New developments in Russian long-range precision-guided weapons strongly support the idea that the country’s leadership has been giving a greater priority to non-nuclear strategic military deterrence. The cases of Ukraine and Syria demonstrate Russia’s willingness to use military force, and prove that its non-nuclear deterrent has matured from theoretical concept to firm reality.
A picture is emerging of a flexible, integrated and versatile package of deterrence and war-fighting capabilities, with non-nuclear missile, electronic warfare and other systems complementing the nuclear arsenal that remains the foundation of Russia’s strategic deterrent.
However, the growing emphasis on non-nuclear weapons is surrounded by uncertainty, both conceptually and practically. As a national security concept, Russian strategic deterrence is expansive, combining elements of containment, deterrence and coercion, military and non-military, nuclear and non-nuclear. For Russia, the value of nuclear weapons remains undiminished, certainly as a deterrent and arguably as a weapon.
This briefing paper examines Russian military non-nuclear deterrence as it exists today. It outlines its capabilities, and explores its potential limitations and inherent ambiguities.
