the EU’s ‘cooperation-based approach to trade and sustainable development’,127 as well as of a declared change in policy in favour of a more assertive approach to enforcing commitments made under ‘trade and sustainable development’ chapters,128 some commentators have suggested that the amount of leeway provided in the panel of expert’s decision is actually indicative of a lack of leverage on the part of the EU as far as labour standards are concerned.129

Aside from the relative weakness of enforcement of commitments given under the ‘trade and sustainable development’ chapters of many EU trade agreements,130 this separation of labour and sustainable development issues131 presents these consultative bodies with a further challenge. Not only does this limit their role to the monitoring of specific, quite narrowly defined themes, it also inhibits the introduction of more cross-cutting monitoring initiatives. The consultative bodies established under these agreements that may be best placed to contribute to human rights monitoring processes tend to have limited mandates (relating to issues such as labour, environment, sustainable development and, though only very recently, gender) which, though important in themselves, may not map well onto to the profile of potential human rights-related impacts presented by the agreement. While other types of human rights issues raised by the agreement (e.g. the consequences of intellectual property protections for access to medicines or food, or the consequences of decisions under investor–state dispute resolution mechanisms for a state’s regulatory space to pursue human rights-related objectives) may be picked up by other joint consultative bodies with broader mandates, there is no built-in means of ensuring that the necessary follow up work is done.

Broadening the mandates of specialist consultative bodies established under trade agreements (e.g. those established under labour and environmental chapters of FTAs), so that they are able to more proactively follow up a broader range of human rights risks (including those that may have been identified in ex ante assessment processes), is an option that has been discussed within EU institutions.132 However, there are some potentially important trade-offs to take account of when deciding the appropriate terms of reference for consultative bodies such as these. Given the capacity and resource implications of establishing monitoring bodies of any kind, (and especially for less developed trading partners)133 the potential advantages of this course of action, and of creating more and strengthened opportunities for participation in dispute resolution and enforcement activities, needs to be balanced against the risk that these bodies (and the organizations on which they rely) may be spread so thin as to be ineffectual.134

Weighing on negotiating parties will be the need to ensure that consultative arrangements provided for in the agreement can stand the test of time. In meeting this objective, parties have some difficult judgments to make about the level of prescription needed to achieve the desired outcomes, while allowing themselves enough flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances. In addition to the potential advantages of greater negotiability, noted above, a certain amount of flexibility of implementation may be necessary to allow parties to tailor their responses to local conditions. A downside, however, is that this can also result in inconsistencies in approach between different trading partners or in non-action,135 and, because of their dependence on governmental resources and support (see section 4.3 below), can make the effectiveness of the mechanisms vulnerable to changes in government and political priorities.136

A further problem arises from the potential proliferation of different monitoring arrangements under different trade agreements. Given the number of trade agreements in effect globally, the development of bespoke monitoring arrangements for each one (and potentially for different human rights-related themes that may be covered in specialized ‘trade and sustainability’ chapters, such as environmental rights, labour rights and rights of non-discrimination etc.) could increase resource demands to an unsustainable level even for wealthier countries, let alone developing trading partners.

In the longer term, the lack of any demonstrable impact of these bodies on social, environmental or human rights conditions (whether due to a lack of a clear set of monitoring priorities or other factors), can lead to cynicism, accusations of manipulation of stakeholders into participation in activities that are essentially ‘window-dressing’, and eventual disengagement. Observers have raised concerns about the implications of ‘the widely diverging evaluations [among stakeholder groups] of the [consultative body] meetings – ranging from ‘talking shops’ to ‘empowering’ marginalized groups’.137 There is evidence that this process of disillusionment is already underway, at least as far as the implementation of ‘labour’ chapters of EU FTAs is concerned.138

Table 4. Overview of possible limitations of consultative bodies as human rights monitoring tools and relevant trade-offs

Inherent limitations	Political/structural issues*	Resource-related limitations	Possible dilemmas and trade-offs
Terms of reference will be circumscribed by what is negotiable as between trading partners.	Lack of clear monitoring role Limited monitoring role Weak accountability framework Vulnerable to changes in political priorities	Power and resources imbalances may distort monitoring priorities in favour of the trade partner with greater resources and leverage. Effective stakeholder engagement may require considerable financial and political support.	The need for flexibility (e.g. to respond to changes in circumstances, local issues) versus the need for predictability and consistency in monitoring priorities and practice. Wide ranging terms of reference (i.e. more cross-cutting role) versus more specialized, streamlined, focussed brief.

Inherent limitations

Political/structural issues*

Resource-related limitations

Possible dilemmas and trade-offs

Terms of reference will be circumscribed by what is negotiable as between trading partners.

Lack of clear monitoring role

Limited monitoring role

Weak accountability framework

Vulnerable to changes in political priorities

Power and resources imbalances may distort monitoring priorities in favour of the trade partner with greater resources and leverage.

Effective stakeholder engagement may require considerable financial and political support.

The need for flexibility (e.g. to respond to changes in circumstances, local issues) versus the need for predictability and consistency in monitoring priorities and practice.

Wide ranging terms of reference (i.e. more cross-cutting role) versus more specialized, streamlined, focussed brief.

Source: Compiled by the authors.

Note: This table is concerned with consultative bodies that have been created under the terms of a trade agreement including bodies created under side agreements or other supplementary arrangements (see Chapter 2 above sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.6).

Note*: Issues identified in the table as ‘political and/or structural issues’ may be a consequence of inherent limitations.

Finally, it is important to acknowledge that power and resources asymmetries between trading partners create problems for the effectiveness of joint monitoring activities, with stakeholder groups from wealthier countries able to access greater levels of support from local sources (including government sources), potentially giving them a much greater voice in agenda-setting. Problems of distortion of monitoring priorities as a result of power and resources imbalances can be compounded by a lack of transparency about the relevant processes, particularly concerning time scales for making submissions, and what is seen as a lack of awareness on the part of government agencies and trade bodies of the logistical challenges and complexities (as well as the time needed) to plan and prepare for meetings and to compile submissions, especially where affected stakeholders are in remote locations or are drawn from hard to reach groups.

4.2.2 Ongoing or periodic evaluations (unilateral)

As noted above, unilateral ongoing or periodic evaluations of human rights compliance of trade partners are used in several different contexts, notably in the administration of GSP schemes by trade actors, which impose human rights ‘conditionality’ on access and continued participation. This research paper has highlighted two areas of EU practice that potentially fall within this broad description, namely:

the ongoing human rights evaluation process that takes place as part of monitoring for compliance of beneficiary countries with GSP+ eligibility criteria (see section 3.2); and
the practice of conducting ex post evaluations of human rights impacts of existing trade agreements as part of an assessment of their impacts on, and contribution to, sustainable development (see section 2.5 above).

While the unilateral nature of these initiatives obviously gives trade actors significantly more latitude than with other mechanisms and processes discussed in this section (i.e. which take place against the background of negotiated arrangements), there are nevertheless a number of limitations and methodological challenges to be aware of, some of which are inherent to the exercise and some of which are affected (in terms of scale) by the decisions taken.

Many of these, such as the challenges demonstrating causal relationships between a trade intervention and a possible human rights effect, are similar to those encountered in relation to ex ante human rights impact assessments,139 even allowing for the fact that the assessment practitioner for the ex post evaluation exercise has the significant advantage of hindsight. A further challenge, again in common with ex ante human rights impact assessment, concerns the significant difficulty of ensuring that relevant stakeholders are informed about the process and properly consulted. While the COVID-19 pandemic may have helped to highlight some novel ways that technology can be used to facilitate remote engagement with different stakeholder groups, the ‘digital divide’ in both the Global North and South between those who enjoy access to stable internet coverage and required technology, and those with poor internet access and limited technological equipment, continues to present significant barriers to inclusion and the ability to engage with consultation processes. Even the more traditional reliance on online surveys and consultations for the collection of data and information tend to assume a certain level of literacy among stakeholders and access to digital resources, which can particularly disadvantage groups of people who live remotely, or who do not have ready access to online resources or support from interested civil society organizations.140 Closely related to this are the obvious resources challenges (and potentially significant associated costs) involved in securing access to the necessary range of specialist expertise.141

While the geographical focus of these types of ex post evaluation processes will depend on the goals of the exercise (human rights monitoring in the context of administration of GSP schemes will obviously be concerned with human rights issues within the territory of trade partners, for instance, whereas more risk-focussed human rights monitoring under FTAs may be focussed on either domestic or extraterritorial risks, or perhaps both),142 it is important to recognize that human rights monitoring exercises, which have an extraterritorial focus, can compound the challenges identified above, as well as presenting some new ones.

There may, for instance, be political sensitivities as regards access to governmental information or local officials, as well as around the evaluation process itself, which need careful handling. The power imbalances that exist between trading partners can sometimes become a flashpoint for complaints about the politicization of the process for selection of sectors and issues for study, as well as (as noted in the previous section) the concerns that human rights goals are being cited as cover for what are really political or protectionist aims.143 Without robust ‘issue selection’ criteria that can be transparently and objectively applied, there is a chance that parties will, for their own domestic and foreign policy reasons, veer towards sectors for evaluation that are less politically sensitive (e.g. on the basis that they are less likely to be associated with human rights violations).144 For trading agreements that have been subjected to ex ante human rights assessment, that earlier process may have yielded a set of issues that either ought to be, or could potentially be, prioritized for future monitoring. However, a lack of methodological and institutional link-up between the ex ante and ex post processes can make this kind of follow-up difficult to achieve in practice. Within the EU context, requiring sustainability impact assessment practitioners to give explicit recommendations not only as regards the issues that will require subsequent monitoring but also the types of data that needs to be collected and retained (and by whom) to enable this to happen could help to strengthen the links between ex ante assessments and subsequent human rights monitoring efforts to the potential benefit of both.145

However, while this kind of continuity can be advantageous, it is important that monitoring systems also have the flexibility to be able to adapt to new and unexpected challenges, as the COVID-19 crisis amply demonstrates. Providing for meaningful stakeholder input into the ‘issues selection’ process is one way in which concerns about the prioritization of issues for future monitoring can be addressed, and the fairness, inclusivity and responsiveness of the process enhanced. It is established practice, at the ‘issues screening’ stage for EU ex post evaluations of trade arrangements and agreements, for example, for there to be a stakeholder consultation process to collect views ‘from the ground’, which is used to complement initial ‘quantitative’ analyses (primarily economic modelling).146 On the other hand, the lack of transparency surrounding the EU’s human rights monitoring process for the purposes of the GSP+ scheme has been justified in terms of the need to ‘facilitate the dialogue tool and build a relationship of trust with beneficiary countries given the sensitive (often political) nature of the issues involved’.147

A potential disadvantage of ‘unilateral’ human rights evaluation processes (i.e. compared to joint and reciprocal processes, see section 4.2.3 below) is that it may be more difficult to secure the buy-in of a trading partner to the outcomes; although, as with the level of cooperation of the trading partner in the process itself (see above), the amount of leverage enjoyed by a trade actor within a relationship may have a bearing on this. In the context of a trading relationship under an FTA, a lack of a trading partner’s acceptance of or participation in a human rights monitoring process may well undermine the chances of agreeing a joint response to any human rights issues that have been identified as needing action (e.g. under a joint action plan, or similar), thus affecting, in turn, the value and effectiveness of the exercise as part of a broader strategy for identifying and managing human rights risks.148

Box 9. Stakeholder engagement in human rights monitoring processes: can new conferencing technologies help to foster greater inclusion and coverage?

The 50MAWS Platform (‘50 Million African Women Speak’) is an illustration of how tech can be used to connect large groups of people. This is a collaborative digital effort by the East African Community, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, and the Economic Community of West African States to facilitate knowledge sharing and funding opportunities among women workers/entrepreneurs in Africa through an online portal and phone app.149

This demonstrates that there is an appetite to create knowledge sharing platforms, and this could potentially be replicated in the human rights monitoring sphere to increase stakeholder engagement, by using a phone app. This would promote connectivity and offer an opportunity to identify problems on the ground more rapidly.

Table 5. Overview of possible limitations of ongoing or periodic evaluations (unilateral) as human rights monitoring tools and relevant trade-offs

Inherent limitations	Political/structural issues	Resource-related limitations	Possible dilemmas and trade-offs
Difficulties showing clear causal relationships between trade agreement terms (or their implementation) and human rights effects. Unilateral nature of exercise means that there may be less cooperation and trade partner ‘buy-in’ than with more joint or reciprocal processes. Difficulties translating unilateral findings and outcomes into a joint programme of action.	Potential political sensitivities surrounding the motivations for the process and issue selection (potentially exacerbated where there are power imbalances in the relationship, e.g. as between larger and smaller economies).	Costs of implementing a robust, credible and comprehensive process. Costs of accessing necessary technical expertise. Impossibility of reaching and engaging meaningfully with all affected stakeholders and groups.	Transparency (for credibility and fairness of processes, and for enhancing stakeholder trust) versus confidentiality (for purposes of building trust between trade partners, and for the purpose of facilitating discussions about issues where there are potential political sensitivities). The need to engage with the widest range of stakeholders versus the need to prioritize (e.g. to enable more focussed, targeted work).

Inherent limitations

Political/structural issues

Resource-related limitations

Possible dilemmas and trade-offs

Difficulties showing clear causal relationships between trade agreement terms (or their implementation) and human rights effects.

Unilateral nature of exercise means that there may be less cooperation and trade partner ‘buy-in’ than with more joint or reciprocal processes.

Difficulties translating unilateral findings and outcomes into a joint programme of action.

Potential political sensitivities surrounding the motivations for the process and issue selection (potentially exacerbated where there are power imbalances in the relationship, e.g. as between larger and smaller economies).

Costs of implementing a robust, credible and comprehensive process.

Costs of accessing necessary technical expertise.

Impossibility of reaching and engaging meaningfully with all affected stakeholders and groups.

Transparency (for credibility and fairness of processes, and for enhancing stakeholder trust) versus confidentiality (for purposes of building trust between trade partners, and for the purpose of facilitating discussions about issues where there are potential political sensitivities).

The need to engage with the widest range of stakeholders versus the need to prioritize (e.g. to enable more focussed, targeted work).

Source: Compiled by the authors.

4.2.3 Periodic evaluations (joint and/or reciprocal)

As noted in Chapter 2 above, outside the scope of consultative bodies (addressed in section 4.2.1 above), examples of joint or reciprocal human rights monitoring processes are quite rare in practice, although it is increasingly common for parties to trade agreements to record in their FTAs (albeit usually in fairly loose, aspirational forms of language) their recognition of the desirability of future cooperation on human rights-related issues, sometimes referring explicitly to ‘joint assessments’, or similar types of initiatives (see sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 above). While this is encouraging on some levels, the paucity of examples of mutually agreed joint monitoring regimes for human rights issues connected with trade will inevitably raise doubts about the negotiability of regimes of this nature in the context of an FTA, and tends to suggest at the very least a lack of political will or interest.

There are no underlying difficulties that would seem to rule out the possibility of trading partners developing joint approaches to human rights risk monitoring and management in future. There may be circumstances in which strong domestic political drivers, favourable political conditions and a willingness to work collaboratively all align to encourage trade actors down this route. Borrowing from the ‘enhanced engagement’ mechanism developed for the EU GSP+ context,150 it might be possible to develop approaches whereby findings from ex ante assessment or ex post evaluation exercises could be followed up with a joint action plan, setting out concrete actions, responsibilities, targets and timelines towards addressing specific human rights-related problems.

Trade actors may be able to identify a number of potential advantages associated with such an approach; for instance, joint action plans that have been based on the outcomes of a cooperative assessment and evaluation process may have greater political buy-in than proposals emerging from unilateral processes. The greater political buy-in that can come from pursuing joint (rather than unilateral) monitoring initiatives may also enhance the ability of trading partners to identify and exploit potential synergies between the underlying objectives of human rights monitoring of trade agreements and relevant policy objectives being pursued at the domestic level, such as through legal regimes to support and encourage companies to take greater account of human rights issues in the way they conduct their business activities,151 and also through relevant private and voluntary schemes aimed at promoting ethical corporate conduct.152 It also provides a potentially stronger political basis for innovative forms of monitoring and engagement that make use of the expertise of relevant international agencies, such as the ILO (see boxes 10 and 11 below).

Box 10. The US–Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement

Signed in January 1999, and operational until its expiry with the phase-out of the WTO Multifibre Arrangement in 2004, the US–Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement created a series of trade-related incentives (in the form of more generous quotas) for Cambodia to work towards substantial compliance with international labour standards and Cambodian labour law.153

Implementing arrangements included an independent, external monitoring programme operated by the ILO, a capacity and technical assistance programme aimed at improving the skills and effectiveness of Cambodian labour inspectors, and technical assistance drafting labour laws. The monitoring system comprised factory level inspections (with the goal that each factory would be inspected six times per year on average), followed up with discussions with employers and workers,154 with points of contention noted in the final reports. A system of indicators to track progress was devised, closely tracking the main elements of the Cambodian labour code.155 Under the plan, chief technical officers published synthesis reports every three months, which were made public (including via the ILO website).

The system had some shortcomings from a human rights perspective. Commentators have criticized, in particular, the uncertainties surrounding the meaning of ‘substantial compliance’, the macro approach to compliance that diminished the leverage needed to bring about improvements at the level of individual factories, lack of proper consultation about findings with workers,156 and weakness of provisions relating to interference with rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining.157 Nevertheless, in its focus on factory level compliance with legal standards (as opposed to country level human rights compliance) the novel human rights monitoring system forged under this bilateral trading agreement demonstrates how, with creativity, more targeted and potentially more effective systems of oversight and reward are possible, which, as well as enabling more granular progress tracking, can have a positive legacy by raising standards not only of individual businesses but also of the domestic agencies responsible for regulating them.

Despite the potential advantages of joint monitoring approaches, trading partners are not yet showing a great deal of enthusiasm for cooperation and innovation in this area. This may be explained in part by the dynamics of the negotiation process and the leverage that can be exercised at different points; particularly the conundrum that the window during which there is potentially the most interest and leverage in the FTA context (i.e. usually before the trading agreement is signed)158 is also likely to be the time during which the parties are most sensitive about sharing information relating to human rights issues and problems, and the risks and economic trade-offs they face. Crafting a robust set of arrangements that can stand the test of time, amid changing political interests and governments, can be a significant challenge, as the experiences of Canada and Colombia with their own human rights monitoring regimes demonstrate.159

However, some interesting and innovative examples of human rights monitoring activities involving diverse stakeholders160 can be found in the context of trading relationships with arrangements for technical assistance either integrated or attached. While these vary from case to case, they are typically oriented around a programme of activities designed to meet a specific set of development objectives relevant to an issue arising in the context of the trading relationship (e.g. greater protection of labour rights for vulnerable workers, such as migrant workers) within a specific business sector (e.g. garment, agricultural or manufacturing sectors). Running alongside programmes to boost local regulatory capacity and institutions, and to strengthen the flanking measures identified as needed to address potential adverse human rights impacts (e.g. measures to enhance access to employment opportunities and job security, entrench decent working conditions and strengthen local trade unions), will often be detailed and substantial data collection activities aimed at tracking progress towards programme objectives. Drawing from a range of sources (including regulatory, sector-level and factory-level sources), these activities can also open up a range of opportunities for stakeholder engagement on both the programme itself and the targeted social problems. For programmes aimed at addressing labour issues in particular, the ILO is obviously a key convenor and source of expertise (see Box 11 below), its Better Work programme161 in some cases providing a ready-made platform and set of methodologies for facilitating engagement between different types of actors (e.g. domestic ministries, regulatory agencies, international brands and local factories).

Box 11. How the ILO supports joint human rights monitoring efforts of trading partners in the context of development cooperation, capacity-building and technical assistance projects connected to trade agreements

‘Member States have requested direct assistance to the ILO concerning policy coherence between national labour market policies and trade, to assess the impact that trade may have on national employment, and to provide advice on how to formulate effective labour provisions and policy responses. Parties to trade agreements have also requested ILO advice in implementing labour standards commitments once a trade agreement has entered into force. This role has been expressly recognized in the labour provisions of many trade agreements in terms of monitoring, dialogue and dispute settlement, where various agreements explicitly include reference “to seek advice from the ILO”. The possibility to seek advice from the ILO in the context of trade agreements is also mentioned in the framework of development cooperation…

The ILO is also involved in the actual implementation of labour standards through development cooperation projects referred to in trade agreements. Some projects focus on capacity-building activities of trade partners to foster the implementation of labour standards. These programmes are carried out in the ILO’s technical departments and field offices, in collaboration with the country’s tripartite constituents and sometimes trade partners.’162

Table 6. Overview of possible limitations of periodic evaluations (joint and/or reciprocal) as human rights monitoring tools and relevant trade-offs

Inherent limitations	Political/structural issues	Resource-related limitations	Possible dilemmas and trade-offs
Possibilities are limited to what is negotiable as between trading partners.	Potential political sensitivities surrounding the motivations for the process and issue selection (potentially exacerbated where there are power imbalances in the relationship, e.g. as between larger and smaller economies). Maintaining the necessary degree of political support, interest and investment during the term of the FTA, amid changing political interests and governments.	Costs of implementing a robust, credible and comprehensive process. Costs of accessing necessary technical expertise. Impossibility of reaching and engaging meaningfully with all affected stakeholders and groups.	Transparency (for credibility and fairness of processes, and for enhancing stakeholder trust) versus confidentiality (for purposes of building trust between trade partners, and for the purpose of facilitating discussions about issues where there are potential political sensitivities). The need to engage with the widest range of stakeholders versus the need to prioritize (e.g. to enable more focussed, targeted work).

Inherent limitations

Political/structural issues

Resource-related limitations

Possible dilemmas and trade-offs

Possibilities are limited to what is negotiable as between trading partners.

Maintaining the necessary degree of political support, interest and investment during the term of the FTA, amid changing political interests and governments.

Costs of implementing a robust, credible and comprehensive process.

Costs of accessing necessary technical expertise.

Impossibility of reaching and engaging meaningfully with all affected stakeholders and groups.

The need to engage with the widest range of stakeholders versus the need to prioritize (e.g. to enable more focussed, targeted work).

Source: Compiled by the authors.

4.3 The vital importance of political support and investment

The human rights monitoring activities discussed in this paper can be costly in terms of time and resources. In addition to the costs of the multidisciplinary teams needed to carry out the necessary information-gathering and analytical work, budgets to support the relevant institutions (to permit hosting and attendance of meetings of consultative bodies, for example), are substantial, even before one takes account of the groundwork that may be needed (for instance in terms of stakeholder awareness-raising and communications), to create the conditions for a successful consultative process.163 Civil society organizations, with specific roles carved out for them under ‘labour and environment’ chapters of agreements but with limited resources to fulfil them, may need extra financial support. Where there are gaps in knowledge and data (a practical problem highlighted by several commentators),164 further investments may be needed to boost the capacity of relevant domestic regulatory bodies and state agencies (such as official statistical agencies) to gather and analyse the information needed to fill these knowledge gaps, and to participate effectively in these processes as a trusted source of information and advice.

In keeping with the idea that these human rights monitoring exercises are ideally cooperative in nature,165 investments in capacity-building and technical support for counterparts in trading partners may be needed as well. Failure to do so, especially in the context of trading relationships where there are significant imbalances in available capacity and resources, risks undermining the effectiveness of these arrangements in practice. Cooperative action and investment are also needed to address the apparently low levels of stakeholder awareness within the jurisdictions of trading partners of the possibility of contributing views through these kinds of monitoring mechanisms.166

For its part, the European Commission has expressed a willingness to invest in improved processes and resources, and with a new ‘implementation handbook’ to promote best practices.167 In 2018, the European Commission financed a new Partnership Instrument project to provide ‘support to civil society participation in the implementation of EU trade agreements’.168 The project has been providing some logistical and technical support to DAGs in the EU and in some trading partner countries, and also facilitates joint discussions between trade and sustainable development chapter liaison committees and civil society bodies in the form of annual workshops.169

These resources challenges (and ways to address them) should be borne in mind when evaluating proposals to strengthen and expand the role of monitoring bodies, such as broadening their scope, as discussed above, or those that increase their burden with respect to attending meetings or travel. More developed trading partners should identify ways to make financial and technical resources available to partner countries’ consultative mechanisms, including through dedicated funding to support and build the capacity of relevant civil society organizations and trade unions, in order to build a strong foundation for robust and purposeful discussion at joint meetings.170

Beyond financial help, monitoring bodies also rely on political support, for their credibility, for the leverage needed to carry out their functions and potentially also for access to sources of information (e.g. from ministries and domestic regulatory bodies). Political support for monitoring bodies may potentially be enhanced by working collaboratively through international organizations. The ILO, for instance, has sought to amplify its role as a source of support to governments to monitor the impacts of trade agreements, particularly from an advisory perspective.171 The extent to which other international agencies, such as the World Health Organization, or treaty bodies with mandates connected with the protection of women’s rights or rights of indigenous peoples, could fulfil a similar role in relation to other kinds of trade-related human rights risks, with a view to providing a comparable level of information and support, seems worth exploring.

See section 2.1 above.

See footnote 23 above.

Barbu et al. (2017), ‘A Response to the Non-paper of the European Commission’, p. 7; European Commission (2018), ‘Feedback and way forward on improving the implementation and enforcement of Trade and Sustainable Development chapters in EU Free Trade Agreements’, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/february/tradoc_156618.pdf; Martens, D., Orbie, J., Van den Putte, L. and Williams, Y. (2016), ‘Civil society meetings in EU trade agreements; Recommendations and lessons for EPAS’, https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/BN93-Civil-Society-Meetings-EPAs-September-2016.pdf.

European Union (2011), ‘Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its member states, of one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part’, Article 13.13.1, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22011A0514(01).

Ioannides, I. (2017), ‘The effects of human rights related clauses in the EU-Mexico Global Agreement and the EU-Chile Association Agreement: Ex-Post Impact Assessment’, European Parliamentary Research Study: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/558764/EPRS_STU(2017)558764_EN.pdf.

Harrison et al. (2019), ‘Labour Standards Provisions in EU Free Trade Agreements’, p. 645.

Ibid.; See European Union (2018), ‘Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Trade and sustainable development chapters (TSD) in EU Free Trade Agreements (FTA)’ (own-initiative opinion)’, (2018) C 227/04. Although note that the EU EESC has voiced support for enhancements to current reporting mechanisms whereby DAGs (through their respective chairs) could report social and environmental concerns arising from the implementation of a trade agreement directly to the relevant joint committees that would then be required to respond to issues and recommendations raised, within a reasonable time frame. See European Union (2019), ‘Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the role of Domestic Advisory Groups in monitoring the implementation of Free Trade Agreements’, p. 29, Article 1.14, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2019.159.01.0028.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2019:159:FULL.

Although the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement is an exception, see footnote 29 above.

Harrison et al. (2019), ‘Labour Standards Provisions in EU Free Trade Agreements’, p. 645; Ebert (2016), ‘Labour Provisions in EU Trade Agreements’.

Harrison et al. (2019), ‘Labour Standards Provisions in EU Free Trade Agreements’; Barbu et al. (2017), ‘A Response to the Non-paper of the European Commission on Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapters in EU Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)’; Gammage, C. (2019), ‘Social Norms in EU Free Trade Agreements: Justiciable or Not?’, in Gammage, C. and Novitz, T. (eds) (2019), Sustainable Trade, Investment and Finance: Toward Responsible and Coherent Regulatory Frameworks, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

European Union (2011), ‘Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its member states, of one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part’, Article 13.4.

European Commission (2019), ‘EU-Korea dispute settlement over workers’ rights in Korea enters next stage’, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2095.

European Commission (2019), ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on implementation of free trade agreements 1 January 2018-31 December 2018’, p. 28.

European Commission (2021), ‘Panel of experts confirms Republic of Korea is in breach of labour commitments under our trade agreement’, press release, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2238.

European Commission (2018), ‘Commissioner Malmström unveils 15-point plan to make EU trade and sustainable development chapters more effective’, press release, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1803.

Beattie, A. (2021), ‘China’s scattergun sanctions show the limits of EU engagement’, Financial Times, 29 March 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/f4ccafc4-9759-429f-af65-c8e6c075174b; Peers, S. (2021), ‘Free trade v freedom of association? The EU/South Korea free trade agreement and the panel report on the EU challenge to South Korean labour law’, EU Law Analysis blog, 26 January 2021, http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2021/01/free-trade-v-freedom-of-association.html.

As noted above (see footnote 31), the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement is an exception to this general approach.

See Harrison (2019), ‘The Labour Rights Agenda in Free trade Agreements’, p 721; European Union (2018), ‘Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Trade and sustainable development chapters (TSD) in EU Free Trade Agreements (FTA)’ (own-initiative opinion)’, (2018) C 227/04, at 1.8.

See European Union (2019), ‘Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the role of Domestic Advisory Groups in monitoring the implementation of Free Trade Agreements (exploratory opinion requested by the European Parliament) [2019] OJ C 159/04’, pp 3.11–3.13, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2019.159.01.0028.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2019:159:FULL; European Union (2018), ‘Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Trade and sustainable development chapters (TSD) in EU Free Trade Agreements (FTA)’ (own-initiative opinion)’, (2018) C 227/04.

See section 4.3 below.

See section 2.1 above and section 4.3 below.

Harrison et al. (2019), ‘Labour Standards Provisions in EU Free Trade Agreements’, p. 645. See also European Union (2018), ‘Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Trade and sustainable development chapters (TSD) in EU Free Trade Agreements (FTA)’ (own-initiative opinion)’, (2018) C 227/04, p 4.2., noting the ‘lack of political will in some partner countries to establish their DAGs in a timely way’. See also Smith, A., Harrison, J., Campling, L., Richardson, B. and Barbu, M. (2020), Free Trade Agreements and Global Labour Governance: The European Union’s Trade-Labour Linkage in a Value Chain World, Routledge. Chapter 7, concluding that ‘the labour standards provisions in EU FTAs were ineffective in protecting workers’ rights and promoting workers’ voice’.

Zerk (2019), Human Rights Impact Assessment of Trade Agreements. See Harrison (2019), ‘The Labour Rights Agenda in Free trade Agreements’, p. 175.

Martens et al. (2016), ‘Civil society meetings in EU trade agreements; Recommendations and lessons for EPAS’.

Ibid.; Smith et al. (2020), Free Trade Agreements and Global Labour Governance.

Zerk (2019), Human Rights Impact Assessment of Trade Agreements, pp. 18–20.

For a discussion of these problems in the context of ex ante human rights impact assessments in the trade context see Zerk (2019), Human Rights Impact Assessment of Trade Agreements.

This is likely to encompass, in addition to crucial expertise in economic modelling, expertise in trade law and human rights law as well as ‘public policy studies or international relations, for an accurate picture of the political and economic constraints that will govern how trade agreements are implemented in practice’. See ibid., p. 20.

That said, it is usual for EU human rights assessment and evaluation processes (both ex ante and ex post) to focus on extraterritorial human rights issues and risks associated with trade agreements. See Zerk (2019), Human Rights Impact Assessment of Trade Agreements, section 3.2.

Smith et al. (2020), Free Trade Agreements and Global Labour Governance, esp. p. 132.

Note, for instance, the prioritization within the Canada–Colombia framework of key Colombian exports of cut flowers and textiles for human rights impact assessment, as opposed to the Canadian extractives sector. See Embassy of Canada to Colombia (2015), ‘Annual Report Pursuant to the Agreement concerning Annual Reports on Human Rights and Free Trade between Canada and the Republic of Colombia for the period January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2015’, https://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/colombia-colombie/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/rep-hrft-co_2015-dple-rapp.aspx?lang=eng.

The potential benefits, including enhanced efficiency and the greater potential for assessment and monitoring processes to operate as a cycle of ‘continuous learning’ are discussed in Zerk (2019), Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade Agreements, Chapter 4.

See, for example, BKP Economic Advisors (2020), Study in support of an impact assessment to prepare the review of GSP Regulation No 978/2012: Inception Report, p. 10.

Ibid., pp. 36–37.

See section 2.5, ‘…treating ex ante and ex post processes as linked, rather than separate, activities can help to strengthen both, not only in terms of building understanding of causal relationships and impact trajectories, but also by creating opportunities for lessons learned from observing how impacts materialize and are experienced in reality, which can then be applied towards improving impact assessments processes and implementation of FTAs, as well as to inform subsequent negotiations.’

East African Community (2019), ‘EAC-COMESA-ECOWAS launch digital platform to empower women’, press release, https://www.eac.int/press-releases/146-gender,-community-development-civil-society/1633-eac-comesa-ecowas-launch-digital-platform-to-empower-women.

See Table 2 in section 3.2 Human rights monitoring under EU GSP schemes.

Such regimes appear to be on the rise at present, with a number of jurisdictions recently passing laws designed to encourage or require companies to undertake ‘human rights due diligence’ in various business contexts. See Clifford Chance and Global Business Initiative (2020), Business and Human Rights: Navigating a Changing Legal Landscape, briefing paper, May 2020, https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2020/05/business-and-human-rights-navigating-a-changing-legal-landscape.pdf. An EU-wide regime for mandatory human rights due diligence for EU-based companies, which will require companies to investigate human rights issues arising within their ‘entire value chains’ is presently under consideration by the European Commission. See Clifford Chance and Global Business Initiative (2021), Mandatory Human Rights and Environmental Due Diligence: What an EU-level law will mean for business, briefing paper, https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2021/01/mhredd-gbi-clifford-chance-january-2021.pdf.

E.g. codes of conduct developed under multi-stakeholder schemes. See Marx, A., Lein, B., Sharma, Arjun, Suse, A. G., Willemyns, I., Ebert, F. and Wouters, J. (2018), What role can Voluntary Sustainability Standards play in the European Union’s GSP Scheme?, https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/research_reports/report-vvs-and-gsp.pdf.

Kolben, K. (2004), ‘Trade, Monitoring and the ILO: Working to Improve Conditions in Cambodia’s Garment Factories’, Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, 7(1): pp. 79–107, https://ssrn.com/abstract=901797. ‘The Cambodia project represents one of the first and most creative experiments in linking trade privileges to the respect of labor rights in trade agreements’, at p. 81.

Although, this does not appear to have worked quite as intended. Kolben (2004), ‘Trade, Monitoring and the ILO’ notes that ‘the project’s Chief Technical Advisor … made a decision at the beginning of the project that he would not share the results of the factory monitoring with workers and their representatives because of fears that the workers would use it to justify a strike.’

The effect of this, according to Kolben (2004) ‘Trade, Monitoring and the ILO’ was ‘to give far more attention to standards than to rights because of the breadth of the Code’. The weakened wording with respect to ILO monitoring and reporting of claims of interference with trade union formation has also been criticized.

See Harrison et al. (2019), ‘Labour Standards Provisions in EU Free Trade Agreements’, pp. 635–657.

Kolben (2004), ‘Trade, Monitoring and the ILO’, pp. 103–106.

Vogt, J. (2015), ‘The Evolution of Labor Rights and Trade–A Transatlantic Comparison and Lessons for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership’, Journal of International Economic Law, 18(4): pp. 827–860, https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgv046.

See section 2.3 above.

See section 1.3 above.

ILO and IFC, Better Work. See https://betterwork.org.

ILO (2016), ‘Labour-related provisions in trade agreements: Recent trends and relevance to the ILO’, briefing paper, 29 September 2016, para. 24 and 26, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/–ed_norm/–relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_530526.pdf.

For a discussion of the implications of a lack of a pre-existing community of strong, independent and well-resourced civil society organizations and trade unions for implementation of labour chapters of EU FTAs, see Smith et al. (2020), Free Trade Agreements and Global Labour Governance, Chapter 7.

Dommen (2020), Blueprint for a human rights impact assessment of the planned comprehensive free trade agreement between EFTA and MERCOSUR, esp. pp. 41–43.

Campling, L., Harrison, J., Richardson, B. and Smith, A. (2015), ‘Can labour provisions work beyond the border? Evaluating the effects of EU free trade agreements’, International Labour Review, 155(3): pp. 357–382, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1564-913X.2015.00037.x; ILO (2016), Assessment of Labour Provisions in Trade and Investment Arrangements, Studies on Growth with Equity, https://www.ilo.org/global/publications/books/WCMS_498944/lang—en/index.htm; Oehri, M. (2015), ‘Comparing US and EU labour governance ‘near and far’ – hierarchy vs network?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 22(5): pp. 731–749, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2014.966743; Postnikov, E. and Bastiaens, I. (2014), ‘Does dialogue work? The effectiveness of labor standards in EU preferential trade agreements’, Journal of European Public Policy, 21(6): pp. 923–940, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2014.910869.

Martens et al. (2016), ‘Civil society meetings in EU trade agreements; Recommendations and lessons for EPAS’.

See European Union (2018), ‘Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Trade and sustainable development chapters (TSD) in EU Free Trade Agreements (FTA)’ (own-initiative opinion)’, (2018) C 227/04.

Directorate-General for Trade of the European Commission (2019), Report on Implementation of EU Free Trade Agreements: 1 January 2018–31 December 2018, p. 28, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/1bbb43a4-f540-11e9-8c1f-01aa75ed71a1.

Ibid.

See Ergon Associates (2012), ‘Trade and Labour: Making effective use of trade sustainability impact assessments and monitoring mechanisms’, Recommendation 26, https://ergonassociates.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Final-report-from-a-study1.pdf.

Agusti-Panareda, J., Ebert, F. and LeClercq, D. (2014), Labour provisions in free trade agreements: fostering their consistency with the ILO standards system, Background Paper – Social Dimensions of Free Trade Agreements, March 2014, International Labour Organisation, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/–dgreports/–inst/documents/genericdocument/wcms_237940.pdf.

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Advancing human rights through trade

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04 Could human rights monitoring of trade agreements be improved?

4.1 Assessing the status quo

Table 3. Key attributes of different types of human rights monitoring activities relevant to the trade context, arranged by type of activity and objective

4.2 Structural, practical and political matters

4.2.1 Consultative bodies created under trade agreement terms

Box 8. Dispute resolution processes over workers’ rights in South Korea under the EU–South Korea FTA

Table 4. Overview of possible limitations of consultative bodies as human rights monitoring tools and relevant trade-offs

4.2.2 Ongoing or periodic evaluations (unilateral)

Box 9. Stakeholder engagement in human rights monitoring processes: can new conferencing technologies help to foster greater inclusion and coverage?

Table 5. Overview of possible limitations of ongoing or periodic evaluations (unilateral) as human rights monitoring tools and relevant trade-offs

4.2.3 Periodic evaluations (joint and/or reciprocal)

Box 10. The US–Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement

Box 11. How the ILO supports joint human rights monitoring efforts of trading partners in the context of development cooperation, capacity-building and technical assistance projects connected to trade agreements

Table 6. Overview of possible limitations of periodic evaluations (joint and/or reciprocal) as human rights monitoring tools and relevant trade-offs

4.3 The vital importance of political support and investment