In Russian theory and practice, nuclear and non-nuclear (conventional) deterrence are inextricably linked. Several factors determine the relationship between the two, including such considerations as credibility and utility.
Nuclear and non-nuclear: complementary capabilities
Conventional inferiority can cause some militaries to seek increased reliance on nuclear deterrence; others strive to improve their conventional capabilities to overcome it. Russia is an example of both. If conventional inferiority were Russia’s central driver, it could be expected to invest less in its nuclear arsenal as it develops further conventional capabilities. Russia, however, pursues conventional and nuclear development in parallel.
It is likely that improved conventional capabilities will serve to provide Russia with more options before it decides to use nuclear weapons.
One likely explanation for this is that, as non-nuclear deterrence depends largely on the availability of long-range precision-guided weapons as its principal offensive component, the number of appropriate conventional strike systems available to Russia is deemed insufficient – especially if its strategists consider a conflict with NATO to be more likely rather than less.
The analytical consensus is that to Russia, conventional capabilities are no substitute for nuclear capabilities or vice versa. Instead, they are complementary, with ‘interchangeable conventional and nuclear options’ being capitalized upon for deterrent effect and military utility. It is thus likely that improved conventional capabilities will serve to provide Russia with more options before it decides to use nuclear weapons.
Thus, a combination of factors is likely to determine the relationship between nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence. These factors range from a persistent perception of conventional inferiority and the availability of conventional strike assets, to considerations such as the greater flexibility as well as credibility which the mix of deterrent assets provide.
Nuclear or non-nuclear: an ambiguous picture
Following the logic of nuclear-conventional integration, Russian practice also resembles a melting pot of nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence capabilities. In the absence of appropriate communication from Russia about the relationship between these capabilities, uncertainty about it prevails, as the examples below illustrate.
Indications of greater emphasis on non-nuclear deterrence can be read into practical activities such as the Grom (Thunder) 2019 strategic-deterrence exercise. This featured the use of Iskander and Kalibr dual-capable systems, potentially among other dual capabilities, alongside nuclear-only strategic offensive arms. A series of what was described as Iskander cruise missile launches took place in Russia’s southern and eastern regions. In addition, surface ships launched Kalibr cruise missiles from the Barents and Caspian Seas. Unspecified air-launched cruise missiles were also test-fired in Russia’s northern and eastern regions in the potentially non-nuclear component of the exercise. However, none of these test-fires was communicated as such. Russia went to considerable lengths to emphasize the involvement of ‘strategic-deterrence forces’, rather than ‘strategic nuclear forces’, a more usual term in Russian to refer to deterrence. Although at no point expressly communicated, the exercising of dual-capable systems can be assumed to have been practice for non-nuclear deterrence, but it remains unclear to what extent, if any, non-nuclear deterrence was part of the package.
Confusingly, the equivalent activity in the following year, 2020, appeared to revert to exclusively or predominantly nuclear deterrence. In December, Putin led a ‘strategic offensive forces’ command-and-control exercise, which included Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles, Sineva submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and unspecified air-launched cruise missiles being test-fired during the exercise. This was followed up with a Tsirkon hypersonic missile test launch from the Admiral Gorshkov, and the sequence culminated in a four-missile Bulava SLBM test-fire from the strategic submarine Vladimir Monomakh. Unlike in Grom 2019, no Iskander or Kalibr dual-capable missile systems were involved, although the Tsirkon is another dual-capable system. Again unlike in Grom 2019, the involvement of the nuclear deterrent was emphasized to the exclusion of other systems.
Integration
The Russian forces are sometimes described as functionally divided into general-purpose and strategic-deterrence forces. The latter include strategic offensive forces (composed of strategic nuclear, non-strategic nuclear and strategic conventional capabilities) and strategic defensive forces (composed of missile attack warning, space surveillance, and missile, space and air defence capabilities in support of strategic offensive forces use). However, such a functional distinction is far from obvious. Instead, their description in Russian sources reveals a seamless integration of strategic-deterrence and general-purpose forces. Strategic-deterrence forces include ‘non-strategic nuclear forces’ functionally as part of strategic-deterrence forces but organizationally as part of general-purpose forces; and ‘strategic non-nuclear forces’, namely ‘formations and military units of general-purpose forces armed with strategic non-nuclear weapons of various basing’.
The question arises of why Russian non-nuclear deterrence is based on specific capabilities rather than general-purpose forces and their capacity for war-fighting. That is the general Western formulation of deterrence, and emphasizes deterrence by denial via conventional parity or superiority. Both theoretical and practical considerations are pertinent here.
Conceptually, specific capabilities are viewed as especially valuable for the purpose of non-nuclear deterrence. Russia’s present military strategy is described by its military leadership as ‘active defence’, which is characterized by a series of anticipatory measures to deter an opponent pre-conflict and a specific formulation on the conduct of combat operations in wartime. Rather than one of denial, it is a concept of operations based on disorganization and attrition. The active component signifies persistent engagement via sustained strikes with long-range conventional systems as a crucial capability against critical enablers, infrastructure, command and control, and logistics.
In practice, as alluded to above, Russia’s perception of its own conventional inferiority must also be factored in, including, in this case, as an element that also dictates the integration of various force elements, nuclear and non-nuclear, strategic-deterrence and general-purpose.
Deterrence
The debate about non-nuclear deterrence in Russian military writings has been comprehensively explored. Their premise is that the threat of nuclear use early on in a conflict would be not credible, hence the need for conventional capabilities for deterrence and escalation-management purposes as capabilities improve.
Seen from another angle, Russian military doctrine distinguishes between local, regional and global, large-scale conflict. Russian writings have traditionally envisioned the application of non-nuclear strategic deterrence to deter levels of conflict in a two-tier system. Regional deterrence, for instance, can presuppose the threat of the massive use of strategic non-nuclear forces or non-strategic nuclear forces. This is more evidence of a ‘habitual’ emphasis on the interchangeability of conventional precision-strike and non-strategic nuclear weapons. As one Russian article puts it: ‘Conventional weapons could carry out missions similar to those of nuclear weapons, such as demonstration strikes and limited strikes aimed at de-escalation, and to take out objects of critical importance to the enemy’.
The premise is that the threat of nuclear use early on in a conflict would be not credible, hence the need for conventional capabilities for deterrence and escalation-management purposes as capabilities improve.
An article from 2019 considered transition towards a deterrence system with greater integration of strategic conventional capabilities. In addition to its proposal to switch from the current two-tier deterrence system (nuclear global and regional) to a broader, three-tier deterrence system, not nuclear-focused (global, regional and local), it outlined the objectives assigned to strategic conventional weapons in each tier: at the local level, conventional deterrence against non-nuclear adversaries; at the regional level, in the pre-nuclear stage to ‘soften the suddenness of the transition from a failure of deterrence of threats during a crisis toward countering them with the means of last resort’; and at the global level, other pre-nuclear functions including ‘managed countervalue escalation’ against an opponent’s targets such as fuel and energy infrastructure, the impact on which is characterized by inflicting ‘dosed damage’.
War-fighting
In a natural extension to the deterrence function of non-nuclear strategic capabilities, Russian writings consider their potential use in actual war-fighting.
In one of the latest examples, a December 2020 article discussed specific scenarios for strategic non-nuclear deterrence and use of two of the latest systems: the Peresvet ‘combat laser’ and the Kinzhal air-launched ‘hypersonic’ missile. Peresvet is described as a system effective against ‘enemy space-based optical-electronic reconnaissance assets’. In addition to the deterrent ‘demonstration’ use of the Kinzhal, broad potential applications are outlined and include strikes against ‘critical enemy [government, economic and military] infrastructure’ in the ‘pre-nuclear’ phase of armed conflict. Confusingly, however, the article ends with a reference to two other strategic-deterrence systems in the context of strategic non-nuclear deterrence, both nuclear-powered and stated to be nuclear-armed. One is the ‘unlimited-range’ nuclear-powered Burevestnik cruise missile. The other is the nuclear-powered Poseydon unmanned underwater vehicle.
Another December 2020 article argued the case for a massive simultaneous air strike against critical NATO ‘multi-domain’ capabilities to pre-emptively disrupt an ‘integrated massive air strike’. In a key argument, the article notes that Russia: ‘[…] is able to move from the policy of containment against a potential adversary by means of nuclear weapons to the policy of intimidation [threat] to inflict unacceptable comprehensive destruction with all types of weapons as part of preventive action when faced with the threat of a local war.’
Conceptually, the emphasis shifts from layered air and missile defence to pre-emption. The article envisions the use of artillery (including rocket artillery), tactical and operational-tactical missiles, and aircraft including helicopters and UAVs – integrated in a ‘reconnaissance and strike system’ to deliver near-instant effects. The article looks to the future by, for example, envisaging the use of systems such as the Kinzhal being complemented with electromagnetic-pulse (EMP) weapons. Presumably non-nuclear, these use what are described as UAV-based ‘UHF munitions’.
